Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS

RELATING TO

THE OUTBREAK OF THE EUROPEAN WAR

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION
by
JAMES BROWN SCOTT
DIRECTOR

PART II

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INTRODUCTION

While the formal Introduction to this publication, which appears only in Part I, may be deemed to explain sufficiently the purpose of the Endowment in issuing it, as well as to give all information as to the method pursued in its compilation and arrangement, the undersigned is unwilling to have the second volume come, as it were, unannounced into the world. Instead of reprinting the Introduction, he prefers to call it to the attention of the reader, and to have something as an Introduction to Part II not to be found in Part I.

It will be observed that the title of this publication states that it contains the diplomatic documents relating to the outbreak of the war, and the introduction to the first volume explains that the documents contained in the present work are those issued by the different belligerents, in an attempt to justify their entrance into the war, as distinguished from those documents which concern alleged atrocities, violations of international law, and other occurrences subsequent to the outbreak of the war. They are thus beyond the scope of the title and therefore find no place in the publication.

Three distinct phases of the present world conflict are shown in the documents reproduced: first, the great crisis at the beginning, involving, among the European Powers, Austria-Hungary and Germany, on the one side, and Belgium, England, France, Russia, and Serbia on the other; second, the entrance of Turkey into the war as an ally of the Central Powers and of Japan as an ally of the Entente Powers; and third, the entrance of Italy as an ally of the latter. Montenegro and Bulgaria have issued no official documents on the subject so far as can be ascertained.

In determining the order of the different books in this publication, the alphabetical arrangement by countries was found the most practicable and convenient. Thus Austria-Hungary appears at the beginning of Part I, and Serbia at the close of Part II. The elaborate tables of contents, and especially the analytical index at the close of Part II, remove, it is thought, any possible inconvenience in the alphabetical arrangement.

It should also be observed that, in order to give the reader the exact sources of the documents contained in the publication, the editor's footnotes, indicated in all cases by arabic numerals, give,

first, the official English title of the publication together with the authority therefor, the name of the publisher, and the place and date of publication, and second, in the same manner, the exact title in the original language when the publication was issued in a foreign language. The footnotes reproduced from the original publications are indicated by asterisks, etc.

It will be noted, finally, that the two volumes are paged consecutively, both for convenience of reference in using the analytical index and for the further reason that the two volumes are but parts of one and the same work.

JAMES BROWN SCOTT,
Director of the Division of International Law.

Washington, D. C., February 28, 1916.

OFFICIAL POSITIONS
OF THE
PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE

AEHRENTHAL, COUNT	Former Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
AKIDZUKI, S.	Japanese Ambassador at Vienna.
ALBERT	King of Belgium.
ALEXANDER	Crown Prince of Serbia.
ALLIZÉ, M.	French Minister at Munich.
AMBRÓZY, COUNT	Austro-Hungarian Minister at Rome.
ANNOVILLE, M. D'	French Chargé d'Affaires at Luxemburg.
APCHIER, M. D'	French Consul-General at Budapest.
AVARNA, DUKE D'	Italian Ambassador at Vienna.
BAPST, M.	French Minister at Copenhagen.
BARRÈRE, M.	French Ambassador at Rome.
BAUDIN, M.	French Minister of Marine.
BEAUMONT, MR.	British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople.
BELOW SALESKE, HERR VON	German Minister at Brussels.
BENCKENDORFF, COUNT	Russian Ambassador at London.
BERCHTOLD, COUNT	Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
BERTHELOT, M.	French Political Director.
BERTIE, SIR FRANCIS	British Ambassador at Paris.
BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, DR. VON	German Imperial Chancellor.
BEYENS, BARON	Belgian Minister at Berlin.
BIENVENU-MARTIN, M.	French Minister of Justice and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.
BOLLATI, M.	Italian Ambassador at Berlin.
BOMPARD, M.	French Ambassador at Constantinople.
BOPPE, M.	French Minister at Belgrade.
BOSCHKOVITCH, M.	Serbian Minister at London.
BRONEWSKY, M.	Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.
BRYAN, WILLIAM J.	Secretary of State of the United States.
BUCH, HERR VON	German Minister at Luxemburg.
BUCHANAN, SIR GEORGE	British Ambassador at Petrograd.
BÜLOW, PRINCE VON	Special German Ambassador at Rome.
BUNSEN, SIR MAURICE DE	British Ambassador at Vienna.
BURIÁN, BARON	Austro-Hungarian Privy Councilor and Chamberlain.
BUISSERET, COUNT DE	Belgian Minister at St. Petersburgh.
CAMBON, M. JULES M.	French Ambassador at Berlin.
CAMBON, M. PAUL	French Ambassador at London.
CARLOTTI DI RIPARBELLA, MARQUIS	Italian Ambassador at Petrograd.
CHEVALLEY, M.	French Minister at Christiania.
CLARY, COUNT	Austro-Hungarian Minister at Brussels.
CRACKANTHORPE, MR.	British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.

CUCCHI BOASSO, M. ..... Italian Minister at Sofia.
CZERNIN, COUNT ..... Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires at Petrograd.

DAVIGNON, M. ..... Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
DELCASSÉ, M. ..... French Minister for Foreign Affairs.
DEMIDOFF, M. ..... Russian Minister at Athens.
DOUMERGUE, M. ..... French Minister for Foreign Affairs.
DUDZEELE, COUNT DE ..... Belgian Minister at Vienna.
DUMAINE, M. ..... French Ambassador at Vienna.

ELST, BARON VAN DER ..... Belgian Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
ESCAILLE, BARON DE L' ..... Counsellor of Belgian Legation at Petrogard and Chargé d'Affaires.
ÉTIENNE, M. ..... French Minister of War.
ETTER, M. DE ..... Counsellor of Russian Embassy at London.
EYSCHEN, M. PAUL ..... President of the Government, Minister of State, Luxemburg.

FALLON, BARON ..... Belgian Minister at The Hague.
FARAMOND, M. DE ..... Naval Attaché to French Embassy at Berlin.
FARGES, M. ..... French Consul-General at Basle.
FLEURIAU, M. DE ..... French Chargé d'Affaires at London.
FLOTOW, HERR VON ..... German Ambassador at Rome.
FORGÁSH, COUNT ..... Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
FRANCIS JOSEPH ..... Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary.
FUNAKOSHI, BARON ..... Japanese Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

GEORGE V. ..... King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, etc., and Emperor of India.
GEORGEVITCH, M. ..... Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople.
GERRARD, MR. JAMES W. ..... American Ambassador at Berlin.
GIERS, M. DE ..... Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.
GIESL, BARON VON ..... Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.
GOSCHEN, SIR EDWARD ..... British Ambassador at Berlin.
GRAZ, MR. DES ..... British Ambassador at Belgrade.
GRENIER, BARON ..... Belgian Minister at Madrid.
GREY, SIR EDWARD ..... British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
GUILLAUME, BARON ..... Belgian Minister at Paris.

HALDANE, VISCOUNT ..... Lord High Chancellor of England.
HENRY ..... Prince of Prussia.
HOFLEHNER, HERR ..... Acting Consul for Austria-Hungary at Nish.
HOHENLOHE, PRINCE ..... Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin, successor to Szögyény.

ISVOLSKY, M. ..... Russian Ambassador at Paris.

JAGOW, HERR VON ..... German Secretary of State.
JEHLITSCHKA, HERR ..... Austro-Hungarian Consul-General at Usküb.
JONNART, M. ..... French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

KAZANSKY, M. ..... Acting Russian Consul at Prague.
KLOBUKOWSKI, M. ..... French Minister at Brussels.
KOUDACHEFF, PRINCE ..... Russian Minister at Antwerp. Formerly Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna.
M. KROUPENSKI ..... Russian Ambassador to Rome.

LAHURE, BARON ..... French Consul at Brussels.
LALAING, COUNT DE ..... Belgian Minister at London.

LICHOWSKY, PRINCE ..... German Ambassador at London.
LOUDON, DR. JKHR. J..... Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs.

MACCHIO, BARON VON..... Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
MALLET, SIR L..... British Ambassador at Constantinople.
MANNEVILLE, COUNT DE..... French Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.
MENSDORFF, COUNT ..... Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London.
MÉREY, HERR VON..... Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome.
MICHAILOVITCH, M. ..... Serbian Minister at Rome.
MOHAMMED V. ..... Sultan of Turkey.
MAYRHAUSER, HERR VON..... Austro-Hungarian Consul at Valona.
MONCHEUR, BARON ..... Belgian Minister at Constantinople.
MOLLARD, M. ..... French Minister at Luxemburg.
MÓRICZ DE TÉCSŐ, P..... Austro-Hungarian Consul at Ancona.
MÜLLER, BARON VON..... Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Tokio.

NICHOLAS II. ..... Emperor of Russia.
NICHOLSON, SIR ARTHUR..... British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
NIGRA, COUNT ..... Former Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

PALÉOLOGUE, M. ..... French Ambassador at Petrograd.
PASHITCH, M. ..... Serbian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.
PATCHOU, DR. LAZA..... Serbian Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.
PELLET, M. ..... French Minister at The Hague.
PENFIELD, MR. FREDERICK C..... American Ambassador at Vienna.
PICHON, M. ..... French Minister for Foreign Affairs.
POINCARÉ, M. ..... President of the Republic of France.
POURTALÈS, COUNT DE ..... German Ambassador at Petrograd.

RENKIN, M. ..... Colonial Minister of Belgium.
RODD, SIR RENNELL..... British Ambassador at Rome.
RONSSIN, M. ..... French Consul-General at Frankfort.
RUMBOLD, SIR HORACE..... British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

SALVIATI, M. ..... Russian Consul-General at Fiume.
SAN GIULIANO, MARQUIS DI..... Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
SAZONOFF, M. ..... Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
SCHÉBÉKO, M. ..... Russian Ambassador at Vienna.
SCHOEN, BARON VON..... German Ambassador at Paris.
SERRET, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL .... Military Attaché to French Embassy at Berlin.
SEVASTOPOULO, M. ..... Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris.
SONNINO, BARON ..... Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
SPALAIKOVITCH, DR. M..... Serbian Minister at Petrograd.
SQUITTI, BARON ..... Italian Minister at Nish.
STEEN DE JEHAY, COUNT VAN DEN. Belgian Minister at Luxemburg.
STORCK, RITTER VON..... Counsellor of Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade.
STRANDTMAN, M. DE..... Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.
STUERGCK, COUNT ..... President of Austrian Council of State.
SUCHOMLINOFF, M. ..... Russian Minister of War.
SWERBÉEW, M. DE..... Russian Ambassador at Berlin.
SZÁPÁRY, COUNT ..... Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Petrograd.
SZÉCSEN, COUNT ..... Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris.
SZOGYÉNY, COUNT DE..... Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin.

THIÉBAUT, M. ..... French Minister at Stockholm.
TISZA, COUNT ..... Hungarian Premier, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

TOMBEUR, M. ..... Belgian Vice-Governor of the Katanga.
TSCHIRSCHKY, HERR VON..... German Ambassador at Vienna.

VESNITCH, DR. MILENKO. R..... Serbian Minister at Paris.
VICTOR EMMANUEL III..... King of Italy.
VILLIERS, SIR FRANCIS..... British Minister at Brussels.
VIVIANI, M. RENÉ..... French Minister for Foreign Affairs, President of the Council.

WATSON, MR. GRANT..... Secretary of British Legation at Brussels.
WEEDE, JONKHEER DE..... Netherland Minister at Brussels.
WELLE, M. DE..... Belgian Minister at Belgrade.
WHITLOCK, MR. BRAND..... American Minister at Brussels.
WILLIAM II. ..... The German Emperor.

YOVANOVITCH, DR. M..... Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.
YOVANOVITCH, M. YOV. M..... Serbian Minister at Vienna.
YPERSELE, M. VAN DE..... Belgian Minister at Bucharest.

ZIMMERMANN, HERR VON..... German Under-Secretary of State.

CONTENTS OF PART II[1]

THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK

1

Page.

Memorial laid before the Imperial Diet on August 3rd, 1914, respecting the controversy between Austria-Hungary and Servia..... 771

2

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SERVIA.

1 Text of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia..... 781
2 Text of the Servian note to Austria with the Austro-Hungarian commentary 785
3 Extract from Austro-Hungarian records concerning the Servian dispute 794

3

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE.

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
1	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to the Imperial Ambassadors in Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh	1914. Berlin July 23	Circular order of the Imperial Chancellor instructing Ambassadors as to statement to be made to the respective governments to which they are accredited	798
2	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to the Federal Governments of Germany	Berlin July 28	Instructions of the Imperial Government that are to be communicated to Federal Governments of Germany	799
3	Herr von Tschirschky to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg	Vienna July 24	Advises of negotiations of Count Berchtold with Russian Chargé d'Affaires respecting Servia.....	801

[1] The Analytical Index covering the documents in Parts I and II will be found at page 1493 of this volume.

NOTE.—The editor is responsible for the table of contents to the *German White Book*, as a detailed table of contents was omitted from the official English translation issued by the German Government. Sections 4 to 12 were not of a form to admit of summaries as in ordinary correspondence. They are therefore printed as they appear in the official English edition issued by the German Government.

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
4	Count Pourtalès to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg	St. Petersburgh July 24	Advises of interview with Sazonof...	802
5	Count Pourtalès to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg	St. Petersburgh July 26	Satisfactory interview of Austro-Hungarian Ambassador with Sazonof	802
6	Count Pourtalès to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg	St. Petersburgh July 25	Transmits message of General von Chelius respecting Russian manœuvres	802
7	Count Pourtalès to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg	St. Petersburgh July 26	Transmits message from Military Attaché respecting mobilisation at Kiev and Odessa.....	803
8	Imperial Consulate to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg	Kovno July 27	States Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war.....	803
9	German Legation to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg	Berne July 27	Discontinuance of manœuvres by 15th French Corps.....	803
10	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to Prince Lichnowsky	Berlin July 26	Refers to Russian mobilisation and necessity for counter measures.....	804
11	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to Herr von Schoen	Berlin July 26	Same subject	804
12	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to Count Pourtalès	Berlin July 26	States that under the circumstances the peace of Europe depends upon Russia	804
13	Count Pourtalès to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg	St. Petersburgh July 27	Report of Military Attaché of a discussion with the Minister of War respecting mobilisation	805
14	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to Prince Lichnowsky	Berlin July 27	Advises of limit of German mediation	805
15	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to Prince Lichnowsky	Berlin July 25	States attitude of German Government in event of Austro-Russian conflict	806
16	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to Count Pourtalès	Berlin July 28	Continuation of negotiations with Vienna for understanding with Russia	806

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
17	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to Prince Lichnowsky	Berlin July 27	Same subject	806
18	Herr von Tschirschky to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg	Vienna July 27	English mediation proposal considered by Count Berchtold	807
19	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to Herr von Schoen	Berlin July 29	Refers to French preparations for war	807
20	Military Attaché to the German Emperor	St. Petersburgh July 30	Advises of receipt of telegram by the Czar from the Emperor	807
21	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to Herr von Flotow	Berlin July 31	Mediation hindered by Russian mobilisation	808
22	German Emperor and the Czar of Russia	July 28-30	Telegrams between the German Emperor and the Czar in an attempt to avoid conflict	808
23	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to Count Pourtalès	Berlin July 31	Russian mobilisation must cease within twelve hours	811
24	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to Herr von Schoen	Berlin July 31	Desirous to know whether France would remain neutral in a Russo-German war	811
25	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to Count Pourtalès	Berlin Aug. 1	Transmits statement to be communicated to Russian Foreign Office in case of unsatisfactory reply to German demands	812
26	Herr von Schoen to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg	Paris Aug. 1	Attitude of France to be dictated by her own interests	813
27	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to Herr von Below Saleske	Berlin Aug. 2	Declaration of German intentions towards Belgium	813
28	Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Imperial Ambassador in Tokio	Berlin Aug. 12	Instructs him to advise Japan that East Asiatic squadron will be directed to avoid hostile attacks against England in case of Japan's neutrality	814

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
29	Baron Funakoshi to the Imperial German Government	1914. Berlin Aug. 17	Ultimatum of the Japanese Government	814
30	Imperial German Government to Baron Funakoshi	Berlin Aug. 23	Verbal answer of the German Government to the foregoing	815

4

A Belgian diplomat's views as to Germany's efforts to maintain peace 815

5

Documents on the political exchange of views between Germany and England 820

6

Negotiations of Prince Lichnowsky with Sir Edward Grey 824

7

Official documents relating to events preceding the war 826

8

Brussels Documents, I 837

9

Brussels Documents, II 840

10

British espionage in Brussels 855

11

New documents concerning England's breach of Belgian neutrality 856

12

Documents found in the possession of Mr. Grant-Watson, Secretary of the British Legation 858

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
1	Sir E. Grey to Sir H. Rumbold	1914. London July 20	Conversation with German Ambassador respecting disquieting situation between Austria-Hungary and Servia. Sir E. Grey assumes that Austria-Hungary will publish her case against Servia before taking any action, and thus facilitate Russia counselling moderation at Belgrade.	803
2	Sir H. Rumbold to Sir E. Grey	Berlin July 22	Attitude of German Government. Secretary of State prefers not to interfere, and considers that Austria-Hungary has shown great forbearance towards Servia in the past....	804
3	Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen	London July 23	Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador respecting note to be sent to Servian Government. Objections urged to insertion of time-limit. Dangers of European conflagration	864
4	Note communicated by Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Count Mensdorff	Vienna July 24	Text of Austro-Hungarian note to Servia	866
5	Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen	London July 24	Austro-Hungarian note to Servia. Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. Sir E. Grey deprecates Austrian demands as inconsistent with maintenance of Servian independent sovereignty	879
6	Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey	St. Petersburgh July 24	Conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting results of M. Poincaré's visit to St. Petersburgh. Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador urged that His Majesty's Government should proclaim solidarity with them. Former hoped in any case His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of Austro-Hungarian action	880

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
7	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna July 24	Views of Russian Chargé d'Affaires on situation as expressed to Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs	882
8	Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir E. Grey	Belgrade July 24	Servian Prime Minister hopes that His Majesty's Government will use influence in moderating Austro-Hungarian demands	882
9	Note communicated by German Ambassador	London July 24	Views of German Government on situation. German Government defend attitude of Austria-Hungary towards Servia, and consider matter concerns those States alone.....	883
10	Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie	London July 24	Conversation with French Ambassador respecting Austro-Hungarian note and possibility of mediation by the four Powers.....	884
11	Sir E. Grey to Sir H. Rumbold	London July 24	Conversation with German Ambassador, who justified Austro-Hungarian action and demands, and urged localisation of conflict. Question of using influence at St. Petersburgh and Vienna in favour of moderation. Ambassador says Servian reply must not be a mere negative.....	885
12	Sir E. Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe	London July 24	Suggests lines of Servian reply to Austria-Hungary. To consult with Russian and French colleagues as to giving advice to Servian Government. Favourable reply should be given on as many points as possible.	886
13	Note communicated by Russian Ambassador	London July 25	Russian Ambassador at Vienna instructed to request extension of time-limit allowed to Servia, and to urge that Austria-Hungary should inform Powers of basis of accusations against Servia. Recommends similar instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador	887
14	Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie and to Sir G. Buchanan	London July 25	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has stated that step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum. Austro-Hungarian Government did not threaten actual military operations. To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs	889

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
15	Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey	1914. Paris July 25	French Government have given Servia advice similar to that advocated by His Majesty's Government (see No. 12)	889
16	Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey	Paris July 25	Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that moderating advice be given at Vienna as well as at Belgrade	889
17	Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey	St. Petersburgh July 25	Russian Government consider that, in view of early expiry of time-limit, it is too late to counsel moderation at Belgrade. Russia prepared to stand aside if mediation of four Powers is accepted. Minister for Foreign Affairs urges that Great Britian should act with France and Russia. Situation will be desperate unless Germany can restrain Austria-Hungary.	890
18	Sir H. Rumbold to Sir E. Grey	Berlin July 25	German Secretary of State admits intention of Austria-Hungary to take military action against Servia. His Excellency considers crisis might be localised. He disclaims all previous knowledge of terms of Austro-Hungarian note	891
19	Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey	Rome July 25	Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs says Austria-Hungary will only be satisfied with unconditional acceptance of her note.....	893
20	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna July 25	Austro-Hungarian press comments show that Servian surrender is neither expected nor desired. Austro-Hungarian Minister will leave Belgrade failing unconditional acceptance of note by 6 P.M. to-day...	893
21	Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir E. Grey	Belgrade July 25	Brief summary of projected Servian reply	893
22	Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir E. Grey	Belgrade July 25	Russian and French representatives still without instructions. In view of this and of proposed conciliatory Servian reply he has abstained from advising Servian Government. Probable that Russia has already urged utmost moderation on Servian Government	894

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
23	Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir E. Grey	Belgrade July 25	Departure of Austro-Hungarian Minister. Government has left for Nish with diplomatic representatives.....	895
24	Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan	London July 25	Refers to No. 6. Approves statement as to attitude of His Majesty's Government. Latter cannot do more, but are anxious to prevent war. Suggests that four other Powers should mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburgh if Austria-Hungary and Russia mobilise. German coöperation essential	895
25	Sir E. Grey to Sir H. Rumbold	London July 25	Conversation with German Ambassador respecting question of mediation between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Ambassador thinks Austria might accept it.....	896
26	Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen	London July 25	Russian communication to Austria-Hungary, asking for an extension of time-limit of ultimatum to Servia, and enquiring data on which Austria bases her demands. He should support his Russian colleague.....	897
27	Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold, Sir G. Buchanan	London July 25	Has informed German Ambassador of projected Servian reply (see No. 21), and expressed hope that Germany will influence Austria-Hungary to receive it favourably.....	898
28	[Nil]			
29	Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd	London July 25	Has informed Italian Ambassador of statements made to German Ambassador (see No. 25). His Excellency states that Italy is anxious to see war avoided	898
30	Sir E. Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe	London July 25	Conversation with Servian Minister. Although ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary, Servian Government could not agree to abandon certain political ideals..	899
31	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna July 25	Servian reply considered unsatisfactory. War regarded as imminent...	900
32	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna July 26	Reports conversation with German Ambassador. Latter considers that Russia will remain inactive.....	900

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
33	Sir H. Rumbold to Sir E. Grey	Berlin July 26	Reports sudden return of Emperor to Berlin. German Under-Secretary of State of opinion that Russia will not move unless Servian territory is annexed	901
34	Sir H. Rumbold to Sir E. Grey	Berlin July 26	German Ambassador at Vienna instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government hope of His Majesty's Government that they will take favourable view of Servian reply. German Government cannot go beyond this	902
35	Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey	Rome July 26	Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes proposal for conference, and Italian Ambassador at Vienna will be instructed accordingly	902
36	Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold, Sir R. Rodd	London July 26	To ascertain whether Minister for Foreign Affairs will agree to a conference in London, and to ask that French, German, and Italian representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Belgrade should urge on respective Governments that, pending decision, all active military operations should be suspended.....	902
37	Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie	London July 26	It is important to know if France will agree to suggestion that the four Powers should urge moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh.....	903
38	Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey	Rome July 23	Conversation with Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who considers gravity of situation lies in conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that their prestige is involved	903
39	Note communicated by Servian Minister	London July 27	Text of Servian reply to Austro-Hungarian note	904
40	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna July 26	Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russian Government will not press for more time. Russia cannot possibly remain indifferent if Servia is attacked	912
41	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	London July 27	Considers that Austria-Hungary is fully determined on war with Servia	913

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
42	Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey	Paris July 27	French Government accept proposals respecting conference. Necessary instructions sent to French representatives at Berlin, Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh.....	913
43	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin July 27	German Secretary of State is opposed to British proposal for a conference. In favour of direct exchange of views between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Germany's position in the event of Russian mobilisation. Secretary of State more hopeful.....	914
44	Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey	St. Petersburgh July 27	Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador respecting note to Servia. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that Entente Powers should present solid front to Germany.....	915
45	Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey	St. Petersburgh July 27	Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has decided to propose direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburgh	916
46	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London July 27	German Ambassador informed that Sir E. Grey desires to keep in touch with Germany so long as the latter works for peace. Germany should urge moderation at Vienna. Servian reply might form basis for discussion	916
47	Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan	London July 27	Russian Ambassador informed of British attitude. Question whether Russia would take action if Austria-Hungary agreed not to annex Servian territory	917
48	Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen	London July 27	Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, who reviewed Servian question at length. Sir E. Grey expressed surprise at Austrian attitude towards Servian reply, which seems already to involve deep humiliation of Servia. British fleet will be kept assembled, but this is no more than proof of anxiety felt in country....	918

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
49	Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd	London July 27	Conversation with Italian Ambassador, who agrees in proposal for conference. His Excellency will recommend to German Government that Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Servia should suspend military operations pending conference.....	920
50	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna July 28	Text of declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia.....	920
51	Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey	Paris July 27	French Government agree to proposals of His Majesty's Government for conference between the four Powers in London.....	922
52	Note communicated by French Embassy	London July 28	French Government in favour of British proposal for conference, and are ready to send instructions accordingly	924
53	Note communicated by Russian Ambassador	St. Petersburgh July 27	Communicates telegram from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Russian Government are in favour of British proposal for conference, failing commencement of direct Austro-Russian conversations.	925
54	Note communicated by Russian Ambassador	St. Petersburgh July 28	Communicates telegram received from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to effect that German Government appear to have taken no measures to induce Austria-Hungary to modify attitude towards Servia, and suggesting His Majesty's Government approaching the German Government. Key of the situation really at Berlin	926
55	Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey	St. Petersburgh July 27	Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will use all his influence at Belgrade to induce Servia to give satisfaction to Austria, but Servian territorial integrity must be guaranteed and sovereign rights be respected. He has proposed direct conversations with Austria, but would be perfectly ready to stand aside if idea of conference accepted	927

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
56	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna July 27	Reports conversation between Russian Ambassador and Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Russia will be unable to localise war. Russia will restrain Servia as long as possible, in order to give time for a settlement. Russian Ambassador urged that conversations should be continued at St. Petersburgh	928
57	Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey	Rome July 27	Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs' views as to conference and suspension of hostilities. Possibility of Servia accepting Austrian note in its entirety on recommendation of four Powers	929
58	Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey	Paris July 28	Has communicated substance of No. 46 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is confident that Sir E. Grey's observations to German Ambassador will tend towards peace.....	930
59	Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey	Paris July 28	Has communicated No. 47 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who fully appreciates standpoint of His Majesty's Government. German Ambassador has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria-Hungary would respect integrity of Servia, but gave no assurance respecting her independence.....	930
60	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin July 28	Refers to No. 43. German Secretary of State has used similar language to French and Italian Ambassadors. Agrees with his two colleagues in thinking that German Government object only to form of proposal respecting conference. Suggests Herr Jagow might himself be induced to suggest lines of coöperation.....	931
61	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna July 28	Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Austria cannot delay proceedings against Servia, and would decline any negotiations on basis of Servian reply. Nothing could now prevent conflict	931

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
62	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna July 28	Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who says that war will be declared to-day, and that no mediation could be accepted. Has appealed to him to place peace of Europe first, and quarrel with Servia second.....	931
63	Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey	Rome July 28	Has informed Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs of substance of No. 27. He is telegraphing similar instruction to Berlin and Vienna.....	932
64	Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey	Rome July 28	Informs of conversation between Servian Chargé d'Affaires and Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Servia might still accept whole Austrian note if certain explanations were given her. Such explanations should be given to the Powers, who should then advise Servia to accept without conditions	933
65	Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir E. Grey	Nish July 28	Has urged greatest moderation on Servian Government pending result of efforts for peaceful solution.....	934
66	Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir E. Grey	Nish July 28	Declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia.....	934
67	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London July 28	Refers to No. 43. Proposed conference would not be arbitration, but private and informal discussion to find a settlement. Agrees that direct conversations between St. Petersburgh and Vienna would be preferable	934
68	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London July 28	Ready to propose that German Secretary of State should suggest method of mediation by four Powers. Will keep the idea in reserve till result of Austro-Russian conversations is seen	935
69	Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan	London July 28	Refers to No. 55. Expresses satisfaction at prospect of direct Austro-Russian conversations. Enquires further as to proposed action at Belgrade	935

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
70	Note communicated by Count Benckendorff	Berlin July 29	Communicates text of two telegrams from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Russian Government will announce partial mobilisation on the 29th July; that Russian Ambassador at Vienna has been recalled; and that mediation by His Majesty's Government is most urgent	936
71	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin July 28	Conversation with Imperial Chancellor, who expressed anxiety to work in concert with England. Reasons for German refusal to support proposed conference. As Russia had mobilised, he could no longer urge moderation at Vienna. General opinion at Berlin that Russia is unprepared for war.....	936
72	Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey	St. Petersburgh July 28	Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs grateful for Sir E. Grey's language to German Ambassador (see No. 46). If Austria crossed Servian frontier Russia would mobilise. Has informed German Ambassador that Germany should use her influence at Vienna	937
73	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna July 28	Informs of Austrian declaration of war against Servia.....	938
74	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna July 28	Russian Ambassador states that Austro-Hungarian Government have declined Russian Government's suggestion of direct discussion between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. Russian Ambassador considers conference in London of less interested Powers the only solution.	939
75	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin July 29	Chancellor states it is too late to act on British suggestion that Servian reply might form basis of discussion. German Government had informed Austrian Government that they quite understood that latter could not rest satisfied unless guaranteed that demands on Servia should be carried out in their entirety. Austrian Government had been advised to say openly that hostilities had that exclusive object.....	939

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
76	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	1914. Berlin July 29	German Secretary of State states that any appearance of pressing moderation on Austria would probably precipitate matters. His Excellency is troubled by reports of military measures in Russia and France.....	940
77	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London July 29	Refers to No. 75. Much appreciates language of Chancellor, and will be very grateful if he can save the peace of Europe. This country will continue to make every effort in that direction	941
78	Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey	St. Petersburgh July 29	Partial Russian mobilisation ordered. Has communicated substance of No. 67 to Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mobilisation only directed against Austria. As Austria has definitely declined direct conversations, Minister for Foreign Affairs will suggest to German Ambassador return to idea of conference. Views of Minister for Foreign Affairs on Italian proposals (see Nos. 57 and 69). German Ambassador says his Government are continuing to exert friendly influence at Vienna.....	941
79	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna July 29	French and Italian Ambassadors agree that no steps can now be taken to stop war with Servia. Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might remain quiet if Austro-Hungarian Government gave binding engagement to Europe not to acquire Servian territory or destroy independence of Servia.....	943
80	Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey	Rome July 29	Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that German Secretary of State might propose formula, and that this might be concomitant with direct Austro-Russian conversations.	944
81	Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd	London July 29	Understands that Austria will not accept any form of mediation between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs should speak at Berlin and Vienna.....	945

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
82	Mr. Beaumont to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople July 29	Designs of Austria likely to extend considerably beyond the sanjak and the punitive occupation of Servian territory. Expected assistance for Austrian army from Mussulman population in Servia.....	945
83	Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir E. Grey	Nish July 29	Has been asked by Servian Prime Minister to convey his thanks for statement in the House of Commons on the 27th July.....	945
84	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London July 29	German Ambassador states that Chancellor is endeavouring to mediate between Austria and Russia. His Majesty's Government urge that Germany should suggest some method by which the four Powers could preserve the peace between Austria and Russia	946
85	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin July 29	German Secretary of State offers that in return for British neutrality German Government would give every assurance that they would make no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France. He was unable to give similar assurance as regards French colonies. If neutrality of Holland were respected by Germany's adversaries, Germany would give assurances to do likewise. Operations of Germany in Belgium depend on action of France, but at end of war Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany	947
86	Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey	Rome July 29	In view of partial Russian mobilisation, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks moment is past for further discussions on basis of Servian note. His utmost hope is that Germany will influence Vienna to prevent or moderate any further Austrian demands on Servia.....	948

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
87	Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie	1914. London July 29	Conversation with French Ambassador respecting policy of His Majesty's Government. Has told M. Cambon of intention to warn German Ambassador that His Majesty's Government will not necessarily stand aside if efforts for peace fail. On the other hand, the present case is different from that of Morocco a few years back, and if France becomes involved His Majesty's Government, who are free from engagements, will have to decide on their attitude in the light of British interests	948
88	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London July 29	Conversation with German Ambassador. Austro-Hungarian declaration of war having rendered direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburgh impossible, it is most important, in the event of German Chancellor failing in his efforts at mediation, that Germany should propose some method of coöperation between the four Powers.....	949
89	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London July 29	Has warned German Ambassador of possibility of British intervention in certain eventualities	950
90	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London July 29	Has communicated to German Ambassador text of Italian proposals and of reply returned thereto (see Nos. 64 and 81). Discussion of question of mediation	951
91	Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen	London July 29	Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, who attempted to justify attitude of his Government in spite of readiness of Powers to assist in obtaining satisfaction from Servia	953
92	Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd	London July 29	Conversation with Italian Ambassador. Italian Government suggest that German objections to mediation might be met by some change in procedure	953

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
93	Count Benckendorff to the British Foreign Office	London July 30	Communicates telegraphic correspondence between himself, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Russian Ambassador at Vienna. (1) Austro-Hungarian Government have been urged by Russian Ambassador at Vienna to be moderate towards Servia; (2) negotiations with German Government through Russian Ambassador at Berlin; (3) Austro-Hungarian Government decline direct conversations with Russian Government	954
94	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna July 29	In present temper of Austria-Hungary irrevocable steps may be taken unless Germany with the other three Powers can mediate at once. Russian Ambassador fears effect on Russian opinion if serious engagement takes place before agreement is reached. Reports interviews between the Russian and French Ambassadors and the German Ambassador..	958
95	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna July 30	Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russia could not see Servia crushed, but would acquiesce in measures that would safeguard Austria-Hungary's Slav provinces from further hostile propaganda. Extreme anti-Servian and anti-Russian sentiments of German Ambassador, to whom text of Austro-Hungarian note was probably known beforehand	959
96	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna July 30	Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed Russian Ambassador that as Russia has mobilised Austria must do likewise. No threat meant. No objection to direct Austro-Hungarian conversations being continued at St. Petersburgh. Russian Ambassador more hopeful	960
97	Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey	St. Petersburgh July 30	German Ambassador has informed Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government would guarantee that Austria should respect Servian integrity. Russia could not, however, agree to vassalage of Servia to Austria. Formula of conditions subject to which Russia would stop military preparations...	960

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
98	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	1914. Berlin July 30	German Government have asked Austrian Government whether they would accept mediation on basis of occupation of Belgrade by Austrian troops and issue of conditions from there. Could His Majesty's Government induce Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement? German Secretary of State says that Russian mobilisation has increased difficulties of situation. German Government have made no special military preparations	961
99	Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey	Paris July 30	Conversation with President of the Republic regarding German communication to St. Petersburgh as to Russian mobilisation. Russia consents to demobilise subject to assurance from Austria to respect sovereignty of Servia, and submit certain points in the Austrian note to international discussion. Peace depended on attitude of His Majesty's Government. Pacific attitude of France. A British declaration to support France would prevent Germany going to war. Explained difficulty of such a declaration.....	962
100	Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey	Rome July 30	German Ambassador at Rome thinks Germany could prevent Austria from making exorbitant demands if Servia would submit to occupation of Belgrade	963
101	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London July 30	Replies to No. 85. His Majesty's Government cannot entertain German proposals to secure British neutrality. For many reasons such a bargain with Germany at the expense of France would be a disgrace to Great Britain. His Majesty's Government cannot bargain away her obligations regarding Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Government must preserve full freedom of action. Best way of maintaining good relations with Great Britain is for Germany to work with her for the preservation of peace.....	964

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
102	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London July 30	Has warned German Ambassador that Germany must not count on Great Britain standing aside in all circumstances	965
103	Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan	London July 30	German Ambassador states that German Government would advise Austria not to advance beyond Belgrade and adjoining territories, whilst Powers urged Servia to give satisfaction sufficient to placate Austria. Earnest hope that this may be agreed to. Suggests change in the formula proposed by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs (see No. 97) in order to meet existing situation	965
104	Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie	London July 30	To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of telegram to Sir G. Buchanan (see No. 103). Trusts that French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh will be able to induce Russian Government not to precipitate a crisis....	966
105	Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie	London July 30	Conversation with French Ambassador respecting attitude of Great Britain in event of conflict between France and Germany; encloses copies of notes exchanged with French Ambassador in 1912, and discusses their scope. Cabinet to meet to-morrow..	966
106	Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey	Rome July 30	Austria has declined to continue direct conversations with Russia. Germany believed to be more disposed to give conciliatory advice at Vienna owing to likelihood of British support for Russia and France. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs is in favour of working with His Majesty's Government even if idea of discussions between four Powers is impossible	971
107	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin July 30	Has asked German Secretary of State if he can suggest any course of action. Latter replied that he was in communication with Vienna to save time. Chancellor was "pressing the button" at Vienna to utmost of his power, and feared he had perhaps gone too far.....	972

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
108	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin July 31	German Chancellor states that owing to Russian mobilisation Germany cannot remain quiet. These proceedings had come just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor and when the latter was about to mediate at Vienna	972
109	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin July 31	Reports having read to Chancellor reply of His Majesty's Government to his appeal for British neutrality (see No. 101). Chancellor desires time to reflect on it.....	973
110	Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan	London July 31	German Ambassador states that Austro-Russian conversations have been resumed at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. German Ambassador has asked that Russia should suspend military preparations in meanwhile. Has informed his Excellency that His Majesty's Government cannot ask Russia to do this unless Austria consents to limit advance of her troops into Servia. Expresses satisfaction at resumption of conversations	974
111	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London July 31	If settlement cannot be reached by direct Austro-Russian conversations, suggests that four Powers should undertake to obtain full satisfaction of Austrian demands from Servia, provided latter's sovereignty and integrity remain intact. Has informed German Ambassador that if Austria and Germany could bring forward any fair proposal, His Majesty's Government would support it strongly at Paris and St. Petersburgh.....	974
112	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin July 31	German Government are about to proclaim "Kriegsgefahr," to be followed by immediate mobilisation. Germany preparing for all emergencies.	975
113	Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey	St. Petersburgh July 31	Russian general mobilisation ordered, owing to Austro-Hungarian movements of troops against her. Germany also making military preparations. Russia cannot allow Germany to get a start.....	976

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		1914.		
114	Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir E. Goschen	London July 31	Enquiries whether France and Germany will engage to respect neutrality of Belgium.....	976
115	Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Villiers	London July 31	To inform Belgian Government of No. 114. Sir E. Grey assumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality	977
116	Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie	London July 31	French Ambassador informed that His Majesty's Government cannot undertake definite pledge to intervene in war, but that situation will be reconsidered in presence of any new development	977
117	Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey	Paris July 31	Informs of German ultimatum to Russia. German Ambassador demands answer from French Government by 1 P.M. to-morrow as to French attitude	978
118	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna July 31	Under-Secretary of State says that mobilisation was not necessarily a hostile act. Austria-Hungary resents Russian intervention on behalf of Servia. Russian Ambassador states that his Government have advised Servian compliance with Austrian demands so far as compatible with independence	979
119	Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie	London July 31	Has denied to French Ambassador that His Majesty's Government had given German Government the impression that they would remain neutral. His Majesty's Government could not, however, at the present moment give France any pledge, though further developments might justify intervention	980
120	Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey	St. Petersburgh July 31	New formula proposed by Russian Government. Russian Government will maintain waiting attitude if Austria agrees to stop advance of her troops and to allow consideration by Great Powers of satisfaction to be given by Servia to Austria-Hungary without prejudice to her independence. Czar has undertaken that no Russian soldier will cross frontier so long as conversation with Austria continues	981

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
121	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin July 31	German Government appreciate Sir E. Grey's efforts to maintain peace, but cannot consider any proposal pending Russian reply to ultimatum presented by Germany relating to Russian mobilisation	982
122	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin July 31	Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 114. Secretary of State cannot reply to British request until he has consulted Emperor and Chancellor. He doubts, however, whether German Government can give any answer. German Government alleges commission of hostile acts by Belgium	983
123	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London Aug. 1	Conversation with German Ambassador respecting the possible effect on British public opinion of any violation of the neutrality of Belgium. Any promise that His Majesty's Government should stand aside definitely refused	984
124	Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey	Paris July 31	German ultimatum to Russia. French Government anxious to know at once attitude of His Majesty's Government	985
125	Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey	Paris July 31	Neutrality of Belgium (see No. 114). French Government are resolved to respect neutrality of Belgium unless compelled to act otherwise by reason of violation at the hands of another Power	985
126	Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey	Paris Aug. 1	German Ambassador has been informed that French Government fail to understand reason for German communication respecting attitude of France in the event of Russo-German war (see No. 117). German Ambassador will see Minister for Foreign Affairs in the evening..	986
127	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna Aug. 1	Mobilisation of Austrian army and fleet	986
128	Sir F. Villiers to Sir E. Grey	Brussels Aug. 1	Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 115. Belgium expects Powers to observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power.....	987

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
129	M. Eyschen to Sir E. Grey	1914. Luxemburg Aug. 2	German Government have informed Luxemburg that the German military measures in that country do not constitute a hostile act, but only to ensure against attack from France.	987
130	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London Aug. 1	British merchant-ships have been detained at Hamburg. To request immediate release. Points out deplorable effect on British public opinion if detention continued.....	988
131	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London Aug. 1	Russian Government report readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and to accept basis of mediation not open to objections raised in regard to original Russian formula (see No. 97). Hopes that German Government may be able to make use of Russian communication in order to avoid tension	988
132	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London Aug. 1	Russia consents to British formula for basis of mediation (see No. 103)	989
133	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London Aug. 1	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has informed Russian Government that Austro-Hungarian Government are ready to discuss substance of Austrian ultimatum to Servia. Russian Government hope that these discussions will take place in London with participation of Great Powers, and that His Majesty's Government will assume direction of them.....	989
134	Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey	Paris Aug. 1	Conversation with President of Republic. German Government are trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility for present situation. President justifies Russian action. Germany is practically mobilising, so France must also. French troops are kept 10 kilom. from frontier, whereas Germans have made incursions into French territory. French Government do not yet despair of possibility of avoiding war.....	990

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
135	Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan	1914. London Aug. 1	Has received reliable information that Austria-Hungary has informed German Government that she would accept Sir E. Grey's proposal for mediation between Austria-Hungary and Servia. Military action would continue against Servia for present, but Russian mobilisation and Austro-Hungarian counter measures would cease. He should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.....	991
136	Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey	Paris Aug. 1	General mobilisation in France ordered owing to German military measures. French troops have left a zone of 10 kilom. between them and the frontier	991
137	Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen	London Aug. 1	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has given assurance that Austrians will respect territorial integrity of Servia, and will not occupy sanjak. Austria has not "banged the door" on further conversations with Russia	992
138	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin Aug. 1	Conversation with German Secretary of State. German Government have ordered mobilisation. Absence of reply to German ultimatum must be regarded as creating a state of war. Russian Government will be so informed	993
139	Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey	St. Petersburgh Aug. 1	Unsatisfactory result of discussions between German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors with the Czar and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respectively. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Austrian domination of Servia would vitally affect Russia, and that he is weary of his ceaseless efforts to avoid war. Action of Austro-Hungarian Government and German preparations have forced Russian Government to order mobilisation, and mobilisation of Germany has created desperate situation. M. Sazonof would adhere to formula contained in No. 120, if its acceptance could be secured before the Germans cross frontier. In no case will Russia commence hostilities. Fear of general conflagration in the Balkans	994

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
140	Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey	Paris Aug. 1	French Minister for War has impressed on British military attaché that only way of securing peace was for Great Britain to take military action. Minister of War maintains that France has, by withdrawing from frontier, given proof of her desire to abstain from any provocative act	995
141	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	Vienna Aug. 1	Conversation with Russian Ambassador at Vienna respecting German ultimatum to Russia. His Excellency thinks that German Government desired war from the first. Explains nature of Russian mobilisation, and says that Russia had no intention of attacking Austria. French Ambassador to speak earnestly to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Anxiety as to attitude of Great Britain.....	996
142	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin Aug. 1	General mobilisation of German army and navy	997
143	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin Aug. 1	Detention of British steamers. German Secretary of State has promised to send orders to release steamers without delay	997
144	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin Aug. 2	German Secretary of State says that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are in a state of war.....	997
145	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin Aug. 2	Orders sent last night to allow British ships detained in Hamburg to proceed. This as a special favour to His Majesty's Government. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions taken	998
146	Sir F. Villiers to Sir E. Grey	Brussels Aug. 2	Belgian Government confirms report that German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.....	998

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
147	M. Eyschen to Sir E. Grey	Luxemburg Aug. 2	Acts of German troops in Luxemburg territory are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy guaranteed by Treaty of London of 1867. Protest has been made to the German representatives at Luxemburg and also to German Secretary of State	908
148	Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie	London Aug. 2	Assurance given to French Ambassador respecting protection by British fleet of French coasts or shipping subject to consent of Parliament. Question of despatch of British force to assist France. Effect of violation of Luxemburg and Belgian neutrality	909
149	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London Aug. 2	Detention of British steamers. Sugar unloaded by force from British vessels at Hamburg and detained. Should inform Secretary of State that His Majesty's Government trust that order already sent for release of British vessels covers also release of cargoes (see No. 143).....	1000
150	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	Berlin Aug. 3	Detention of British steamers. Refers to No. 149. No information available	1001
151	Sir F. Villiers to Sir E. Grey	Brussels Aug. 3	French Government have offered five army corps to Belgian Government. Belgian Government reply that whilst sincerely grateful they do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers, and will decide later on their action.....	1001
152	Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie	London Aug. 3	Communication from French Ambassador to effect that Italy does not consider *casus fœderis* has arisen...	1002
153	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London Aug. 4	Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Government have been informed that German Government have proposed to Belgium friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and of German threat in case of refusal. Belgian Government have declined offer. Should ask for immediate assurance from German Government that they will not proceed with threat or violate Belgian neutrality	1002

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
154	Sir F. Villiers to Sir E. Grey	Brussels Aug. 4	Belgian neutrality (see No. 153). In view of Belgian reply, German Government have threatened to carry out their proposals by force.....	1003
155	Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Villiers	London Aug. 4	To inform Belgian Government that His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist attempt to infringe their neutrality. His Majesty's Government prepared to join with Russia and France in assisting Belgian Government to resist German aggression and to guarantee independence and integrity in future years	1003
156	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London Aug. 4	To demand immediate release of British ships detained in German ports	1004
157	Note communicated by German Embassy to British Foreign Office	Berlin Aug. 4	Assurance that Germany will in no case annex Belgian territory. Germany forced to disregard Belgian neutrality owing to knowledge of French plans	1004
158	Sir F. Villiers to Sir E. Grey	Brussels Aug. 4	German troops have entered Belgian territory. Liége summoned to surrender	1005
159	Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen	London Aug. 4	Belgian neutrality threatened by Germany. Unless German Government prepared to give assurance by 12 midnight to respect neutrality of Belgium, His Majesty's Ambassador is to ask for passports and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold their treaty obligations	1005
160	Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey	London Aug. 8	Gives the details of final interview with Berlin Foreign Office respecting the rupture of diplomatic relations.	1006
161	Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey	London Sept. 1	Gives the complete report of interview with Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office immediately before the declaration of war.....	1012

APPENDIX I.

Telegrams and Letters published officially in the Press by the Governments of Great Britain, Russia and Germany.

I.

Telegrams exchanged between His Majesty King George and His Majesty the Czar.

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
1	Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan	London Aug. 1	Instructs him to seek audience with His Majesty the Emperor and deliver personal message from the King regarding mediation and peace	1020
2	His Majesty the Czar to His Majesty King George	Aug. 1	Informs him of German note declaring war and hopes for the support of His Majesty's Government.....	1022

II.

Telegrams exchanged between London and Berlin, 30th July-2nd August, 1914.

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
1	His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia to His Majesty King George	July 30	Communicated his message to His Majesty the Emperor and proposes that His Majesty the King use influence on France and Russia that they remain neutral.....	1023
2	His Majesty King George to His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia	July 30	Acknowledges above and assures him that he is doing all in his power to preserve peace. Suggests that His Majesty the Emperor use influence on Austria	1024
3	His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George	July 31	Has just heard that Russian mobilisation of army and fleet has been ordered by the Czar.....	1024

Note.—The editor is responsible for the table of contents to appendices I and II of the *British Blue Book* (*No.* 1), as a table of contents was omitted from the official British publication containing this correspondence.

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
4	His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William	Aug. 1	Acknowledges above	1025
5	Prince Lichnowsky to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg	London Aug. 1	Reports conversation with Sir E. Grey regarding German attitude toward France in case she remains neutral in a German-Russian war..	1025
6	His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George	Aug. 1	Acknowledges above. Mobilisation ordered on two fronts must proceed. Germany will not attack France if her neutrality is guaranteed by England	1025
7	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to Prince Lichnowsky	Aug. 1	Seeks guarantee of England for the neutrality of France.....	1026
8	His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William	Aug. 1	Suggests that there must be some misunderstanding regarding the conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey.....	1026
9	Prince Lichnowsky to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg	London Aug. 2	English suggestions made without enquiry of France and without knowledge of mobilisation.....	1027

III.

Telegrams from the German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor, 1st August, 1914.

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
1		Aug. 1	Statement of Sir Edward Grey's Secretary regarding English neutrality in case of a German war with Russia and France.....	1027
2		Aug. 1	Forwards declaration of the British Cabinet regarding Belgian neutrality	1027
3		Aug. 1	Cancels communication of the morning regarding English neutrality...	1028

IV.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY THE CZAR TO HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR WILLIAM.

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914. July 29	States that it would be right to give over the Austro-Servian problem to the Hague Tribunal.....	1029

V.

LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
1	The President of the French Republic to His Majesty King George	1914. Paris July 31	Thinks that peace will depend upon the impression made upon Germany and Austria that the Entente Powers are acting in agreement and unity	1029
2	His Majesty King George to the President of the French Republic	London Aug. 1	Acknowledges above	1031

APPENDIX II.

DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND BELGIUM PREVIOUSLY TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
1	Sir Edward Grey to Sir Francis Villiers	1913. London Apr. 7	Discusses possible violation of Belgian neutrality	1032
2	Baron Beyens to M. Davignon	1911. Berlin Dec. 23	Extract from despatch *in re* an Anglo-Belgian agreement (taken from the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of October 13, 1914).....	1033

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
3	Circular Telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Representatives Abroad	1914. London Oct. 14	Denies existence of an Anglo-Belgian agreement of 1906	1035
4	Documents as published in facsimile in a special supplement to the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of Nov. 25, 1914		(1) Letter [from the Chief of the Belgian General Staff] to the [Belgian] Minister of War respecting Anglo-Belgian confidential interviews with regard to attacks upon Belgium by Germany. (2) Additional letter	1037
5	Extract from a brochure by M. J. Van den Heuvel, Belgian Minister of State		"On the Violation of Belgian neutrality"	1046
6	Viscount Haldane, Lord High Chancellor, to Dr. A. E. Shipley, Master of Christ's College, Cambridge	Nov. 14	Encloses memoranda regarding an Anglo-Belgian agreement	1051

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
1	Sir E. Grey to Mr. Beaumont	1914. London Aug. 3	Turkish ships building in Great Britain. To inform Turkish Government that His Majesty's Government desire to take over contract.....	1057
2	Mr. Beaumont to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 3	Turkish ships in Great Britain. Turkish Government annoyed at retention by His Majesty's Government.....	1057
3	Mr. Beaumont to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 4	Grand Vizier declares that Turkey intends to maintain neutrality. German military mission offered to stay and had consequently been retained	1058
4	Sir E. Grey to Mr. Beaumont	London Aug. 4	Turkish ships. To explain why His Majesty's Government had to retain ships, necessity for which is much regretted	1058
5	Sir E. Grey to Mr. Beaumont	London Aug. 7	If Turkey remains neutral His Majesty's Government do not propose to alter status of Egypt. Instructs him to contradict reported intention to annex Egypt	1058
6	Mr. Beaumont to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 9	Retention of ships is causing excitement. An assurance that ships would be restored at end of war would have soothing effect.....	1059
7	Mr. Beaumont to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 11	"Goeben" and "Breslau" reported to have entered Dardanelles.....	1059
8	Sir E. Grey to Mr. Beaumont	London Aug. 11	"Goeben" and "Breslau" must leave within twenty-four hours or be interned. To point this out to Turkish Government	1060
9	Mr. Beaumont to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 11	Turkey has bought "Goeben" and "Breslau." Grand Vizier asks that British naval mission may remain..	1060

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
10	Mr. Beaumont to Sir E. Grey	1914. Constantinople Aug. 11	"Breslau" is perquisitioning British ships at Dardanelles. British vessels are being detained at Straits..	1061
11	Sir E. Grey to Mr. Beaumont	London Aug. 12	If German officers and crews are returned to Germany at once, no reason to withdraw British naval mission	1061
12	Mr. Beaumont to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 12	Reports strong representations to Grand Vizier against detention, &c., of British ships. Minister of War is quite out of hand.....	1061
13	Sir E. Grey to Mr. Beaumont	London Aug. 12	He should point out to Turkish Government that German ships must not be allowed to commit acts of war, and ask why British ships are detained	1062
14	Tewfik Pasha to Sir E. Grey	London Aug. 13	Declaration that Turkey is determined to maintain strict neutrality.	1062
15	Mr. Beaumont to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 14	Minister of Marine has undertaken to hand over "Goeben" and "Breslau" to Admiral Limpus. No intention of sending ships outside Sea of Marmora till end of war.....	1063
16	Mr. Beaumont to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 15	Admiral Limpus and British officers replaced by Turkish executive officers	1063
17	Sir E. Grey to Mr. Beaumont	London Aug. 16	France, Russia, and Great Britain will guarantee independence and integrity of Turkey if she remains scrupulously neutral	1064
18	Mr. Beaumont to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 16	Grand Vizier solemnly declares Turkey will maintain neutrality. His Highness admits Germany is trying to compromise her. "Goeben" and "Breslau" are now off Constantinople and are flying Turkish flag.....	1064
19	Mr. Beaumont to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 16	Mines have been laid in Dardanelles.	1065

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
20	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 18	Reports interview with Grand Vizier, who deeply deplored breach of neutrality in matter of German ships. His Highness said Germans were exploiting Turkish resentment at seizure of ships building in England. He gave assurance that Turkey will not side against allies.....	1065
21	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Aug. 18	Sir E. Grey has told Turkish Ambassador Turkey had nothing to fear from Great Britain, and that her integrity would be preserved if she remained really neutral, sent away German crews, and did not impede British vessels	1066
22	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 19	Presence of British Fleet in Dardanelles is wise in existing circumstances	1067
23	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 19	Has obtained undertaking from Grand Vizier that British merchant vessels may leave. Despite this, they have been detained. Will protest again..	1067
24	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 20	Minister of Marine has proposed (1) abolition of Capitulations, (2) restitution of Turkish ships in England, (3) renunciation of any interference in internal affairs of Turkey, (4) handing back of Western Thrace, (5) restoration of Greek islands. He promised to open Dardanelles to British fleet if German crews did not leave when told to.....	1068
25	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 20	More mines laid in Dardanelles.....	1069
26	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 21	Porte gives assurance that British ships will not again be interfered with at Dardanelles.....	1070
27	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 21	Germans and Minister of War striving to force on war with Russia. German garrisons reported to hold Dardanelles forts	1070

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
28	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Aug. 22	To inform Turkish Government that if they promise (1) to dismiss German naval officers and crews, (2) to give all facilities to British merchant ships, (3) to maintain strict neutrality; allies will (1) agree to abolition of Capitulations as regards ex-territorial jurisdiction, (2) give written guarantee of Turkish independence and integrity.....	1071
29	Tewfik Pasha to Sir E. Grey	London Aug. 22	Turkish Government will grant free navigation of Turkish waters to all merchant ships, and will replace German officers and crew by crew of "Sultan Osman" when latter reach Constantinople	1071
30	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 22	Turkish crew has now arrived. Has pressed Minister of Marine to replace German crews.....	1072
31	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 23	Further contingent of German officers reported to have arrived *vid* Sophia.	1073
32	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 24	Reports stating to Grand Vizier that His Majesty's Government will not tolerate Germanising of Turkish fleet. Grand Vizier declared Turkey had no such intention.....	1073
33	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 25	Reports receipt of written assurance that merchant vessels may ply without hindrance	1074
34	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Aug. 25	Message from the King to the Sultan expressing regret at necessity of detaining Turkish ships in England. Ships will be restored at end of war	1074
35	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 25	Reports seizure of camels from Egyptians at Gaza.....	1074
36	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 25	Has made strong representation respecting seizure of camels. Grand Vizier denies all intention of attacking or intriguing against Egypt....	1075
37	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 25	Reports further laying of mines in Dardanelles	1075

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
38	Sir E. Grey to Tewfik Pasha	London Aug. 26	Sir E. Grey has taken note of assurances conveyed in his Excellency's note of 22nd August.....	1075
39	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 26	Reports arrival of further German sailors. Grand Vizier denies reported intention to close Dardanelles. Preparations in Turkish army and fleet proceeding. Situation most unsatisfactory.....	1076
40	Sir G. Barclay to Sir E. Grey	Bucharest Aug. 27	Five hundred German marines proceeding through Roumania to Constantinople	1077
41	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 27	Germans urging Turks to send "Goeben" into Black Sea, counting on attack by Russian war-ship. Now said to be 162 German officers in Constantinople	1077
42	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 27	Grand Vizier emphatically asseverates "Goeben" will never be allowed to enter Black Sea so long as she is manned by Germans. Sir L. Mallet replied that so long as Germans remained, Grand Vizier was not master of his own house. Grand Vizier declared that Turkey would never depart from neutrality, in spite of German machinations, which he fully understood	1078
43	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 27	Grand Vizier declares his ignorance of reported arrival of German sailors, who had not been asked for by Turkish Government. Sir L. Mallet warned his Highness that allied Governments would be unfavourably influenced by continued violation of Turkish neutrality	1079
44	Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey	Cairo Aug. 28	There is evidence that Turkey contemplates attack on Egypt. Turkish emissaries are being sent to India, the Yemen, Senoussi, and Egypt. Reports Turkish military activity..	1079
45	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 28	Still considers it improbable Turkey will make any forward move. Germans confident of hostilities. Reports German Ambassador's activity in circulating misleading reports respecting the allies.....	1080

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
46	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 28	Area of Dardanelles, Constantinople, and Bosphorus will soon form German enclave. Probable arrival of German and Austrian guns for Straits defences	1081
47	Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir E. Grey	Sophia Aug. 28	Reports passage of German naval officers, men, guns, and artillery for Turkey	1081
48	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 30	Does not regard situation as hopeless. Believes Turkish Government are aware of German aims. Has warned Grand Vizier of inevitable result of siding against allies. His Highness promised to send away German sailors	1082
49	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 1	Minister of Marine has assured Russian Ambassador that he will send away German sailors in a fortnight, and that 200 are leaving to-day....	1082
50	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 1	Grand Vizier gives solemn assurance that Turkey will maintain neutrality. Sir L. Mallet replied that until German sailors left His Majesty's Government would not be satisfied..	1083
51	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 1	Sulleiman-el-Burouni reported to be in Egypt fomenting revolution.....	1083
52	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Sept. 1	To avoid misunderstanding Turkish Government should be informed of British patrol of Suez Canal, and that no advance into Sinai is contemplated	1083
53	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 2	May he inform Turkish Government that "Goeben" will be treated as German ship if she enters Mediterranean with Germans on board?....	1084
54	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 2	May he announce publicly that Turkey has nothing to fear from British ships if she remains strictly neutral, does not interfere with British trade, and dismisses German crews?	1084
55	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 3	May he let it be known that if Turkish fleet leaves Dardanelles it will be treated as part of German fleet?.	1084

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
56	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Sept. 3	"Goeben" will be treated as German ship if she comes out of the Straits.	1085
57	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Sept. 4	Authorises statement proposed in No. 54	1085
58	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Sept. 4	Approves proposal in No. 55.....	1085
59	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 5	Reports Turkish intended intrigues in Afghanistan, India, and Persia.....	1085
60	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 5	Has discussed situation fully with Minister of Interior. Apparent improvement in situation. Has received assurance that Turkish fleet will not leave Dardanelles on any account	1086
61	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 6	Reports prospect of improvement in public opinion. Growing discontent at German influence.....	1086
62	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 19	Forwards copy of *note verbale* addressed to Turkish Government protesting against perquisitions made by "Breslau" on British ships at Dardanelles and detention of British ships	1086
63	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Aug. 21	Transmits *note verbale* from Turkish Government expressing regret for incidents at the Dardanelles.....	1087
64	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 6	Reports conversation with Minister of Interior respecting Turkish attitude. Has warned his Excellency against embarking on military adventure, and impressed upon him unwisdom of Turkish attitude. Minister said Turkey wished to remain friend of Great Britain. He proposed sale of two Turkish ships, when Turkish Government would send away all Germans	1089
65	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 7	Further evidence that there has been no sale of "Goeben" and "Breslau" to Turkey	1090

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
66	Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey	1914. Cairo Sept. 8	Turkish intrigues in Egypt. Reports attempt by Turkish naval officer to corrupt stokers and engineers of Khedivial mail steamers.....	1091
67	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Sept. 8	Requests his views as to recall of British naval mission. Admiralty wish to withdraw Admiral Limpus and staff	1091
68	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 8	Considers moment suitable to withdraw naval mission. Great discontent against Germans among Turkish naval officers.....	1092
69	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 9	Turkish Government have decided to abolish Capitulations. Reports verbal protest to Grand Vizier.....	1093
70	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 9	Note has been despatched to foreign embassies abolishing Capitulations. German Ambassador has disclaimed authorship of this move. Minister of Interior denies any intention of hostility against foreigners.....	1093
71	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 9	All embassies will send in identic notes stating that abolition of Capitulations cannot be accepted.....	1094
72	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 10	Reports amount of munitions of war so far traced as having been sent to Turkey. German reservists in Turkey instructed to report for enrolment with Turkish troops.....	1094
73	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 10	Note abolishing Capitulations received. Identic notes of protest addressed to Turkish Government by all foreign representatives, including German and Austrian Ambassadors.	1095
74	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 13	Reports military movements at Alexandretta where Germans are dominant	1095
75	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 14	German Ambassador has received instructions from Berlin to disseminate report of revolution in India and application by His Majesty's Government to Japan for assistance.	1096

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
76	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 15	Danger of Turkish fleet going into Black Sea and of entire closure of Dardanelles by mines. German and Austrian Ambassadors urging this step upon Turkey.....	1096
77	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Sept. 16	Sir E. Grey suggests pointing out to Turkish Government that so long as they maintain neutrality undertakings already given by His Majesty's Government hold good and reasonable concessions about Capitulations will be considered, but concessions cannot be expected whilst Turkey's irregular conduct in matter of German crews continues.....	1097
78	United Shipowners' Freight, Demurrage, and Protective Association to Sir E. Grey	Cardiff Sept. 16	Reports case of detention of steamship "Reliance" at Dardanelles, and requests assistance in recovery of compensation	1098
79	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 16	Minister of Marine is aware of German intrigues. Sir L. Mallet has pointed out to him danger of sending Turkish fleet into Black Sea as long as German officers remain. Grand Vizier declares there is no intention of sending "Goeben" into Black Sea	1099
80	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 18	Consul at Basra reports intention of Vali to request commodore of British war-ship to leave Shatt-el-Arab and to seal wireless.....	1100
81	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 18	Has instructed consul at Basra that Turkish authorities have no right to interfere with wireless on His Majesty's ship	1100
82	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 19	Has informed President of the Chamber that it would be absolute madness to go to war with Russia. Sir L. Mallet has urged him most strongly against sending Turkish fleet into Black Sea. Party in favour of neutrality is growing. German officers and men continue to arrive. Turkish military movements from Erzeroum to the frontier.....	1101

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
83	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 20	Minister of War is the only firebrand. Party in favour of peace is daily increasing. Conversation between French Ambassador and Minister of Marine. Latter admitted that Enver had ordered fleet to go into Black Sea, but Cabinet had decided that two destroyers only should do so. Despite this assurance, "Breslau" and three smaller ships have just entered Black Sea.....	1102
84	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 20	Cabinet are all peaceably inclined except Enver. Sir L. Mallet has drawn attention of Grand Vizier to total disregard by Minister of War of Cabinet's decision that fleet should not enter Black Sea, and has pointed out that Constantinople and neighbourhood now form an armed German camp, adding that between 4,000 and 5,000 soldiers and sailors had arrived up to date. His Highness declared with violence that he would never allow Minister of War to supersede him. Has called attention to numerous cases of anti-British action, and to intrigues against Egypt	1102
85	Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey	Cairo Sept. 21	Turkish preparations against Egypt continue. Measures for protection of Egyptian frontier may become necessary	1104
86	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 22	British postmaster at Constantinople has received information from subordinate Turkish postal official that foreign post offices in Turkey will be abolished on 1st October. Has instructed postmaster to return letter. Subsequently saw Grand Vizier and protested against discourteous manner of communication and against abolition of post offices. His Highness stated that similar communication had been addressed to all Powers. Sir L. Mallet considers that considerable modification of existing system should not be resisted.....	1104

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
87	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 22	Reports audience with the Sultan, to whom King's message, authorised in No. 36, has been delivered. Sultan expressed earnest desire for good relations with Great Britain.....	1105
88	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Sept. 23	His Majesty's Government consider situation at Constantinople most unsatisfactory. Recapitulates grievances in general against Turkish Government, and instructs Sir L. Mallet to make representations to Grand Vizier	1105
89	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Sept. 24	Egyptian frontier has been violated by Arabs, who have been encouraged by Turks. To inform Grand Vizier and Khedives, adding that British military authorities consider breach of peace on Egyptian frontier is imminent	1106
90	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 24	Has addressed note to Grand Vizier, recapitulating recent information respecting Turkish preparations against Egypt, and pointing out conditional nature of assurances given by His Majesty's Government respecting status of Egypt (see No. 5). Turkish Government have doubtless been strongly urged to attack Egypt by Germans. It is circumstantially reported that Germans are making desperate efforts to force Turk's hands, but that their efforts are being strongly resisted.....	1107
91	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 24	Grand Vizier has denied intrigues against Egypt, but finally admitted pressure by Austria and Germany. He emphatically disclaimed any complicity in such intrigues. His Highness seemed more preoccupied with Balkan situation than with anything else, and said that Turkey could not refrain from attempt to regain what they had lost in Balkan wars if Balkan complications ensued	1108
92	Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey	Cairo Sept. 25	Reports further Turkish preparations on Sinai frontier.....	1108

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
93	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	1914. London Sept. 25	He should make best arrangements possible with regard to post offices, and should put on record that His Majesty's Government do not agree to abolition	1109
94	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 25	Has again pointed out most strongly to Grand Vizier fatal result of hostility towards Great Britain, and renewed protests respecting German crews of "Goeben" and "Breslau." His Highness repeated his intention of maintaining peace. Has warned his Highness of dangers of a repetition of Arab raid across Egyptian frontier. Difficult position of Grand Vizier, whose party is gaining ground	1109
95	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 25	Reports further Turkish military preparations in Syria, and arrival of two Germans there with consignment of explosives	1110
96	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 26	Has informed Grand Vizier of information contained in No. 92 and No. 95, and has warned him of serious consequences if such preparations against Egypt continue. Has taken steps to enlighten prominent members of Cabinet with what is going on	1111
97	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 27	Turkish destroyer has been stopped outside Dardanelles and turned back by British fleet. Dardanelles were thereupon closed by Turkish authorities. Turkish Government much perturbed. Has informed Grand Vizier of reasons of British action, and urged him to reopen Straits, and has again called his attention to Turkish action on Egyptian frontier. Grand Vizier replied that there would be no more acts of aggression, and that there was no thought of attacking Egypt. Bedouins had been ordered to withdraw at once.....	1111
98	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 27	Grand Vizier promises reopening of Dardanelles if British fleet move a little further off (see No. 97).....	1112

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
99	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 29	Germans endeavouring to induce Turkey to attack Russia in Black Sea. Umbrage caused by German Ambassador ordering "Breslau" to the Black Sea. Grand Vizier repeats request as to removal of fleet (see No. 98)	1112
100	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Sept. 29	Turkish Minister of War has promised military stores and instructors to Emir of Nejd and Vali of Basra, telling latter that German and other emissaries have been sent to preach "jehad" in India, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan, and that Turkey was prepared to help Germany in return for support in Balkan war.....	1113
101	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Sept. 29	In reply to representations by Turkish Ambassador as to presence of H.M.S. "Odin" in Shatt-el-Arab, it has been pointed out that so long as Turkey does not observe rules of neutrality she cannot appeal to them	1113
102	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Sept. 30	Request for withdrawal of fleet (see No. 97) cannot be entertained until German officers and crews are repatriated	1114
103	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 1	Reports from Basra of intention of Turks to block Shatt-el-Arab, and of departure of British man-of-war from Turkish waters.....	1114
104	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 2	Information as to movements of troops and stores with view to eventual attack on Egypt. This and movements of certain Germans brought to attention of Grand Vizier. Calls attention to possibility of counter-measures being required in Sinai peninsula.....	1115
105	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 3	Germans long working for closing of Dardanelles to be freer in Black Sea. Probability that they have mined entrance, the Turks not knowing of position of mines.....	1116

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
106	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	1914. Constantinople Oct. 4	Report from His Majesty's Consul as to demand by Vali of Basra that His Majesty's ships should leave Shatt-el-Arab within twenty-four hours, and asking for instructions..	1116
107	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Oct. 4	May inform Turkey that as soon as Turkish Navy ceases to be under German control British fleet will move away from Dardanelles.....	1117
108	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 5	Turkey bankrupt, and short of coal and provisions. Thinks that they do not desire to go to all lengths with Germany, but doubts their ability to prevent Germans taking matters in their own hands.....	1117
109	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 6	Conversation of Military Attaché with Minister of War, who seemed to have ambitious schemes as to Arab world and Egypt, and denied intention of attacking latter country, though admitting that measures of precautionary character were being taken	1118
110	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 6	His Majesty's Consul at Basra reports that Vali has orders to close Shatt-el-Arab and sea within 6 miles of shore to war-ships, and fire on them if they disobey.....	1119
111	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Oct. 7	His Majesty's ships are not in Turkish waters, which only extend 3 miles from coast. Mohammerah does not belong to Turkey. His Majesty's Government reserve right to pass up and down the Shatt-el-Arab at all times	1120
112	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Sept. 22	Delivery of message from the King (see No. 34) at audience with Sultan, and conversation as to breaches of neutrality by Turkey and the departure of Admiral Limpus.....	1120
113	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 7	Grand Vizier says Vali of Basra instructed to avoid interference with His Majesty's ships in Shatt-el-Arab	1124

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
114	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 7	Attacks on Russian frontier by Kurds and Turkish troops, and arrest of Russian consul. Grand Vizier has promised Russian Ambassador to take suitable action, but Sir L. Mallet doubts his ability to restrain military party under Enver Pasha, incited by Germans and Austrians..	1125
115	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 10	Sending money to Syria, mainly to subsidise Bedouins. Movements of German officers supposed to have money with them. Carriage of dynamite to Beirout and troops to Aleppo	1125
116	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Oct. 11	Cannot give way to Turkish demands, especially as to Persian Gulf, beyond certain point, but agrees that His Majesty's Government must continue to avoid giving even plausible cause of offence to Turkey.....	1126
117	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 12	Note received from Porte, claiming that passage of His Majesty's ships to Mohammerah was breach of Turkish neutrality, and requesting that they should go to sea within eight days	1126
118	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 12	Reply of Porte as to preparations against Egypt (see No. 143) points out that these are only part of general precautionary mobilisation. No hostile intentions against any Power, but declaration that Egypt is in state of war, dismissal of German and Austrian agents, and arrival of troops from India caused anxiety. Sir L. Mallet suggests reminding Grand Vizier that maintenance of status of Egypt is conditional on Turkish neutrality	1127
119	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 12	Turkish fleet has left Constantinople and entered Black Sea.....	1128

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
120	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 12	Departure of His Majesty's ships from Mohammerah now might be misinterpreted, though channel may be closed if they stay. Resistance of moderates to German endeavours to secure Turkish coöperation must not be weakened by any action on our part	1128
121	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 12	Has expressed surprise at receipt of note, as Mohammerah is a Persian port. Grand Vizier says there was no question of an ultimatum. He seems confident he can resist German pressure. Strict orders sent to Turkish troops not to cross Persian frontier	1128
122	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 13	Vali has told consular officer at Basra that H.M.S. "Espiègle" must leave Mohammerah within eight days or be interned. "Dalhousie" has left.	1129
123	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Oct. 13	To tell Turkish Government (see No. 117) that His Majesty's Government are prepared to discuss question of passage through Shatt-el-Arab when Porte strictly observe their neutrality violated with regard to "Goeben" and "Breslau." Mohammerah not in Ottoman territory, and so presence of His Majesty's ships there does not concern Turkey.....	1129
124	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 14	Deliberate German and Turkish falsehoods officially circulated amongst Moslems in Aleppo district, leading them to believe German Emperor has embraced Islam and fighting for it against Russia	1130
125	Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey	Cairo Sept. 30	Transmit interrogatories regarding case of Lieutenant Robert Mors, of Egyptian Police, showing his relations with Germans, Turks, &c., and efforts at espionage and introduction of explosives into Egypt.....	1130
126	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 14	Turkish fleet has returned. As on a previous occasion, two German steamers have been convoyed, flying Turkish flag till inside Bosphorus..	1138

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
127	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 14	Moslem "fedahis" sent to numerous Syrian towns and proceeding to Arabia and Egypt to incite Moslems against British. Many Aleppo shiekhs seem to have been gained over to side of Germany	1139
128	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 14	Large sums spent in corruption have secured control of Turkish press to German Embassy, which emits stream of mendacity.....	1139
129	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 15	Agents sent to conduct anti-British propaganda at Basra and in Afghanistan. Distribution of gold amongst Bedouins. Boats, dynamite, and mines sent to various ports. Hostile preparations under German influence	1139
130	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 15	Possibility of Germans sending persons disguised as Indians to Egypt.	1140
131	Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir E. Grey	Sophia Oct. 16	Bullion, armaments, and stores from Germany passing through Rustchuk for Constantinople	1141
132	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 16	Rifles and ammunition distributed amongst Bedouins at Jaffa. Wells prepared and horses and mules requisitioned. Expected move on Akaba	1141
133	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 16	German officers with money, guns, and ammunition arrived at Aleppo *en route* for Bagdad. Trucks of dynamite sent to Damascus and Alexandretta, where mines laid by officers of "Breslau".....	1141
134	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 16	Minister of War, controlled by Germans, now supreme instead of Minister of Interior, who is practically powerless	1142
135	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 17	Mines are being sent to Basra.....	1142
136	Sir F. Elliot to Sir E. Grey	Athens Oct. 17	Bouhadi Sadil, two of whose accomplices were convicted in Egypt, has been found buying arms and ammunition for importation into that country	1143

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
137	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	1914. London Oct. 17	As "Espiègle" not in Turkish territorial waters attack on her would be wanton aggression. No present intention of her passing down Shatt-el-Arab, but we claim right of passage so long as "Goeben" and "Breslau" have free use of Turkish territorial waters	1143
138	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 17	Gold and war material received in Constantinople since end of September. Submarine and two aeroplanes reported to have left Rustchuk....	1143
139	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 18	Aeroplane and airmen left Beersheba. Telegram from Minister of War as to action of Commandant of Jaffa on approach of an enemy.....	1144
140	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 2	Transmits copies of note from Grand Vizier demanding closing of British post offices in Turkey, and reply (see Nos. 86 and 93) reserving all rights, but stating that operations will be suspended by offices.....	1144
141	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 2	Transmits copy of note to Grand Vizier asking if Turkey intends to carry out promises of Sultan and his Government to dismiss German officers and crews, and when this would be done.....	1146
142	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 4	Transmits copy of note denying right of Turkey to abolish Capitulations, reserving liberty of action, and warning Porte of dangers of new policy adopted	1148
143	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 4	Transmits copies of two notes complaining of the military preparations, which are evidently directed against Egypt, and of the failure of the Porte to reply to the first of these notes and to subsequent letters	1149
144	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 6	Transmits copy of note to Grand Vizier welcoming the rules of neutrality drawn up by the Porte in so far as they affect wireless telegraphy, and demanding their application to the "Corcovado".....	1157

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
145	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 6	Transmits copy of a note from the Porte communicating regulations as to belligerent war-ships in Turkish territorial waters, and copy of reply pointing out how little Turkish practice has conformed to these regulations, and expressing hope that new policy will be followed in future....	1159
146	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 6	Transmits copy of note to Grand Vizier asking on what grounds Turkey objects to His Majesty's ships being at Persian port of Mohammerah, and requesting instructions to Vali of Basra to refrain from any measures against British war-ships	1166
147	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 6	Transmits copies of a note to Porte and of letter to Talaat Bey complaining of anti-British and unscrupulous campaign in press, which is permitted by the censor in spite of the friendly assurances of the Government	1167
148	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 19	New Governor-General of Basra with naval and military officers (including Germans) and men, with ammunition, arrived at Alexandretta. Destination reported as Basra or Maan	1171
149	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 19	Reports passage through Adana for Syria of officers and men (including many Germans) and of civilian officials	1171
150	Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey	Cairo Oct. 19	Departure of Turkish staff officers and others from Smyrna to participate in Turcophile propaganda in India	1171
151	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 19	Reports movements of German and possibly also Austrian naval parties to Akaba, Persian Gulf, and Syrian coast ports	1172
152	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 21	Movements of troops at Alexandretta and Damascus towards south.....	1172
153	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 21	Possibility of *coup d'État* by Enver, backed by Germans, should be remembered	1173

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
154	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 22	Secret manifesto inciting Moslem soldiers to revolt against allies is being circulated at Beirout. Is attributed to Sheikh Aziz Shawish.....	1173
155	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 22	Copies of above-mentioned manifesto are to be smuggled into Egypt and India	1173
156	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Oct. 22	German officers on frontier bent on forcing matters. Arab raid possible at any moment.....	1174
157	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 22	Russian Ambassador thinks Turkey will declare war on receipt of first half of 4,000,000*l.* to be provided by Germany. 1,000,000*l.* already reported to have arrived. Virulent anti-British campaign in progress..	1174
158	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 22	Press campaign aims at proving Great Britain is inflicting deliberate blows at Islam.....	1174
159	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Oct. 23	His Majesty's Government will regard mining of Shatt-el-Arab as an act of open hostility.....	1175
160	Sir E. Grey to Mr. Cheetham	London Oct. 23	Turkish Minister at Sophia has gone to Germany to arrange, it is reported, for stirring up Moslem fanaticism in India, Egypt, Algeria, and Tunis	1175
161	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 23	Reports arrival of further consignments of munitions of war.....	1176
162	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 23	Reports arrival of large quantities of bar gold. Probably between two and three millions have now arrived....	1176
163	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 23	Military movements at Aleppo. Arab raid possible	1176
164	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 23	Minister of Marine denies to French Ambassador intention of war with allies, but did not deny desire to regain Egypt. Germans are inciting religious fanaticism against British.	1177
165	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 23	German and Turkish efforts to cause anti-British feeling at Haifa by such reports as invasion of India by the Ameer of Afghanistan.....	1178

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
166	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	1914. London Oct. 24	To enumerate to Grand Vizier hostile acts of Turkey and warn him of inevitable result of any attack on Egypt or Suez Canal. Summarises Turkish acts of aggression, &c.....	1178
167	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 25	Turkish fleet at Kadikeui since 20th October	1179
168	Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey	Petrograd Oct. 26	Forty-two Germans and naval officers, disguised as tourists, said to have reached Aleppo	1179
169	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 27	Enver and others making every preparation for expedition against Egypt. Majority of Committee are, however, said to be against war. Halill has left for Berlin.....	1180
170	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 27	With exception of Enver, Turkish Government are seeking to temporise. Austrian Ambassador much annoyed at tardiness of Turkey. Turkish fleet has gone into Black Sea	1180
171	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 28	Porte regret they cannot take wireless messages for His Majesty's Embassy from England.....	1181
172	Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey	Cairo Oct. 28	Reported unsuccessful attempt of German officers to provoke attack upon Egyptian post at Kossaimo...	1181
173	Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey	Cairo Oct. 28	Two thousand armed Bedouins have invaded Egyptian territory.....	1181
174	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Oct. 28	To warn Turkish Government that so long as Germans remain Turkish ships will be treated as enemy ships	1181
175	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 28	Further movements in Syria of German and Turkish naval officers.....	1182
176	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 29	Has made representations to Grand Vizier respecting Bedouin raid into Egypt, and has warned him of possible consequences	1182
177	Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey	Petrograd Oct. 29	Russian gunboat at Odessa has been sunk and Theodosia bombarded by Turkish fleet	1183

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
178	Mr. Roberts to Sir E. Grey	Odessa Oct. 29	Further details of attack upon Odessa	1183
179	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Oct. 30	Russian Ambassador has been instructed to leave Constantinople. Unless Turkish Government will dismiss German crews within twelve hours Sir L. Mallet should ask for his passports	1184
180	Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey	Constantinople Oct. 30	Russian, French, and British Ambassadors have asked for their passports	1184
181	Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey	Cairo Oct. 20	Transmits further interrogatories of German spy Mors.....	1185
182	Telegram communicated by Count Benckendorff	Nov. 2	Communicates telegram from M. Sazonof. Turkish Chargé d'Affaires at Petrograd has handed in telegram from Turkish Government, insinuating that Russian fleet took initiative in hostilities. M. Sazonof indignantly denied insinuation, and told Turkish Chargé d'Affaires that he would receive his passports on 2nd November	1189
183	Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir G. Buchanan, Sir C. Greene	London Nov. 3	Informs of interviews between Sir A. Nicolson and Turkish Ambassador on 31st October and 2nd November. Transmits telegram communicated by his Excellency, in which Turkish Government express regret at incident in Black Sea, but state that His Majesty's Government have "provoked" rupture of relations. Sir A. Nicolson strongly demurred to this expression in view of what had, in fact, happened.....	1191
184	Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, Sir F. Bertie, Sir C. Greene	London Nov. 4	Final interview between Sir E. Grey and Turkish Ambassador, who asked for his passports. It was again explained to Tewfik Pasha that unless German military and naval missions, and especially crews of "Goeben" and "Breslau," were dismissed, hostilities with Turkey must continue..	1193
	Sir L. Mallet to British Foreign Office	London Nov. 20	Summarises events leading up to the rupture of relations with Turkey...	1193
	Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet	London Dec. 4	Reply to the above.....	1205

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
1	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Dec. 9	The point of view of the Italian Government regarding the Austro-Hungarian military operations in Serbia	1209
2	Baron Sonnino to M. Bollati	Rome Dec. 9	On the same subject.....	1210
3	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Dec. 12	On the same subject.....	1211
4	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Dec. 13	On the same subject.....	1213
5	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Dec. 14	Action of Germany at Vienna.....	1214
6	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Dec. 16	Interpretation of Article VII.....	1214
7	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Dec. 20 (recd. 21)	Interpretation of Article VII.....	1217
8	Baron Sonnino to the Italian Ambassadors at Vienna and Berlin	Rome Dec. 20	Interview of Minister for Foreign Affairs with Prince von Bülow and Baron Macchio	1218
		1915.		
9	M. Bollati to Baron Sonnino	Berlin Jan. 6	Action of Germany at Vienna.....	1220
10	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Jan. 7	Interview of Minister for Foreign Affairs with Baron Macchio.....	1221
11	Baron Sonnino to the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna	Rome Jan. 15	Interview of Minister for Foreign Affairs with Prince von Bülow and Baron Macchio	1224
12	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Jan. 18 (recd. 18)	On the territorial concessions to be made to Italy.....	1226

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
13	M. Bollati to Baron Sonnino	1915. Berlin Jan. 22 (recd. 22)	Action of Germany at Vienna.....	1230
14	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Jan. 23	On the territorial concessions to be made to Italy.....	1230
15	Baron Sonnino to the Italian Ambassadors at Vienna and Berlin	Rome Jan. 26	Interview of Minister for Foreign Affairs with Prince von Bülow.....	1231
16	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Jan. 28 (recd. 29)	On the territorial concessions to be made to Italy.....	1233
17	Baron Sonnino to M. Bollati	Rome Feb. 2	Interview of Minister for Foreign Affairs with Prince von Bülow.....	1236
18	Baron Sonnino to M. Bollati	Rome Feb. 4	Interview of Minister for Foreign Affairs with Baron Macchio.....	1236
19	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Feb. 7	Requesting a reply from Vienna.....	1237
20	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Feb. 9 (recd. 10)	Counter-proposals of Austria-Hungary	1237
21	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Feb. 12 (recd. 13)	On the same subject.....	1241
22	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Feb. 12	The Italian Government's reply to the Austro-Hungarian proposals....	1245
23	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Feb. 14	Observations of the Austro-Hungarian Government	1249
24	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Feb. 17	Austro-Hungarian military operations in Serbia	1250
25	Baron Sonnino to M. Bollati	Rome Feb. 18	Interview of Minister for Foreign Affairs with Prince von Bülow.....	1251
26	Baron Sonnino to M. Bollati	Rome Feb. 21	Interview of Minister for Foreign Affairs with Prince von Bülow.....	1252
27	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Feb. 22 (recd. 23)	The agreement regarding Article VII. to be anticipatory.....	1253

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
28.	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	1915. Rome Feb. 25	On the same subject.....	1256
29	Baron Sonnino to M. Bollati	Rome Feb. 25	On the same subject.....	1258
30	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Rome Feb. 24 (recd. 25)	On the same subject.....	1258
31	M. Bollati to Baron Sonnino	Berlin Feb. 26 (recd. 27)	On the same subject.....	1259
32	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Feb. 26 (recd. 27)	On the same subject and on the territories to be ceded.....	1260
33	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Feb. 27	Regarding the territories to be ceded.	1262
34	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Mar. 3 (recd. 3)	On the same subject.....	1263
35	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Mar. 4	Recapitulation of the Italian point of view	1266
36	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Mar. 4	Austro-Hungarian military operations in Montenegro	1267
37	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Mar. 7 (recd. 7)	The Austro-Hungarian Government promises to make known its views..	1267
38	Baron Sonnino to the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna	Rome Mar. 8	Interview of Minister for Foreign Affairs with Prince von Bülow.....	1268
39	Baron Sonnino to the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna	Rome Mar. 9	The Austro-Hungarian Government accept in principle the cession of territories to Italy.....	1269
40	M. Bollati to Baron Sonnino	Berlin Mar. 9 (recd. 10)	On the same subject.....	1270

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
41	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	1915. Vienna Mar. 9 (recd. 9)	On the same subject.....	1270
42	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Mar. 10	The Italian Government declares that the agreement must be subject to immediate fulfilment	1271
43	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Mar. 13 (recd. 13)	On the same subject.....	1273
44	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Mar. 13	On the same subject.....	1275
45	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Mar. 16 (recd. 16)	On the same subject.....	1276
46	Baron Sonnino to the Italian Ambassadors at Vienna and Berlin	Rome Mar. 17	Interview of Minister for Foreign Affairs with Prince von Bülow.....	1279
47	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Mar. 17	Regarding the date of the cession of the territories	1281
48	Baron Sonnino to the Italian Ambassadors at Vienna and Berlin	Rome Mar. 17	Interview of Minister for Foreign Affairs with Prince von Bülow.....	1282
49	Baron Sonnino to the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna	Rome Mar. 20	Regarding the date of the cession of territories	1283
50	Baron Sonnino to the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna	Rome Mar. 20	Interview of Minister for Foreign Affairs with Baron Macchio.....	1284
51	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Mar. 21 (recd. 21)	Regarding the date and the nature of the cession of territories.....	1285
52	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Mar. 22	The Italian Government ask the Austro-Hungarian Government to make concrete proposals	1287

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	No.
53	Baron Sonnino to the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna	1915. Rome Mar. 23	On the same subject.....	1287
54	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Mar. 24 (recd. 24)	The Austro-Hungarian Government consents to make concrete proposals. It insists on the subject of the date of the concessions.....	1289
55	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Mar. 24 (recd. 25)	The Austro-Hungarian Government declares that it will make concrete proposals	1290
56	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Mar. 27 (recd. 28)	The Austro-Hungarian Government submits concrete proposals.....	1291
57	Marquis A. Carlotti di Riparbella to Baron Sonnino	Petrograd Mar. 29 (recd. 29)	Rumours of peace between Austria and Russia	1293
58	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Mar. 31	Observations of Minister for Foreign Affairs on Austro-Hungarian proposals	1293
59	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Apr. 1	Austro-Hungarian military operations in Montenegro	1295
60	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Apr. 2 (recd. 2)	Discussion of the Austro-Hungarian proposals	1296
61	M. Bollati to Baron Sonnino	Berlin Apr. 2 (recd. 3)	Rumours of peace between Germany and Russia	1298
62	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Apr. 6 (recd. 7)	Discussion of the Austro-Hungarian proposals	1298
63	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Apr. 8	Austro-Hungarian military operations in Montenegro	1299
64	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Apr. 8	Counter-proposals of the Italian Government	1299
65	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Apr. 10 (recd. 11)	The Austro-Hungarian Government will examine the Italian counter-proposals	1303

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1915.		
66	Baron Squitti de Palermite e Guarna to Baron Sonnino	Nisch Apr. 10 (recd. 10)	Rumours of peace between Austria and Russia	1303
67	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Apr. 13	A reply is requested from the Austro-Hungarian Government	1304
68	M. F. Cucchi Bosso to Baron Sonnino	Sofia Apr. 13 (recd. 14)	Rumours of peace between Austria and Russia	1304
69	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Apr. 14 (recd. 14)	A reply to the Italian counter-proposals is requested from the Austro-Hungarian Government	1304
70	M. Bollati to Baron Sonnino	Berlin Apr. 15 (recd. 16)	Rumours of peace between Germany and Russia	1305
71	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Apr. 16 (recd. 17)	The Austro-Hungarian Government pronounces its views upon the Italian counter-proposals	1305
72	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome Apr. 21	The Italian Government explains its counter-proposals	1305
73	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Apr. 21 (recd. 22)	The Austro-Hungarian Government undertakes to examine the reasons adduced by the Italian Government.	1310
74	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Apr. 25	The Italian Ambassador recapitulates the situation	1311
75	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna Apr. 29 (recd. 30)	The Austro-Hungarian Government pronounces its views upon the various Italian counter-proposals	1312
76	Baron Sonnino to the Duke d'Avarna	Rome May 3	Declaration of the Italian Government at Vienna	1316
77	Duke d'Avarna to Baron Sonnino	Vienna May 4	On the same subject	1318
—	Baron Burián to Baron Macchio	Vienna May 21	Text of the reply of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Italian Government concerning the cancellation of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance	1319

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
—	Baron Sonnino to Italian Representatives abroad and to Foreign Governments	1915. Rome May 23	Detailed statement of the reasons actuating Italy in denouncing the Treaty of the Triple Alliance.....	1322

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
21	M. Strandtman to M. Sazonoff	Belgrade July 12 (25)	Advises of statement of Austro-Hungarian Minister that he is to leave Belgrade in view of unsatisfactory reply of Servia	1348
22	Count Benckendorff to M. Sazonoff	London July 12 (25)	View of Sir E. Grey that Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain should abstain from immediate mobilisation and offer good offices. Consent of Germany essential	1349
23	M. Sazonoff to M. Kroupenski	St. Petersburgh July 13 (26)	Question of Italian influence upon Austria	1349
24	M. Kazansky to M. Sazonoff	Prague July 13 (26)	Mobilisation ordered	1349
25	M. Sazonoff to M. Schébéko	St. Petersburgh July 13 (26)	Details conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador respecting the situation	1350
26	M. Sazonoff to M. de Swerbéew	St. Petersburgh July 13 (26)	Asks Berlin to advise Vienna to meet Russian proposal in a friendly spirit	1351
27	M. Sevastopoulo to M. Sazonoff	Paris July 13 (26)	Servian reply as viewed at Paris	1351
28	M. Sevastopoulo to M. Sazonoff	Paris July 13 (26)	German Ambassador states attitude of his Government towards the Servian question	1351
29	M. Sevastopoulo to M. Sazonoff	Paris July 13 (26)	Purpose of representations of Germany at Paris	1352
30	M. Bronewsky to M. Sazonoff	Berlin July 13 (26)	Advises of effect at Berlin of news that Austria-Hungary has mobilised against Servia	1352
31	Count Benckendorff to M. Sazonoff	London July 14 (27)	Question of mediation by the four Governments	1353
32	M. Sazonoff to M. Isvolsky and Count Benckendorff	St. Petersburgh July 14 (27)	Same subject	1353

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
33	M. Sazonoff to M. Isvolsky, Count Benckendorff, M. Swerbéew, M. Schébéko, and M. Kroupenski	St. Petersburgh July 14 (27)	Discusses reply of Servian Government to Austria	1354
34	M. Sevastopoulo to M. Sazonoff	Paris July 14 (27)	Interview of German Ambassador with French Political Department	1354
35	M. Isvolsky to M. Sazonoff	Paris July 14 (27)	Advises of interview with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and discussion of Germany's views as to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum	1355
36	M. Isvolsky to M. Sazonoff	Paris July 14 (27)	Details in respect to news of Austro-Hungarian ultimatum	1355
37	M. Isvolsky to M. Sazonoff	Paris July 14 (27)	Advises of representations to French Government that the Servian reply is unsatisfactory. Consequences	1356
38	M. Bronewsky to M. Sazonoff	Berlin July 14 (27)	Question of revision of Austro-Hungarian demands	1356
39	M. Bronewsky to M. Sazonoff	Berlin July 14 (27)	Informs of endeavours of French Ambassador to induce the German Government to accept British proposal for action in favour of peace	1357
40	His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Servia	July 14 (27)	Informs Prince Alexander of his sympathy with the Servian people and of his serious attention to their difficulties	1357
41	M. Schébéko to M. Sazonoff	Vienna July 14 (27)	Reports interview with Baron Macchio as to the situation	1358
42	Count Benckendorff to M. Sazonoff	London July 14 (27)	Interview between Sir E. Grey and German Ambassador as to mediation	1359
43	M. Sazonoff to Count Benckendorff	St. Petersburgh July 15 (28)	Interviews with German Ambassador. Impressions as to the attitude of Germany	1359

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
44	M. Salviati to M. Sazonoff	Fiume July 15 (28)	State of siege proclaimed in Slavonia, etc.	1360
45	M. Schébéko to M. Sazonoff	Vienna July 15 (28)	Interview with Count Berchtold as to the situation	1360
46	M. Bronewsky to M. Sazonoff	Berlin July 15 (28)	Publication of Servian Note	1361
47	M. Schébéko to M. Sazonoff	Vienna July 15 (28)	Orders for mobilisation signed	1361
48	M. Sazonoff to Count Benckendorff	St. Petersburgh July 15 (28)	Suggests immediate steps by Great Britain for mediation	1362
49	M. Sazonoff to M. Bronewsky	St. Petersburgh July 16 (29)	Interview with German Ambassador. He suggests direct explanations between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Russian counter-suggestions for parallel discussions by conference of Germany, France, England, and Italy	1362
50	M. Sazonoff to Count Benckendorff and M. Isvolsky	St. Petersburgh July 16 (29)	Reports refusal of Vienna Cabinet for direct negotiations with Russian Government. Russia relies on British Government for initiative in any other steps	1363
51	M. Bronewsky to M. Sazonoff	Berlin July 16 (29)	Further interview with German Secretary of State on question of mediation. Discusses Russian mobilisation	1364
52	M. Strandtman to M. Sazonoff	Nish July 16 (29)	Bulgaria to remain neutral	1364
53	M. Isvolsky to M. Sazonoff	Paris July 16 (29)	Attitude of French Government. Summary of situation prepared by French Minister for Foreign Affairs for the President of the Republic	1365
54	Count Benckendorff to M. Sazonoff	London July 16 (29)	Form of mediation of the four Powers to prevent war	1366

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
55	M. Isvolsky to M. Sazonoff	Paris July 16 (29)	France to act in concert with Russia.	1366
56	His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Servia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia		Thanks Emperor for telegram.....	1367
57	M. Strandtman to M. Sazonoff	Nish July 16 (29)	Same subject	1368
58	M. Sazonoff to M. Isvolsky	St. Petersburgh July 16 (29)	Mobilisation by Germany. Views of Russian Foreign Minister.....	1368
59	M. Strandtman to M. Sazonoff	Nish July 17 (30)	Manifesto of Prince Regent on declaration of war by Austria-Hungary	1369
60	M. Sazonoff to M. Swerbéew, M. Schébéko, M. Isvolsky, Count Benckendorff, and M. Kroupenski	St. Petersburgh July 17 (30)	Interview with German Ambassador as to the attitude of Russia, in case Austria-Hungary promises no violation of integrity of Servia.....	1369
61	M. Swerbéew to M. Sazonoff	Berlin July 17 (30)	Mobilisation of German army and navy	1370
62	M. Swerbéew to M. Sazonoff	Berlin July 17 (30)	Same subject. Denial by German Minister for Foreign Affairs.....	1370
63	M. Swerbéew to M. Sazonoff	Berlin July 17 (30)	Russian proposals of German Minister	1371
64	Count Benckendorff to M. Sazonoff	London July 17 (30)	Interview with Sir E. Grey as to the situation	1371
65	Count Benckendorff to M. Sazonoff	London July 17 (30)	Enquiry of German Ambassador as to British naval and military measures	1372
66	M. Schébéko to M. Sazonoff	Vienna July 18 (31)	Interview with Count Berchtold as to Austria-Hungary's intentions	1372

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
67	M. Sazonoff to M. Swerbéew, M. Schébéko, M. Isvolsky, Count Benckendorff and M. Kroupenski	St. Petersburgh July 18 (31)	Attitude of Russia if Austria-Hungary ceases invasion in Servia.....	1373
68	M. Swerbéew to M. Sazonoff	Berlin July 18 (31)	Germany's views as to Russian mobilisation	1373
69	M. Sazonoff to Count Benckendorff	St. Petersburgh July 18 (31)	Gratitude to Sir E. Gray for friendly tone of discussion.....	1374
70	M. Sazonoff to Russian Representatives abroad	July 19 (Aug. 1)	Advises of German Ambassador's instructions as to the mobilisation by Germany if Russia did not demobilise in twelve hours.....	1374
71	Count Benckendorff to M. Sazonoff	London July 19 (Aug. 1)	Sir E. Grey's views as to latest mediation proposal	1375
72	Count Benckendorff to M. Sazonoff	London July 19 (Aug. 1)	Neutrality of Belgium.....	1375
73	M. Isvolsky to M. Sazonoff	Paris July 19 (Aug. 1)	Interview of Austro-Hungarian Ambassador with Premier Viviani.....	1375
74	M. Isvolsky to M. Sazonoff	Paris July 19 (Aug. 1)	French mobilisation order signed....	1376
75	M. Isvolsky to M. Sazonoff	Paris July 19 (Aug. 1)	Austria advises France of her intention to respect territorial integrity of Servia	1376
76	Count Pourtalès to the Russian Foreign Office	St. Petersburgh July 19 (Aug. 1) at 7:10 p.m.	Informs French Government of state of war between Germany and Russia	1377
77		St. Petersburgh July 20 (Aug. 2)	Announcement by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting recent events	1378

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
78	M. Sazonoff to Russian Representatives abroad	1914. St. Petersburgh July 20 (Aug. 2)	Advises Russian representatives abroad of probability of rupture with Germany	1381
79	Count Szapary to the Russian Foreign Office	St. Petersburgh July 24 (Aug. 6) at 6 p.m.	Informs Russian Government that Austria-Hungary considers herself at war with Russia.....	1381

THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK (NO. 2)

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
1	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople July 19 (Aug. 1)	Reports interview with Grand Vizier, who referred to endeavours of Austria to induce Turkey to become her ally	1385
2	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople July 20 (Aug. 2)	Statement of Grand Vizier to French Ambassador of intention to remain neutral	1385
3	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople July 20 (Aug. 2)	Interview with Grand Vizier as to Turkey's mobilisation	1386
4	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople July 20 (Aug. 2)	Intentions of Turkish Government	1386
5	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople July 21 (Aug. 3)	Informs as to limit of Turkey's mobilisation	1387
6	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople July 21 (Aug. 3)	Presence of German officers in Turkey	1387
7	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople July 22 (Aug. 4)	Turkey to preserve neutrality	1388
8	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople July 23 (Aug. 5)	German officers in Turkey	1388
9	Count Benckendorff to M. Sazonoff	London July 24 (Aug. 6)	Neutrality of Turkey assured by Grand Vizier	1389
10	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople July 25 (Aug. 7)	Sequestration of Turkish dreadnoughts by England	1389

NOTE.—The editor is responsible for the table of contents to the *Russian Orange Book* (*No.* 2), as a table of contents was omitted from the official English translation issued by the Russian Government.

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
11	M. Sazonoff to M. Giers	Petrograd July 26 (Aug. 8)	Protest against passage of cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau" through the Dardanelles	1389
12	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople July 26 (Aug. 8)	Same subject	1390
13	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople July 27 (Aug. 9)	Further assurances of neutrality of Turkey	1390
14	M. Sazonoff to M. Giers	Petrograd July 27 (Aug. 9)	Advises that if "Goeben" proceeds through the Dardanelles, Russian Admiral will endeavour to destroy her	1391
15	Count Benckendorff to M. Sazonoff	London July 26 (Aug. 8)	British protest against presence of war vessels of belligerent powers passing through the Dardanelles	1391
16	M. Sazonoff to M. Giers	Petrograd July 28 (Aug. 10)	Advises friendly negotiations with Turkey, but you should impress them with the fact that action taken without the sanction of Russian Government may jeopardise their existence.	1391
17	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople July 29 (Aug. 11)	Reports "Goeben" and "Breslau" entering Dardanelles	1392
18	M. Sazonoff to M. Giers	Petrograd July 29 (Aug. 11)	Protest against reported purchase of "Goeben" and "Breslau" as a violation of neutrality	1392
19	Count Benckendorff to M. Sazonoff	London July 29 (Aug. 11)	Same subject	1393
20	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople July 30 (Aug. 12)	Advises further concerning "Goeben" and "Breslau"	1393
21	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople July 30 (Aug. 12)	Same subject	1394

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
22	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople July 31 (Aug. 13)	Advises that he entered protest respecting German vessels as a violation of neutrality. Entered protest in concert with British and French representatives	1394
23	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 1 (14)	Reports "Goeben" and "Breslau" still under German flag	1395
24	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 1 (14)	Turkish orders for removal from foreign merchant vessels of wireless telegraph apparatus upon their entry into the Straits	1395
25	M. Sazonoff to M. Giers	Petrograd Aug. 1 (14)	Transmits statement of Turkish Ambassador for Foreign Affairs as to neutrality	1395
26	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 4 (17)	Reports on status of "Goeben" and "Breslau"	1396
27	M. Demidoff to M. Sazonoff	Athens Aug. 6 (19)	Advises of reported statement of Greek Minister at Berlin to German Government that no purchase of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" had been make by Turkey	1396
28	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 6 (19)	Removal of crew of "Goeben" and "Breslau"	1397
29	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 7 (20)	Advises of gravity of situation. Military in power and apparently trying to draw Turkey into war	1397
30	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 6 (19)	Interview with Minister of Finance, who suggests possible agreement with Triple Entente. Suggests grant to Turkey of complete economic independence and suppression of capitulations	1397
31	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 7 (20)	Same subject	1398

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
32	M. Sazonoff to Count Benckendorff and M. Isvolsky	Petrograd Aug. 8 (21)	Same subject	1399
33	M. Isvolsky to M. Sazonoff	Paris Aug. 9 (22)	Same subject	1399
34	M. Sazonoff to M. Giers	Petrograd Aug. 10 (23)	Informs of status of question of meeting Turkish demands. States England and France ready to join in giving written guaranty of inviolability of Turkey, etc. Turkey to remain neutral and to return German officers and crew of "Goeben" and "Breslau" to Germany	1400
35	M. Isvolsky to M. Sazonoff	Paris Aug. 11 [24)	Same subject	1401
36	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 14 (27)	Reports rumours of exit of "Goeben" and "Breslau" into Black Sea. Advises also of report of arrival of German seamen and mechanical engineers from Constantinople	1401
37	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 14 (27)	German Admiral to arrive at early date. German officers have already arrived for service in the Dardanelles forts	1402
38	Count Benckendorff to M. Sazonoff	London Aug. 15 (28)	Views of Sir Edward Grey, who expressed his anxiety at situation at Constantinople	1402
39	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 16 (29)	Reports on efforts of Germany to draw Turkey into war. Advises of arrival of German enlisted men under guise of artisans, and of 800 German soldiers with officers	1402
40	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 19 (Sept. 1)	Advises of interview with Minister of Marine, who promises removal of German sailors	1403
41	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 26 (Sept. 8)	Advises of probable declaration by Turkey of suppression of capitulations	1404

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
42	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 27 (Sept. 9)	Italy does not approve of suppression of the capitulations	1404
43	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 28 (Sept. 10)	Note of Grand Vizier giving notice of the capitulations. Text of the note. Text of the reply of the Powers	1405
44	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 28 (Sept. 10)	Interview with Grand Vizier concerning capitulations	1408
45	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 28 (Sept. 10)	Strengthening of the forts of the Dardanelles under the direction of Weber Pasha and German high officer	1409
46	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 28 (Sept. 10)	Informs of report that Turkey is bound to Germany by an agreement presumed to have been effected by Enver Pasha	1409
47	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 28 (Sept. 10)	Advises of information that German Government has notified Turkish Government that she should fulfil her obligations as an ally of Germany	1410
48	M. Sazonoff to Count Benckendorff and M. Isvolsky	Petrograd Aug. 28 (Sept. 10)	Russian views as to capitulations	1410
49	M. Sazonoff to M. Giers	Petrograd Aug. 28 (Sept. 10)	Instructed to warn Grand Vizier that complications may arise at the appearance in the Black Sea of the "Goeben" and "Breslau"	1411
50	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 31 (Sept. 13)	Same subject	1411
51	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 31 (Sept. 13)	Withdrawal of German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors from making further objection to abrogation of capitulations	1411
52	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Aug. 31 (Sept. 13)	Recall by England of Admiral Limpus and all British officers on account of situation in Turkey	1412

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
53	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 1 (14)	Informs of effects of subsidising by Germany and Austria-Hungary of the Constantinople press	1412
54	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 2 (15)	Reports interview with Turkish officials respecting Turkish economic problems and suppression of capitulations	1413
55	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 4 (17)	Advises of interview with Djavid Bey, who stated that the Triple Entente could bring about Turkish demobilisation if made conditional upon their consent to the suppression of economic, as well as juridical, capitulations	1413
56	M. Sazonoff to M. Giers	Petrograd Sept. 6 (19)	Reply of Russian Government to Turkish proposals	1414
57	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 8 (21)	Reports further respecting the "Goeben" and advises of interview with Grand Vizier on the subject	1414
58	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 9 (22)	States the "Breslau" was sent into the Black Sea, notwithstanding the decision of the Council of Ministers to the contrary	1415
59	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 9 (22)	Reports efforts of German and Austrian Ambassadors to arouse Turks against Russians	1415
60	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 9 (22)	Reports new customs law increasing duties	1416
61	M. Sazonoff to M. Giers	Petrograd Sept. 11 (24)	Instructs respecting negotiations concerning capitulations	1416
62	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 12 (25)	Reports publication of transitory law extending law of temettu to foreigners engaged in mercantile business, etc.	1417

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
63	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 12 (25)	Reports negotiations of British and French Ambassadors with Ottoman Government concerning capitulations	1417
64	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 13 (26)	Effect on international postal service of suppression of capitulations.....	1418
65	M. Sazonoff to M. Giers	Petrograd Sept. 13 (26)	Instructs him to inform Ottoman Government of approval by Russian Government of protest submitted by Russian Ambassador relative to capitulations	1418
66	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 14 (27)	Advises that Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has been charged to use every means to call forth action of Turkish fleet against Russia.....	1419
67	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 14 (27)	Reports stoppage of Turkish torpedo boat by British war-ship, the British commander having received instructions not to permit exit from the Dardanelles	1419
68	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 14 (27)	Reports concerted action of French and British Ambassadors and himself in protesting against closure of the Dardanelles	1420
69	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 15 (28)	Reports request of Grand Vizier for the withdrawal of British squadron to some distance from the entrance to the Dardanelles, promising the opening of the Straits if request was complied with	1420
70	M. Isvolsky to M. Sazonoff	Bordeaux Sept. 17 (30)	Same subject	1421
71	M. Isvolsky to M. Sazonoff	Bordeaux Sept. 18 (Oct. 1)	States that French Ambassador at London telegraphed that British Government would not withdraw its ships as requested by Turkish Government	1421
72	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 17 (30)	British and Russian post-offices in Turkey to discontinue receipt of mails. Joint British and Russian protest made against decree of the Porte	1422

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
73	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 18 (Oct. 1)	Same subject	1422
74	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 18 (Oct. 1)	Reports negotiations with the President of the Chamber of Deputies relative to suppression of capitulations. Gives summary of answer given by him with assent of British and French Ambassadors.....	1422
75	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 19 (Oct. 2)	Reports efforts of Austro-Hungarian Government to induce Turkey to proceed at once against Russia.....	1423
76	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 20 (Oct. 3)	Reviews general situation in Constantinople	1424
77	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 20 (Oct. 3)	Abolition of Lebanon privileges at an early date	1425
78	M. Sazonoff to M. Giers	Petrograd Sept. 21 (Oct. 4)	Instructs him to support French Ambassador respecting preservation of Lebanon statute	1425
79	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 22 (Oct. 5)	Advises of substance of interview of British Ambassador with the Sultan who stated that Turkey desired to observe strict neutrality.....	1425
80	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 22 (Oct. 5)	Report of general situation in Turkey as result of mobilisation and placing on war footing.....	1426
81	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 22 (Oct. 5)	Identical note presented by Entente Powers relative to Lebanon statute.	1427
82	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 26 (Oct. 9)	Advises of establishment of official German institution for making requisitions on foreign goods.....	1427
83	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 23 (Oct. 6)	Further efforts of Austria-Hungary and Germany to induce Turkish Government to have its fleet attack Black Sea coast.....	1428

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
84	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 28 (Oct. 11)	Proposed promulgation by the Porte of a law for the subjection of foreign schools to government control. Protest made jointly with French and British Ambassadors.....	1428
85	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Sept. 30 (Oct. 13)	Russian and Roumanian war flags ordered and received by the Germans for the "Goeben".....	1428
86	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Oct. 2 (15)	Further information respecting demands of German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors on Turkey.....	1429
87	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Oct. 3 (16)	Same subject	1429
88	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Oct. 5 (18)	Same subject	1429
89	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Oct. 7 (20)	Same subject	1430
90	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Oct. 16 (29)	Views on sinking of several vessels at Odessa by torpedo boats. French, British, and Russian Ambassadors suggest a declaration to the Porte that it can take the choice between the immediate breaking off of relations or the removal from Turkey of German officers, as well as the mission of Limann von Sanders, and of the navy	1430
91	M. Sazonoff to M. Giers	Petrograd Oct. 16 (29)	Opening of hostilities by Turks against Theodosia and Odessa. Instructs the Ambassador to leave Constantinople	1430
92	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Oct. 17 (30)	Acknowledges receipt of foregoing...	1431

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
93	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	1914. Constantinople Oct. 17 (30)	Same subject	1431
94	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Constantinople Oct. 17 (30)	Reports interview with Grand Vizier, who expressed regret for attack of Turkish fleet and gave assurances that he would be able to set the Germans straight	1431
95	M. Isvolsky to M. Sazonoff	Bordeaux Oct. 17 (30)	Advises that Minister for Foreign Affairs told him of instructions of French Ambassador at Constantinople to coöperate with Russian and British colleagues	1432
96	Count Benckendorff to M. Sazonoff	London Oct. 18 (31)	Informs that Russian, French, and Italian Ambassadors had demanded passports	1432
97	M. Sazonoff to M. Isvolsky and Count Benckendorff	Petrograd Oct. 19 (Nov. 1)	Transmits contents of telegram from Grand Vizier presented by Ottoman Chargé d'Affaires expressing regret for the action of the Turkish fleet and giving assurances of appropriate solution of the question. Turkish Ambassador to be given his passports	1433
98	M. Giers to M. Sazonoff	Petrograd Oct. 31 (Nov. 13)	Detailed report of recent events on Turkish situation	1434

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
1	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Vienna June 16 (29)	Attitude of the Vienna press respecting the Serajevo outrage.....	1441
2	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Vienna June 17 (30)	Same subject	1441
3	Dr. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Berlin June 17 (30)	Articles in Berlin press respecting Serajevo outrage misleading German public opinion.....	1442
4	Dr. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Berlin June 17 (30)	Same subject	1442
5	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Vienna June 17 (30)	Advises of interview with the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office. Gives résumé of the argument in behalf of Serbia concerning the Serajevo outrage. Explained attitude of Serbia towards the matter as one of condemnation of the outrage and of the alleged fostering of ill-will towards Austria-Hungary	1442
6	M. M. Georgevitch to M. N. Pashitch	Constantinople June 17 (30)	Advises of conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador regarding relations with Austria-Hungary. Expressed to the Ambassador the hope that the Serajevo matter would not unfavourably influence these relations	1443
7	M. M. S. Boschkovitch to M. N. Pashitch	London June 18 (July 1)	Attitude of the English newspapers..	1444
8	M. N. Pashitch to all the Royal Serbian Legations abroad	Belgrade June 18 (July 1)	Advises that the Austro-Hungarian press are blaming Serbia for the Serajevo matter. States attitude in Serbia as one of condemnation in regard to the assassination. Anti-Serbian campaign in the European press should be stopped.....	1444

NOTE.—The editor is responsible for the table of contents to the *Serbian Blue Book*, as the table of contents was omitted from the official British publication containing this correspondence.

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page,
		1914.		
9	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Vienna June 18 (July 1)	Demonstration in front of the Serbian Legation. Hatred of Serbians and of Serbia being expressed among the people	1445
10	Dr. M. R. Vesnitch to M. N. Pashitch	Paris June 19 (July 2)	Suggestion of French Government that Serbia maintain an attitude of composure	1446
11	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Vienna June 20 (July 3)	Demonstration before the Serbian Legation. Removal of the Serbian flag demanded	1446
12	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Vienna June 20 (July 3)	Describes interview with Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office. Belgrade press severely criticised by Baron Macchio. In reply suggested same attitude of Vienna press towards Serbia	1447
13	Dr. M. R. Vesnitch to M. N. Pashitch	Paris June 21 (July 4)	Interview with French Minister for Foreign Affairs in which he described to the Minister the attitude of Serbia	1448
14	Dr. M. Spalaikovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Petrograd June 21 (July 4)	Interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The outrages upon the Serbs in Austria will increase the sympathy of Europe for Serbia	1449
15	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Vienna June 23 (July 6)	Situation at Vienna one of excitement in military and Government circles against Serbia	1449
16	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Vienna June 23 (July 6)	Résumé of articles in Vienna press against Serbia	1449
17	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Vienna June 24 (July 7)	Continuation of excitement in Vienna. Letter of Emperor to the Prime Ministers of Austria and Hungary appealing for calmness. Possible course of Austria-Hungary respecting relations to Serbia	1451
18	M. N. Pashitch to all the Serbian Legations abroad	Belgrade June 26 (July 9)	Receipt of threatening letters from Austria-Hungary by the Crown Prince Alexander	1452
19	Dr. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Berlin July 1 (14)	Criticism by Austro-Hungarian Secretary of State of the provocative attitude of the Serbian press	1452

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
20	M. N. Pashitch to all the Serbian Legations abroad	Belgrade July 1 (14)	Hostile attitude of the Austrian press in order to excite public opinion in Europe	1452
21	M. N. Pashitch to all the Serbian Legations abroad	Belgrade July 1 (14)	Same subject	1453
22	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Vienna July 1 (14)	Same subject. Official German circles at Vienna especially ill-disposed towards Serbia	1454
23	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Vienna July 2 (15)	Situation at Vienna. Meeting of the Ministers of the Dual Monarchy. No information as to object and result	1455
24	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Vienna July 2 (15)	Magisterial investigation into the Serajevo outrage. Mode of procedure of Austro-Hungarian Government criticised and condemned in diplomatic circles	1456
25	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Vienna July 2 (15)	Discussed possible attitude of Austria-Hungary. Memorandum of accusation against Serbia will probably be drawn up	1457
26	Dr. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Berlin July 3 (16)	View at Vienna of existence of a Great Serbian propaganda. Requests for its suppression	1458
27	M. M. S. Boschkovitch to M. N. Pashitch	London July 4 (17)	Efforts of Austrian Ambassador to win over the English press against Serbia	1458
28	M. Ljub Michailovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Rome July 4 (17)	Attitude of Italian Government. International considerations to be taken into account by Austria in any step against Serbia	1459
29	Dr. M. Spalaikovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Petrograd July 5 (18)	Interview of Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the provocative attitude of the Vienna press	1459
30	M. N. Pashitch to all Serbian Missions abroad	Belgrade July 6 (19)	Extensive discussion of the attitude of the Austrian press and of the Serbian press. Attitude of the Serbian Government one of peace and maintenance of good relations with Austria-Hungary	1459
31	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Vienna July 7 (20)	Contentions of Austria-Hungary. Preparations of a serious character being made	1463

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
32	Baron Giesl von Gieslingen to Dr. Laza Patchou	Belgrade July 10 (23)	Text of Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia	1464
33	Dr. Laza Patchou to all the Serbian Legations abroad	Belgrade July 10 (23)	Advises of receipt of Austro-Hungarian Note	1469
34	M. N. Pashitch to Dr. M. Spalaikovitch	Belgrade July 11 (24)	Serbian reply to be handed in Saturday at 6 p.m.	1469
35	M. N. Pashitch to M. M. Boschkovitch	Belgrade July 11 (24)	Interview of British Chargé d'Affaires respecting Austria-Hungary's demands	1469
36	Dr. M. Spalaikovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Petrograd July 11 (24)	Details of conversation with German Ambassador concerning Hungarian matters. Opinion of Ambassador that the question is one between Serbia and Austria only	1470
37	Crown Prince Alexander to the Emperor of Russia	Belgrade July 11 (24)	Telegram of Crown Prince Alexander to the Emperor of Russia asking assistance	1470
38	M. N. Pashitch to all the Serbian Legations	Belgrade July 12 (25)	Summary of reply of Serbian Government communicated to representatives of the allied Governments	1471
39		Belgrade July 12 (25)	Text of the repy of the Serbian Government	1472
40	Baron Giesl von Gieslingen to M. N. Pashitch	Belgrade July 12 (25)	Note of Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade advising that he is leaving with the Staff of the Imperial and Royal Legation. Rupture of diplomatic relations	1476
41	M. N. Pashitch to all the Serbian Legations abroad	Belgrade July 12 (25)	Interview with the Austro-Hungarian Minister. Advises of unsatisfactory character of Serbia's reply, and that he was leaving Belgrade	1477
42	Count Leopold Berchtold to M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch	Vienna July 12 (25)	States that Baron Giesl had been instructed to leave the Serbian capital on account of unsatisfactory reply of Serbia. Transmits passports for Serbian Minister	1477
43	Emperor of Russia to Crown Prince of Serbia	Petrograd July 14 (27)	Telegram of Emperor of Russia to Crown Prince Alexander advising of his sympathy and interest in Serbia.	1478

No.	Name.	Place and Date.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
44	Crown Prince Alexander to Emperor of Russia	Nish July 17 (30)	Reply of Crown Prince Alexander to telegram of Emperor of Russia.....	1479
45	Count Leopold Berchtold to M. N. Pashitch	Vienna July 15 (28)	State of war declared by Austria-Hungary	1479
46	M. N. Pashitch to all the Serbian Legations abroad	Nish July 15 (28)	Same subject	1480
47	Dr. M. Spalaikovitch to M. Sazonoff	Petrograd July 15 (28)	Advises Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war. Petitions for aid from the Russian Government.....	1480
48	M. Sazonoff to Dr. M. Spalaikovitch	Petrograd July 17 (30)	Reply to the foregoing.....	1481
49	M. N. Pashitch to Dr. M. Yovanovitch	Nish July 22 (Aug. 4)	Withdrawal of the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.....	1481
50	Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the German Legation at Nish	Nish July 24 (Aug. 6)	Requests Baron Giesl to leave Serbian territory. Encloses passports	1481
51	Dr. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Berlin July 24 (Aug. 6)	Details of visit to German Foreign Office and states its attitude to be against Servia and condemns Russia as the instigator of Serbia.....	1482
52	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch to M. N. Pashitch	Nish Aug. 3 (16)	Summarises recent events at Vienna prior to the declaration of the war. Attitude of the diplomatic circles towards the Austro-Hungarian Note and Serbian reply.....	1482

APPENDIX.

Speech of Signor Giolitti before the Italian Chamber of Deputies, December 5, 1914..... 1489

THE
GERMAN WHITE BOOK

THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK[1]

1. MEMORIAL LAID BEFORE THE IMPERIAL DIET ON AUGUST 3, 1914.

On June 28, 1914, the Heir Apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by a member of a band of Servian conspirators. The investigation of the crime made by the Austro-Hungarian authorities has proved that the conspiracy against the life of the Archduke and successor to the throne was not only organised in Belgrade, but aided and abetted by Servian officials, and executed with arms from a Servian State arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the entire civilised world, not only as regards the aims of the Servian policy directed against the existence and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which the Pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in employing for the achievement of these aims.

The goal of this policy was to gradually revolutionise and finally separate the southeasterly districts from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and to unite them with Servia. In spite of Servia's repeated and solemn declarations and promises to change this policy towards Austria-Hungary as well as to cultivate good and neighbourly relations with Austria, the policy in question has been adhered to continuously.

Thus Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world war for the third time within the last six years.

Only because she expected support from Russia could Servia adopt such an attitude.

Soon after the events resulting from the Turkish revolution of 1908, Russia endeavoured to bring about under her patronage a union

[1] *Documents relating to the Outbreak of the War. Published by the Imperial German Foreign Office.* Title of publication in the original text: *Aktenstücke zum Kriegsausbruch. Herausgegeben vom Auswärtigen Amte.*

of the Balkan States directed against the existence of Turkey. This union, which succeeded in 1911 in driving Turkey from a greater part of her European possessions, collapsed when it came to the question of the distribution of spoils. Russia's policy, however, was not put off by this failure. The Russian statesmen now conceived the idea of a new Balkan union under Russian patronage, which, however, should no longer be directed against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balkans, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The idea was that Servia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during the last Balkan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina, which were to be taken from Austria. In order to oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this plan she was to be isolated, Roumania was to be attached to Russia with the aid of French propaganda, and Servia was promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

Under these circumstances it became clear that it was no longer compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to view idly the Servian agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal Government apprised Germany of these views and asked for our opinion. Whole-heartedly we were able to agree with our ally's view of the situation, and assure her that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Servia directed against the very existence of the Monarchy, would meet with our approval.

We were perfectly well aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia into the field, and that we might therefore be involved in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not, however, considering the vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to adopt a conciliatory attitude incompatible with her dignity, nor could we deny her our assistance in these trying days, more especially as our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. Had the Serbs with the aid of Russia and France been allowed to go on menacing the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under the Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. Austria morally weakened under the pressure of Russian Pan-Slavism would no longer be an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever increasingly menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbours. We

therefore granted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Servia; we did not participate in her preparations.

Austria chose to present to the Servian Government a note, in which the direct connexion between the murder at Serajevo and the Pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but actively supported by the Servian Government, was exposed, and in which she demanded that this agitation should cease, and that those who were found guilty should be punished. At the same time Austria-Hungary postulated as necessary guarantee for the execution of her demands that some Austrian officials should participate in the preliminary examination on Servian territory, and that the Pan-Serb societies agitating against Austria-Hungary should be dissolved for good. The Imperial and Royal Government granted a delay of forty-eight hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands.

The day after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note, the Servian Government began the mobilisation of its army.

After the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a reply which, in some points, complied with the conditions made by Austria-Hungary, which however in all the essential points showed that Servia through procrastination and new negotiations was trying to escape from the just demands of the Monarchy; the latter therefore broke off her diplomatic relations with Servia without indulging in further negotiations, or accepting further assurances from Servia, the value of which, to her own detriment, she had sufficiently experienced.

From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Servia, which was officially proclaimed on the 28th of July by a formal declaration of war.

From the beginning of the conflict it was our opinion that this was a matter which Austria alone would have to settle with Servia. We therefore directed our efforts towards localising the war, and towards convincing the other Powers that Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, forced upon her under the existing circumstances. We emphatically held the opinion that no civilised country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and political crime, and to shield the Servians against their just punishment. In this sense we instructed our representatives with the foreign Powers.

Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government informed the Russian Government that the step undertaken against Servia implied merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but that

Austria-Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a continued friendly behaviour of Servia towards the Monarchy. Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in the Balkans.

In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired, and aimed at, a localisation of the conflict, both the French and the British Governments promised an action in the same direction. But these endeavours did not succeed in preventing Russia from interfering in the Austro-Servian disagreement.

The Russian Government issued an official communication on July 24th, which declared that Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the Serbo-Austrian conflict. The same was declared by the Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès. In the afternoon of July 26th, the Austrian Government, through its Ambassador in St. Petersburgh, again declared that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wanted peace on her frontiers.

In the course of the same day, however, the first news of Russian mobilisation reached Berlin.

In the evening of July 26th, the German Ambassadors in London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh were instructed to energetically point out to the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Russia the danger of this Russian mobilisation. Austria-Hungary having officially declared to Russia that she did not claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision as to the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburgh. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh was directed to make the following statement to the Russian Government:

> "Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army. Mobilisation however means war. Knowing the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to bring about such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not call in question the existence of the Servian Kingdom, we are of opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more sincerely support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to infringe upon the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding."

On July 27th, the Russian Secretary of War, M. Suchomlinof, gave the German Military Attaché his word of honour that no order to mobilise had been issued, that merely preparations were being made, but not a horse had been mustered, nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts adjoining Austria, *i.e.*, Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilised, but under no circumstances those situated on the German frontier, *i.e.*, St. Petersburgh, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon enquiry into the object of the mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The Military Attaché then pointed out that these mobilisation measures directed against Austria-Hungary were also extremely menacing for Germany.

In the following days news concerning Russian mobilisation came at a rapid rate. There was also news about preparations on the German-Russian frontier, such as the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.

On July 27th, the first information was received concerning preparatory measures taken by France: The 14th Corps discontinued its manœuvres and returned to its garrison.

In the meantime we did not relax our efforts to localise the conflict by emphatically working on the various Cabinets.

On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared in regard to this proposal that, however much we approved of the idea, we could not participate in such a conference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with Servia before a European tribunal.

France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected.

Faithfully upholding the principle that mediation should not deal with the Austro-Servian conflict, which was to be considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely with the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavours to bring about an understanding between these two Powers.

But the conference idea having failed, we were also prepared to transmit to Vienna a second proposal made by Sir Edward Grey, suggesting that Austria-Hungary should decide either that the Servian reply was sufficient, or that it might be used as a basis for

further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government, fully appreciating our mediation, remarked that this proposal had been made too late, as the hostilities had already opened.

In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised Vienna to make every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the Monarchy.

Unfortunately, all these proposals were frustrated by the military preparations of Russia and France.

On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilised. At the same time further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of France, both on water and on land.

On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh had a conversation with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he reported, by telegraph, as follows:

"The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands touching upon the sovereignty of Servia. I merely promised to report the conversation, pointing out that, Russia having decided upon the baneful step of mobilisation, every exchange of ideas appeared extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia was now demanding from us as regards Austria-Hungary precisely what Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Servia, *i.e.*, an infringement of the rights of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial aspiration,—a great concession on the part of a state engaged in war,—should therefore be permitted to attend to her affair with Servia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Servia.

"I very solemnly added that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European conflagration, and I took great pains to present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger.

"It was impossible to dissuade Sazonof from the idea that Servia at this moment could not be deserted by Russia."

On July 29th, the German Military Attaché in St. Petersburgh wired the following report of a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army:

"The Chief of the General Staff asked me to call on him, and he told me that he had just come from His Majesty and that he had

been requested by the Secretary of War to assure me once more that everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days ago. He offered confirmation in writing, and gave me his word of honour in the most solemn manner that nowhere had there been a mobilisation, *viz.*, calling in of a single man or horse, up to the present time, *i.e.*, 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not guarantee for the future, but he could emphasise that on the fronts directed towards our own frontiers, His Majesty desired no mobilisation.

"As, however, I had received repeated news concerning the calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country, also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his officer's word of honour he replied that such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given.

"Considering the abundant and positive information about the calling in of reserves, I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken."

In reply to various enquiries made as to reasons for its threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that Austria-Hungary had as yet commenced no conversation in St. Petersburgh. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburgh was therefore instructed on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with M. Sazonof. Count Szapary was empowered to explain to the Russian Minister the note to Servia, which, however, was obliterated by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia, as well as to discuss with M. Sazonof all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian relations.

Shoulder to shoulder with England we tried to mediate incessantly and we supported every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as late as the 30th of July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, suggesting that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Servia, *i.e.*, after her march into Servia. We thought that Russia would accept this basis.

Whilst during the time from July 29th to July 31st, supported by England, we urgently and continuously endeavoured to mediate, there appeared renewed and abundant news concerning Russian measures of mobilisation. Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier, and the declaration of the state of war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier, allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilisation was in full swing against us, while at

the same time to our representative in St. Petersburgh all such measures were denied on word of honour.

Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German mediation, the tendencies and basis of which must have been known in St. Petersburgh, could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilisation.

During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the German Emperor and Czar Nicholas an exchange of telegrams, in which His Majesty called the attention of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russian mobilisation during the continuance of his own mediating activities.

On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majesty the Emperor:

"I thank you heartily for your mediation, which begins to give one hope that all may yet end peacefully. It is technically impossible to stop our military preparations, which were obligatory owing to Austria's mobilisation. We are far from wishing war. As long as the negotiations with Austria on Servia's account are taking place, my troops shall not take any provocative action. I give you my solemn word for this. I put all my trust in God's mercy and hope in your successful mediation in Vienna, for the welfare of our countries and for the peace of Europe.

Your affectionate

NICHOLAS."

This telegram of the Czar crossed the following, sent by H. M. the Emperor, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m.:

"On your appeal to my friendship and your call for assistance I began to mediate between your and the Austro-Hungarian Government. While this action was proceeding, your troops were mobilised against Austria-Hungary, my ally. Thereby, as I have already pointed out to you, my mediation has been made almost illusory. I have nevertheless continued my action; I now receive authentic news of serious preparations for war on my eastern frontier. Responsibility for the safety of my empire forces preventive measures of defence upon me. In my endeavours to maintain the peace of the world I have gone to the utmost possible limit. The responsibility for the disaster which is now threatening the whole civilised world will not be laid at my door. In this moment it still lies in your power to avert it. Nobody is threatening the honour or power of Russia,

who can well afford to await the result of my mediation. My friendship for you and your empire transmitted to me by my grandfather on his death-bed, has always been sacred to me, and I have honestly often backed up Russia when she was in serious trouble, especially in her last war. The peace of Europe may still be maintained by you if Russia will agree to stop the military measures which must threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary."

Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilisation of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered during the afternoon of the 31st of July, was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the Czar's telegram was despatched at 2 o'clock that same afternoon.

After the Russian general mobilisation became known in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh was instructed in the afternoon of July 31st, to inform the Russian Government that Germany had declared the state of war as a counter-measure to the general mobilisation of the Russian army and navy, and that mobilisation was bound to follow if Russia did not stop her military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, and notify Germany thereof.

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed to demand from the French Government a declaration within eighteen hours as to whether they would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.

The Russian Government by mobilising, thus menacing the security of our country, frustrated the laborious efforts at mediation of the European Cabinets. The Russian measures of mobilisation, in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government were never allowed by us to entertain a doubt, in connexion with the continued denial that they had been taken, show clearly that Russia wanted war.

The Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh delivered his note to M. Sazonof on July 31st at midnight.

The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us.

Two hours after the expiration of the time-limit the Czar telegraphed to H. M. the German Emperor, as follows:

"I received your telegram. Understand you are obliged to mobilise, but wish to have the same guarantee from you as I gave you, that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue negotiating for the benefit of our countries and universal peace dear to all our hearts. Our long-proved friendship must succeed

with God's help in avoiding bloodshed. Anxiously full of confidence await your answer."

To this H. M. the German Emperor replied:

"Thank you for your telegram. I yesterday pointed out to your Government the way by which alone war may be avoided. Although I requested an answer for noon to-day, no telegram from my Ambassador conveying an answer from your Government has reached me as yet. I therefore have been obliged to mobilise my army. Immediate, affirmative, clear and unmistakable answer from your Government is the only way to avoid endless misery. Until I have received this answer, alas, I am unable to discuss the subject of your telegram. I must as a matter of fact request you to immediately order your troops on no account to commit the slightest act of trespassing over our frontiers."

As the term granted to Russia had expired without a reply to our enquiry having arrived, H. M. the Emperor ordered the mobilisation of the entire German army and navy on August 1st at 5 p.m.

The German Ambassador in St. Petersburgh was instructed that, in the event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, he should declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war, our demands having been refused. Before, however, the German Government had been advised that this order had been carried out, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August 1st, *i.e.*, in the same afternoon in which the telegram of the Czar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German territory.

Thus Russia began war against Germany.

Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris, as ordered, put our question to the French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m.

The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply on August 1st at 1 p.m., giving no clear idea of the attitude of France, as he limited himself to the explanation that France would do that which her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the mobilisation of the entire French army and navy was ordered.

On the morning of the next day France opened the hostilities.

Concluded on August 2nd, midday.

2. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SERVIA.

I. The Austro-Hungarian Note to Servia.
(North German Gazette, July 25, 1914.)

Berlin, July 24th.—The Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade presented to the Servian Government at 6 o'clock last night a verbal note containing the Austro-Hungarian demands. An answer to this note is expected by Saturday, July 25th, 6 p.m. The note runs as follows:

On March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Minister to the Court of Vienna made the following statement, by order of his Government, to the Imperial and Royal Government:

"Servia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt herself to the decisions which the Powers are going to arrive at in reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. In following the counsels of the Powers, Servia binds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she binds herself further to change the direction of her present policy towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter in friendly and neighbourly relations."

The history of the last years, more especially the painful events of June 28th, have demonstrated the existence of a subversive movement in Servia aiming at a separation of certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This movement, which developed under the eyes of the Servian Government, has subsequently made itself felt beyond the territory of the kingdom, through acts of terrorism, a series of assassinations and attempted murders.

Far from fulfilling the formal obligations expressed in the declaration of March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Government have done nothing to suppress this movement. They tolerated the criminal doings of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, the unbridled language of the press, the glorification of the instigators of assassinations, and the participation of officers and officials in subversive intrigues; they tolerated the unwholesome propaganda in public education, and lastly permitted all manifestations which would mislead the Servian people into hatred of the Monarchy and into contempt for its institutions.

This tolerance of which the Royal Servian Government have made

themselves guilty, lasted up to the very moment in which the events of June 28th demonstrated to the entire world the ghastly consequences of such tolerance.

It is proved by the evidence, and by the confessions of the criminal authors of this outrage of June 28th, that the Serajevo murder was instigated in Belgrade, that the murderers received the arms and bombs with which they were equipped from Servian officers and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transporting of the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by leading Servian frontier officials.

Owing to these results of the investigation, the Imperial and Royal Government can no longer maintain the attitude of forbearance which they have maintained for years towards these agitations emanating from Belgrade, and extending into the territory of the Monarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the duty of putting an end to intrigues that constitute a permanent menace for the peace of the Monarchy.

In order to attain this end, the Imperial and Royal Government are forced to demand an official assurance from the Servian Government that they condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, *i.e.*, all the machinations aiming at a separation from the Monarchy of parts belonging thereto, and that they bind themselves to suppress by all means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to emphasise the solemn character of their obligations, the Royal Servian Government will publish on the first page of their official organ on July 26th, 1914, the following declaration:

"The Royal Servian Government condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, *i.e.*, all the machinations aiming at a separation from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy of territories belonging thereto, and they sincerely regret the ghastly consequences of such criminal actions.

"The Royal Servian Government regret that Servian officers and officials have participated in the propaganda cited above, and have thus threatened the friendly and neighbourly relations which the Royal Government were solemnly bound to cultivate by their declaration of March 31st, 1909.

"The Royal Government, disapproving of and rejecting every thought or every attempt at influencing the destiny of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty to call most emphatically to the attention of their officers and officials and of the entire population of the kingdom, that they will henceforth

proceed with the utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar actions, which they will make every effort to prevent and suppress."

This explanation is to be simultaneously notified to the Royal Army by order of H. M. the King, and it is to be published in the official organ of the army.

"In addition, the Royal Servian Government pledge themselves as follows:

"1. To suppress any publication fostering hatred of and contempt for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and general tendency of which is directed against the latter's territorial integrity;

"2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate its entire means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and associations in Servia occupying themselves with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the necessary steps to prevent the societies that have been dissolved from continuing their activities under another name or in another form;

"3. Without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Servia, so far as the body of instructors, as well as the means of instruction, are concerned, anything that serves, or may serve, to foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

"4. To remove from the military and civil service in general all officers and officials guilty of carrying on propaganda against Austria-Hungary; the Imperial and Royal Government will in time communicate to the Royal Government their names and the facts adduced against them;

"5. To consent to officials of the Imperial and Royal Government coöperating in Servia in the suppression of the agitation directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

"6. To take judicial proceedings against those participants in the conspiracy of June 28th who are now on Servian territory. Officials delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government will take part in the investigations;

"7. To proceed at once with all severity with the prosecution of Major Voja Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganovic, a Servian State official, who have been compromised by the result of the investigations;

"8. To prevent through effective measures the participation of the Servian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the frontier, and to dismiss those officials stationed at Shabatz and

Loznica who assisted the instigators of the crime of Serajevo in crossing the frontier;

"9. To give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations regarding the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries in Servia and abroad who, when interviewed after the outrage of June 28th, in spite of their official position, did not hesitate to express themselves in a hostile manner against Austria-Hungary;

"10. The Imperial and Royal Government expect a reply by the Royal Government not later than Saturday 25th inst., at 6 p.m. A memorial dealing with the results of the investigations at Serajevo, as far as they concern points 7 and 8, is enclosed with this note."

(ENCLOSURE.)

The criminal proceedings taken against Gabrilo Princip and his accomplices by the Court of Serajevo, with regard to the assassination on June 28th, have adduced the following facts:

1. The plan to murder Archduke Franz Ferdinand during his stay in Serajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko Gabrinovic, and a certain Milan Ciganovic and Trifko Grabez, with the aid of Major Voja Tankosic.

2. Six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by the criminals, were obtained by Milan Ciganovic and Major Tankosic, and presented to Princip Gabrinovic and Grabez in Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of the Servian army in Kragujevac.

4. To ensure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganovic instructed Princip, Gabrinovic and Grabez in the use of the grenades and gave them instructions in shooting with Browning pistols in a forest near the shooting ground of Topshider.

5. In order to enable Princip, Gabrinovic and Grabez to cross the frontier of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to smuggle their arms, a secret system of transport was organised by Ciganovic. The entry of the criminals with their arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was effected by the frontier captains of Shabatz (Rade Popovic) and of Loznica, as well as by the custom house official Rudivoy Grbic, of Loznica, with the aid of several other persons.

II. The Servian Note.
(North German Gazette, July 29, 1914.)

Vienna, July 27th.—The Note presented by the Royal Servian Government and dated July 12/25th, 1914, runs as follows:

The Royal Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 23rd inst. and are convinced that their reply will do away with any misunderstanding threatening to destroy the friendly and neighbourly relations between the Austrian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

The Royal Government are aware that on no occasion have the protests against the great neighbourly Monarchy been renewed, which formerly were expressed in the Skupschtina, as well as in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State, and which were brought to an end by the Servian declaration of March 18th, 1909; and further that since that time neither the various Governments of the kingdom which have succeeded each other, nor their officials, have made any attempt to alter the political and legal conditions created in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The Royal Government beg to state that the I. and R. Government have made no protest in this sense excepting in the case of a schoolbook, in regard to which, however, the I. and R. Government have received an entirely satisfactory explanation. During the Balkan crisis Servia has in numerous cases given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy, and the preservation of peace is only due to the sacrifices which Servia has made in the interest of the peace of Europe.

To this point the Austro-Hungarian Government remark:

The Royal Servian Government confine themselves to establishing that since the declaration of March 18th, 1909, there has been no attempt on the part of the Servian Government and their organs to alter the position of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, thus deliberately altering the very basis of our note, which did not contend that the Servian Government and their officials had officially taken any particular steps in that direction. Our point is that in spite of the obligation which the Servian Government took upon themselves in the note cited above, they have failed to suppress the movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy.

Thus Servia's obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the entire direction of her policy, and in entering into friendly and neighbourly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and not merely in not officially interfering with the possession of Bosnia.

The Servian note then goes on:

The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for expressions of a private character, such as newspaper articles and the peaceful work of societies, expressions which are of very common appearance in other countries, and which ordinarily are not controlled by the State, more especially as the Royal Government have shown great courtesy in the solution of a series of questions which have arisen between Servia and Austria-Hungary, thus succeeding in solving the greater number thereof, to the benefit of both countries.

Austro-Hungarian commentary:

The assertion of the Royal Servian Government that the utterance of the press and the activity of Servian associations are of a private character and are thus not subject to the control of the Government, is an absolute contrast to the institutions of modern States, and even to the most liberal laws regulating the press and societies, which subject these, since they are of a public character, to a certain control by the State. This is also provided for by the Servian institutions. The Servian Government are to be blamed precisely for having totally failed to supervise their press and their associations, knowing their tendency to be hostile to the Monarchy.

Servian note:

The Royal Government were therefore painfully surprised by the assertion that Servian subjects had participated in the preparations of the Serajevo outrage. The Government had expected an invitation to coöperate in the investigation of the crime, and they were ready, in order to prove their complete correctness, to proceed against all persons in regard to whom they might receive information.

Austro-Hungarian commentary:

This assertion is incorrect. The Servian Government were accurately informed as to the suspicion resting upon certain clearly defined persons, and they were not only in the position, but also obliged by their own laws to institute investigations spontaneously. The Servian Government have done nothing in this direction.

Servian note:

Complying with the wishes expressed by the I. and R. Government, the Royal Government are prepared to surrender to the court, without regard to position and rank, every Servian citizen, of the participation of whom in the Serajevo crime they shall have received proofs. In particular they bind themselves to publish on the first page of the official organ of the 26th of July the following statement:

"The Royal Servian Government condemn any propaganda that might be directed against Austria-Hungary, *i.e.*, such activities in their entirety as aim at the separation of certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they sincerely regret the lamentable consequences of these criminal machinations."

Austro-Hungarian commentary:

The Austrian demand reads:

"The Royal Servian Government condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary. . . ." The alteration of the declaration as demanded by us, which has been made by the Royal Servian Government, is meant to imply that a propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist, or that they are not aware of its existence. This formula is insincere and treacherous, the Servian Government reserving to themselves for future occasions the subterfuge that they had not disavowed by this declaration the propaganda actually existing at the time, nor recognise the same as hostile to the Monarchy, whence they could further deduce that they were not obliged to suppress a propaganda similar to the one now on foot.

Servian note:

The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication of the I. and R. Government, certain Servian officers and functionaries have participated in the propaganda just referred to, and that these have therefore endangered the amicable relations, the observation of which the Royal Government had solemnly promised through the declaration of March 31st, 1909.

"The Government" . . . wording of the demanded text.

Austro-Hungarian commentary:

The formula as demanded by Austria reads:

"The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries . . . have participated . . ." Hence, with this formula, and the further addition, "according to the communication of the I. and R. Government," the Servian Government pursue the object, indicated above, of retaining a free hand for the future.

Servian note:

The Royal Government bind themselves further:

1. During the next regular meeting of the Skupschtina to embody in the press laws a clause, to wit, that the incitement to hatred of, and contempt for the Monarchy will be punished most severely, likewise any publication, the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.

In view of the impending revision of the Constitution they bind themselves to add an amendment to Art. 22 of the Constitution whereby the confiscation of such publications shall be permitted, which, under the clear provisions of Art. 22 of the Constitution as it now stands, is impossible.

Austrian commentary:

Austria had demanded:

1. "The suppression of any publication inciting to hatred of, and contempt for the Monarchy, and tending to attack the territorial integrity of the Monarchy."

We thus wanted to obtain a formal obligation on the part of Servia to see that such attacks by the press should cease in future; in other words, we wanted to make sure of some noticeable change.

Servia instead offers to pass certain laws which are meant as means towards this end, *viz.:*

(a) A law whereby utterances of the press hostile to the Monarchy can be punished in certain cases. This is quite immaterial to us, more especially as the individual prosecution of press delicts is very rarely possible and as, with a lax enforcement of such laws, the few cases of this nature would not be punished. The proposal, therefore, does not in any way meet our demand, and it offers not the slightest guarantee for the desired improvement.

(b) An amendment to Art. 22 of the Constitution, which would permit of confiscation. This proposal does not satisfy us either, as the existence of such a law in Servia is of no use to us, constituting merely the obligation of the Government to apply the law; but we have not been promised that this will really be done. For we also want the obligation of the Government to enforce it, and that has not been promised us.

These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and evasive, as we are not told within what time these laws will be passed, and as in the case of these laws not being carried by the Skupschtina everything would remain as it is, unless, of course, the Government were to resign.

Servian note:

2. The Government possess no proofs, nor does the note of the I. and R. Government furnish such, that the society Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have committed, up to the present day, any criminal actions of the said manner through one of their members. Notwithstanding, the Royal Government accept the demand of the I. and R. Government and will dissolve the society Narodna Odbrana, as well as any other society which should act against Austria-Hungary.

Austrian commentary:

The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies hostile to the Monarchy saturates the entire public life of Servia.

The reserve made by the Servian Government asserting that they know nothing about it is altogether unacceptable. Besides, our demand is not completely fulfilled, as we further postulated:

"To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies and to prevent the refounding of the dissolved societies under another name and in another form."

On these two points the Belgrade Cabinet remains silent, so that by this incomplete concession there is offered us no guarantee that an end shall be put to the agitation of the associations hostile to the Monarchy, especially the Narodna Odbrana, by dissolving them.

Servian note:

3. The Royal Servian Government bind themselves to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia anything which might further the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, provided the I. and R. Government furnish actual proofs thereof.

Austrian commentary:

In this case also the Servian Government demand proofs that hostility towards the Monarchy is being publicly taught in Servian schools, whereas they must needs know that the books introduced in the Servian schools contain such obnoxious matter and that a large number of Servian schoolmasters are members of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies.

Moreover, the Servian Government have only partly fulfilled our demands, having omitted in their note the addition desired by us: "As far as the body of instructors is concerned, as well as the means of instruction"—a passage showing clearly where the propaganda hostile to the Monarchy is to be found in the Servian schools.

Servian note:

4. The Royal Government are also prepared to dismiss those officers and officials from the military and civil service who by judicial investigation have been found guilty of actions directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy; they expect that

the I. and R. Government will communicate the names of these officers and officials, and the facts with which they have been charged, so that the proceedings may be begun.

Austrian commentary:

The Servian Government, by promising to dismiss from the military and civil service those officers and officials who have been found guilty by judicial procedure, are limiting their assent to those cases only in which these persons have been charged with a criminal offence. As, however, we demand the removal of such officers and officials indulging in a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy, which in general is not subject to punishment in Servia, our demands have not been fulfilled in this point.

Servian note:

5. The Royal Government confess that they are not quite clear as to the meaning and scope of the demand made by the I. and R. Government concerning the obligation on the part of the Royal Servian Government to permit the coöperation of officials of the I. and R. Government on Servian territory, but they declare that they are willing to accept every coöperation not inconsistent with international and criminal law, as well as with friendly and neighbourly relations.

Austrian commentary:

International law, as well as criminal law, has nothing to do with this question; it is purely a matter of police to be handled by the State police and which may be solved by way of a special agreement. The reserved attitude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible, and on account of its vague general form it would lead to insoluble difficulties.

Servian note:

6. The Royal Government consider it their duty as a matter of course to begin an investigation against all those persons who have participated in the outrage of June 28th and who are now in Servian territory. As to the coöperation in this investigation of specially delegated officials of the I. and R. Government, this cannot be accepted, as this would mean a violation of the Constitution and of criminal procedure. Yet in some cases the result of the investigation might reasonably be communicated to the Austro-Hungarian officials.

Austrian commentary:

The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable. We demanded:

1. The instituting of a criminal proceeding against the participants in the outrage.

2. Participation by I. and R. Government officials in the examinations (*recherche* in contrast with *enquête judiciaire*).

3. It did not mean to let I. and R. Government officials participate in the Servian court procedure; they were only to coöperate in the police researches which had to furnish and fix the material for the investigation.

If the Servian Government misunderstand this point, this is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between *enquête judiciaire* and simple police researches. Wishing to avoid any control of the investigation which, if carried out correctly, would yield results highly undesirable to the Servian Government, and possessing no plausible excuse to refuse the coöperation of our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in great number), they try to justify their refusal by picturing our demands as impossible.

Servian note:

7. The Royal Government on the evening of the day on which the note was received ordered the arrest of Major Voislar Tankosic.

As to Milan Ciganovic, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who until June 28th was employed in the Servian Railroad Department, it has as yet been impossible to locate him; a warrant was therefore issued against him.

The I. and R. Government is requested to make known, as soon as possible, for the purpose of the conduct of the investigation, the existing grounds for suspicion and the proofs of guilt obtained in the investigation at Serajevo.

Austrian commentary:

This reply is perfidious. According to our investigations, Ciganovic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left for Ribari three days after the outrage, it having become known that Ciganovic had participated in the outrage. In the first place, it is therefore incorrect that Ciganovic quitted the Servian service on June 28th. In the second place, we add that the prefect of police at Belgrade, who had himself caused the departure of the said Ciganovic and who knew his whereabouts, declared in an interview that a man by the name of Milan Ciganovic did not exist in Belgrade.

Servian note:

8. The Servian Government will extend and render more severe the measures existing for the suppression of smuggling of arms and explosives.

It is a matter of course that they will proceed at once against, and punish severely, those officials of the frontier service on the line Shabatz-Loznica who violated their duty and who permitted the perpetrators of the crime to cross the frontier.

9. The Royal Government are prepared to give explanations with regard to utterances made in interviews by Servian officials in Servia and abroad after the outrage and which, according to the assertion of the I. and R. Government, were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon as the I. and R. Government point out in detail where these utterances were made and succeed in proving that they were actually made by the functionaries concerned, the Royal Government themselves will see that the necessary evidence and proofs are collected.

Austrian commentary:

The Royal Servian Government must have full knowledge of the interviews in question. By asking the I. and R. Government to furnish all sorts of details with regard to the said interviews and by reserving for themselves the right of a formal investigation, they show that they do not seriously intend to fulfil the demand.

Servian note:

10. The Royal Government will notify the I. and R. Government, so far as this has not been done already in the present note, of the execution of the measures in question as soon as one of these measures has been ordered and put into execution.

The Royal Servian Government believe it to be of common interest not to rush the solution of this affair and they are, therefore, in case the I. and R. Government should not consider itself satisfied with this answer, ready, as ever, to accept a peaceable solution, either by referring the decision of this question to the International Court at The Hague or by leaving it to the decision of the Great Powers who have participated in the working out of the declaration given by the Servian Government on March 31st, 1909.—End of the Note.

III. Extract from the Austro-Hungarian Records.

Vienna, July 27th.—The dossier concerning the Servian conflict, mentioned in the Austro-Hungarian circular note to the Embassies of the foreign Powers, was made public to-day.

This memorial directs attention to the fact that the campaign inspired by Servia, having as its purpose the wresting of the southern part of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy and its incorporation in the Servian State, began a long time ago. This propaganda, in its end purposing always the same, and varying only in the means employed and in the degree of its activity, reached its climax at the time of the annexation crisis, when it appeared in its true light. While, on the one hand, the entire Servian press agitated for a war against the Monarchy, there were formed—not to mention other propagandist methods—associations which prepared the ground for this conflict, chief

among which was the Narodna Odbrana. This organisation, which was an outgrowth of a revolutionary committee and was completely dependent upon the Foreign Office at Belgrade, constituted itself under the leadership of statesmen and officers, among whom were General Jankovic and the former Minister Ivanovic. Major Voja Tankovic and Milan Pribicevic were also among the organisers. This association had as its purpose the training and equipment of irregulars for the coming war against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. One of the documents appended to the memorial is an extract from the organ of the Narodna Odbrana, given out by the central committee of the association and bearing the same name as the latter, which exhaustively describes in a number of articles the activities and purposes of the organisation. It is asserted in these articles that one of the chief aims of the Narodna Odbrana is the union with its neighbouring and remote brothers across the border, and with "our other friends in the world."

Austria is described as the first and greatest enemy. In the same manner in which the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of a war with Austria, it preaches "the sacred truth of our situation." The final chapter contains an appeal to the Government and the people of Servia to prepare itself in every manner for the conflict which the annexation has shown to be imminent.

The memorial describes, using the statement of a *Komitatschi* who had been won over as a member of the organisation, the activity of the Narodna Odbrana, which supported a school for the training of bands of irregulars. This school was conducted by two captains, one of whom was Tankovic, and was inspected regularly by Captain Milan Pribicevic. The *Komitatschis* were also instructed in shooting, bomb-throwing, mine-laying, dynamiting of railway bridges, etc. With the solemn declaration of the Servian Government in 1909 the end of this organisation appeared to have come. These expectations, however, were not only not realised, but the propaganda was continued by the Servian press. As an example, the memorial describes the manner in which the attempt upon the life of the Bosnian president, Varesanin, was handled by the press, which praised the assailant as a Servian national hero and glorified his deed. These newspapers were circulated not only in Servia, but were also smuggled into the Monarchy by well-organised underground routes.

While the persons who organised it were still its leaders, the Narodna Odbrana became a short while ago the centre of an agitation which embraced the Schützenbund (Marksmen's Association), with

762 subordinate associations, a Sokolbund (an association of gymnasts), with 3,500 members, and various other organisations.

In the shape of an educational association, concerned only with the spiritual, physical and material development of the people of Servia, the Narodna Odbrana betrays its real reorganised programme in the article from its organ, already referred to, in which it preaches "the sacred truth," declaring that it is an essential necessity to conduct with rifle and cannon a war of extermination against Austria, its chief and greatest enemy, and to prepare the people by all possible means for the battle to liberate the subject territories, in which many million brothers languish under Austrian yoke. The proclamations and speeches of a similar character cited in the memorial illustrate the many-sided foreign policy of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated societies, which embraced addresses by travelling lecturers and participation in the banquets of Bosnian associations, at which undisguised recruiting of members for the Servian association was carried on. An investigation is at present being conducted in order to determine whether the gymnastic associations of Servia induced similar associations in the Monarchy to join them in an organisation that has so far remained secret. The agitation was brought to bear by secret agents and missionaries on adults and on the undiscriminating youth. In this way former Honved officers and a lieutenant of gendarmes were induced by Milan Pribicevic under suspicious circumstances to leave the service of the army in the Monarchy. A further extensive agitation was developed in the training schools for teachers. The desire for war against the Monarchy was so far developed that Servian emissaries were entrusted with the destruction of the means of transport, and with the instigation of revolts and panics in case of an outbreak of hostilities. All these things are substantiated in a separate supplement.

The memorial describes further the connexion between this activity of the Narodna Odbrana and of its affiliated organisations, and the attempts upon the royal commissioner in Agram, Cuvaj, in July, 1912, the attempt by Dojcic in Agram in 1913 upon Skerlecz, and the foiled attempt of Schäfer on May 20th in the Agram Theatre. It then deals with the connexion between this activity of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated societies, and the attempt upon the heir to the throne and his wife, upon the manner in which the boys in the schools were corrupted by the ideas of the Narodna Odbrana, and upon the manner in which the assailants of the royal couple, with the assistance of Pribicevic and Dacic, secured the means for

carrying out their attempt. In this connexion especial attention is devoted to the part played by Major Tankosic, who furnished the deadly weapons, and to the rôles of a certain Ciganovic and of a former *Komitatschi,* at present an official of the Servian Railway Department in Belgrade, who had already come to the front in 1909 as a pupil of the Narodna Odbrana's school for irregulars. There are further particulars concerning the manner in which bombs and weapons were secretly smuggled into Bosnia, which permit no doubt that the way chosen was a well-prepared one, and one often employed by the Narodna Odbrana for secret ends.

A supplement contains an excerpt from the proceedings of the court-martial in Serajevo in the investigation of the attack upon Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. According to this, Princip, Gabrinovic, Grabez, Crupilovic and Papovic confess to having formed, in connexion with Mehmedbasic, who has fled, a plot to murder the Archduke, and to having lain in wait for him with this purpose. Cabrinovic confesses to having thrown the bomb and Gabrilo Princip to having carried out the attempt with the Browning revolver. Both confessed that they acted with intent to murder. The other sections of the supplement contain further statements of the defendants before the examining magistrate concerning the origin of the plot and the source whence the bombs were obtained, which were factory-made, designed for military purposes and came from the Servian arms depôt in Kragujevac in their original packing. The supplement, in concluding, gives information concerning the transport of the three assailants and of the weapons from Servia to Bosnia. A further extract from the evidence of witnesses before the court discloses the fact that a subject of the Monarchy wished, some days before the attempt, to inform the Austro-Hungarian Consulate in Belgrade of his belief that a plan was on foot to make an attempt upon the life of the Archduke during his presence in Bosnia. This man is said to have been arrested by Belgrade police agents upon frivolous grounds just as he was about to enter the consulate, and thus to have been hindered from giving his warning. It is said that the evidence also shows that the police who made this arrest knew of the planned attempt. Since these assertions have not yet been investigated, no judgment can yet be given as to their correctness. In the supplement to the memorial it is said: "In front of the reception hall of the Servian Ministry of War are to be found on the walls four allegorical pictures, three of which are representations of Servian successes in war, whilst the fourth represents the fulfil-

ment of the anti-Austrian tendencies of Servia. Above a landscape, which presents in part mountains (Bosnia), in part plains (Southern Hungary), rises the Zora, the dawning of Servian hopes. In the foreground stands an armed female figure, carrying a shield upon which are inscribed the names of 'all provinces yet to be liberated,' Bosnia, Herzegovina, Woiwodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, etc.''

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3. DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

Circular Order of the Imperial Chancellor.

The Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors in Paris, London and St. Petersburgh, on July 23rd, 1914:

The publications made by the Austro-Hungarian Government with regard to the circumstances under which the assassination of the heir apparent to the Austrian throne and his consort took place, clearly disclose the aims which the Pan-Serb propaganda has set itself and the means which it utilises for their realisation. The facts published must dispel the last doubt that the centre of action of these efforts aiming at the separation of the South Slavonic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their union with the Servian Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade, where it is displaying its activity with the connivance of members of the Government and the army.

The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series of years. The Pan-Serb chauvinism showed itself most markedly during the Bosnian crisis. It was only due to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and the energetic intercession of the Powers, that the provocations to which at that time Austria-Hungary was exposed on the part of Servia did not lead to a conflict. The promise of future good behaviour which the Servian Government gave at that time, has not been kept. Under the very eyes of official Servia or, to say the least, tacitly approved of by her, the Pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope and intensity; the latest crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade, is to be laid at its door. It has become evident that it is incompatible either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to continue to view idly the doings across the

border through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. In view of this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be considered as absolutely justifiable. Nevertheless, considering the attitude assumed by public opinion as well as by the Government in Servia, it is to be feared that the Servian Government will decline to meet these demands and that they will allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. There would then be nothing left to the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless they renounced definitely their position as a Great Power, but to press their demands on the Servian Government and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be left with Austria.

I have the honour to request you to make a statement on the lines indicated above to (the present substitute of M. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (M. Sazonof), especially emphasising the view, that in this question there is concerned an affair which should be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that it must be the earnest endeavour of the Powers to ensure the limitation of the quarrel to the parties concerned. We earnestly desire the localisation of the conflict because any intervention of another Power, owing to the various treaty-alliances, would entail inconceivable consequences.

I am awaiting with interest a telegraphic report on the result of your interview.

No. 2.

The Imperial Chancellor to the Federal Governments of Germany.

(Confidential.) *Berlin, July 28th,* 1914.

Kindly make the following report to the Government to which you are accredited:

Considering the facts which the Austrian Government have published in their note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must now disappear as to the fact that the outrage to which the heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne has fallen a victim was prepared in Servia, with, to say the least, the connivance of members of the Servian Government and army. The crime is a product of the Pan-Serb intrigues which, for a series of years, have become a source

of permanent disturbance for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of Europe.

The Pan-Serb chauvinism was most especially marked during the Bosnian crisis. It is only due to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of the Powers that the provocations to which Austria-Hungary was exposed at that time did not lead to a conflict. The Servian Government have not kept their assurance given at the time, that in future they would be well-behaved. Nay, under the very eyes of official Servia, or, to say the least, tacitly approved of by her, the Pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile continued to increase in scope and intensity. It would be incompatible with Austria's dignity and with her right of self-preservation, for the Austro-Hungarian Government to continue to view idly the intrigues carried on beyond the frontier, through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. The action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government must be considered as fully justified by this state of affairs.

The reply made by the Servian Government to the demands which the Austro-Hungarian Government submitted to them on the 23rd inst. through their representative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in Servia are not inclined to put an end to their former policy and agitation. There will therefore be no other alternative but for the Austro-Hungarian Government to press their demands, if need be by military action, unless they renounce for good their position as a Great Power.

Some Russian personalities deem it the most decided right and duty of Russia to become an active ally of Servia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and the latter. For the European conflagration which would result from such step taken by Russia, the "Novoye Vremya" would even make Germany responsible unless she induced Austria-Hungary to yield.

The Russian press thus turns things upside down. It is not Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Servia, but Servia, who, through unscrupulously favouring Pan-Serb aspirations, even in some parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, has been threatening the very existence of that country and creating conditions which eventually resulted in the wanton outrage committed at Serajevo. If Russia believes that she must champion the cause of Servia in this matter, she certainly has the right to do so. She must however realise that she is making the Serb activities, tending to under-

mine the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, her own, and that thus she is bearing the sole responsibility for the war that may possibly originate from the Austro-Servian affair, which all other Great Powers are desirous to localise. It is evident that this responsibility is resting entirely with Russia, and it is weighing all the more heavily as Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention of acquiring Servian territory or of touching the existence of the Servian Kingdom, but that she only desires peace from the Servian intrigues threatening her existence.

The attitude of the Imperial German Government in this question is clearly indicated. The Pan-Slav agitation against Austria-Hungary has for its goal to destroy the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and thus to scatter or weaken the Triple Alliance, resulting in a complete isolation of the German Empire. Our own interests therefore call us to the side of Austria-Hungary. It is our duty to guard Europe from a universal war, and we are therefore obliged to support all endeavours aiming at the localisation of the conflict, true to our policy which we have successfully carried out for forty-four years in the interest of the preservation of the peace of Europe.

But if, owing to Russia's interference, the conflagration should happen to spread, then Germany, faithful to her duties as ally, would have to support the neighbouring Monarchy with all her might. We shall draw the sword only if forced to do so, but we shall do it with a clear conscience, knowing that we are not guilty of the calamity which war will bring upon the peoples of Europe.

No. 3.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Vienna to the Imperial Chancellor on July 24th, 1914.

Count Berchtold to-day begged the Russian Chargé d'Affaires to call on him in order to explain to him in general and in a cordial way Austria-Hungary's point of view towards Servia. Having referred to the historical development of the past few years, he emphasised the fact that the Monarchy entertained no thought of conquests in Servia. Austria-Hungary would not claim Servian territory. Austria maintained that this step was meant merely as a definite means of checking the Servian intrigues. Austria-Hungary

was compelled to demand a guarantee for continued amicable relations with Servia. She was far from intending to bring about a change in the balance of power in the Balkans. The Chargé d'Affaires, who had received no instructions from St. Petersburgh, took the explanation of the Secretary "ad referendum," with the promise to submit it immediately to M. Sazonof.

No. 4.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh to the Imperial Chancellor on July 24th, 1914.

I have just utilised the contents of Order 592 (p. 45) in a prolonged interview with M. Sazonof. The Minister (Sazonof) indulged in immoderate accusations against Austria-Hungary and he was very much agitated. He declared most positively that Russia could not under any circumstances permit of the Servo-Austrian difficulty being settled between the two parties concerned.

No. 5.

The Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh to the Imperial Chancellor. Telegram of July 26th, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had a prolonged conversation with Sazonof this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory impression, as they told me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary had no idea of conquest, but wished to obtain peace at last on her frontiers, greatly pacified the Minister.

No. 6.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh to the Imperial Chancellor on July 25th, 1914.

Message to H. M. from General von Chelius:

The manœuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly

interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. The manœuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised to the rank of officers to-day instead of Michaelmas. Headquarters are most excited about Austria's procedure. I have the impression that complete preparations for mobilisation against Austria are being made.

No. 7.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh to the Imperial Chancellor on July 26th, 1914.

The Military Attaché requests the following message to be sent to the General Staff:

I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable elsewhere.

No. 8.

Telegram of the Imperial Consulate in Kovno to the Imperial Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.

Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war.

No. 9.

Telegram of the Imperial Minister in Berne to the Imperial Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.

Have heard from reliable source that French XIVth Corps has discontinued manœuvres.

No. 10.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July 26th, 1914. (*Urgent.*)

Austria-Hungary officially and solemnly declared in St. Petersburgh that she had no desire for territorial gain in Servia; that she would not touch the existence of the Kingdom, but that she desired to establish peaceful conditions. According to news received here, the call for several classes of the reserves in Russia is imminent, which is equivalent to mobilisation. If this news proves correct, we shall, very much against our own wish, be forced to counter-measures. Our desire to localise the conflict and to preserve the peace of Europe remains unchanged. We beg you to work on these lines in St. Petersburgh with all possible emphasis.

No. 11.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July 26th, 1914.

Austria-Hungary having officially declared to Russia that she had no intention to acquire new territory nor to touch the existence of the Kingdom of Servia, the decision as to a European war rests solely with Russia, which has to bear the entire responsibility. We rely upon France, with whom we are at one in the desire for the preservation of the peace of Europe, to exercise her influence at St. Petersburgh in favour of peace.

No. 12.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh on July 26th, 1914.

Austria having solemnly declared her territorial disinterestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the peace of Europe

through a Russian intervention rests solely with Russia. We still trust that Russia will undertake no steps which will seriously threaten the peace of Europe.

No. 13.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh to the Imperial Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.

Military Attaché reports a conversation with the Minister of War:

M. Sazonof had requested the latter to inform me on the situation. The Minister of War gave me his word of honour that no order to mobilise had as yet been issued. Though preliminary preparations were being made, no reserves had been called in and no horses mustered. If Austrian troops crossed the Servian frontier, those military districts which lay in the direction of Austria, *viz.*, Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan, were to be mobilised. Under no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilna and St. Petersburgh. Peace with Germany was earnestly desired. Upon my enquiry as to the object of mobilisation against Austria, he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the Minister that we appreciated the friendly intentions, but considered mobilisation even against Austria as most menacing.

No. 14.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July 27th, 1914.

We have as yet received no news of a suggestion made by Sir Edward Grey to hold a quadruple conference in London. We find it impossible to place our ally in her dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict.

No. 15.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July 25th, 1914.

The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro-Servian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do not wish to interfere in the former any more than England, and, as heretofore, we still maintain that this question must be localised by the fact of all Powers refraining from intervention. We therefore sincerely hope that Russia, knowing her responsibility and the seriousness of the situation, will abstain from interfering. We are prepared, in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, remembering at the same time our duties as allies, to intervene between Russia and Austria in conjunction with the other Powers.

No. 16.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh on July 28th, 1914.

We are continuing our endeavours to induce Vienna to elucidate in St. Petersburgh the object and scope of the Austrian action in Servia, in a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The declaration of war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter.

No. 17.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July 27th, 1914.

We have at once commenced efforts at mediation in Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have also communicated to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sazonof for a direct parley with Vienna.

No. 18.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Vienna to the Imperial Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.

Count Berchtold requests me to express to your Excellency his thanks for the communication of the English mediation proposal. He, however, remarks that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequent declaration of war, the step appears somewhat belated.

No. 19.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July 29th, 1914.

News received here regarding French preparations of war multiplies from hour to hour. I request that you call the attention of the French Government to this and insist that such measures would call forth counter-measures on our part. We should have to proclaim threatening state of war, and while this would not mean a call for the reserves or mobilisation, yet the tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for the preservation of peace.

No. 20.

Telegram of the Military Attaché in St. Petersburgh to H. M. the German Emperor on July 30th, 1914.

Prince Troubetzki, having ordered Your Majesty's telegram to be delivered to Czar Nicholas at once, said to me yesterday: "Thank God that a telegram has arrived from your Sovereign!" Just now he told me that the telegram had made a deep impression upon the Czar, but as the mobilisation against Austria had already been ordered and M. Sazonof had convinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat, His Majesty was sorry he could no longer

change matters. I answered that the premature mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, which after all was involved merely in a local war with Servia, would have to be blamed for the unaccountable consequences thereof, for Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility rested solely upon Russia ignoring Austria-Hungary's assurances that it had no intentions of territorial gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary had mobilised against Servia and not against Russia, and there was no ground for an immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that, since the horrible crime committed at Serajevo, Germany could no longer understand the phrase adopted by Russia that "she could not desert her brethren in Servia." I finally told him that he need not wonder if Germany were to mobilise her army.

No. 21.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Rome on July 31st, 1914.

We have incessantly negotiated between Russia and Austria-Hungary by a direct exchange of telegrams between His Majesty the German Emperor and His Majesty the Czar, as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Through the mobilisation of Russia all our efforts have been greatly handicapped, if they have not been rendered fruitless. In spite of pacifying assurances Russia is taking such far-reaching measures against us that the situation is continually becoming more menacing.

No. 22.

Telegrams Exchanged Between His Majesty the German Emperor and the Czar.

I. His Majesty the German Emperor to the Czar.

July 28th, 10.45 p.m.

It is with the gravest concern that I hear of the impression which the action of Austria against Servia is creating in your country.

The unscrupulous agitation that has been going on in Servia for years has resulted in the outrageous crime to which Archduke Franz Ferdinand fell a victim. The spirit that led Servians to murder their own king and his wife still dominates the country. You will doubtless agree with me that we both, you and I, have a common interest as well as all Sovereigns to insist that all the persons morally responsible for the dastardly murder should receive their deserved punishment.

On the other hand I fully understand how difficult it is for you and your Government to face the drift of your public opinion.

Therefore with regard to the hearty and tender friendship which binds us both from long ago with firm ties, I am exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly and to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with you. I confidently hope you will help me in my efforts to smooth over difficulties that may still arise.

Your very sincere and devoted Friend and Cousin,

(signed) WILHELM.

II. The Czar to His Majesty.

Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 p.m.

Am glad you are back. In this most serious moment I appeal to you to help me. An ignoble war has been declared on a weak country. The indignation in Russia shared fully by me is enormous. I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure brought upon me and be forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war. To try and avoid such a calamity as a European war I beg you in the name of our own friendship to do what you can to stop your ally from going too far.

(signed) NICHOLAS.

III. His Majesty to the Czar.

July 29th, 6.30 p.m.

I received your telegram and share your wish that peace should be maintained. But as I told you in my first telegram I cannot consider Austria's action against Servia an "ignoble war." Austria knows by experience that Servian promises on paper are wholly unreliable. I understand her action must be judged as tending to

get full guarantee that the Servian promises shall become real facts. Thus my reasoning is borne out by the statement of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria does not want to make any territorial conquests at the expense of Servia. I therefore suggest that it would be quite possible for Russia to remain a spectator of the Austro-Servian conflict without involving Europe in the most horrible war she ever witnessed. I think a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna possible and desirable, and, as I already telegraphed to you, my Government is continuing its exertions to promote it. Of course military measures on the part of Russia which could be looked upon by Austria as threatening, would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid and jeopardise my position as mediator, which I readily accepted on your appeal to my friendship and my help. (signed) WILHELM.

IV. The Czar to His Majesty.

Peterhof (Palace), July 29th, 8.20 *p.m.*

Thanks for your telegram conciliatory and friendly. Whereas official message presented to-day by your Ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. Beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Servian problem to The Hague Conference. Trust in your wisdom and friendship.

(signed) NICHOLAS.

V. His Majesty to the Czar.

July 30th, 1 *a.m.*

My Ambassador was instructed to draw the attention of your Government to the danger and grave consequences involved by a mobilisation. I said the same in my telegram to you. Austria has only mobilised against Servia and only a part of her army. If, as it is now the case, according to the communication by you and your Government, Russia mobilises against Austria, my rôle as mediator you kindly entrusted me with, and which I accepted at your express prayer, will be endangered if not ruined. The whole weight of the decision lies solely on your shoulders now, which have to bear the responsibility for peace or war.

(signed) WILHELM.

VI. The Czar to His Majesty.

Peterhof, July 30th, 1914, 1.20 *p.m.*

Thank you heartily for your quick answer. Am sending Tatitscheff this evening with instructions. The military measures which have now come into force were decided five days ago for reasons of defence and on account of Austria's preparations. I hope from all my heart that these measures won't in any way interfere with your part as mediator, which I greatly value. We need your strong pressure on Austria to come to an understanding with us.

(signed) NICHOLAS.

No. 23.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh on July 31st, 1914. (*Urgent.*)

In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilisation, Russia has mobilised her entire army and navy, that is to say, also against us. On account of these Russian measures we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim the threatening state of war, which, however, does not imply mobilisation. But mobilisation is bound to follow, unless Russia stops every measure of war against us and Austria-Hungary within twelve hours and notifies us definitely to this effect. Please communicate this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of communication.

No. 24.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July 31st, 1914. (*Urgent.*)

Russia has ordered mobilisation of her entire army and navy, directed also against us in spite of our still pending mediation and although we have not resorted to any mobilisation measures. We there-

upon declared the threatening state of war, which is bound to be followed by mobilisation unless Russia stops within twelve hours all warlike measures against us and Austria. Mobilisation inevitably implies war. Please ask French Government whether they intend to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made within eighteen hours. Wire at once hour of enquiry. Utmost speed necessary.

No. 25.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh on August 1st, 12.52 p.m. (Urgent.)

In case the Russian Government make no satisfactory reply to our demand, Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5 o'clock (mid-European time) the following statement:

"Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les début de la crise de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir que lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre s'était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Pétersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer.

A la suite de cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun préparatif militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût manqué de parer à ce péril il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus, que son action était dirigée contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir à Votre Excellence ce quit suit:

Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire relève le défi et Se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie."

Please wire, urgent, receipt and time of carrying out this instruction by Russian time.

Please ask for your passports and hand over protection and affairs to the American Embassy.

No. 26.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Imperial Chancellor on August 1st, 1.05 p.m.

Upon my repeated definite enquiry whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister declared that France would do that which her interests dictated.

No. 27.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the German Minister in Brussels, August 2nd, 1914.

The Imperial Government are in possession of trustworthy information regarding the proposed drawing up of French forces on the Meuse, on section Givet-Namur. This information permits of no doubt that the French intend to advance against Germany through Belgian territory. The Imperial Government fear that Belgium, even with the best of intentions, will not be able, without assistance, to ward off a French approach with so great a chance of success as to furnish a sufficient guarantee against the threatened danger to Germany. It is the postulate of self-preservation that Germany should anticipate the hostile attack. The German Government would therefore much regret if Belgium should consider it an act of hostility towards herself that Germany, through the designs of her adversaries, in her own defence is compelled in turn to enter into Belgian territory. In order to avoid misconception, the Imperial Government make the following declaration:

1. Germany contemplates no acts of hostility against Belgium. If Belgium in the impending war is willing to take a position of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government pledge themselves to guarantee the territorial integrity and independence of the Kingdom to the fullest extent on the conclusion of peace.

2. Germany pledges herself under the above condition to withdraw her troops from the Kingdom as soon as peace is concluded.

3. If Belgium maintains a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in agreement with the Royal Belgian authorities, to purchase for cash all necessaries required by her troops, and to indemnify Belgium for any damage that might possibly be caused by the German troops.

If Belgium commence hostilities against the German troops, more especially if she should impede their advance, through a resistance offered by the fortifications on the Meuse, or through the destruction of railways, roads, tunnels or other works, Germany would to her regret be compelled to regard the Kingdom as an enemy. In this case Germany would not be under any obligation to the Kingdom, but would be obliged to leave the adjustment of the relations between the two States to the arbitrament of arms.

No. 28.

Telegram of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Imperial Ambassador in Tokio on August 12th, 1914.

East Asiatic squadron instructed to avoid hostile acts against England in case Japan remains neutral. Please inform Japanese Government.

No answer to this has been received from Japan.

No. 29.

Ultimatum presented to the Imperial German Government by the Imperial Japanese Chargé d'Affaires, Baron Funakoshi, on August 17th, 1914.

Considering it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East, and to safeguard the general interest contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in

Eastern Asia, establishment of which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

1. To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn.

2. To deliver on a date not later than September 15th, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiautchou, with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.

The Imperial Japanese Government announce at the same time that in the event of their not receiving by noon August 23rd, 1914, the answer of the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, they will be compelled to take such action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation.

No. 30.

Verbal answer given by the Imperial German Government to the Imperial Japanese Chargé d'Affaires on August 23rd, 1914.

The German Government has no reply to make to the demands of Japan. It is therefore obliged to recall the Imperial Ambassador in Tokio and to hand the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin his passports.

4. A BELGIAN DIPLOMAT'S VIEWS AS TO GERMANY'S EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN PEACE.

(North German Gazette, September 12th, 1914.)

On July 31st, 1914, a letter was posted bearing the following address:

"Madame Costermans,

107 *Rue Froissard, Bruxelles, Belgique.*"

Since, as is known, the territory of the empire was on the same day declared to be in a state of war, and the expedition of private

letters to foreign countries therefore ceased, the letter was returned to the post office of origin bearing an inscription by the postal authorities, "returned because of state of war." The letter remained there and, after the expiration of the prescribed time, was officially opened by the Imperial head postal authorities in order to discover the name of the sender. Inside the outer envelope there was a second envelope, addressed:

"Son Excellence Monsieur Davignon,

Ministre des Affaires Étrangères."

Inasmuch as the name of the sender did not appear on this envelope either, it was also opened. Therein was found an official report of the Royal Belgian Chargé d'Affaires in St. Petersburgh, Mr. B. de l'Escaille, concerning the political situation there on July 30th of this year. This report, in view of its political significance, was sent to the Foreign Office by the Imperial postal officials.

The report reads:

"*Légation de Belgique à St. Pétersbourg.*
795/402.
Situation politique.

Le 30 juillet, 1914.

Monsieur Le Ministre,

Les journées d'hier et d'avant-hier se sont passées dans l'attente d'événements qui devaient suivre la déclaration de guerre de l'Autriche-Hongrie à la Serbie. Les nouvelles les plus contradictoires ont circulé sans qu'il soit possible de démêler exactement le vrai du faux touchant les intentions du Gouvernement Impérial. Ce qui est incontestable c'est que l'Allemagne s'est efforcée, autant ici qu'a Vienne, de trouver un moyen quelconque d'éviter un conflit général, mais qu'elle a rencontré d'un côté l'obstination du Cabinet de Vienne à ne pas faire un pas en arrière, et de l'autre la méfiance du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg devant les assurances de l'Autriche-Hongrie qu'elle ne songeait qu'à punir la Serbie et non à s'en emparer.

M. Sazonof a déclaré qu'il était impossible à la Russie de ne pas se tenir prête et de ne pas mobiliser, mais que ces préparatifs n'étaient pas dirigés contre l'Allemagne. Ce matin un communiqué officiel aux journaux annonce que "les réservistes ont été appelés

sous les armes dans un certain nombre de Gouvernements." Connaissant la discrétion des communiqués officiels russes, on peut hardiment prétendre qu'on mobilise partout.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a déclaré ce matin qu'il était à bout des essais de conciliation qu'il n'a cessé de faire depuis samedi et qu'il n'avait plus guère d'espoir. On vient de me dire que l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre s'était prononcé dans le même sens. La Grande-Bretagne a proposé dernièrement un arbitrage, M. Sazonof a répondu: "Nous l'avons proposé nous mêmes à l'Autriche-Hongrie, elle l'a refusé." A la proposition d'une Conférence, l'Allemagne a répondu par la proposition d'une entente entre cabinets. On peut se demander vraiment si tout le monde ne désire pas la guerre, et tâche seulement d'en retarder un peu la déclaration pour gagner du temps.

L'Angleterre a commencé par donner à entendre qu'elle ne voulait pas se laisser entrainer dans un conflit. Sir George Buchanan le disait ouvertement. Aujourd'hui on est fermement convaincu à St. Pétersbourg, on en a même l'assurance, que l'Angleterre soutiendra la France. Cet appui est d'un poids énorme et n'a pas peu contribué à donner la haute main au parti de la guerre.

Le Gouvernement Russe a laissé dans ces derniers jours libre cours à toutes les manifestations pro-Serbe et hostiles à l'Autriche et n'a aucunement cherché à les étouffer. Il s'est encore produit des divergences de vues dans le sein du Conseil des Ministres qui s'est réuni hier matin; on a retardé la publication de la mobilisation. Mais depuis s'est produit un revirement, le parti de la guerre a pris le dessus et ce matin à 4 heures cette mobilisation était publiée.

L'armée qui se sent forte est pleine d'enthousiasme et fonde de grandes espérances sur les énormes progrès réalisés depuis la guerre japonaise. La marine est si loin d'avoir réalisé le programme de sa reconstruction et de sa réorganisation qu'elle ne peut vraiment pas entrer en ligne de compte. C'est bien là le motif tant d'importance à l'assurance de l'appui de l'Angleterre.

Comme j'ai eu l'honneur de vous le télégraphier aujourd'hui (T. 10) tout espoir de solution pacifique parait écarté. C'est l'opinion des cercles diplomatiques.

Je me suis servi pour mon télégramme de la voie via Stockholm par le Nordisk Kabel comme plus sûre que l'autre. Je confie cette dépêche à un courrier privé qui la mettra à la poste en Allemagne.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de mon plus profond respect. (signed) B. DE L'ESCAILLE."

Testimony of the Belgian Minister in St. Petersburgh.

Belgian Legation.
St. Petersburgh.
795/402.
On the political situation.

July 30*th*, 1914.

To
His Excellency M. Davignon, *Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Monsieur Le Ministre,

Yesterday and the day before yesterday have passed in the expectation of events that must follow Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Servia. The most contradictory reports have been circulating; it was impossible to make out what was true or not true as regards the intentions of the Imperial Russian Government. There is however no denying the fact that Germany has made serious efforts both here and in Vienna to find some way of avoiding a general conflict. On the one hand, however, it has met with the firm decision of the Vienna Cabinet not to yield a step, and on the other hand with the fact that the St. Petersburgh Cabinet mistrusted the assurance made by Austria-Hungary that she only intended to punish Servia, but not to annex her territory.

M. Sazonof declared that it was impossible for Russia to avoid holding herself in readiness and not to mobilise, but that these preparations were not directed against Germany. This morning an official communication to the newspapers announced that "the reserves in a certain number of districts have been called to the colours." Anyone who knows the reservedness of the official Russian communications, can safely maintain that a general mobilisation is taking place.

The German Ambassador declared this morning that the efforts which since Saturday he had been making incessantly to bring about a satisfactory arrangement had come to an end, and that he had almost given up hope.

I have been told that the British Ambassador also expressed himself in the same way. England recently proposed arbitration. Sazonof answered: "We have ourselves proposed it to Austria-Hungary, but she has rejected the proposal." To the proposal of a conference, Germany answered by proposing in turn a settlement between the Cabinets. One might truly ask whether the whole world

does not wish war and only seeks to postpone for a while the formal declaration of it, in order to gain time.

England at first let it be understood that she did not wish to be drawn into a conflict. Sir George Buchanan said so quite openly. To-day in St. Petersburgh one is fully convinced, and even the assurance has been given, that England will stand by the side of France. This support is of quite extraordinary weight, and has in no small degree contributed to give the war party the upper hand. The Russian Government have in these last days given free rein to all demonstrations friendly to Servia and hostile to Austria, and have in no way attempted to suppress them. In the Cabinet Council, which took place yesterday morning, there were differences of opinion; the notification of a mobilisation was postponed, but since then a change has taken place, the war party has obtained the upper hand, and this morning at four o'clock the mobilisation order was published.

The army, which is conscious of its strength, is full of enthusiasm, and bases great hopes on the extraordinary progress which it has made since the Japanese war. The navy is still so far from the completion of its projected reorganisation that it is scarcely to be taken into account. For this very reason, the assurance of English assistance is considered of such great importance.

As I had the honour of wiring you to-day (T. 10), all hope of a peaceful solution seems to have vanished; such is the view of the diplomatic corps.

I have made use of the route via Stockholm by the Nordisk Cable for sending my telegram, as it is safer than the other.

I am entrusting this report to a private courier, who will post it in Germany.

Please receive, Monsieur le Ministre, the assurance of my greatest respect.

(signed) B. DE L'ESCAILLE.

Our enemies are to-day declaring to the whole world, slanderously and with a deliberate misrepresentation of the real facts, that the Powers of the Triple Entente had up to the last moment in view solely the maintenance of peace, but that they were forced into war through Germany's brusque attitude, which made any understanding impossible; that Germany, in her wild desire for conquest, wanted war under all circumstances. In answer to this the foregoing document evidences that in diplomatic circles in St. Petersburgh, as early as July 30th, that is to say, two days before the German mobilisation,

the conviction prevailed that Germany had been at the greatest pains, in Vienna as well as in St. Petersburgh, to localise the Austro-Servian conflict and to prevent the breaking out of a general world-conflagration. It is furthermore important as evidence that the same circles were even then convinced that England, through the assurance that she would not remain neutral in an eventual war, but would support France against Germany, had stiffened the backbone of the Russian war party and thus contributed largely to provoke the war. And, finally, this document is also of interest because its author felt that he must report to his Government that he considered untrustworthy the assurances of Russia that the troops were being called to the colours only in certain districts, and that no general mobilisation was taking place.

5. DOCUMENTS ON THE POLITICAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN GERMANY AND ENGLAND.

(North German Gazette, August 21st, 1914.)

Official documents relating to the political exchange of views between Germany and England immediately before the outbreak of the war, are published below. These communications elucidate the fact that Germany was prepared to spare France, provided England remained neutral and guaranteed the neutrality of France.

Telegram of His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia to H. M. the King of England on July 30th, 1914.

Am here since yesterday, have informed William of what you kindly told me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday, who gratefully received your message.

William, much preoccupied, is trying his utmost to fulfil Nicholas's appeal to him to work for the maintenance of peace and is in constant telegraphic communication with Nicholas, who to-day confirms news that military measures have been ordered by him equal to mobilisation, measures which have been taken already five days ago.

We are furthermore informed that France is making military preparations, whereas we have taken no measures, but may be forced to do so any moment should our neighbours continue, which then would mean a European war.

If you really and earnestly wish to prevent this terrible disaster, may I suggest you using your influence on France and also Russia to keep neutral, which seems to me would be most useful.

This I consider a very good, perhaps the only chance, to maintain the peace of Europe.

I may add that now more than ever Germany and England should lend each other mutual help to prevent a terrible catastrophe which otherwise seems unavoidable.

Believe me that William is most sincere in his endeavours to maintain peace, but that the military preparations of his two neighbours may at last force him to follow their example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would remain defenceless.

I have informed William of my telegram to you and hope you will receive my information in the same spirit of friendship which suggested them. (signed) HENRY.

Telegram of H. M. the King of England to Prince Henry of Prussia on July 30th, 1914.

Thanks for your telegram. So pleased to hear of William's effort to concert with Nicholas to maintain peace. Indeed, I am earnestly desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a European war should be averted. My Government is doing its utmost suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations if Austria will consent to be satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile suspending their war preparations. Trust William will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William I am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power to preserve the peace of Europe.

(signed) GEORGE.

Telegram of His Majesty the Emperor to H. M. the King of England on July 31st, 1914.

Many thanks for kind telegram. Your proposals coincide with my ideas and with the statements I got this night from Vienna which

I have had forwarded to London. I just received news from the Chancellor that official notification has just reached him that this night Nicholas has ordered the mobilisation of his whole army and fleet. He has not even awaited the results of the mediation I am working at and left me without any news. I am off to Berlin to take measures for ensuring safety of my eastern frontiers, where strong Russian troops are already posted.

(signed) WILHELM.

Telegram of the King of England to His Majesty the Emperor on August 1st, 1914.

Many thanks for your telegram last night. I sent an urgent telegram to Nicholas, expressing my readiness to do everything in my power to assist in reopening conversations between Powers concerned.

(signed) GEORGE.

Telegram of the German Ambassador in London to the Imperial Chancellor of August 1st, 1914.

Sir E. Grey just asked me by telephone whether I believed that I could declare that we would not attack France in a war between Germany and Russia in case France should remain neutral. I declared that I thought I could give that assurance.

(signed) LICHNOWSKY.

Telegram of His Majesty the Emperor to H. M. the King of England on August 1st, 1914.

I just received the communication from your Government offering French neutrality under guarantee of Great Britain. Added to this offer was the enquiry whether under these conditions Germany would refrain from attacking France. On technical grounds my mobilisation, which had already been proclaimed this afternoon, must proceed against two fronts east and west as prepared; this cannot be countermanded, because I am sorry your telegram came too late. But if France offers me neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the British fleet and army, I shall of course refrain from attacking France and

employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on my frontier are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into France.

(signed) WILHELM.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the German Ambassador in London on August 1st, 1914.

Germany is ready to accept the British proposal in case England guarantees with all her forces the absolute neutrality of France in the Russo-German conflict. German mobilisation has been ordered to-day on account of Russia's challenge before the English proposals were known here. It is therefore now impossible to make any change in the strategical distribution of our troops ordered to the French frontier. But we guarantee that our troops will not cross the French frontier before 7 p.m. on Monday 3rd inst. if England has consented to our proposal by that time.

(signed) BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

Telegram of H. M. the King of England to His Majesty the Emperor on August 1st, 1914.

In answer to your telegram just received, I think there must be some misunderstanding as to a suggestion that passed in friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon, when they were discussing how actual fighting between German and French armies might be avoided while there is a chance of some agreement between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will arrange to see Prince Lichnowsky early to-morrow morning to ascertain whether there is a misunderstanding on his part.

(signed) GEORGE.

Telegram of the German Ambassador in London to the Imperial Chancellor on August 2nd, 1914.

Sir E. Grey's suggestions were prompted by a desire to make it possible for England to keep permanent neutrality, but as they were not based on a previous understanding with France and made with-

out knowledge of our mobilisation, they have been abandoned as absolutely hopeless.

(signed) LICHNOWSKY.

The pith of the declarations made by Germany lies in the telegram of the Emperor William to the King of England. Even if there had been a misunderstanding as to an English proposal, the offer made by His Majesty nevertheless gave England an opportunity to prove honestly her love of peace and to prevent war between Germany and France.

6. NEGOTIATIONS OF PRINCE LICHNOWSKY WITH SIR EDWARD GREY.

(North German Gazette, September 6th, 1914.)

According to reports to hand, Sir Edward Grey declared in the House of Commons that the publication made by the German Government of the German-English exchange of telegrams before the war was incomplete. Prince Lichnowsky, it is declared, cancelled by telegram his report on the well-known telephone conversation immediately he was informed that a misunderstanding existed. This telegram, it is asserted, was not published. The "Times," apparently upon information from official sources, made the same assertion, adding the comment that the telegram had been suppressed by the German Government in order that it might accuse England of perfidy and prove Germany's love of peace.

In answer to this we are able to state that such a telegram is non-existent. Apart from the telegram already published, which was despatched from London at 11 a.m., Prince Lichnowsky on August 1st sent the following telegrams:

First, at 1.15 p.m.

". . . Sir Edward Grey's private secretary has just been to see me to say that the Minister desired to make proposals to me regarding England's neutrality, even for the event that we should go to war with Russia as well as with France. I shall see Sir Edward Grey this afternoon, and shall report immediately."

Second, at 5.30 p.m.

"Sir Edward Grey has just read to me the following declaration, which has been unanimously framed by the Cabinet:

> "'The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way clear to give the same positive reply as that which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here, while on the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.'

"In answer to my question as to whether, on condition that we respected the Belgian neutrality, he could give me a definite declaration concerning the neutrality of Great Britain, the Minister replied that that was impossible for him to do, but that this question would nevertheless play an important part in public opinion here. If we should violate the Belgian neutrality in a war with France, a reversal of sentiment would certainly result and this would make it difficult for the Government here to assume a friendly neutrality. For the present there was not the slightest intention of taking hostile action against us. It would be the desire to avoid that if it should be in any way possible. It would, however, be difficult to draw a line marking how far we might go before there would be intervention from here. He recurred again and again to Belgian neutrality and expressed the opinion that this question would play an important part in any event. He had wondered whether it were not possible that we and France should remain armed against each other without attacking each other in case of a Russian war. I asked him whether he was in a position to declare to me that France would enter into a compact to that effect. Since we neither desired to destroy France nor to acquire parts of her territory, I was able to believe that we could enter into an agreement of such a sort, which would ensure us the neutrality of Great Britain.

"The Minister said he would make enquiries; he did not overlook the difficulties of holding the armies of both sides inactive."

Third, at 8.30 p.m.

> "My report made early to-day is cancelled by my report of this evening. Since absolutely no positive English proposal has been submitted, further steps along the line of the instructions given me are superfluous."

As will be observed, these telegrams contain no sort of indication that there had been a misunderstanding, and nothing concerning the assertion made from the English side of a clearing up of the alleged misunderstanding.

7. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO EVENTS PRECEDING THE WAR.

(North German Gazette, October 16th, 1914.)

In view of the apparent endeavours of our opponents to ascribe the responsibility for the present war to the German "military party" and German militarism, we publish below a number of reports made by German diplomatic representatives in foreign countries, which have for their subject the political and politico-military relations of the Entente Powers before the outbreak of the war. For obvious reasons the places from which the reports have been sent, and their exact dates, are not given. These documents speak for themselves.

I.

. . . March, 1913.

The meshes of the net into which French diplomacy is succeeding in entangling England are steadily growing narrower. Even in the first phases of the Morocco conflict, England, as is known, made concessions of a military nature to France which have in the meantime developed into concrete agreements between the General Staffs of both countries. In regard to the agreements concerning a coöperation at sea, I learn from a generally well-informed source the following:

The English fleet will protect the North Sea, the English Channel, and the Atlantic Ocean, in order to make it possible for France to concentrate her naval forces in the western basin of the Mediterranean, in connexion wherewith Malta is placed at her disposal as a naval base. Details arrange for the employment of French torpedo flotillas and submarines in the channel, and of the English Mediterranean squadron, which, on the outbreak of war, is to be placed under the command of the French Admiral.

In the meantime the attitude of the British Government during the Moroccan crisis in 1911, during which it showed itself to be a

tool of French politics, as uncritical as it was submissive, and which, through the speech made by Mr. Lloyd George, encouraged French chauvinism to new hopes, has given the French Government an opportunity to drive another nail into the coffin in which Entente politics have already buried England's freedom of political decision.

I obtain from a special source knowledge of an exchange of notes which took place in the autumn of the preceding year between Sir Edward Grey and Ambassador Cambon, and which, with the request that it be employed in strict confidence, I have the honour to submit to you herewith. In the exchange of notes the British and the French Governments agree, in the case of an attack threatened by a third Power, to enter at once into an exchange of views as to whether joint action was indicated to repulse the attack, and, in that event, as to how and to what extent the existing military arrangements should be made use of.

The form of the agreements is calculated in such a way that the latter shall be in technical conformity with British neutrality. England does not formally assume in any manner the duty of furnishing military help. Under the wording she retains a free hand to act at all times in accordance with the demands of her own interests. It hardly requires, however, any special amplification to show that England, through these compacts, in conjunction with the military arrangements made, has already pledged herself *de facto* beyond redemption to the French *revanche* idea.

The British Government is playing a dangerous game. Through its policy in the Bosnian and Moroccan questions it has evoked crises which have twice brought the world to the verge of a war. The encouragement which it gives to French chauvinism directly and indirectly can one day lead to a catastrophe in which English as well as French soldiers will pay with their blood on French battlefields for the British policy which aims at the isolation of Germany.

The seed sowed by King Edward is sprouting.

Letter of Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador Paul Cambon.

Foreign Office, November 22nd, 1912.

My dear Ambassador,

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of

either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition for instance of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to coöperate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Letter of the French Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, to Sir E. Grey.
Londres, le 23 *Novembre,* 1912.

Par Votre lettre en date d'hier 22 novembre, Vous m'avez rappelé que dans ces dernières années les autorités militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne s'étaient consultées de temps en temps; qu'il avait toujours été entendu que ces consultations ne restreignaient pas la liberté pour chaque Gouvernement de décider dans l'avenir s'ils se prêteraient l'un l'autre le concours de leurs forces armées; que de part et d'autre ces consultations entre spécialistes n'étaient et ne devaient pas être considérées comme des engagements obligeant nos Gouvernements à agir dans certains cas; que cependant je Vous avait fait observer que si l'un ou l'autre Gouvernement avait de graves raisons d'appréhender une attaque non provoquée de la part d'une tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur l'assistance armée de l'autre. Votre lettre répond à cette observation et je suis autorisé à Vous déclarer que dans le cas où l'un de nos Gouvernements aurait un motif grave d'appréhender soit l'agression d'une tierce Puissance soit

quelque événement menaçant pour la paix générale, ce Gouvernement examinerait immédiatement avec l'autre si les deux Gouvernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prévenir l'agression ou de sauvegarder la paix. Dans ce cas, les deux Gouvernements délibéreraient sur les mesures qu'ils seraient disposés à prendre en commun; si ces mesures comportaient une action, les deux Gouvernements prendraient aussitôt en considération les plans de leurs États-Majors et décideraient alors de la suite qui devrait être donnée à ces plans.

II.

May ..., 1914.

Concerning the political results of the visit of the King of England in Paris I learn that a number of political questions were discussed between Sir Edward Grey and M. Doumergue. Moreover, a suggestion came from the French side to supplement the existing politico-military understandings between France and England by analogous understandings between England and Russia. Sir Edward Grey received the suggestion sympathetically, but declared that he was not in a position to undertake anything of binding force without consulting the British Cabinet. The reception given to the English guests by the French Government as well as by the people of Paris is said to have made a great impression on the Minister. It is to be feared that the English statesman, who visited a foreign country for the first time in an official capacity, and who, it is asserted, had never been out of England before, will in the future be even more subject to French influences than has already been the case.

III.

June ..., 1914.

I have received confirmation of the report that military arrangements between England and Russia were proposed from the French side on the occasion of the visit of the King of England in Paris. Concerning the preliminary events I learn from a reliable source that the moving spirit was M. Isvolsky. It was the Ambassador's idea to make use of the anticipated festive spirit of the days in Paris in order to change the Triple Entente into an alliance analogous to the Triple Alliance. If, however, Paris and St. Petersburgh have been finally satisfied with less, their attitude appears to have been dictated by the consideration that public opinion in England is in

great part firmly opposed to entering into formal treaties of alliance with other Powers. In view of this fact, there was plainly some hesitation about going to the root of things, despite the numerous proofs of the utter lack of resistance of English politicians to French and Russian influences. (I may recall the support which Russia recently received from England in the matter of the German military mission in Turkey.) Therefore were the tactics of a slow, pace-by-pace advance decided upon. Sir Edward Grey warmly advocated the Franco-Russian suggestions in the British Cabinet Council, and the Cabinet adopted his ideas. It was decided to work, in the first place, for a naval agreement, and to cause negotiations to take place in London between the British Admiralty and the Russian Naval Attaché.

The satisfaction of Russian and French diplomacy at having again taken the English politicians by surprise, is great. The conclusion of a formal treaty of alliance is now considered only a matter of time. To hasten this event, St. Petersburgh would even be prepared to make certain sham concessions to England in the Persian question. The differences of opinion in this matter that have recently come to light between the two Powers have not yet been disposed of. On the Russian side the procedure is, for the time being, one of conciliatory promises, on account of the uneasiness which has been again manifested in England lately concerning the future of India.

IV.

June ..., 1914.

There is much uneasiness in St. Petersburgh and London on account of the French indiscretions concerning the Russo-English naval convention. Sir Edward Grey is afraid there will be interpellations in Parliament. The Naval Attaché, Captain Wolkoff, who was in St. Petersburgh for a few days, presumably to receive instructions for the negotiations, has returned to London. The negotiations have already begun.

V.

June ..., 1914.

In the House of Commons the question was put to the Government from the Ministerial side as to whether Great Britain and Russia

had recently concluded a naval agreement, or as to whether negotiations for the conclusion of such an agreement had recently taken place between the two countries or were now taking place.

In his answer Sir Edward Grey referred to similar questions put to the Government last year. The Prime Minister, continued Sir Edward, had at that time replied that there existed for the event of the outbreak of a war between European Powers no unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the free decision of the Government or of Parliament as to whether England should take part in the war or not. This answer was just as applicable to-day as a year ago. Since that time no negotiation which could now make the declaration less applicable had been concluded with any Power; no negotiations of the sort were in progress, and, so far as he could judge, it was not probable that any such would be entered into. If, however, any agreement should be concluded which should involve a retraction or an alteration of the above-mentioned declaration made by the Prime Minister the year before, it was his opinion that it would have to be submitted to Parliament, and that would doubtless be done.

The great majority of the English press refrains from commenting on the Minister's declaration in any way.

Only two radical papers, the "Daily News" and the "Manchester Guardian," express their opinion in short leading articles. The first-named views Sir Edward Grey's words with satisfaction and thinks that they are definite enough to dissipate every doubt. England is not under the control of any other country. She is not the vassal of Russia, nor the ally of France, nor the enemy of Germany. The declaration, it says, is a wholesome lesson for that section of the English press which would create the belief that there was in existence a Triple Entente of the same nature as the Triple Alliance.

The "Manchester Guardian," on the other hand, is not satisfied with the Minister's declaration. It finds fault with its obscure form and endeavours to show that it admits of interpretations which do not altogether exclude the existence of certain, perhaps conditional, agreements of a nature in conformity with that which rumour lends them.

The declarations by Sir Edward Grey are in accordance with a confidential statement made by a personage of the immediate entourage of the Minister, to the effect that "he could declare most emphatically and definitely that no agreements of military or naval nature existed between England and France, although from the French side the

desire of such compacts had been repeatedly uttered. The British Cabinet would not grant to Russia what it had refused to France. No naval convention had been concluded with Russia, and none would be concluded."

VI.

June ..., 1914.

Sir Edward Grey has plainly felt it necessary to take a stand immediately and emphatically against the comments of the "Manchester Guardian" on his answer to the interpellation in the matter of the alleged Anglo-Russian naval understanding. The "Westminster Gazette" publishes in a leading column a denial from the pen of Mr. Spender, who, as is well known, is one of Sir Edward Grey's most intimate friends; this denial leaves nothing to be desired in the way of definiteness. It is remarked therein that there exists no naval agreement, and that no negotiations are in progress between Great Britain and Russia concerning a naval agreement, and that no one who knew the character and methods of Sir Edward Grey would even for a moment assume that the statement made by him was designed to cover up the truth.

VII.

June ..., 1914.

The fact that Sir Edward Grey's statement in the English House of Commons concerning the Russo-English naval agreement has been so readily accepted by public opinion in England, has brought about a feeling of great relief here and in St. Petersburgh. The wire-pullers in this matter had already feared that the lovely dream of the new "Triple Alliance" had come to an end. Moreover, I can hardly believe that the "Manchester Guardian" should alone have been able to see through the trick which Sir Edward Grey employed in not answering at all the questions put to him as to whether negotiations with Russia concerning a naval agreement were imminent or in progress, but rather in denying the question, which had never been put, as to whether England had entered into binding undertakings concerning participation in any European war. I am, rather, inclined to believe that the British press in this matter has again

given a proof of its well-known discipline in the treatment of questions of foreign policy, and has, whether upon a *mot d'ordre* or out of political instinct, kept quiet. To what criticisms and fault-finding by the German people's representatives and the German press would not the Imperial German Government be exposed, what a cry over our foreign policy and our diplomacy would not be raised, if a similar declaration had been made before the Imperial Diet! In parliamentary England everybody keeps quiet when a Minister seeks in such a barefaced manner to mislead his own party, the people's representatives, and the public opinion of the whole country. What does England not sacrifice to her Germanophobia?

VIII.

June ..., 1914.

From a quarter which has retained its old sympathy for Germany I have received, with request to keep the matter strictly secret, a note, which I most respectfully submit herewith, concerning a conference which took place on May 26th, of this year, with the chief of the Russian Naval Staff, and in which the foundations were laid for the negotiations concerning the Russo-English naval agreement. My informant did not yet know to what results the negotiations have thus far led, but he expressed very earnest concern about the benefit which would accrue to Russian nationalism if the agreement really came into being. As soon as the coöperation of England was assured, the notorious Pan-Slav agitators would not hesitate to employ the first opportunity offered to bring about war. M. Sazonof himself, he thought, was clearly being driven into the arms of the Russian war party.

(Enclosure.)

St. Petersburgh, May 13/26*th*, 1914.

Considering that an agreement between Russia and England is desired regarding the coöperation of their naval forces in the event of warlike operations of Russia and England with the participation of France, the conference arrived at the following conclusions:

The projected naval convention shall in all details regulate the

17624
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relations between the Russian and British armed forces at sea, and therefore an understanding concerning signals and special codes, wireless telegrams and the form of intercourse between the Russian and British naval staffs is to be brought about. The two naval staffs shall furthermore regularly make to one another reports on the navies of other Powers and on their own fleets, especially as to technical data and newly introduced machinery and inventions.

As in the case of the Franco-Russian naval convention, there shall take place between the Russian and British naval staffs regular exchanges of opinions for the consideration of questions interesting the naval boards of both states.

The Russian naval agreement with England, like the Franco-Russian naval agreement, shall provide for separate actions of the Russian and British navies, which however shall be based on mutual understanding. In regard to the strategic aims a distinction must be made on the one hand between the maritime operations in the Black Sea and the North Sea, and on the other hand the probable naval war in the Mediterranean. In both places it must be Russia's endeavour to secure compensation from England in return for drawing off a part of the German fleet against the Russian.

In the region of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles temporary undertakings in the straits shall be kept in view as strategic operations by Russia in case of war.

The Russian interests in the Baltic Sea demand that England immobilise as great a part of the German fleet in the North Sea as possible. In this way the great superiority of the German over the Russian fleet would be annulled and a Russian landing in Pomerania would perhaps be rendered possible. In this connexion the British Government could render an important service by sending into the Baltic harbours before the beginning of war such a number of merchant ships as would compensate for the lack of Russian transports.

As to the situation in the Mediterranean, it is most highly important for Russia that the absolute superiority of the fighting forces of the Entente over those of Austria and Italy be assured. For if the Austro-Italian forces should dominate this sea, attacks of the Austrian fleet in the Black Sea would be possible, which would be a dangerous blow for Russia. It must be surmised that the Austro-Italian forces are superior to the French. England would therefore have to leave the necessary number of ships in the Mediterranean to ensure the superiority of the forces of the Entente Powers until

such time as the Russian navy's development should have proceeded sufficiently far to enable it to take over the solution of this question itself. Russian vessels would have to use the British harbours in the Mediterranean as naval bases with England's permission, just as the French naval agreement permits Russia to use the French harbours in the Western Mediterranean as bases.

IX.

July ..., 1914.

During my talk to-day with M. Sazonof the conversation turned to President Poincaré's visit. The Minister emphasised the pacific tone of the toasts exchanged. I could not refrain from calling M. Sazonof's attention to the fact that it was not the toasts exchanged at such visits that gave grounds for uneasiness, but rather the comments of the press on the matter. I said such comments had not been lacking this time, either, and that among them even the report of the alleged conclusion of a Russo-English naval convention had been published. M. Sazonof seized upon this sentence and declared angrily that such a naval convention existed only "in the mind of the 'Berliner Tageblatt' and in the moon."

X.

July ..., 1914.

I have the honour to send you herewith the copy of a letter which the adjutant of a Russian Grand Duke, who was at the time sojourning here, wrote from St. Petersburgh under date of the 26th inst. to the Grand Duke, the important contents of which letter I have already been able to report by telegraph. The letter, of which I obtained knowledge in a confidential way, shows, in my respectful opinion, that Russia has been decided on war ever since the 24th of the month.

(Enclosure.)

July 12/25th, St. Petersburgh.

There have been great disorders among the workmen in St. Petersburgh; it is remarkable that they took place at the time of the visit of the French President to the Russian Capital, and of the Aus-

trian ultimatum to Servia. Yesterday I heard from the French military agent General de la Guiche that he had learnt that Austria was not without guilt in the matter of the disorder among the workmen. Now, however, everything is rapidly assuming normal conditions. And it appears that, encouraged by the French, our Government has stopped trembling before the Germans. It was high time! It is better to express oneself clearly at last than everlastingly to hide behind the "professional lies" of the diplomats. Austria's ultimatum is of unheard-of effrontery, as all the papers here unite in saying. I have just read the evening paper:—yesterday there was a sitting of the Council of Ministers; the Minister of War spoke very energetically and confirmed the news that Russia was ready for war, and the other Ministers unanimously agreed with him; a report to the Emperor in the same spirit was prepared, and this report was confirmed on the same evening. There was published to-day in the "Russian Invalid" a preliminary communication by the Government, stating that "the Government was greatly concerned about the events that had occurred and the despatch of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. The Government is following carefully the development of the Austro-Servian conflict, with regard to which Russia cannot remain indifferent." This communication has been reprinted with most favourable comments by all papers. We are all convinced that no Rasputins will this time impede Russia from doing her duty. Germany, who is sending Austria on ahead, is firmly decided to fight us before we build up our fleet and the Balkan States have not yet recovered from the last wars. We, too, must feel the danger and not hide our heads, as we did during the Balkan War, when Kokovtsof thought only of the Bourse. At that time, however, the war would have been easier, for the Balkan federation was fully armed. But we let the police scatter the street demonstrations directed against that miserable Austria! Now, however, such demonstrations would be joyfully greeted. Let us hope above all that the régime of the cowards (of the stamp of Kokovtsof) and of certain criers and mystics is over. War is a storm. Even if catastrophes were to come, it would still be better than to remain in this unbearably oppressive atmosphere. I know for a certainty, from experience, that the quietest place for me is at the front, where one sees danger in its natural proportions, and that is not so fearful; the worst place is the rearguard, in which the atmosphere of cowardice prevails, improbable rumours circulate, and panics arise. In the future war, however, the interior of Russia will be the rearguard.

8. THE BRUSSELS DOCUMENTS.

I.

(North German Gazette, October 13th, 1914.)

The assertion of the British Government that the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany was the cause of England's participation in the present war, has already been proved untenable by Sir Edward Grey's own declaration. Certain documents discovered by the German military authorities in the archives of the Belgian General Staff in Brussels throw a new and somewhat peculiar light upon the pathetic moral indignation at the German invasion of Belgium, with which the English tried to stir up the feeling in neutral countries against Germany.

From the contents of a portfolio bearing the inscription, "Intervention Anglaise en Belgique," it is evident that the despatch of an English expeditionary corps to Belgium in the event of a Franco-German war was already contemplated as far back as the year 1906. According to a report of April 10th, 1906, addressed to the Belgian Minister of War, which was found there, the chief of the Belgian General Staff, after repeatedly conferring with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, then English Military Attaché in Brussels, worked out upon the latter's initiative and in conjunction with him, a detailed plan for joint operations against Germany of the Belgian army and an English expeditionary force of 100,000 men. This plan met with the approval of Major-General Grierson, Chief of the British General Staff. Full information as to the strength and organisation of the British troops, as to the composition of the expeditionary corps, as to the places of disembarkation and the exact time of the despatch of the troops, etc., was communicated to the Belgian General Staff. On the ground of this information, the Belgian General Staff thoroughly prepared for the transport of the British troops to the basis of their strategical operations against Germany, and also for the housing and feeding of the troops. All the details of the coöperation of the latter with the Belgians were carefully worked out. Thus a large number of interpreters and Belgian gendarmes were to be placed at the disposal of the British army, and the necessary maps were to be supplied to them. Provisions were even made for the care of the British wounded.

Dunkerque, Calais and Boulogne were selected as ports of disembarkation for the British troops. From these places they were to be transported by Belgian trains into the fighting zone. The fact that the disembarkation at French ports and the transport through French territory were planned, proves that the Anglo-Belgian arrangements were preceded by arrangements with the French General Staff. These three Powers drew up the exact plans for the coöperation of the "allied armies," as the document says. This is further substantiated by the fact that among the secret documents there was also found a map showing the French lines of deployment.

The report mentioned above contains some remarks of special interest. It is said there that Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston had remarked that Holland's support could not be relied upon at the time (1906), and that he had further given the confidential information that the British Government intended to transfer to Antwerp the basis for provisioning the British army, as soon as the North Sea had been cleared of all German warships. The British Military Attaché also suggested the establishment of a spy service in the Prussian Rhine Province.

A valuable supplement to the military documents discovered, was found amongst the secret papers in the shape of a report by Baron Greindl, for many years Belgian Minister in Berlin, addressed to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. In it Baron Griendl reveals with great acumen the real reasons which prompted England to make her offer, and he points out the dangerous situation in which Belgium had placed herself by taking sides with the Entente Powers. In this very detailed report, dated December 23rd, 1911, the full text of which may at the Government's discretion be published in due course, Baron Greindl points out that the plan, drawn up by the Belgian General Staff for the defence of Belgian neutrality in the event of a Franco-German war and communicated to him (the Minister), had bearing only on the question of what military measures should be taken in the event of Germany violating Belgian neutrality, whereas the hypothesis of a French attack upon Germany through Belgium was equally within the range of possibilities. The Minister then proceeds as follows:

"On the French side we are threatened not only in the south from Luxemburg, but there is also danger along our entire common frontier. This assertion is not founded on mere supposition, but on positive facts.

"An outflanking movement from the north is undoubtedly part

of the military plan of the Entente Cordiale. Were this not the case, the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have caused such an outcry in Paris and London. The reason for wishing the Scheldt not to be fortified was not even kept secret. The object in view was to be able to transport without hindrance a British garrison to Antwerp, in order to establish in Belgium a basis of operations for an offensive movement directed against the lower Rhine and Westphalia, and then to draw us into the conflict, which would not be difficult; for, after having given up that stronghold of our national safety, we should have discarded, through our own fault, the last chance of resisting the demands of our dubious protectors, having been so unwise as to let them in. The overtures of Colonel Barnardiston, made at the time when the Entente Cordiale was concluded, were as perfidious as they were naïve, and clearly showed us what the game really was. When, however, it was seen that we were not intimidated by the apparent danger of a closure of the Scheldt, this plan was not entirely abandoned, but it was provided that the English expeditionary force was not to be landed on the Belgian coast, but in the adjacent French ports. This is confirmed by the disclosures of Captain Faber, which have never been denied, as well as by the newspaper reports confirming them or supplementing them in certain points, which reports have never been contradicted either. The British army landed at Calais and Dunkerque would not march along our frontier to Longwy, in order to reach Germany; it would right away invade Belgium from the northwest. That would give it the advantage of going into action at once and attacking the Belgian army in a region where we should be without a fortified position, in case we should be willing to risk a battle. This would enable the invading British army to occupy provinces having great resources of all kinds, and in any case to impede our mobilisation, or to allow it only after having compelled us to mobilise solely for the benefit of England and of her ally.

"It is most imperative to work out in advance a plan of campaign for the Belgian army, which shall provide also for this eventuality. This is necessary in the interest of our military defence as well as of the management of our foreign policy in the event of a war between Germany and France."

These remarks, made by an unbiased personality, prove conclusively that the same Great Britain who is now pretending to be the protectress of Belgian neutrality induced Belgium to side with the Entente Powers, and that at one time England even thought of

infringing on the Netherlands' neutrality. Moreover it is clearly shown that the Belgian Government itself, by lending its ear to the British proposals, has rendered itself guilty of a grave offence against the obligations resting upon it as a neutral Power. Had the Belgian Government acted in full accordance with the duties of a neutral country, it would have come to an arrangement with Germany similar to the one made with France and England. The papers discovered supply the documentary proof of the fact, known to the German authorities long before the outbreak of war, that Belgium was conniving with the Entente Powers. These papers may serve as a justification of our military action, and also as a confirmation of the reports received by the German military authorities regarding the intentions of France. May they open the eyes of the Belgian people as to whom the catastrophe is due which has overtaken their unfortunate country!

9. THE BRUSSELS DOCUMENTS.

II.

(North German Gazette, November 25th, 1914, Special Supplement.)

The Breach of Belgian Neutrality by England and Belgium.

The British Government has confined its answer to our revelations from the archives of the Belgian Ministry of War, concerning the Anglo-Belgian military agreements in 1906, to the statement that Major-General Grierson, who took part in their formulation, had died; that Colonel Barnardiston was away as chief of the English troops before Kiaochow; and that it was possible that an academic discussion had taken place between those two British officers and the Belgian military authorities, concerning the assistance which the British army would be able to give to Belgium in case her neutrality were violated by one of her neighbours.

The Belgian Government has observed that it could only be considered as natural that the English Military Attaché in Brussels should, during the Algeciras crisis, have asked the Chief of the Belgian General Staff about the measures which were to prevent the violation of Belgian neutrality guaranteed by England. The Chief of the General Staff, General Ducarme, had answered, that Belgium

would be capable of warding off an attack, no matter from which side it might come. The Belgian Government adds to this the following remark: "Did the conversation exceed these limits, and did Colonel Barnardiston explain the war plan which the British General Staff wished to follow in case our neutrality should be violated? We doubt it." Demanding the unabridged publication of the material found in the Belgian secret archives, the Belgian Government makes the solemn assertion that it was never asked directly or indirectly to take sides with the Triple Entente in case of a Franco-German war.

As may be seen from these declarations, the British Government from the beginning has failed to dispute the statements of the Imperial Government. It has limited itself to minimising them. It perhaps suggested itself to the British Government that, owing to the overwhelming abundance of evidence, a denial of the facts would be useless and risky. The discovery, in the meantime, of an Anglo-Belgian military news service, and of Belgian war maps prepared by the British authorities, prove anew how far the preparations for the Anglo-Belgian war plan against Germany had proceeded.

We reproduce herewith in facsimile the text of the rough draft discovered of the report of General Ducarme to the Belgian Minister of War of April 10th, 1906, which can hardly be unknown to the Belgian Government, inasmuch as the Belgian Minister in Berlin, Baron Greindl, expressly referred to its contents in his report of December 23rd, 1911. If, however, the memory of the Belgian Government should be faulty, its doubts concerning the themes treated in the conversations of General Ducarme with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston may be dissipated by the following text of the report which was preserved in the Belgian Ministry of War, in an envelope containing the inscription, "Conventions anglo-belges."

The report of General Ducarme reads, in the English translation, as follows:

Letter to the Minister Concerning the Confidential Conversations.
To the Minister of War.

(Confidential.) *Brussels, April 10th,* 1906.

"Monsieur le Ministre,

"I have the honour to submit to you a brief report concerning the conversations which I had with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, and which have already been the subject of my verbal communications.

"The first visit took place in the middle of January. Mr. Barnardiston referred to the anxieties of the General Staff of his country with regard to the general political situation, in view of the possibility of war soon breaking out. In case Belgium should be attacked, the sending of about 100,000 troops was provided for.

"The Lieutenant-Colonel asked me how such a measure would be regarded by us. I answered that from a military point of view the measure was doubtless satisfactory, but that this question of intervention was just as much a matter for the political authorities, and that, therefore, it was my duty to inform the Minister of War about it.

"Mr. Barnardiston answered that the British Minister in Brussels would speak about it with our Minister for Foreign Affairs.

"He proceeded in the following sense: The landing of the English troops would take place on the French coast in the vicinity of Dunkerque and Calais, so as to hasten their movements as much as possible. The entry of the English into Belgium would take place only after the violation of our neutrality by Germany. A landing at Antwerp would take much more time, because larger transports would be needed, and because on the other hand the safety would be less complete.

"This being admitted, there would be several other points to consider, such as railway transport, the question of the requisitions which the British army could make, the question of the supreme command of the allied forces.

"He enquired whether our preparations were sufficient to secure the defence of the country during the crossing and the transporting of the English troops—which he estimated to last about ten days.

"I answered that the places Namur and Liége were protected from a *coup de main* and that our field army of 100,000 men would be capable of intervention within four days.

"After having expressed his full satisfaction with my explanations, my visitor laid emphasis on the following facts: (1) that our conversation was entirely confidential; (2) that it was not binding on his Government; (3) that his Minister, the English General Staff, he and I were, up to the present, the only ones informed about the matter; (4) that he did not know whether his Sovereign had been consulted.

"In a following discussion Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston assured me that he had never received confidential reports of the other

Military Attachés about our army. He then gave the exact numerical data of the English forces; we could depend upon it, that in twelve or thirteen days two army corps, four cavalry brigades and two brigades of mounted infantry would be landed.

"He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to that part of the country where they would be useful, and he promised to give me for this purpose details about the composition of the landing army.

"He returned to the question concerning the effective strength of our field army, and he emphasised the fact that no detachments should be sent from this army to Namur and Liége, because these places were provided with garrisons of sufficient strength.

"He asked me to direct my attention to the necessity of granting the British army those advantages which the regulations concerning the military requisitions provided for. Finally he insisted upon the question of the supreme command.

"I answered him that I could say nothing with reference to this last point, and promised him that I would study the other questions carefully.

"Later on the British Military Attaché confirmed his former calculations: Twelve days at least would be necessary to carry out the landing on the French coast. It would take a considerably longer time (one to two and one-half months) to land 100,000 men in Antwerp.

"Upon my objection that it would be unnecessary to await the end of the landing in order to begin with the transporting of the army by rail, and that it would be better to proceed with this as soon as the troops arrived at the coast, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston promised to give me exact data as to the number of troops that could be landed daily.

"As regards the military requisitions, I told my visitor that this question could be easily regulated.

"The further the plans of the English General Staff progressed, the clearer became the details of the problem. The Colonel assured me that one-half of the British army could be landed within eight days; the rest at the conclusion of the twelfth or thirteenth day, with the exception of the mounted infantry, which could not be counted upon until later.

"In spite of this, I felt that I had to insist again upon the necessity of knowing the exact number of the daily shipments, in order to regulate the railway transports for every day.

"The British Military Attaché conversed with me about several other questions, namely:

"(1) The necessity of keeping the operations secret and of demanding strict secrecy from the press;

"(2) The advantages which would accrue from giving one Belgian officer to each English Staff, one interpreter to each commanding officer, and gendarmes to each unit of troops, in order to assist the British police troops.

"In the course of another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and I studied the combined operations to take place in the event of a German offensive with Antwerp as its object, and on the hypothesis of the German troops marching through our country in order to reach the French Ardennes.

"In this question, the Colonel said he quite agreed with the plan which I had submitted to him, and he assured me also of the approval of General Grierson, Chief of the English General Staff.

"Other secondary questions, which were likewise settled, had particular reference to intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps, photographs of uniforms, special copies, translated into English, of some Belgian regulations, the regulations concerning the import duties on English provisions destined for the wounded of the allied armies, etc. Nothing was resolved on as regards the influence which the Government or the military authorities might exert on the Press.

"During the final meetings which I had with the British Attaché, he informed me about the numbers of troops which would be daily disembarked at Boulogne, Calais, and Cherbourg. The distance of the last place, which is necessary for technical considerations, will involve a certain delay. The first Corps would be disembarked on the tenth day, the second on the fifteenth day. Our railways would carry out the transport so that the arrival of the first Corps, either in the direction of Brussels-Louvain or in that of Namur-Dinant, would be assured on the eleventh day, and that of the second on the sixteenth day.

"I again, for the last time, and as emphatically as I could, insisted on the necessity of hastening the sea-transports so that the British troops could be with us between the eleventh and twelfth day. The happiest and most favourable results can be reached by a convergent and simultaneous action of the allied forces. But if that coöperation should not take place, the failure would be most serious.

Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything conducing to this end would be done.

"In the course of our conversations, I had occasion to convince the British Military Attaché that we were willing, as far as possible, to check the movements of the enemy and not to take refuge in Antwerp from the outset.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston for his part told me that, at the time, he had little hope of any support or intervention on the part of Holland. At the same time he informed me that his Government intended to transfer the basis of the British commissariat from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as all German ships were swept off the North Sea.

"In all our conversations the Colonel regularly informed me about the secret news which he had concerning the military circumstances and the situation of our eastern neighbours, etc. At the same time he emphasised the fact that Belgium was under the imperative necessity of keeping herself constantly informed of what was happening in the adjoining Rhineland. I had to admit that the surveillance carried on by us abroad was, in times of peace, not directly in the hands of the General Staff, as our Legations had no Military Attachés. But I was careful not to admit that I did not know whether the spying service which is prescribed in our regulations, was in working order or not. But I consider it my duty to point out this position, which places us in a state of evident inferiority to our neighbours, our presumable enemies.

Major-General, Chief of the General Staff.
(Initials of General Ducarme.)"

"*Note.*

"When I met General Grierson at Compiègne, during the manœuvres of 1906, he assured me that the result of the reorganisation of the British Army would be to assure the landing of 150,000 men. The latter, moreover, would stand ready for action in a shorter time than has been assumed above.

"End of September, 1906.

(Initials of General Ducarme.)"

It will be noted that the following note appears on the margin of the document: "L'entrée des Anglais en Belgique ne se ferait qu'après la violation de notre neutralité par l'Allemagne." (The

entry of the English into Belgium shall not take place until after the violation of our neutrality by Germany.) How the matter really stood appears from a note found in the Belgian Ministry of the Interior, concerning a conversation of a successor of Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, the British Military Attaché in Brussels, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, with the Belgian Chief of the General Staff, General Jungbluth. The document, which is dated April 23rd and probably dates from the year 1912, bears the inscription "confidentielle" in the handwriting of Count van der Straaten, Director in the Belgian Ministry of the Interior, and reads in the English translation as follows:—

"(Confidential.)

"The British Military Attaché asked to see General Jungbluth. The two gentlemen met on April 23rd.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the General that England had at her disposal an army which could be sent to the continent, composed of six divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry—together, 160,000 troops. She has also everything which is necessary for her to defend her own territory. Everything is ready.

"During the recent events, the British Government would have immediately effected a landing in Belgium (*chez nous*), even if we had not asked for assistance.

"The General objected that our consent was necessary for this.

"The Military Attaché said that he knew it, but that—since we were not able to prevent the Germans from passing through our country—England would have landed her troops in Belgium under all circumstances (*en tout état de cause*).

"As for the place of landing, the Military Attaché did not make a precise statement; he said that the coast was rather long, but the General knows that Mr. Bridges, during the Easter holidays, paid daily visits to Zeebrugge from Ostend.

"The General added that we were, besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from passing through."

Here it is plainly stated that the British Government had the intention, in case of a Franco-German war, to send troops to Belgium immediately, that is to say, to violate Belgian neutrality and do the very thing which England, at the time when Germany, justified by reasons of self-protection, anticipated her, used as a pretext for declaring war on Germany. Moreover, the British Government, with a cynicism

that is unparalleled in history, has taken advantage of Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality for the purpose of raising sentiment against us all over the world and of posing as the protector of small and weak States.

As regards the Belgian Government, it was its duty not only to reject most emphatically the British insinuations, but also to point out to the other signatories of the London Protocol of 1839, and especially to the German Government, that England had repeatedly tempted Belgium to disregard the duties incumbent upon her as a neutral Power. The Belgian Government, however, did not do so. That Government considered itself justified in taking, in agreement with the British General Staff, military precautions against the supposed plan of a German invasion of Belgium. On the other hand, the Belgian Government has never made the slightest attempt to take, in agreement with the German Government or the military authorities of Germany, defensive measures against the possibility of an Anglo-French invasion of Belgium. Yet the documentary evidence which has been found proves that Belgium was fully informed that such an invasion was intended by the two Entente Powers. This shows that the Belgian Government was determined from the outset to join Germany's enemies and to make common cause with them.

Inscription on the Cover of General Ducarme's Report



Confidentielle

Lettre à Mr le Ministre
au sujet des entretiens confidentiels

Bruxelles, le 10 Avril 1906

Mr le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître sommairement des entretiens que j'ai eus avec le Cl. Barrendrikan et qui ont fait depuis l'objet de nos communications écrites.
La première visite date de la mi-janvier. Mr Barrendrikan me fit part des préoccupations de l'Etat-major de son pays relativement à la situation politique générale et aux éventualités de guerre du moment. Les cinq à six troupes, d'un total de 100.000 hommes environ, étaient prêtes pour le cas où la Belgique serait attaquée.

Le Chef. m'ayant demandé comment cette action serait interprétée par nous, je lui répondis que, au point de vue diplomatique, elle ne pourrait qu'être favorable, mais que cette question d'intervention ~~militaire~~ également de la neutralité publique et que, dès lors, j'étais sans instructions à donner le Ministre de la guerre.

Mr Barrendrikan me répondit que son ministre à Bruxelles en parlerait à notre Min. des Aff. Etr.

Il continua dans ce sens : En débarquement des nos troupes anglaises françaises sur la côte de France, vers Dunkerque et Calais, de façon à gêner le plus possible le mouvement de débarquement par ailleurs demanderait beaucoup plus de temps parce qu'il faudrait disposer de transports plus considérables et que la traversée serait moins complète.

Les admis, il voulait à régler divers autres points, savoir : les transports par Ch de fer, la question des réquisitions auprès des l'armée anglaise pouvait avoir cours, la question des communications Sup.t des forces alliées.

Il s'informa si pendant la traversée des transports, nos dispositions étaient suffisantes pour assurer la défense des pays durant la traversée et les transports des troupes anglaises, et jusqu'à quel point il était question d'une défense de jours.

Je répondis que les plans de travaux chez nous étaient établis pour une armée active, en 4 jours, notre armée de campagne, forte de 100.000 hommes, serait en état d'entrer en ligne — ce qui leur donnait complète garantie

Mr le Ministre de la guerre

ée des anglais en rique ne se fait pas ais la violation notre neutralité allemagne.

qui avait supprimé toutes les dépêches au sujet de ma démission

Le Gal Guillaumat, mon subordonné, insista sur le fait que : 1° notre convention était absolument conforme ; 2°/ elle ne pouvait lier en rien le Gal Commandant l'Armée anglaise, car il n'était question, en ce moment, dans la convention ; 3°/ que l'on n'avait pas encore été prévenu

X

Dans un entretien subséquent, le Gal Barrandon m'assura qu'il n'avait jamais reçu de renseignements d'autres attachés militaires au sujet de notre convention. Il précisa ensuite les termes mêmes des ordres anglais, nous faisant comprendre que, en 12 ou 13 jours, tous les débarquer : 2 corps d'armée, 4 brig. de cav.ie et 2 brig. d'infie montée.

Il fit remarquer l'inconvénient du transport de nos forces vers le centre du pays où elles devaient aller et, dans ce but, il me pria de lui communiquer détaillé de l'armée de débarq.t.

Il revint sur la question des effectifs de notre armée de campagne qui n'atteint pas, pour qu'on ne fût pas de détach.ts de cette armée à Namur et à Liège, puisque les places étaient pourvues de garnisons suffisantes.

Il me demanda de faire une attention sur la nécessité de permettre à l'armée anglaise de bénéficier des avantages prévus par le Right to the protection militaire. Enfin, il insista sur la question du commandement suprême.

Je lui répondis que je ne pouvais aucune dépêche donner à ce dernier point, et je lui promis un examen attentif des autres questions

X

Plus tard, l'attaché militaire anglais confirma son entretien précédent : 12 jours devaient au moins indispensables pour faire le débarquement sur la côte de France. Il faudrait beaucoup plus (16 à 18 jours) pour débarquer 100.000 h.es à Anvers.

Sur mon objection qu'il était inutile d'attendre l'achèvement des débarq.ts pour commencer les transports par Ch. de fer et qu'il valait mieux les faire au fur et à mesure des arrivages à la côte, le Gal Barrandon me promit des travaux avec l'état journalier des débarq.ts.

Quant aux protections militaires, je fis part à mon subordonné que bien que le Right fût formel pour la protection à des troupes alliées, cette question devait facilement être réglée.

X

A mesure que les études de l'état-major anglais avançaient, les besoins des prélèv.ts de puissance. Le Colonel en retraite Repington, l'armée anglaise pouvait être débarquée en 8 jours, et la restante le devait à la fin des 12e ou 13e jours ; sauf l'infie montée dont le Gal Guillaumat me fallait compter que plus tard.

Récemment, je crus devoir insister à nouveau sur la nécessité de connaître le renseignement pour le jour, de faire à régler les transports par Ch. de fer de chaque jour.

L'attaché anglais m'entretint ensuite de diverses questions secondaires ; savoir :

1°/ s'il serait de bonne à ce que des officiers de la garnison anglaise visitassent quelques musées,

2°/ s'il y aurait à organiser un service belge à chaque état-major anglais, un traducteur à chaque commandant des troupes, des gendarmes à chaque quartier pour aider les troupes de police anglaises.

X

Dans une autre entrevue, le L.C. Ramaekers a examiné les opérations combinées dans le cas d'une agression de la part de l'Allemagne comme objectif éventuel et dans l'hypothèse d'une traversée de notre pays pour attaquer les Allemands français.

Par la suite le Colonel me remettra son avant-projet sur le plan que je lui avais présenté et m'adressa de l'assentiment de Sir Archibald, chef de l'Et-Maj. anglais.

D'autres questions secondaires furent également réglées, notamment en ce qui regarde les off. intermédiaires, les traducteurs, les gendarmes, les cartes, les albums des uniformes, les titres à faire traduire en anglais de certains rapports belges, etc. le rapport des frais de séjour pour les rapports anglais, l'hospitalisation des blessés de l'armée alliée, etc. Rien ne fut

X

Dans les dernières entrevues que j'ai eues avec l'attaché anglais, il me communiqua le résumé journalier des débarquements à Boulogne, Calais et Cherbourg. L'embarquement de ce dernier point, signalé par des considérables d'autre part, a commencé

cette question à Bruxelles pourrait avoir lieu après la prise de contact entre les états-majors etc.

sauf certains retards. Le I.C. avait débarqué le 10e jour, celui du C. le 15e jour.

Notre matériel des ch. de fer exécuterait les transports de deux fois l'armée, soit, vers Bruxelles-Louvain, soit vers Namur-Briart, du Ier jour au 11e jour, celui des IIe Corps, le 16e jour.

J'ai insisté une dernière fois et aussi vivement que je le pouvais sur la nécessité de hâter encore les transports de façon que les troupes anglaises fussent près de nous entre le 11e et le 15e jour. Les résultats les plus heureux, les plus favorables pourraient être obtenus par une action combinée et simultanée des forces alliées. Au contraire, si nous devions subir seuls le premier choc, notre armée serait mise en péril. Le Col. Ramaekers m'a assuré que toute avait fait dans ce but.

X

Au cours de nos entretiens, j'eus l'occasion de remarquer l'attaché militaire anglais était de la volonté que nous avions d'entrer, dans la limite du possible, les mains de l'ennemi et de ne pas nous replier, dès le début, sans cesse.

De son côté, le Col. Ramaekers me fit part de son désir de connaître l'appui sur lequel nous pouvions compter de la part de la Hollande. Il me confia également que nous pourrions prochainement

La base d'appui anglaise
de la côte française à Ouessant, dit que la mer du nord serait abîmée
de tous les navires de guerre allemands.

Dans tous nos entretiens, le Colonel ne fit publier aucun renseignement
confidentiels qu'il possédait sur l'état de la défense allemande, dans la
prévision de la mauvaise tournure des événements. En même temps, il insista sur la
nécessité impérieuse pour la Belg. de se tenir au courant de ce qui se
passait dans les pays Rhénans qui nous avoisinent. Je dus lui confesser
que, chez nous, le service de surveillance au delà de la frontière,
en temps de paix, ne relève pas directement de notre état-major; HR
que nous n'avions pas personnellement de relations établies avec
d'attachés mil.res auprès de nos légations. Je me gardai bien, cependant,
de lui avouer que j'ignorais si le service Espionnage, qui
cependant est prévu par nos règl.ts, était ou non préparé. Mais
il est de mon devoir de signaler ici cette lacune qui
nous met en état d'infériorité flagrante vis-à-vis de nos voisins, nos
communs éventuels.

Le Lt. major, chef des Corps d'Etat.

Note Lorsque je rencontrai le Général Grasmon à Compiègne,
pendant les manœuvres de 1906, il m'annonça que la
réorg.on de l'armée anglaise aurait pour résultat, non
seulement d'assurer le débarq.t de 150.000 h., mais de
permettre leur action dans un délai plus court que celui
dont il est question précéd.t

fin septbre 1906

Minutes of a conference on April 23rd, probably 1912.

Confidentielle

L'Attaché lilitaire anglais a demandé à voir le Général Jungbluth. Ces Messieurs se sont rencontrés le 23 avril.

Le Lieutenant Colonel Bridges a dit au Général que l'Angleterre disposait d'une armée pouvant être envoyée sur le continent, composée de six divisions d'infanterie et de huit brigades de cavalerie-en tout 160.000 hommes. Elle a aussi tout ce qu'il lui faut pour défendre son territaire insulaire Tout est prêt.

Le Gouvernement britannique, lors des derniers évènements, aurait débarqué immediatement chez nous, même si nous n'avions pas demandé de secours.

Le Général a objecté qu'il faudrait pour cela notre consentement.

L'Attaché militaire a répondu qu'il le savait, mais que comme nous n'étions pas à même d'empêcher les Allemands de passer chez nous, l'Angletarre aurait débarqué ses troupes en Belgique en tout état de cause.

Quant au lieu de débarquement, l'Attaché militaire n'a pas précisé; il a dit que la côte était assez longue, mais le Général sait que M. Bridges a fait, d'Ostende des visites journalières à Zeebrugge pendant les fêtes de Pâques.

Le Général a ajouté que nous étions, parfaitement à même d'empêcher les Allemands de passer.

On December 23rd, 1911. Baron Greindl, then and for many years Belgian Minister in Berlin, made a report to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, extracts of which have been given above. Owing to its considerable length only part of the first page can be reproduced here in facsimile. There was found in Brussels a copy of this report. The official character of this third document is evident from the official imprint of the paper on which the copy was made.

SECTION
N° .....
ANNEXE
Réponse au N°
Dion Gte ..... Beau
du .....

Copie.

Berlin, le 23 Décembre 1911

Légation de Belgique
N° 3022/626

Très Confidentielle.

Que fera la Belgique en cas de guerre?

Monsieur le Ministre

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la dépêche du 27 novem.
Ire Section, P. Sans numéro de dossier, n° d'ordre 1108,

10. British Espionage in Brussels.

(North German Gazette, November 6th, 1914.)

E. M. de L'ARMEE ANGLAISE

Je soussigné DALE LONG, attaché à l'E. M.

réquisitionne .....

.....

.....

A le 1914

A whole package of formulas like the one printed above was found in the writing-room of the British central office for espionage in Brussels.

Long before the war it had become known that a certain Dale Long lived in Brussels and carried on espionage against Germany for England. It has also been possible to bring a great number of his agents before the court, but it was never possible to establish definitely that Dale Long belonged to the British General Staff. From the formulas found, however, it appears that Dale Long was to join the British General Staff in case of war, that he was authorized, as a member of the British army, to make requisitions in Belgium, and that this authorization was attested by the British Legation in Brussels, as the seal indicates. The presence of a great pile of blank formulas of this sort moreover proves in quite unimpeachable manner that this was a measure of mobilization which would be impossible without the consent of the Belgian Government.

11. NEW DOCUMENTS CONCERNING ENGLAND'S BREACH OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

(North German Gazette, December 2nd, 1914.)

Evidence is accumulating that England, working in conjunction with Belgium, had done its utmost, not only diplomatically, but also in a military way, to prepare for war against Germany. Our troops recently captured secret military handbooks dealing with Belgium's roads and rivers, which the English General Staff had published (Belgium, Road and River Reports prepared by the General Staff, War Office). Four volumes of this handbook are in our possession, of which the first volume was printed as long ago as 1912, the second in 1913, the third (in two parts) and the fourth in 1914.

They are marked: Confidential. This book is the property of H. B. M. Government, and is intended for the personal information of . . . . . ., who is personally responsible for its safe custody. The contents are to be disclosed only to authorised persons.

These handbooks contain the most exact descriptions of territory conceivable, based upon military investigations. The introductory notice reads: These reports can only give the state of the roads at the time they were reconnoitred. It will always be advisable to reconnoitre them immediately before using them, to make sure that they are not blocked owing to repairs or pipe-laying, apart from possible obstructions arranged by hostile forces or inhabitants.

Thus, for example, in volume I, pages 130 sqq., the high road Nieuport-Dixmuide-Ypres-Menin-Tourcoing-Tournai is dealt with as regards the nature of the road, the country traversed, tactical considerations, observation points and water conditions, and illustrated by special maps. The report includes an enumeration and description of places along the way. It contains their exact distances from each other, as well as exhaustive details concerning the roads under discussion, their grades, bridges, cross-roads, telephone and telegraph stations, railway stations, including the length of their platforms and embankments, narrow-gauge railways, oiltanks, etc. It is always stated whether all or part of the inhabitants speak French.

Let us, for example, give literally the tactical observations about Dixmuide found on page 151:

Dixmuide would be difficult to take, whether attacked from the north or from the south. The best line to hold against an attack

from the south would be the railway embankment W. of and up to the road, continuing along a line of knolls to the east of the road. West of the road the field of fire is good for 1,500 yards, east of it trees limit the view. A suitable garrison would be Hoogmolen and Veartkant. There is nothing else of tactical importance, nor is there anything likely to retard the rate of marching. Observation points: (*a*) the mill at Reencheeck, view all round; (*b*) Koelberg (7½ miles beyond Ypres) view to east and south. Incidentally it may be remarked that the church towers are, as a rule, noted as good observation points.

In a similarly thorough manner the whole course of the Scheldt is described, with all tributary rivers, villages, landing and fording places, breadth and depth, bridges, boats on hand, etc.

Thus the handy volumes form a splendid guide for commanders, General Staff officers, and subordinate leaders of every grade. There are appended:

1. A list of billeting possibilities in the various communes and villages, giving figures on billets for men, transport facilities at hand, and all other details which a commander requires;

2. A Report on Belgium, south of the line Charleroi-Namur-Liége, and on Brussels from the point of view of aviation, containing valuable information for aviators.

This lucid report, compiled most carefully and supplemented by a map of landing-places, bears the inscription "secret," and was drawn up in July, 1914.

Now these handbooks drawn up from a military and geographical point of view were not made just a short time before or during the war. Except perhaps the printing of them, that would not have been possible. The material on which they are based was, as may be gathered from the notes regarding the various parts, acquired since 1909 through careful and separate investigations. The first volume was then printed in 1912.

These reports therefore prove that there has been going on for the last five years a thorough preparation for a campaign in neutral Belgium. They are nothing else than a set of secret regulations for an English army waging war in that country. Thus the British General Staff, for some considerable time, prepared for this eventuality to such an extent, and foresaw it so clearly, that it carried out the tedious work of the compilation of these military handbooks.

Such a work could not have been accomplished without the ready and most extensive support of the Belgian Government and military

officials. Such exhaustive and detailed strategic and tactical information as that mentioned above, or such exact data concerning all the railways and the entire traffic, concerning the rolling stock, the locks and bridges systems, cannot be obtained in any other way. The lists of billeting possibilities drawn up for the British army and which deal with Belgium as if it were their own country, can only have been supplied by the Belgian Government. Without question official Belgian material was used here. It was adapted to suit English purposes, or in many places simply translated into English.

Such was the thoroughness with which England and Belgium had arranged in time of peace for joint military action. Belgium was, politically and from a military point of view, nothing but England's vassal. The indignation exhibited before the world by England over Germany's alleged breach of neutrality, is shown by these documents to be absolutely groundless and unjustified. If anybody has a right to be indignant, it is Germany.

When, on the occasion of our operations on the coast, the English and French press asserted contemptuously that we were not informed as to the dangers of the submergible territory in the so-called Polderland, it was correct in so far as we knew Belgian territory at the beginning of the war only through what we had been able to find in the sources available in the bookstores.

For this reason, the English reports of their investigations and their excellent maps were valuable booty for us. We were able to make immediate use of this extraordinarily valuable material for our own purposes, and to fight England with her own weapons. In this fact may be found the best tribute to the painstaking work of our enemies.

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12. DOCUMENTS FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF MR. GRANT-WATSON, SECRETARY OF THE BRITISH LEGATION.

(North German Gazette, December 15th, 1914.)

New and important proofs have been found of the Anglo-Belgian complicity. Some time ago Mr. Grant-Watson, the Secretary of the British Legation, was arrested in Brussels. He had remained at the legation quarters, after the legation had been transferred to Ant-

werp and later to Havre. The said gentleman was recently caught trying to do away with some documents, which he had carried away unnoticed from the legation when arrested. An examination of the papers revealed that they were official documents, with data of the most intimate character concerning the Belgian mobilisation and the defence of Antwerp, dating from the years 1913 and 1914. They include circular orders to the higher Belgian officers in command, bearing the signature in facsimile of the Belgian Minister of War and of the Belgian General Staff, and also a note concerning a conference of the "Commission de la base d'approvisionnements à Anvers," on May 27, 1913. The fact that these papers were found in the British Legation shows sufficiently that the Belgian Government had no military secrets to hide from the English Government, and that both governments, with regard to military matters, are in very close touch with each other.

There is also a hand-written note of especial interest which was found among the papers that the British Secretary endeavoured to destroy. It reads as follows:

Renseignements.

1° Les officiers français ont reçu ordre de rejoindre dès le 27. après-midi.

2° Le même jour, le chef de Gare de Feignies a reçu ordre de concentrer vers Maubeuge tous les wagons fermés disponibles, en vue du transport de troupes.

Communiqué par la Brigade de gendarmerie de Frameries.

Feignies, it may be remarked, is a railway station in France on the road from Maubeuge to Mons, about three kilometres from the Belgian frontier. Frameries is on the same line in Belgium, ten kilometres from the French frontier.

From this notice it must be gathered that France had already made her first mobilisation plans on July 27th, and that the British Legation immediately received information thereof from Belgian sources.

The material thus discovered furnishes an additional and valuable proof—if indeed any be needed—of the relations existing between England and Belgium. It shows anew that Belgium had sacrificed her own neutrality in favour of the Entente, and that she was an active member of the coalition which had been formed to fight the

German Empire. For England, on the other hand, Belgian neutrality really was nothing but "a scrap of paper," to which she appealed when it was in her interest, and which she disregarded when she found it expedient to do so. It is obvious that the British Government made use of the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany, only as a pretext to justify the war against us before the world and the British people.

THE

BRITISH BLUE BOOK

(NO. 1)

THE BRITISH BLUE BOOK (NO. 1)[1]

No. 1.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

SIR, *Foreign Office, July* 20, 1914.

I asked the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia.

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable.

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold,* in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up.

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia.

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial.

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be known.

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war

[1] *Miscellaneous. No.* 10 (1915). *Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of His Majesty, May* 1915. Section II of this British publication is designated as "The British Diplomatic Correspondence," and relates to the negotiations preceding the European crisis. It is reproduced in the Endowment's publication under the popular title "The British Blue Book (No. 1)." London: Printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office, by Harrison and Sons, 45-47 St. Martin's Lane, W. C., 1915. [Cd. 7860.]

* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable.

The Ambassador agreed whole-heartedly in this sentiment.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 2.

Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 22, 1914.*

Last night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter. He had, however, on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian Minister, emphasised the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing.

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude adopted towards Servia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one of great forbearance.

No. 3.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

SIR, *Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.*

Count Mensdorff * told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Servia to-day by Austria. He then explained

* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia.

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight.

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with, a time-limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia. I admitted that, if there was no time-limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards; that, if the demands were made without a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed.

Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an enquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909, Servia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself.

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable

that those who had influence in St. Petersburgh should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe—let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia.

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other.

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburgh had not been very favourable recently.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 4.

Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24, 1914.)

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade:—

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est vu obligé d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian

l'entremise du Ministre Impérial et Royal à Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie:—

"Le 31 mars, 1909, le Ministre de Serbie à Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal la déclaration suivante:—

" 'La Serbie reconnaît qu'elle n'a pas été atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine et qu'elle se conformera par conséquent à telle décision que les Puissances prendront par rapport à l'article 25 du Traité de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage dès à présent à abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observée à l'égard de l'annexion depuis l'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, à changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers l'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre désormais avec cette dernière sur le pied d'un bon voisinage.'

"Or, l'histoire des dernières années, et notamment les événements douloureux du 28 juin, ont démontré l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour

Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade:—

"On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:—

" 'Servia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Servia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter.'

"The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under

sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrivé à se manifester au delà du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une série d'attentats et par des meurtres.

"Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la déclaration du 31 mars, 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement: il a toléré l'activité criminelle des différentes sociétés et affiliations dirigées contre la Monarchie, le langage effréné de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agissements subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'instruction publique, toléré enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe à la haine de la Monarchie et au mépris de ses institutions.

"Cette tolérance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cessé au moment où les événements du 28 juin dernier en ont démontré au monde entier les conséquences funestes.

"Il résulte des dépositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de l'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a été tramé à Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient être munis leur ont

the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

"Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

"This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

"It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which the mur-

été donnés par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la 'Narodna Odbrana,' et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a été organisé et effectué par des chefs du service-frontière serbe.

"Les résultats mentionnés de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude de longanimité expectative qu'il avait observée pendant des années vis-à-vis des agissements concentrés à Belgrade et propagés de là sur les territoires de la Monarchie; ces résultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin à des menées qui forment une menace perpétuelle pour la tranquillité de la Monarchie.

"C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se voit obligé de demander au Gouvernement serbe l'énonciation officielle qu'il condamne la propagande dirigée contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage à supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

"Afin de donner un caractère

derers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

"The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

"To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

"In order to give a formal

solennel à cet engagement, le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie fera publier à la première page du 'Journal officiel' en date du 13/26 juillet l'énonciation suivante:—

" 'Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

" 'Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars, 1909.

" 'Le Gouvernement Royal, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer.'

character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their 'Official Journal' of the 13/26 July the following declaration:—

" 'The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—*i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

" 'The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

" 'The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.'

"Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le 'Bulletin officiel' de l'armée.

"Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en outre:—

"1° à supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale;

"2° à dissoudre immédiatement la société dite 'Narodna Odbrana,' à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme;

"3° à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie;

"4° à éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propa-

"This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army.

"The Royal Servian Government further undertake:—

"1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

"2. To dissolve immediately the society styled 'Narodna Odbrana,' to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;

"3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

"4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of prop-

gande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal;

"5° à accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie;

"6° à ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe;

"des organes, délégués par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, prendront part aux recherches y relatives;

"7° à procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du Commandant Voija Tankosić et du nommé Milan Čiganović, employé de l'État serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo;

"8° à empêcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autorités serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière;

"à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service-frontière de Schabatz et de Ložnica coupables d'avoir aidé les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière;

"9° à donner au Gouvernement

ganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

"5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

"6. To take judicial proceeding against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

"7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employé, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo;

"8. To prevent by effective measures the coöperation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Ložnica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

"9. To furnish the Imperial

Impérial et Royal des explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, qui, malgré leur position officielle, n'ont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise; enfin

"10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents.

"Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal attend la réponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, à 6 heures du soir.

"Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo à l'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé à cette note."

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de cette note à la connaissance du Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité,en accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici:

Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouvernement Royal serbe a adressé à l'Autriche-Hongrie la déclaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus.

Le lendemain même de cette

and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

"10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

"A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note."

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations:—

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this

déclaration le Serbie s'est engagée dans une politique tendant à inspirer des idées subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et à préparer ainsi la séparation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes à la Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle.

Des sociétés et affiliations ne tardèrent pas à se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestinement, étaient destinées à créer des désordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces sociétés et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des généraux et des diplomats, des fonctionnaires d'État et des juges, bref les sommités du monde officiel et inofficiel du royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est presque entièrement au service de cette propagande, dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie voisine ou à des attentats dirigés plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa sûreté et son intégrité.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appelé à soutenir par tous les moyens l'agitation contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et à corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont les

declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges —in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of

annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la dernière crise balkanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque-là occupées en Macédoine sont venus se mettre à la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

En présence de ces agissements, auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposée depuis des années, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manqué au devoir que lui imposait la déclaration solennelle du 31 mars, 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonté de l'Europe et avec l'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-à-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La longanimité du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal à l'égard de l'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie était inspirée du désintéressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de même par apprécier à sa juste valeur l'amitié de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante pour les intérêts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal espérait que le royaume se déciderait finalement à suivre de son côté une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait

the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-

surtout à une pareille évolution dans les idées politiques en Serbie, lorsque, après les événements de l'année 1912, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal rendit possible, par une attitude désintéressée et sans rancune, l'agrandissement si considérable de la Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestée par l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de l'État voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifié les procédés du royaume, qui a continué à tolérer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes conséquences se sont manifestées au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour où l'héritier présomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre épouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot tramé à Belgrade.

En présence de cet état de choses le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a dû se décider à entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes démarches à Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement serbe à arrêter le mouvement incendiaire menaçant la sûreté et l'intégrité de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal est persuadé qu'en entreprenant cette démarche il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisées, qui ne sauraient admettre que le régicide devînt une arme dont on puisse se servir

Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Servia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiment of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in

impunément dans la lutte politique, et que la paix européenne fût continuellement troublée par les agissements partant de Belgrade.

C'est à l'appui de ce qui précède que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal tient à la disposition du Gouvernement Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier élucidant les menées serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menées et le meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est adressée aux représentants Impériaux et Royaux auprès des autre Puissances signataires.

Vous êtes autorisé de laisser une copie de cette dépêche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

Vienne, le 24 juillet, 1914.

ANNEXE.

L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrilo Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicité y relative—crime commis par eux le 28 juin dernier—a jusqu'ici abouti aux constations suivantes:

1°. Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son séjour à Sarajevo, de l'Archiduc François-Ferdinand fut formé à Belgrade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko

political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a *dossier* elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connexion between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

ANNEX.

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th of June last has up to the present led to the following conclusions:—

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip,

Čabrinović, le nommé Milan Čiganović et Trifko Grabež, avec le concours du commandant Voija Tankosić.

2°. Les six bombes et les quatre pistolets Browning avec munition, moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livrés à Belgrade à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež par le nommé Milan Čiganović et le commandant Voija Tankosić.

3°. Les bombes sont des grenades à la main provenant du dépôt d'armes de l'armée serbe à Kragujevać.

4°. Pour assurer la réussite de l'attentat, Čiganović enseigna à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež la manière de se servir des grenades et donna, dans un forêt près du champ de tir à Topschider, des leçons de tir avec pistolets Browning à Princip et Grabež.

5°. Pour rendre possible à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež de passer la frontière de Bosnie-Herzégovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un système de transport secret fut organisé par Čiganović.

D'après cette organisation l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzégovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut opérée par les capitaines-frontières de Chabać (Rade Popović) et de Ložnica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbić de Ložnica avec le concours de divers particuliers.

Nedeljko Čabrinović, one Milan Čiganović and Trifko Grabež, with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosić.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež by the man Milan Čiganović and Commander Voija Tankosić at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depôt of the Servian army at Kragujevać.

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Čiganović taught Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabež in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider.

5. To enable Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Čiganović.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabać (Rade Popović) and Ložnica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbić, of Ložnica, with the assistance of various individuals.

No. 5.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 24, 1914.

Note addressed to Servia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.*

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time-limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia.

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.

Count Mensdorff * replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; Servia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time-limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Servia's part.

I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying, a time-limit could have been introduced later; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation.

* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

No. 6.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914.*

I had a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof * to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof * replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria?

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. Sazonof * said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time-limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Servia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 7.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia could not leave Russia indifferent.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 P.M. to-morrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any Power.

No. 8.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July 24, 1914.*

Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them.

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.

No. 9.

Note communicated by German Ambassador, July 24, 1914.

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubts that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army.

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic interference of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity; to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would

then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.

The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localisation of the conflict, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences.

No. 10.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

SIR, *Foreign Office, July* 24, 1914.

After telling M. Cambon * to-day of the Austrian communication to Servia, which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorff † upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburgh. I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it; but if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Servia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburgh till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some

* French Ambassador in London.

† Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburgh until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Servia, and Russia then mobilised, it would be possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Servia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers.

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Servia.

He replied that it was so.

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject. I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 11.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 24, 1914.

German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Servia. I understand the German Government is making the same communication to the Powers.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburgh, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded the

German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavour to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburgh, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercise influence alone.

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Servia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Servia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State.

Prince Lichnowsky * said that Austria might be expected to move when the time-limit expired unless Servia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands *in toto*. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be returned by Servia; a reply favourable on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria.

No. 12.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 24, 1914.

Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests.

* German Ambassador in London.

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time-limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as many points as the time-limit allows.

Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as expressed above, to Servian Government.

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action.

No. 13.

Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25.

(Translation.)

M. Sazonof télégraphie au Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Vienne en date du 11 (24) juillet, 1914:—

"La communication du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aux Puissances le lendemain de la présentation de l'ultimatum à Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un délai tout à fait insuffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour l'aplanissement des complications surgies.

"Pour prévenir les conséquences incalculables et également néfastes pour toutes les Puissances qui peuvent suivre le

M. Sazonof telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914:—

"The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of

mode d'action du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, il nous paraît indispensable qu'avant tout le délai donné à la Serbie pour répondre soit prolongé. L'Autriche-Hongrie, se déclarant disposée à informer les Puissances des données de l'enquête sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner également le temps de s'en rendre compte.

"En ce cas, si les Puissances se convainquaient du bien-fondé de certaines des exigences autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir au Gouvernement serbe des conseils en conséquence.

"Un refus de prolonger le terme de l'ultimatum priverait de toute portée la démarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois auprès des Puissances et se trouverait en contradiction avec les bases même des relations internationales.

"Le Prince Koudachef est chargé de communiquer ce qui précède au Cabinet de Vienne."

M. Sazonof espère que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique adhérera au point de vue exposé, et il exprime l'espoir que Sir Edward Grey voudra bien munir l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne d'instructions conformes.

action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna."

M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna.

No. 14.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 25, 1914.

Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a *démarche* with a time-limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time-limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations.

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at Paris (St. Petersburgh), you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute.

No. 15.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.— (*Received July* 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 25, 1914.

I learn from the Acting Political Director that the French Government have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government contained in your telegram of to-day.* They have, however, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday.†

No. 16.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.— (*Received July* 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 25, 1914.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as

* See No. 14. † See No. 12.

Belgrade. He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety.

No. 17.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1914.*

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,* and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade.†

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time-limit expires this evening.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.

If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite

* See No. 14.

† See No. 12.

ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present *status quo* in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.

I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.

No. 18.

Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July* 25, 1914.

Your telegram of the 24th July * acted on.

Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this

* See No. 11.

morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time-limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold * is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time-limit extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburgh. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.

* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 19.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July 25, 1914.*

I saw the Secretary-General this morning and found that he knew of the suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Servia become menacing.

In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway.

No. 20.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 P.M. to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to communicate personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes.

No. 21.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for

Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply:—

The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declaration in the "Official Gazette." The ten points are accepted with reservations. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana.

The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.

No. 22.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July* 25, 1914.

I have seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views.

They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in view of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I have up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government.

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government.

No. 23.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

The Austrian Minister left at 6.30.

The Government have left for Nish, where the Skuptchina * will meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul is remaining in charge of the archives.

No. 24.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported in your telegram of yesterday,† and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian *démarche* makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburgh to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly coöperate.

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The coöperation of Germany would, therefore, be essential.

* The Servian Parliament.

† See No. 6.

No. 25.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 25, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time-limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed.

Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilisation of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia,* and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them.

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky † said, however, that if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it. He expressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion.

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand.

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were travelling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it.

* Should be "Italy."

† German Ambassador in London.

No. 26.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 25, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

"The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time-limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Servia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time-limit, not only would they be acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to the Powers of any practical meaning."

You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian colleague.

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time-limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps.

No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 25, 1914.

I have communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of to-day.* I have said that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it.

No. 28.
[Nil.]

No. 29.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

SIR, *Foreign Office, July* 25, 1914.

The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

* See No. 21.

No. 30.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.

SIR, *Foreign Office, July* 25, 1914.

The Servian Minister called on the 23rd instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson * on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary.

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of the enquiry at Serajevo—an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy—disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction; but if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must abandon certain political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit to such dictation.

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects—Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual.

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch † his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavour to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

* British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
† Servian Minister in London.

No. 31.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent.

No. 32.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian questions, being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Servia. One naturally sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other

way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she required; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. He asked whether I had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilisation and retirement of Government from Belgrade.

No. 33.

Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July* 26, 1914.

Emperor returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory.

No. 34.

Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 26, 1914.*

Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.*

Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this.

No. 35.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July 26, 1914.*

Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration of war.

No. 36.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.*

Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and

* See No. 21.

Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh should be authorised to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

No. 37.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 26, 1914.

Berlin telegram of 25th July.*

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four Powers if necessary.

No. 38.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 27.)

SIR, *Rome, July* 23, 1914.

I gather that the Italian Government have been made cognisant of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

* See No. 18.

No. 39.

Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note.—(Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27.)

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe a reçu la communication du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal du *10 de ce mois et il est persuadé que sa réponse éloignera tout malentendu qui menace de gâter les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie.

Le Gouvernement Royal conscient que les protestations qui ont apparu tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina † nationale que dans les déclarations et les actes des représentants responsables de l'État, protestations qui furent coupées court par les déclarations du Gouvernement serbe, faites le *18 mars, 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelées vis-à-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion et que, depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui se sont succédé que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a été faite dans le but de changer l'état de choses politique et juridique créé en Bosnie et Herzégovine, le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal n'a fait

* Old style.

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant,* and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina † and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th * March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connexion the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation

† The Servian Parliament.

aucune représentation, sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, et au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a reçu une explication entièrement satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nombreuses fois donné des preuves de sa politique pacifique et modérée pendant la durée de la crise balkanique, et c'est grâce à la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans l'intérêt exclusif de la paix européenne que cette paix a été préservée. Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas être rendu responsable pour les manifestations d'un caractère privé, telles que les articles des journaux et le travail paisible des sociétés, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui échappent, en règle générale, au contrôle officiel, d'autant moins que la Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une série de questions qui se sont présentées entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, a montré une grande prévenance et a réussi, de cette façon, à en régler le plus grand nombre au profit du progrès des deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a été péniblement surpris par les affirmations, d'après lesquelles des personnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient participé à la préparation de l'attentat commis à Sarajevo; il s'attendait à ce qu'il soit invité à

except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Governernment cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal

collaborer à la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte à ce crime, et il était prêt, pour prouver son entière correction, à agir contre toutes les personnes à l'égard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites, se rendant donc au désir du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, est disposé à remettre au Tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans égard à sa situation et à son rang, pour la complicité duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient fourniers, et spécialement, il s'engage à faire publier à la première page du "Journal Officiel" en date du 13 (26) juillet, l'énonciation suivante:—

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels. Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers en fonctionnaires serbes aient participé, d'après la communication du Gouvernement Royal et Impérial, à la propagande susmentionnée, et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le

Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal Officiel," on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:—

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the

Gouvernement Royal serbe était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars, 1909,* qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers et fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer."

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'armée Royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le Prince héritier Alexandre, et sera publié dans le prochain bulletin officiel de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre:

1. D'introduire dans la première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtina† une disposition dans la loi de la presse, par laquelle sera punie de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance générale serait dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Il se charge,

Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909,* which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake:—

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina† a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government en-

* New style.

† The Servian Parliament.

lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, à faire introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui actuellement aux termes catégoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution est impossible.

2. Le Gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve et la note du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la société "Narodna Odbrana" et autres sociétés similaires aient commis, jusqu'à ce jour quelques actes criminels de ce genre, par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins, le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal et dissoudra la société "Narodna Odbrana" et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage à éliminer sans délais de l'instruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande.

4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de même à éloigner du service militaire ceux pour qui l'enquête judiciare aura prouvé

gage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved

qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, et il attend que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui communique ultérieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal que la Serbie s'engage à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, mais il déclare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons rapport de voisinage.

6. Le Gouvernement Royal cela va de soi, considère de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête éventuellement, auraient été mêlés au complot du 15* juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant à la participation à cette enquête des agents ou autorités austro-hongrois qui seraient délégués à cet effet par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle; cependant

to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th * June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and

* Old style.

dans des cas concrets des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction en question pourraient être données aux agents austro-hongrois.

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait procéder, dès le soir même de la remise de la note, à l'arrestation du Commandant Voïslav Tankossitch. Quant à Milan Ciganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu'au 15 * juin était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être arrêté.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prié de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumée, faire connaître le plus tôt possible, les présomptions de culpabilité ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de leur culpabilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'enquête à Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquête ultérieure.

8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière. Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne Schabatz-Loznica qui ont manqué à leurs devoirs et laissé passer les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th * June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznica line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

* Old style.

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, ont eu après l'attentat dans des entrevues et qui, d'après l'affirmation du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, ont été hostiles envers la Monarchie, dès que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui aura communiqué les passages en question de ces propos, et dès qu'il aura démontré que les propos employés ont, en effet, été tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui-même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions.

10. Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la présente note, aussitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le Gouvernement serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt comme toujours d'accepter une entente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question à la décision du Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the

déclaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) mars, 1909.

Belgrade, le 12 (25) *juillet*, 1914.

declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

No. 40.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July* 26, 1914.

Russian Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant * (last paragraph).

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris † arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government.

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the request of the Russian Government that the time-limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be taken.

* See No. 26. † See No. 36.

No. 41.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now.

No. 42.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July 27, 1914.*

Your proposal, as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,* is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry

* See Nos. 36 and 37.

of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so.

No. 43.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(*Received July* 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July* 27, 1914.

Your telegram of 26th July.*

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to coöperate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburgh showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof † to exchange views with Count Berchtold.‡ He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburgh had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.

* See No. 36.

† Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

‡ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 44.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914.*

Austrian Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution, seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government.

On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had correctly defined the attitude of His Majesty's Government in my conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant.* I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if they supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the

* See No. 6.

issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long.

No. 45.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914.*

Since my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram of to-day,* I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

No. 46.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

German Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburgh to localise the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into

* See No. 44.

Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could be not localised, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

No. 47.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 27, 1914.

See my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.*

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.

We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments.

* See No. 46.

No. 48.

Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

SIR, *Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

Count Mensdorff * told me by instruction to-day that the Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Servia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbour, though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Servia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to every one what appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the southeastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the fight, if necessary.

* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Servia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory.

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one thing —the coöperation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburgh that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

I am, &c.

E. Grey.

No. 49.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

SIR, *Foreign Office, July* 27, 1914.

The Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson * to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London.

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis di San Giuliano † would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German Government, and would enquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 50.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

SIR, *Vienna, July* 28, 1914.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

ENCLOSURE in No. 50.

Copy of Note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914.

(Translation.)

Pour mettre fin aux menées subversives partant de Belgrade et dirigées contre l'intégrité terri-

In order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating from Belgrade and aimed at the

* British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
† Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

torial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a fait parvenir à la date du 23 juillet, 1914, au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie une note dans laquelle se trouvait formulée une série de demandes pour l'acceptation desquelles un délai de quarante-huit heures a été accordé au Gouvernement Royal. Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'ayant pas répondu à cette note d'une manière satisfaisante, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se trouve dans la nécessité de pourvoir lui-même à la sauvegarde de ses droits et intérêts et de recourir à cet effet à la force des armes.

L'Autriche-Hongrie, qui vient d'adresser à la Serbie une déclaration formelle conformément à l'article 1er de la convention du 18 octobre, 1907, relative à l'ouverture des hostilités, se considère dès lors en état de guerre avec la Serbie.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de l'Ambassade Royale de Grande-Bretagne le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de déclarer que l'Autriche-Hongrie se conformera au cours des hostilités, sous la réserve d'un procédé analogue de la part de la Serbie, aux stipulations des conventions de La Haye du 18 octobre, 1907, ainsi qu'à celles de la Déclaration de Londres du 26 février, 1909.

L'Ambassade est priée de

territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has delivered to the Royal Servian Government a note, dated July 23, 1914, in which a series of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The Royal Servian Government not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

Austria-Hungary, who has just addressed to Servia a formal declaration, in conformity with Article 1 of the convention of the 18th October, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Servia.

In bringing the above to notice of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the Conventions of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London of the 26th February, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted by Servia.

The embassy is requested to be

vouloir bien communiquer, d'urgence, la présente notification à son Gouvernement.

so good as to communicate the present notification as soon as possible to the British Government.

No. 51.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.— (*Received July* 28.)

SIR, *Paris, July* 27, 1914.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

ENCLOSURE in No. 51.

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin.

Par une note en date du 25 de ce mois, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a fait connaître au Gouvernement de la République que, d'après Sir Edward Grey, la seule manière d'assurer, si c'était possible, le maintien de la paix dans le cas où les rapports entre la Russie et l'Autriche deviendraient plus tendus serait une démarche commune à Vienne et à Saint-Pétersbourg des représentants de

(Translation.)

In a note of the 25th of this month, his Excellency the British Ambassador informed the Government of the Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only possible way of assuring the maintenance of peace in case of the relations between Russia and Austria becoming more strained would be if the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Austria and Russia were to take joint action

l'Angleterre, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en Autriche et en Russie; et il a exprimé le désir de savoir si le Gouvernement de la République était disposé à accueillir favorablement cette suggestion.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim a l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie qu'il a invité M. Jules Cambon * à se concerter avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre en Allemagne et à appuyer la démarche qu'ils jugeront opportune de faire auprès du Cabinet de Berlin.

Le Gouvernement de la République a, d'autre part, conformément au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement britannique et que son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie lui a transmis par une note en date du 26 de ce mois, autorisé M. Paul Cambon † à prendre part à la réunion proposée par Sir Edward Grey pour rechercher avec lui et les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Italie à Londres, les moyens de résoudre les difficultés actuelles.

Le Gouvernement de la République est prêt également à donner aux agents français à Pétersbourg, à Vienne et à Belgrade des instructions pour qu'ils obtiennent des Gouvernements russe, autrichien et serbe de s'abstenir de toute opération at Vienna and at St. Petersburgh; and he expressed the wish to know if the Government of the Republic were disposed to welcome such a suggestion.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs *ad interim* has the honour to inform his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that he has requested M. Jules Cambon * to concert with the British Ambassador in Germany and to support any representation which they may consider it advisable to make to the Berlin Cabinet.

In accordance with the desire expressed by the British Government and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie in his note of the 26th of this month, the Government of the Republic have also authorised M. Paul Cambon † to take part in the conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed with a view to discovering in consultation with himself and the German and Italian Ambassadors in London a means of settling the present difficulties.

The Government of the Republic is likewise ready to instruct the French representatives at St. Petersburgh, Vienna, and Belgrade to induce the Russian, Austrian, and Servian Governments to abstain from all active military operations pending the

* French Ambassador in Berlin.
† French Ambassador in London.

militaire active en attendant les résultats de cette conférence. Il estime toutefois que les chances de succès de la proposition de Sir Edward Grey reposent essentiellement sur l'action que Berlin serait disposée à Vienne [*sic*]. Une démarche auprès du Gouvernement austro-hongrois pour amener la suspension des opérations militaires paraît vouée à l'échec si l'influence de l'Allemagne ne s'est pas exercée au préalable sur le Cabinet de Vienne.

Le Garde des Sceaux, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim, saisit cette occasion de renouveler, &c.

Paris, le 27 *juillet,* 1914.

results of this conference. He considers, however, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essentially on the action which the Berlin Government would be willing to take at Vienna. Representations made to the Austro-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about a suspension of military operations would seem bound to fail unless the German Government do not beforehand exercise their influence on the Vienna Cabinet.

The President of the Council *ad interim* takes the opportunity, &c.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

No. 52.

Note communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914.

(Translation.)

Le Gouvernement de la République accepte la proposition de Sir Edward Grey relative à une intervention de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en vue d'éviter les opérations militaires actives sur les frontières autrichiennes, russes et serbes; il a autorisé M. P. Cambon * à pren-

The Government of the Republic accept Sir Edward Grey's proposals in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy with a view to avoiding active military operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Servia; and they have authorised M. P. Cambon * to take part in the deliberations

* French Ambassador in London.

dre part aux délibérations de la réunion à quatre, qui doit se tenir à Londres.

L'Ambassadeur de France à Berlin a reçu pour instructions, après s'être concerté avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Berlin, d'appuyer la démarche de ce dernier dans la forme et la mesure qui seraient jugées opportunes.

M. Viviani * est prêt à envoyer aux représentants français à Vienne, Saint-Pétersbourg et Belgrade des instructions dans le sens suggéré par le Gouvernement britannique.

Ambassade de France, Londres, le 27 juillet, 1914.

of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London.

The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult first the British Ambassador in Berlin, and then to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered appropriate.

M. Viviani * is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Belgrade instructions in the sense suggested by the British Government.

French Embassy, July 27, 1914.

No. 53.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.)

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 14 (27) *juillet,* 1914.

(Télégraphique.)

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre est venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile que l'Angleterre prenne l'initiative de convoquer à Londres une conférence des représentants de l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie,

(Translation.)

St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

The British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and

* French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

pour étudier une issue à la situation actuelle.

J'ai répondu à l'Ambassadeur que j'ai entamé des pourparlers avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en conditions que j'espère favorables. Pourtant je n'ai pas encore reçu de réponse à la proposition que j'ai faite d'une revision de la note entre les deux Cabinets.

Si des explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne se trouvaient irréalisables, je suis prêt à accepter la proposition anglaise, ou toute autre de nature à résoudre favorablement le conflit.

Je voudrais pourtant écarter dès aujourd'hui un malentendu qui pourrait surgir de la réponse donnée par le Ministre de la Justice français à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, concernant des conseils de modération à donner au Cabinet Impérial.

Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hope, may be favourable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favourable solution of the conflict.

I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which might arise from the answer given by the French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador, regarding counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial Cabinet.

No. 54.

M. Sazanof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.—(*Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July* 28, 1914.)

Saint-Pétersbourg,
le 15 (28) *juillet,* 1914.
(Télégraphique.)

Mes entretiens avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne confirment mon impression que l'Allemagne

(Translation.)

St. Petersburgh,
July 15 (28), 1914.
(Telegraphic.)

My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if

est plutôt favorable à l'intransigeance de l'Autriche.

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arrêter tout le développement de la crise, paraît n'exercer aucune action sur son alliée.

L'Ambassadeur trouve insuffisante la réponse de la Serbie.

Cette attitude allemande est tout particulièrement alarmante.

Il me semble que mieux que toute autre Puissance l'Angleterre serait en mesure de tenter encore d'agir à Berlin pour engager le Gouvernement allemand à l'action nécessaire. C'est à Berlin qu'indubitablement se trouve la clef de la situation.

anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient.

This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.

It seems to me that Great Britain is in a better position than any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

No. 55.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914.*

With reference to my telegram of yesterday,* I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic.

He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria, but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers throughout the conversations that would ensue.

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by

* See No. 44.

Servia in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers.

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially of your instructions to me, and enquired whether instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed. The German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary.

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.

No. 56.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Petersburgh, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give away again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yes-

terday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 57.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(*Received July* 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July* 27, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, but he had hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Servia, but he believes that if Servia will even now accept it Austria will be satisfied, and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may defer action. Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favourably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he has expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both before and after communication of the note, and again to-day, that Austrian Government have given him assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from Servia.

No. 58.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(*Received July* 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 28, 1914.

I communicated to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, recorded in your telegram * to Berlin of the 27th July.

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace.

No. 59.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(*Received July* 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 28, 1914.

I informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday † to St. Petersburgh.

He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the impossibility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves "solidaires" with Russia on a question between Austria and Servia, which in its present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government.

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Servia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.

* See No. 46.

† See No. 47.

No. 60.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

Secretary of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported in my telegram of yesterday * to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply, and we found that, while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.

No. 61.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike proceedings against Servia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply.

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict.

No. 62.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your telegram of 27th July † to Berlin. I avoided the word "media-

* See No. 43. † See No. 46.

tion,'' but said that, as mentioned in your speech,* which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Servia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Servia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer be postponed.

No. 63.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(*Received July* 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July* 28, 1914.

Your telegram of 25th July to Paris.†

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs,

* "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933.

† See No. 27.

who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna.

No. 64.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July 28, 1914.*

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following to you:—

In a long conversation this morning Servian Chargé d'Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under Article 5 and Article 6, Servia might still accept the whole Austrian note.

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Servia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Servia to accept without conditions.

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inadequate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation—such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propaganda—quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Chargé d'Affaires. It was stated that coöperation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here.

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian declaration.

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador.

No. 65.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Nish, July 28, 1914.*

I have urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation pending efforts being made towards a peaceful solution.

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian merchant-vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova.

No. 66.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Nish, July 28, 1914.*

Telegram received here that war declared by Austria.

No. 67.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

Explanation given in your telegram of the 27th July * of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies.

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all.

* See No. 43.

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and, if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.*

No. 68.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1914.

German Government, having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress.

No. 69.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1914.

It is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram of the 27th July.†

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to coöperate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape.

* See No. 46. † See No. 55.

No. 70.

Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 29, 1914.

(1.) *Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated July* 28, 1914.

In consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Servia, the Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilisation in the military circonscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.

(2.) *Telegram to Count Benckendorff.**

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Servia is now most urgent.

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush Servia.

No. 71.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29).

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July* 28, 1914.

At invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening. He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, as they had done successfully in the last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a conference

* Russian Ambassador in London.

would in his opinion have had appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective coöperation. You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburgh to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to coöperate with England and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided" were his last words.

Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here.

No. 72.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July 28, 1914.*

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram * to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to

* See No. 46.

his Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news from Vienna as had reached His Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of Servia's integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangement for averting a European war would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that order for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier.

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria.

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions.

No. 73.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July* 28, 1914.

I have received *note verbale* from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23rd July * in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Servia formal declaration according to Article 1 of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and considers herself from to-day in state of war with Servia. Austria-

* See No. 4.

Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of London of 26th February, 1909.

No. 74.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's suggestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, who should be authorised accordingly.

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned.

No. 75.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I was sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiving their reply, despatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply

to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Servia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs.

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings.

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realise that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications.

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated.

No. 76.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.— (*Received July* 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July* 29, 1914.

I found Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a *fait accompli.* This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Servia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia, and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, re-

called officers on leave. His Excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French colleague said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation, that it seemed to him that when Austria had entered Servia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favourable for four disinterested Powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you.

Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial Government that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments.

No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 29, 1914.

I much appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram of to-day.* His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.

No. 78.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 29, 1914.

Partial mobilisation was ordered to-day.

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant † to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German Secretary of State had made to the British

* See No. 75. † See No. 67.

Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he explained, would only be directed against Austria.

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with Ambassadors either collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to accept. Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realised by the British public that it was not the fault of the Russian Government.

I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion made in Rome telegram of the 27th July,* which I mentioned to him, were carried out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers provided it was acceptable to Servia; he could not, he said, be more Servian than Servia. Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th instant † was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did to me to-day. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilisation, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the

* See No. 57.

† See No. 69.

fact that Austrian consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colours, that Austria had already partially mobilised, and had now declared war on Servia. From what had passed during the Balkan crisis she knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobilisation was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.

No. 79.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

There is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Servia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people which has been published this morning, and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburgh to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. This, however, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse to do.

No. 80.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July 29, 1914.*

In your telegram of the 27th instant * to Berlin, German Ambassador was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instant † from Berlin.

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 27th July,† but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference," so the Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin to-night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secretary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburgh fails to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views might be concomitant with such direct communication.

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Government must lend their coöperation in this.

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect.

Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views.

* See No. 46.

† See No. 43.

No. 81.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 29, 1914.

With reference to your telegram of yesterday.*

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favourable reception is given to any suggestions he can make there.

No. 82.

Mr. Beaumont, British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July* 29, 1914.

I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the Austrian army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Servian rule.

No. 83.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Nish, July* 29, 1914.

I have been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th instant in the House of Commons.

* See No. 64.

No. 84.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 29, 1914.

The German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor to inform me that he is endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, and he hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, and he is endeavouring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburgh the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh should be authorised to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict. The press correspondents at St. Petersburgh had been told that Russian Government would mobilise. The German Government had said that they were favourable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations *à quatre* in London, too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace.

No. 85.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request

would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day * to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.

No. 86.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(*Received July* 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July* 29, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made to-day by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilisation. The utmost he now hopes for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Servia.

No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 29, 1914.

After telling M. Cambon † to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon † that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a

* See No. 77.

† French Ambassador in London.

question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky * not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 88.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

SIR, *Foreign Office, July* 29, 1914.

I told the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting

* German Ambassador in London.

her mobilisation. I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff,* that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared to-day. To-day the German Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburgh. If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this morning, and propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Servia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Servia. It was, of course, too late for all military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Servia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed to Berlin what I had said to him this morning.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 89.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

SIR, *Foreign Office, July* 29, 1914.

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and

* Russian Ambassador in London.

I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation —which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 90.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

SIR, *Foreign Office, July* 29, 1914.

In addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning, as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July * to your Excellency. I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's † telegram of the 28th July ‡ and of my reply to it.§ I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Servia

* See No. 84.
† British Ambassador in Rome.
‡ See No. 64.
§ See No. 81.

would now satisfy Austria. But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano * had said, to be a method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with Servia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Servian territory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory while leaving nominal Servian independence, Austria might turn Servia practically into a vassal State, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans.

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands apparently were taking precautions.

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found of preserving the peace of Europe.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

* Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 91.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

SIR, *Foreign Office, July* 29, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a long memorandum, which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an account of the conduct of Servia towards Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian action was.

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Servia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake.

Count Mensdorff * said that the war with Servia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilising again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandisement, and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded.

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Servia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal State.

Count Mensdorff deprecated this.

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Servia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 92.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

SIR, *Foreign Office, July* 29, 1914.

The Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication from the Marquis di San Giuliano † suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was

* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

† Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

strongly favoured by Italy, might be removed by some change in the form of procedure.

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 93.

Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 30, 1914.

(1.)

*Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof.**

Vienne,
le 15 (28) *juillet,* 1914.
(Télégraphique.)

J'ai entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte Berchtold † dans le sens des instructions de votre Excellence. Je lui fis observer, en termes les plus amicaux, combien il était désirable de trouver une solution qui, en consolidant les bons rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, donnerait à la Monarchie austro-hongroise des garanties sérieuses pour ses rapports futurs avec la Serbie.

J'attirais l'attention du Comte Berchtold † sur tous les dangers pour la paix de l'Europe, qu'-

(Translation.)
Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.
(Telegraphic.)

I spoke to Count Berchtold † to-day in the sense of your Excellency's instructions. I brought to his notice, in the most friendly manner, how desirable it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Servia.

I drew Count Berchtold's † attention to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

entraînerait un conflit armé entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie.

Le Comte Berchtold * me répondit qu'il se rendait parfaitement compte du sérieux de la situation et des avantages d'une franche explication avec le Cabinet de Saint-Pétersbourg. Il me dit que d'un autre côté le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, qui ne s'était décidé que très mal volontiers aux mesures énergiques qu'il avait prises contre la Serbie, ne pouvait plus ni reculer, ni entrer en discussion aucune des termes de la note austro-hongroise.

Le Comte Berchtold * ajouta que la crise était devenue si aigue, et que l'excitation de l'opinion publique avait atteint tel degré, que le Gouvernement, le voulait-il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, d'autant moins, me dit-il, que la réponse même de la Serbie donne la preuve du manque de sincérité de ses promesses pour l'avenir.

involved by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

Count Berchtold * replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburgh Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided much against their will on the energetic measures which they had taken against Servia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold * added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excitement, that the Government, even if they wished it, could no longer consent to such a course. This was all the more impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Servian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity of Servia's promises for the future.

(2.)

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.

Saint-Pétersbourg,
le 16 (29) *juillet,* 1914.
(Télégraphique.)

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'informe, au nom du Chancelier,

St. Petersburgh,
July 16 (29), 1914.
(Telegraphic.)

The German Ambassador informs me, in the name of the

* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

que l'Allemagne n'a pas cessé d'exercer à Vienne une influence modératrice et qu'elle continuera cette action même après la déclaration de guerre. Jusqu'à ce matin il n'y avait aucune nouvelle que les armées autrichiennes aient franchi la frontière serbe. J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur de transmettre au Chancelier mes remerciements pour la teneur amicale de cette communication. Je l'ai informé des mesures militaires prises par la Russie, dont aucune, lui dis-je, n'était dirigée contre l'Allemagne; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne préjugeaient pas non plus des mesures agressives contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, ces mesures s'expliquant par la mobilisation de la plus grande partie de l'armée austro-hongroise.

L'Ambassadeur se prononçant en faveur d'explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne et nous, je répondis que j'y étais tout disposé, pour peu que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin dont il parlait trouvent écho à Vienne.

En même temps je signalais que nous étions tout disposés à accepter le projet d'une conférence des quatre Puissances, un projet auquel, paraissait-il, l'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas entièrement.

Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le meilleur moyen pour mettre à profit tous les moyens propres à

Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there had been no news that the Austrian army has crossed the Servian frontier. I have begged the Ambassador to express my thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenor of this communication. I have informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I told him, were directed against Germany; I added that neither should they be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation being the mobilisation of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The Ambassador said that he was in favour of direct explanations between the Austrian Government and ourselves, and I replied that I, too, was quite willing, provided that the advice of the German Government, to which he had referred, found an echo at Vienna.

I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account the most suitable meth-

produire une solution pacifique, consisterait en une action parallèle des pourparlers d'une conférence à quatre de l'Allemagne, de la France, de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie et d'un contact direct entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, à l'instar à peu près de ce qui avait eu lieu aux moments les plus critiques de la crise de l'an dernier.

Je dis à l'Ambassadeur qu'après les concessions faites par la Serbie, un terrain de compromis pour les questions restées ouvertes ne serait pas très difficile à trouver, à condition toutefois de quelque bonne volonté de la part de l'Autriche et à condition que toutes les Puissances usent de toute leur influence dans un sens de conciliation.

ods of finding a peaceful solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four Powers—Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy—and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year's crisis.

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Servia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some good-will and that all the Powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

(3.)

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 16 (29) *juillet*, 1914.

(Télégraphique.)

Lors de mon entretien avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, dont traite mon télégramme précédent, je n'avais pas encore reçu le télégramme du 15 (28) juillet de M. Schébéko.*

Le contenu de ce télégramme

St. Petersburgh, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

At the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schébéko's * telegram of the 15th (28th) July.

The contents of this telegram

* Russian Ambassador at Vienna.

constitue un refus du Cabinet de Vienne de procéder à un échange d'idées direct avec le Gouvernement Impérial.

Dès lors, il ne nous reste plus qu'à nous en remettre entièrement au Gouvernement britannique pour l'initiative des démarches qu'il jugera utile de provoquer.

constitute a refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government.

From now on, nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in any steps which they may consider advisable.

No. 94.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

I learn that mobilisation of Russian corps destined to carry out operations on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My informant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realised, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. I believe that the news of Russian mobilisation will not be a surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening. Unless mediation, which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro-Servian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns surprise that Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and French colleagues have spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demands in a favourable spirit; if approached in a proper manner, he thought she would probably go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which

opened any prospect of possible acceptance by both sides, he personally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers.

I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Servia.

No. 95.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

Russian Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be regarded by Austria as what it is, *viz.*, a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Servia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Servia will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Servia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory.

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war.

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity.

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it.

No. 96.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

The Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilised, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh continuing their conversations, although he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Servian reply.

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of a rumour that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria.

No. 97.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July 30, 1914.*

French Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

M. Sazonof * told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia—more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 A.M., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof * to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof * accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of which following is translation:—

"If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations."

Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that, if Austria refuses to make a concession, Russia cannot hold back, and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilisation.

No. 98.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(*Received July* 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July* 30, 1914.

Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's † telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from here. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has yet only mobilised against Servia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrange-

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
† German Ambassador in London.

ment and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave—a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French ambassador yesterday—Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.

His Excellency added that telegram * received from Prince Lichnowsky † last night contains matter which he had heard with regret but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in the way he had done.

No. 99.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(*Received July* 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 30, 1914.

President of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stops her mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a further report, since received from St. Petersburgh, states that the German communication had been modified, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilisation. The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Servia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Servia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by

* See No. 102. † German Ambassador in London.

Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.

No. 100.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July* 30, 1914.

German Ambassador told me last night that he thought Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Servia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished.

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an exchange of views.

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion.

No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 30, 1914.

Your telegram of 29th July.*

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party,

* See No. 85.

by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 30, 1914.

I have warned Prince Lichnowsky * that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to German Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.†

No. 103.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 30, 1914.

German Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained,

* German Ambassador in London. † See No. 98.

I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides.

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof,* as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,† and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Servia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same.

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 104.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 30, 1914.

You should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan ‡ of to-day,§ and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburgh.

No. 105.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 30, 1914.

M. Cambon || reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
† See No. 97.
‡ British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.
§ See No. 103.
|| French Ambassador in London.

was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit.

I said that the Cabinet was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see him again to-morrow afternoon.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

ENCLOSURE 1 in No. 105.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR, *Foreign Office, November* 22, 1912.

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to coöperate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.
E. GREY.

ENCLOSURE 2 in No. 105.

M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to Sir Edward Grey.

L'Ambassade de France,
Londres,
le 23 novembre, 1912.

Cher Sir Edward,

Par votre lettre en date d'hier, 22 novembre, vous m'avez rappelé que, dans ces dernières années, les autorités militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne s'étaient consultées de temps en temps; qu'il avait toujours été entendu que ces consultations ne restreignaient pas la liberté, pour chaque Gouvernement, de décider dans l'avenir s'ils se prêteraient l'un l'autre le concours de leurs forces armées; que, de part et d'autre, ces consultations entre spécialistes n'étaient et ne devaient pas être considérées comme des engagements obligeant nos Gouvernements à agir dans cer-

(Translation.)

French Embassy, London.
November 23, 1912.

Dear Sir Edward,

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I

tains cas; que cependant je vous avais fait observer que, si l'un ou l'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisons d'appréhender une attaque non provoquée de la part d'une tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur l'assistance armée de l'autre.

Votre lettre répond à cette observation, et je suis autorisé à vous déclarer que, dans le cas où l'un de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un motif grave d'appréhender soit l'agression d'une tierce Puissance, soit quelque événement menaçant pour la paix générale, ce Gouvernement examinerait immédiatement avec l'autre si les deux Gouvernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prévenir l'agression ou de sauvegarder la paix. Dans ce cas, les deux Gouvernements délibéreraient sur les mesures qu'ils seraient disposés à prendre en commun; si ces mesures comportaient une action, les deux Gouvernements prendraient aussitôt en considération les plans de leurs états majors et décideraient alors de la suite qui devrait être donnée à ces plans.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,

PAUL CAMBON.

had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours &c.,

PAUL CAMBON.

ENCLOSURE 3 in No. 105.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.

(Translation.)

L'Armée allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontières, hier; par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire. Nos avant-postes sont en retraite à 10 kilom. en arrière de la frontière. Les populations ainsi abandonnées à l'attaque de l'armée adverse protestent; mais le Gouvernement tient à montrer à l'opinion publique et au Gouvernement britannique que l'agresseur ne sera en aucun cas la France. Tout le 16e Corps de Metz renforcé par une partie du 8e venu de Trèves et de Cologne occupe la frontière de Metz au Luxembourg. Le 15e Corps d'Armée de Strasbourg a serré sur la frontière. Sous menace d'être fusillés les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays annexés ne peuvent pas passer la frontière; des réservistes par dizaines de milliers sont rappelés en Allemagne; c'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisation: or, nous n'avons rappelé aucun réserviste.

Comme vous le voyez, l'Allemagne l'a fait. J'ajoute que toutes nos informations concordent pour montrer que les pré-

The German Army had its advance-posts on our frontiers yesterday; German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance-posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilom. from the frontier. The local population is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th corps from Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Trèves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th army corps from Strassburg has closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by tens of thousands. This is the last stage before mobilisation, whereas we have not called back a single reservist.

As you see, Germany has done so. I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on

paratifs allemands ont commencé samedi,* le jour même de la remise de la note autrichienne.

Cés éléments, ajoutés à ceux contenus dans mon télégramme d'hier, vous permettent de faire la preuve au Gouvernement britannique de la volonté pacifique de l'un et des intentions agressives de l'autre.

Saturday,* the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in.

These facts, added to those contained in my telegram of yesterday, will enable you to prove to the British Government the pacific intentions of the one party and the aggressive intentions of the other.

No. 106.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.— (*Received July* 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July* 30, 1914.

I learnt from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that might imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once.

* *Sic:* in original. The actual date of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum was, in fact, Thursday, July 23. The Servian reply was dated Saturday, July 25, and it is clearly to the latter document that reference is intended.

There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favour of continuing an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible.

No. 107.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July* 30, 1914.

I do not know whether you have received a reply from the German Government to the communication * which you made to them through the German Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night that they had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply to an enquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned.

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise.

No. 108.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July* 31, 1914.

Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobili-

* See No. 84.

sation against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powers; and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor.

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request.

No. 109.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(*Received July* 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July* 31, 1914.

I read to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of yesterday.* His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not as an official document.

His Excellency agreed.

* See No. 101.

No. 110.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 31, 1914.

I learn from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilising eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians.

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show good-will in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations.

It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them.

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia.

No. 111.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 31, 1914.

I hope that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the

independence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburgh, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburgh, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations.

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal.

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburgh and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above.

No. 112.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July* 31, 1914.

According to information just received by German Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, whole Russian army and fleet are being mobilised. Chancellor tells me that "Kriegsgefahr" * will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added

* "Imminence of War."

in explanation that "Kriegsgefahr" signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country.

This news from St. Petersburgh, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies.

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

No. 113.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 31, 1914.

It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation.

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

No. 114.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 31, 1914.

I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether

French (German) Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.

A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Government. It is important to have an early answer.

No. 115.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 31, 1914.

In view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power.

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe.

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.

No. 116.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 31, 1914.

I have received your telegram of yesterday's date.*

Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers.

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war.

* See No. 99.

I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision.

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development.

No. 117.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(*Received July* 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 31, 1914.

At 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency.

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilised.

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England.

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminates. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs tomorrow (Saturday) at 1 P.M. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances.

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place.

No. 118.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

I am informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilisation was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobilise, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Servia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognise such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Servia, and that a compromise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. Although he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation.

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly with Servia; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Servia to yield to them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace.

No. 119.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

SIR, *Foreign Office, July* 31, 1914.

M. Cambon * referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson † this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

* French Ambassador in London.

† British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 120.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 31, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July * with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.† He trusted it would meet with your approval:—

"Si l'Autriche consentira à arrêter marche des ses troupes sur le territoire serbe, si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d'État souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante." ‡

* See No. 103. † See No. 97.

‡ TRANSLATION.—"If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conversation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier; it was, however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilisation which was already in progress.

M. Sazonof * said that undoubtedly there would be better prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favourable, and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this.

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain.

No. 121.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

Your telegram of 31st July.†

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately counter-

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† See No. 111.

mand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria.

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand.

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions—and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilisation had spoilt everything.

No. 122.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.— (*Received August* 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July* 31, 1914.

Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.*

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.

* See No. 114.

I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government.

No. 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

SIR, *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1914.

I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply * of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

* See No. 122.

No. 124.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(*Received August* 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 31, 1914.

On the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon,* I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 10.30 to-night at the Élysée, where a Cabinet Council was being held. He took a note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make.

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobilisation of her army if Russia do not demobilise at once. He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by His Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is packing up.

No. 125.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(*Received August* 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 31, 1914.

My immediately preceding telegram.†

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows:—

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defence of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at

* See No. 114. † See No. 124.

Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.

No. 126.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August 1, 1914.*

I have had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, that the French Government failed to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilisation in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilisation, and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilise if all Powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburgh requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding.

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that he had packed up.

No. 127.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August 1, 1914.*

General mobilisation of army and fleet.

No. 128.

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Brussels, August 1, 1914.*

Belgian neutrality.

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday * have been acted upon.

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.

No. 129.

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 2.)

(Translation.)

Luxembourg, 2 août, 1914.

(Télégraphique.)

Ministre d'État du Luxembourg Eyschen vient de recevoir par l'intermédiaire du Ministre d'Allemagne à Luxembourg, M. de Buch, un télégramme du Chancelier de l'Empire allemand Bethmann-Hollweg disant que les mesures militaires à Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte hostile

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

The Luxemburg Minister of State, Eyschen, has just received through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hos-

* See No. 115.

contre le Luxembourg, mais sont uniquement des mesures destinées à assurer contre attaque éventuelle d'une armée française. L'exploitation des voies ferrées affermées à l'Empire Luxembourg recevra complète indemnité pour dommages éventuels.

tile act against Luxemburg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways which are leased to the Empire.

No 130.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1914.

We are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant-ships.

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered.

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible.

No. 131.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1914.

I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are

ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters.

No. 132.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1914.

Following the telegram from M. Sazonof * to Count Benchendorff † of the 31st July communicated to me to-day:—

"(Urgent.)

"Formule amendée conformément à la proposition anglaise: 'Si Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d'État souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante.'" ‡

(Above communicated to all the Powers.)

No. 133.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1914.

M. de Etter § came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof,* dated the 31st July, which are as follows:

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† Russian Ambassador in London.

‡ TRANSLATION.—"Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: 'If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.'"

§ Counsellor of Russian Embassy in London.

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.

"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory."

(The above has been communicated to the Six Powers.)

No. 134.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August* 1, 1914.

President of the Republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.

No. 135.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1914.

Information reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that though the situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favourably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The effect of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government also by Russian Government.

No. 136.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.— (*Received August* 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August* 1, 1914.

Minister of War informed military attaché this afternoon that orders had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilisation of the French Army. This became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of "Kriegszustand," * the Germans have called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation under another name.

* "State of war."

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purposes.

No. 137.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1914.

I saw the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak.

Count Mensdorff * called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh by Count Berchtold,† and gave me the substance.

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburgh that the "door had been banged" by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburgh, to the effect that neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary.

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff to the fact that

* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.
† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburgh had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary.

No. 138.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, August* 1, 1914.

Your telegram of to-day.*

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German representative at St. Petersburgh had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war.

* See No. 131.

No. 139.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, August* 1, 1914.

My telegram of 31st July.*

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No progress whatever was made.

In the evening M. Sazonof † had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador, who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Servia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Servia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Servia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment.

M. Sazonof † informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the

* See No. 120. † Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburgh: the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof * was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate situation.

M. Sazonof * added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July,† had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first.

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised on their own sides of the frontiers, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis.

No. 140.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August 1, 1914.*

The Minister of War again sent for the military attaché this evening, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom., which he had arranged between the French troops and the German frontier,

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. † See No. 120.

and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit no provocative act.

No. 141.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August 1, 1914.*

I am to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisation is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on

their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany.

No. 142.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(*Received August* 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, August* 1, 1914.

Orders have just been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August.

No. 143.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(*Received August* 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, August* 1, 1914.

Detention of British merchant ships at Hamburg.

Your telegram of 1st August * acted on.

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.

No. 144.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(*Received August* 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, August* 2, 1914.

Secretary of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war.

* See No. 130.

No. 145.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

My telegram of 1st August.*

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken.

No. 146.

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Brussels, August 2, 1914.*

The news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government.

No. 147.

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 2.)

Luxembourg, le 2 août, 1914.
(Télégraphique.)

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence les faits suivants:—

Dimanche, 2 août, de grand

(Translation.)
Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.
(Telegraphic.)

I have the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts:—

On Sunday, the 2nd August,

* See No. 143.

matin, les troupes allemandes, d'après les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand ducal à l'heure actuelle, ont pénétré sur le territoire luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de Remich, se dirigeant spécialement vers le sud du pays et vers la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand Duché. Un certain nombre de trains blindés avec des troupes et des munitions ont été acheminés par la voie de chemin de fer de Wasserbillig à Luxembourg, où l'on s'attend de les voir arriver. D'un instant à l'autre, ces faits impliquent des actes manifestement contraire à la neutralité du Grand Duché garantie par le Traité de Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement luxembourgeois n'a pas manqué de protester énergiquement contre cette agression auprès des représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne à Luxembourg. Une protestation identique va être transmise télégraphiquement au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Etrangères à Berlin.

very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

No. 148.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 2, 1914.

After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon * the following memorandum:—

* French Ambassador in London.

"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon * asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.

No. 149.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 2, 1914.

Your telegram of 1st August.†

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship "Sappho" at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar.

* French Ambassador in London.

† See No. 143.

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of 1st August,* I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified.

No. 150.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, August 3, 1914.*

Your telegram of 2nd August:† Detention of British ships at Hamburg.

No information available.

No. 151.

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

French Government have offered through their military attaché the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply has been sent to-day:—

"We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take."

* See No. 130. † See No. 149.

No. 152.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

SIR, *Foreign Office, August* 3, 1914.

On the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communication:—

"In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano * replied:—

" 'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.' "

In making this communication, M. Cambon † was instructed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the *casus fœderis* under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 153.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 4, 1914.

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:—

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German

* Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† French Ambassador in London.

Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

No. 154.

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

German Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.

No. 155.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in

this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

No. 156.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 4, 1914.

I continue to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given.

No. 157.

German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, August* 4, 1914.

Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

No. 158.

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

Military attaché has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory, and that Liége has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans, who, however, were repulsed.

No. 159.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning * be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

* See No. 153.

No. 160.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.

SIR, *London, August* 8, 1914.

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant * I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow † at once replied that he was very sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow † again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,‡ and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium

* See No. 153. † German Secretary of State. ‡ See No. 159.

and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow * replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow * expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow * wished me to understand that for

* German Secretary of State.

strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.*

At about 9.30 P.M. Herr von Zimmermann,† the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and,

* This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.

† German Under-Secretary of State.

nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow * a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann † said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann † left me, a flying sheet, issued by the *Berliner Tageblatt,* was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow * at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow * came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorised by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the "pestilential *Tageblatt,*" which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made

* German Secretary of State.

† German Under-Secretary of State.

and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message:—

"The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles."

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery.

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow * and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports—which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing—and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route viâ the Hook of Holland to that viâ Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the

* German Secretary of State.

station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-by on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard,* and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and *savoir-faire* and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

* American Ambassador in Berlin.

No. 161.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.

SIR, *London, September* 1, 1914.

The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments.

The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Servia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tschirscky,* who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking.

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold † during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following

* German Ambassador in Vienna.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

day. It is true that during all this time the *Neue Freie Presse* and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The official *Fremdenblatt,* however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications.

On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl * had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning.

The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connexion with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must

* Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis.* On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold † and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons ‡ on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed out that whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily

* "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

‡ *See* Hansard, Vol. 65, No. 107, columns 931-933.

from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to coöperate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia.

The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirscky * abstained from inviting my coöperation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary † with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof.‡ Count Berchtold § refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko || again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburgh. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szapary

* German Ambassador in Vienna.
† Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.
‡ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
§ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
|| Russian Ambassador in Vienna.

had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof * that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof, M. Schebeko † added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff, ‡ to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations. § M. Schebeko† to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, || and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach,¶ had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko † repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko † had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August when Count Berchtold || informed the foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia."

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
† Russian Ambassador in Vienna.
‡ Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.
§ See No. 137.
|| Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
¶ Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

M. Schebeko * left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold † the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's † assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated.

The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 4th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The *Neue Freie Presse* was violently insulting towards England. The *Fremdenblatt* was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgian neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in the war.

The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction

* Russian Ambassador in Vienna.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage.

On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff,* at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia, who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff * that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August.

After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo. Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold † received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorff * had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and other places throughout the country. I had

* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.
† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation should be over. Count Berchtold * agreed to Mr. Phillpots, till then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of Chargé des Archives. He presumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold * was pleased to say he would deliver my message.

Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady de Bunsen at the embassy. We left the railway station by special train for the Swiss frontier at 7 P.M. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold.* The journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. We reached Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay

* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

there, on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

APPENDIX I.[1]

TELEGRAMS AND LETTERS PUBLISHED OFFICIALLY IN THE PRESS BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN, RUSSIA AND GERMANY.

I.

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE AND HIS MAJESTY THE CZAR.

(Published in the British Press on the 5th August, 1914.)

No. 1.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan (St. Petersburgh).

Foreign Office, 1st August, 1914.

You should at once apply for an audience with His Majesty the Emperor, and convey to him the following personal message from the King:—

"My Government has received the following statement from the German Government:—

"'On July 29 the Russian Emperor requested the German Emperor by telegraph to mediate between Russia and Austria. The Emperor immediately declared his readiness to do so. He informed the Russian Emperor of this by telegraph, and took the required

[1] The material in Appendix I as well as in Appendix II is taken from *Miscellaneous, No.* 10 (1915), *Cd.* 7860. (British official publication.) Appendix II appears in that document as an appendix to the *Belgian Grey Book* (No. 1), but inasmuch as the original *Belgian Grey Book* issued by that Government does not contain an appendix, the material has been printed in this publication simply as an extract from the British publication and arbitrarily designated as an appendix to the *British Blue Book* (No. 1), as was also done in the case of Appendix I.

action at Vienna. Without waiting for the result of this action Russia mobilised against Austria. By telegraph the German Emperor pointed out to the Russian Emperor that hereby his attempt at mediation would be rendered illusory. The Emperor further asked the Russian Emperor to suspend the military operations against Austria. This, however, did not happen. In spite of this the German Government continued its mediation at Vienna. In this matter the German Government have gone to the farthest limit of what can be suggested to a Sovereign State which is the ally of Germany. The proposals made by the German Government at Vienna were conceived entirely on the lines suggested by Great Britain, and the German Government recommended them at Vienna for their serious consideration. They were taken into consideration at Vienna this morning. During the deliberations of the (? Austrian) Cabinet, and before they were concluded, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh reported the mobilisation of the entire Russian army and fleet. Owing to this action on the part of Russia the Austrian answer to the German proposals for mediation, which were still under consideration, was not given. This action on the part of Russia is also directed against Germany—that is to say, the Power whose mediation had been invoked by the Russian Emperor. We were bound to reply with serious counter measures to this action, which we were obliged to consider as hostile, unless we were prepared to endanger the safety of our country. We are unable to remain inactive in face of the Russian mobilisation on our frontier. We have therefore informed Russia that, unless she were prepared to suspend within twelve hours the warlike measure against Germany and Austria, we should be obliged to mobilise, and this would mean war. We have asked France if she would remain neutral during a German-Russian war.'

"I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has produced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal appeal to you to remove the misapprehension which I feel must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace. If you think I can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do everything in my power to assist in reopening the interrupted conversations between the Powers concerned. I feel confident that you are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be done to secure the peace of the world."

No. 2.

His Majesty the Czar to His Majesty King George.

1*st August*, 1914.

I would gladly have accepted your proposals had not German Ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my Government declaring war. Ever since presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade, Russia has devoted all her efforts to finding some pacific solution of the question raised by Austria's action. Object of that action was to crush Servia and make her a vassal of Austria. Effect of this would have been to upset balance of power in Balkans, which is of such vital interest to my Empire. Every proposal, including that of your Government, was rejected by Germany and Austria, and it was only when favourable moment for bringing pressure to bear on Austria had passed that Germany showed any disposition to mediate. Even then she did not put forward any precise proposal. Austria's declaration of war on Servia forced me to order a partial mobilisation, though, in view of threatening situation, my military advisers strongly advised a general mobilisation owing to quickness with which Germany can mobilise in comparison with Russia. I was eventually compelled to take this course in consequence of complete Austrian mobilisation, of the bombardment of Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian troops in Galicia, and of secret military preparations being made in Germany. That I was justified in doing so is proved by Germany's sudden declaration of war, which was quite unexpected by me, as I have given most categorical assurances to the Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued.

In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and Russia. God bless and protect you.

II.

Telegrams Exchanged Between London and Berlin, 30th July–2nd August, 1914.

(Published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of the 20th August, 1914.)

No. 1.

His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia to His Majesty King George, dated 30th July, 1914.

I arrived here yesterday and have communicated what you were so good as to say to me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday to William, who was very thankful to receive your message.

William, who is very anxious, is doing his utmost to comply with the request of Nicholas to work for the maintenance of peace. He is in continual telegraphic communication with Nicholas, who has to-day confirmed the news that he has ordered military measures which amount to mobilisation, and that these measures were taken five days ago.

We have also received information that France is making military preparations while we have not taken measures of any kind, but may be obliged to do so at any moment if our neighbours continue their preparations. This would then mean a European war.

If you seriously and earnestly desire to prevent this terrible misfortune, may I propose to you to use your influence on France and also on Russia that they should remain neutral? In my view this would be of the greatest use. I consider that this is a certain and, perhaps, the only possible way of maintaining the peace of Europe. I might add that Germany and England should now more than ever give each other mutual support in order to prevent a terrible disaster, which otherwise appears inevitable.

Believe me that William is inspired by the greatest sincerity in his efforts for the maintenance of peace. But the military preparations of his two neighbours may end in compelling him to follow their example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would remain defenceless. I have informed William of my telegram to you, and I hope that you will receive my communication in the same friendly spirit which has inspired it.

Henry.

No. 2.

His Majesty King George to His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia, dated 30th July, 1914.

Thanks for your telegram. I am very glad to hear of William's efforts to act with Nicholas for the maintenance of peace. I earnestly desire that such a misfortune as a European war—the evil of which could not be remedied—may be prevented. My Government is doing the utmost possible in order to induce Russia and France to postpone further military preparations, provided that Austria declares herself satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighbouring Servian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands, while at the same time the other countries suspend their preparations for war. I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Please assure William that I am doing all I can, and will continue to do all that lies in my power, to maintain the peace of Europe.

GEORGE.

No. 3.

His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George, dated 31st July, 1914.

Many thanks for your friendly communication. Your proposals coincide with my ideas and with the communication which I have this evening received from Vienna, and which I have passed on to London. I have just heard from the Chancellor that intelligence has just reached him that Nicholas this evening has ordered the mobilisation of his entire army and fleet. He has not even awaited the result of the mediation in which I am engaged, and he has left me completely without information. I am travelling to Berlin to assure the safety of my eastern frontier, where strong Russian forces have already taken up their position.

WILLIAM.

No. 4.

His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William, dated 1st August, 1914.

Many thanks for your telegram of last night. I have sent an urgent telegram to Nicholas, in which I have assured him of my readiness to do everything in my power to further the resumption of the negotiations between the Powers concerned.

GEORGE.

No. 5.

German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor, dated 1st August, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey has just called me to the telephone and has asked me whether I thought I could declare that in the event of France remaining neutral in a German-Russian war we would not attack the French. I told him that I believed that I could assume responsibility for this.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 6.

His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George, dated 1st August, 1914.

I have just received the communication of your Government offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great Britain. To this offer there was added the question whether, under these conditions, Germany would refrain from attacking France. For technical reasons the mobilisation which I have already ordered this afternoon on two fronts—east and west—must proceed according to the arrangements made. A counter order cannot now be given, as your telegram unfortunately came too late, but if France offers me her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the English army and navy, I will

naturally give up the idea of an attack on France and employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not be nervous. The troops on my frontier are at this moment being kept back by telegraph and by telephone from crossing the French frontier.

WILLIAM.

No. 7.

German Imperial Chancellor to the German Ambassador at London, dated 1st August, 1914.

Germany is ready to agree to the English proposal in the event of England guaranteeing with all her forces the unconditional neutrality of France in the conflict between Germany and Russia. Owing to the Russian challenge German mobilisation occurred to-day before the English proposals were received. In consequence our advance to the French frontier cannot now be altered. We guarantee, however, that the French frontier will not be crossed by our troops until Monday, the 3rd of August, at seven P.M., in case England's assent is received by that time.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 8.

His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William, dated 1st August, 1914.

In answer to your telegram, which has just been received, I believe that there must be a misunderstanding with regard to a suggestion which was made in a friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey when they were discussing how an actual conflict between the German and the French army might be avoided, so long as there is still a possibility of an agreement being arrived at between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky early to-morrow morning in order to ascertain whether there is any misunderstanding on his side.

GEORGE

No. 9.

German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor, dated 2nd August, 1914.

The suggestions of Sir Edward Grey, based on the desire of creating the possibility of lasting neutrality on the part of England, were made without any previous enquiry of France and without knowledge of the mobilisation, and have since been given up as quite impracticable.

LICHNOWSKY.

III.

TELEGRAMS FROM THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR AT LONDON TO THE GERMAN IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR, 1ST AUGUST, 1914.

(Published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of the 6th September, 1914.)

No. 1.

1*st August,* 1.15 P.M.

. . . Sir Edward Grey's Private Secretary has just been to see me in order to say that the Minister wishes to make proposals to me for the neutrality of England, even in the case that we had war with Russia and France. I see Sir Edward Grey this afternoon and will communicate at once.

No. 2.

1*st August,* 5.30 P.M.

Sir Edward Grey has just read to me the following declaration which has been unanimously adopted by the Cabinet:—

"The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the

neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same positive reply as that which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here, while, on the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country."

On my question whether, on condition that we would maintain the neutrality of Belgium, he could give me a definite declaration with regard to the neutrality of Great Britain, the Minister answered that that was impossible, but that this question would play a great part in public opinion in this country. If we violated Belgian neutrality in a war with France there would certainly be a change in public opinion which would make it difficult for the Cabinet here to maintain friendly neutrality. For the time there was not the slightest intention to proceed in a hostile manner against us. It would be their desire to avoid this if there was any possibility of doing so. It was, however, difficult to draw a line up to which we could go without intervention on this side. He turned again and again to Belgian neutrality, and was of opinion that this question would also play a great part.

He had also thought whether it was not possible that we and France should, in case of a Russian war, stand armed opposite to one another without attacking. I asked him if he would be in a position to arrange that France would assent to an agreement of this kind. As we wanted neither to destroy France nor to annex portions of French territory, I could think that we would give our assent to an arrangement of this kind which would secure for us the neutrality of Great Britain. The Minister said he would make enquiries; he also recognised the difficulties of holding back the military on both sides.

No. 3.

1st August, 8.30 P.M.

My communication of this morning is cancelled by my communication of this evening. As there is no positive English proposal before us, any further step in the sense of the message I sent is superfluous.

IV.

Telegram from His Majesty the Czar to His Majesty the Emperor William.

(Published in the Russian Press on the 31st January, 1915.)

29*th July*, 1914.

Thanks for your telegram,* which is conciliatory and friendly, whereas the official message presented to-day by your Ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to The Hague Tribunal. I trust in your wisdom and friendship.

V.

Letters Exchanged Between His Majesty King George and the President of the French Republic.

(Published in the British Press on the 20th February, 1915.)

No. 1.

The President of the French Republic to His Majesty King George.

Dear and Great Friend, *Paris, July* 31, 1914.

In the grave events through which Europe is passing, I feel bound to convey to your Majesty the information which the Government of the Republic have received from Germany. The military preparations which are being undertaken by the Imperial Government, especially in the immediate neighbourhood of the French frontier, are being pushed forward every day with fresh vigour and speed. France, resolved to continue to the very end to do all that lies within her power to maintain peace, has, up to the present, confined herself solely to the most indispensable precautionary measures. But it does not appear that her prudence and moderation serve to check Germany's action; indeed, quite the reverse. We are, perhaps, then,

* German White Book, No. 20, p. 431. [This reference is to the British publication. In the present publication the reference should be to "The German White Book," No. 22, p. 808.]

in spite of the moderation of the Government of the Republic and the calm of public opinion, on the eve of the most terrible events.

From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France might be engaged; if, on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the *entente cordiale* would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken.

It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave complete liberty to your Majesty's Government, and that, in the letters exchanged in 1912 * between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon, Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a mutual agreement to consult one another in the event of European tension, and to examine in concert whether common action were advisable.

But the character of close friendship which public feeling has given in both countries to the entente between Great Britain and France, the confidence with which our two Governments have never ceased to work for the maintenance of peace, and the signs of sympathy which your Majesty has ever shown to France, justify me in informing you quite frankly of my impressions, which are those of the Government of the Republic and of all France.

It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settlement depend.

We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have enjoined upon our Ally an attitude of moderation from which they have not swerved. In concert with your Majesty's Government, and in conformity with Sir E. Grey's latest suggestions, we will continue to act on the same lines.

But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an agreement between her and Russia will become impossible. I am profoundly convinced that at the present moment, the more Great Britain, France, and Russia can give a deep impression that they are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible will it be to count upon the preservation of peace.

* See pp. 80 and 81. [This reference is to the British publication. In the present publication the reference should be to pp. 966-969.]

I beg that your Majesty will excuse a step which is only inspired by the hope of seeing the European balance of power definitely reaffirmed.

Pray accept the expression of my most cordial sentiments.

R. POINCARÉ.

No. 2.

His Majesty King George to the President of the French Republic.

Dear and Great Friend, *Buckingham Palace, August* 1, 1914.

I most highly appreciate the sentiments which moved you to write to me in so cordial and friendly a spirit, and I am grateful to you for having stated your views so fully and frankly.

You may be assured that the present situation in Europe has been the cause of much anxiety and preoccupation to me, and I am glad to think that our two Governments have worked so amiably together in endeavouring to find a peaceful solution of the questions at issue.

It would be a source of real satisfaction to me if our united efforts were to meet with success, and I am still not without hope that the terrible events which seem so near may be averted.

I admire the restraint which you and your Government are exercising in refraining from taking undue military measures on the frontier and not adopting an attitude which could in any wise be interpreted as a provocative one.

I am personally using my best endeavours with the Emperors of Russia and of Germany towards finding some solution by which actual military operations may at any rate be postponed, and time be thus given for calm discussion between the Powers. I intend to prosecute these efforts without intermission so long as any hope remains of an amicable settlement.

As to the attitude of my country, events are changing so rapidly that it is difficult to forecast future developments; but you may be assured that my Government will continue to discuss freely and frankly any point which might arise of interest to our two nations with M. Cambon.

Believe me,

M. le Président,

(Signed) GEORGE R.I.

APPENDIX II.

Documents Relative to the Relations Between Great Britain and Belgium Previously to the Outbreak of War.

No. 1.

*Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.**

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 7, 1913.*

In speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said, speaking unofficially, that it had been brought to my knowledge that there was apprehension in Belgium lest we should be the first to violate Belgian neutrality. I did not think that this apprehension could have come from a British source.

The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been talk, in a British source which he could not name, of the landing of troops in Belgium by Great Britain, in order to anticipate a possible despatch of German troops through Belgium to France.

I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it. What we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embarrassing question, was what it would be desirable and necessary for us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if Belgian neutrality was violated by any Power. For us to be the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium would be to give Germany, for instance, justification for sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be respected, and as long as it was not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory.

I am, &c.

E. Grey.

* A record of this despatch was communicated by Sir F. Villiers to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 2.

Extract from a Despatch from Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated December 23, 1911.

(From the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,* October 13, 1914.)

"Von der französischen Seite her droht die Gefahr nicht nur im Süden von Luxemburg. Sie bedroht uns auf unserer ganzen gemeinsamen Grenze. Für diese Behauptung sind wir nicht nur auf Mutmassungen angewiesen. Wir haben dafür positive Anhaltspunkte.

"Der Gedanke einer Umfassungsbewegung von Norden her gehört zweifellos zu den Kombinationen der *Entente cordiale.* Wenn das nicht der Fall wäre, so hätte der Plan, Vlissingen zu befestigen, nicht ein solches Geschrei in Paris und London hervorgerufen. Man hat dort den Grund gar nicht verheimlicht, aus dem man wünschte, dass die Schelde ohne Verteidigung bliebe. Man verfolgte dabei den Zweck, unbehindert eine englische Garnison nach Antwerpen überführen zu können, also den Zweck, sich bei uns eine Operationsbasis für eine Offensive in der Richtung auf den Niederrhein und Westfalen zu schaffen und uns dann mit fortzureissen, was nicht schwer gewesen wäre. Denn nach Preisgabe unseres nationalen

(Translation.)

"From the French side the danger threatens not only in the south from Luxemburg; it threatens us along our whole common frontier. For this assertion we are not dependent only on surmises. We have positive facts to go upon.

"The combinations of the *Entente cordiale* include, without doubt, the thought of an enveloping movement from the north. If that were not the case, the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have evoked such an outcry in Paris and London. No secret was made there about the reasons why it was wished that the Scheldt should remain unfortified. The object was to be able to ship a British garrison without hindrance to Antwerp, and to obtain in our country a base of operations for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia, and then to carry us along with them, which would not have been difficult. For after giving up our national place of refuge, we should by our own fault have deprived ourselves of

Zufluchtsortes hätten wir durch unsere eigene Schuld uns jeder Möglichkeit begeben, den Forderungen unserer zweifelhaften Beschützer Widerstand zu leisten, nachdem wir so unklug gewesen wären, sie dort zuzulassen. Die ebenso perfiden wie naiven Eröffnungen des Obersten Barnardiston zur Zeit des Abschlusses der *Entente cordiale* haben uns deutlich gezeigt, um was es sich handelte. Als es sich herausstellte, dass wir uns durch die angeblich drohende Gefahr einer Schliessung der Schelde nicht einschüchtern liessen, wurde der Plan zwar nicht aufgegeben, aber dahin abgeändert, dass die englische Hilfsarmee nicht an der belgischen Küste, sondern in den nächstliegenden französischen Häfen gelandet werden sollte. Hierfür zeugen auch die Enthüllungen des Kapitäns Faber, die ebensowenig dementiert worden sind, wie die Nachrichten der Zeitungen, durch die sie bestätigt oder in einzelnen Punkten ergänzt worden sind. Diese in Calais und Dünkirchen gelandete englische Armee würde nicht an unserer Grenze entlang nach Longwy marschieren, um Deutschland zu erreichen. Sie würde sofort bei uns von Nordwesten her eindringen. Das würde ihr den Vorteil verschaffen, sofort in Aktion treten zu können, die belgische Armee in einer Gegend zu treffen, in der wir uns auf keine Festung stützen können,

any possibility of resisting the demands of our doubtful protectors after being so foolish as to admit them to it. The equally perfidious and naïf revelations of Colonel Barnardiston at the time of the conclusion of the *Entente cordiale* showed us clearly what was intended. When it became evident that we were not to be intimidated by the alleged threatening danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not indeed abandoned, but altered in so far as the British auxiliary force was not to be landed on the Belgian coast, but in the nearest French harbours. The relevations of Captain Faber, which have been no more denied than the information of the newspapers by which they were confirmed or elaborated in certain particulars, are evidence of this. This British army, landed at Calais and Dunkirk, would not march along our frontier to Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would immediately invade us from the northwest. This would gain for it the advantage of going into action at once, of meeting the Belgian army in a region where we cannot obtain support from any fortress, in the event of our wishing to risk a battle. It would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich in every kind of resource, but in any case to hinder our mobilisation or to allow it only when we had formally

falls wir eine Schlacht riskieren wollen. Es würde ihr ermöglichen, an Ressourcen aller Art reiche Provinzen zu besetzen, auf alle Fälle aber unsere Mobilmachung zu behindern oder sie nur zuzulassen, nachdem wir uns formell verpflichtet hätten, die Mobilmachung nur zum Vorteil Englands und seines Bundesgenossen durchzuführen.

"Es ist dringend geboten, im voraus einen Schlachtplan für die belgische Armee auch für diese Eventualität aufzustellen. Das gebietet sowohl das Interesse an unserer militärischen Verteidigung als auch die Führung unserer auswärtigen Politik im Falle eines Krieges zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich."

pledged ourselves to complete mobilisation solely for the benefit of Great Britain and her allies.

"I would strongly urge that a plan of action should be drawn up for this eventuality also. This is demanded as much by the requirements of our military defence as by the conduct of our foreign policy in the case of a war between Germany and France."

No. 3.

*Circular Telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Representatives Abroad.**

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1914.

The story of an alleged Anglo-Belgian agreement of 1906 published in the German press, and based on documents said to have been found at Brussels, is only a story which has been reproduced in various forms and denied on several occasions. No such agreement has ever existed.

As the Germans well know, General Grierson is dead, and Colonel (now General) Barnardiston is commanding the British forces before Tsing-tao. In 1906 General Grierson was on the General Staff at the War Office and Colonel Barnardiston was military attaché at Brus-

* This telegram was sent on receipt of a summary of the documents contained in No. 4, issued by the German Government on the 13th October in advance of the publication of the documents themselves.

sels. In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great Britain to protect the neutrality of Belgium against violation from any side, some academic discussions may, through the instrumentality of Colonel Barnardiston, have taken place between General Grierson and the Belgian military authorities as to what assistance the British army might be able to afford to Belgium should one of her neighbours violate that neutrality. Some notes with reference to the subject may exist in the archives at Brussels.

It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely, 1906, was the year following that in which Germany had, as in 1911, adopted a threatening attitude towards France with regard to Morocco, and, in view of the apprehensions existing of an attack on France through Belgium, it was natural that possible eventualities should be discussed.

The impossibility of Belgium having been a party to any agreement of the nature indicated, or to any design for the violation of Belgian neutrality, is clearly shown by the reiterated declarations that she has made for many years past that she would resist to the utmost any violation of her neutrality from whatever quarter and in whatever form such violation might come.

It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive designs on the part of other Powers are made by Germany, who, since 1906, has established an elaborate network of strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren, thinly-populated tract, deliberately constructed to permit of the sudden attack upon Belgium which was carried out two months ago.

No. 4.

Documents as published in facsimile in a special Supplement to the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" of November 25, 1914.

(1.)

Lettre à M. le Ministre de la Guerre au sujet des Entretiens confidentiels.

(Confidentielle.) *Bruxelles, le 10 avril, 1906.*

M. le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte sommairement des entretiens que j'ai eus avec le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston et qui ont fait l'objet de mes communications verbales.

La première visite date de la mi-janvier. M. Barnardiston me fit part des préoccupations de l'état-major de son pays relativement à la situation politique générale et aux éventualités de guerre du moment. Un envoi de troupes, d'un total de 100,000 hommes environ, était projeté pour le cas où la Belgique serait attaquée.

Le lieutenant-colonel m'ayant demandé comment cette action serait interprétée par nous, je lui répondis que, au point de vue militaire, elle ne pourrait qu'être favorable; mais que cette question d'intervention relevait égale-

(Translation.)

Letter [from the Chief of the Belgian General Staff] to the [Belgian] Minister of War respecting the confidential Interviews.

(Confidential.)

Brussels, April 10, 1906.

Sir,

I have the honour to furnish herewith a summary of the conversations which I have had with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, which I have already reported to you verbally.

His first visit was in the middle of January. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston told me of the preoccupation of the British General Staff concerning the general political situation and the existing possibilities of war. Should Belgium be attacked, it was proposed to send about 100,000 men.

The Lieutenant-Colonel having asked me how we should interpret such a step, I answered that, from the military point of view, it could only be advantageous; but that this question of intervention had also a political side, and that

ment du pouvoir politique et que, dès lors, j'étais tenu d'en entretenir le Ministre de la Guerre.

M. Barnardiston me répondit que son Ministre à Bruxelles en parlerait à notre Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

Il continua dans ce sens: le débarquement des troupes anglaises se ferait sur la côte de France, vers Dunkerque et Calais, de façon à hâter le plus possible le mouvement.* La débarquement par Anvers demanderait beaucoup plus de temps, parce qu'il faudrait des transports plus considérables et d'autre part la sécurité serait moins complète.

Ceci admis, il resterait à régler divers autres points, savoir: les transports par chemin de fer, la question des réquisitions auxquelles l'armée anglaise pourrait avoir recours, la question du commandement supérieur des forces alliées.

Il s'informa si nos dispositions étaient suffisantes pour assurer la défense du pays durant la traversée et les transports des troupes anglaises, temps qu'il évaluait à une dizaine de jours.

Je répondis que les places de

I must accordingly consult the Minister of War.

Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston replied that his Minister at Brussels would speak about it to our Minister for Foreign Affairs.

He continued as follows: The disembarkation of the British troops would take place on the French coast, in the neighbourhood of Dunkirk and Calais, in such a manner that the operation might be carried out in the quickest possible way.* Landing at Antwerp would take much longer, as larger transports would be required, and, moreover, the risk would be greater.

This being so, several other points remained to be decided, *viz.*, transport by rail, the question of requisitions to which the British Army might have recourse, the question of the chief command of the allied forces.

He enquired whether our arrangements were adequate to secure the defence of the country during the crossing and transport of the British troops—a period which he estimated at about ten days.

I answered that the fortresses

* The following marginal note occurs in the facsimile:—

"L'entrée des Anglais en Belgique ne se ferait qu'après la violation de notre neutralité par l'Allemagne."

(Translation.)

"The entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany."

Namur et de Liége étaient à l'abri d'un coup de main et que, en quatre jours, notre armée de campagne, forte de 100,000 hommes, serait en état d'intervenir. Après avoir exprimé toute sa satisfaction au sujet de mes déclarations, mon interlocuteur insista sur le fait que: (1) notre conversation était absolument confidentielle; (2) elle ne pouvait lier son Gouvernement; (3) son Ministre, l'état-major général anglais, lui et moi étions seuls, en ce moment, dans la confidence; (4) il ignorait si son Souverain avait été pressenti.

Dans un entretien subséquent, le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston m'assura qu'il n'avait jamais reçu de confidences d'autres attachés militaires au sujet de notre armée. Il précisa ensuite les données numériques concernant les forces anglaises; nous pouvions compter que, en douze ou treize jours, seraient débarqués: deux corps d'armée, quatre brigades de cavalerie, et deux brigades d'infanterie montée.

Il me demanda d'examiner la question du transport de ces forces vers la partie du pays où elles seraient utiles et, dans ce but, il me promit la composition détaillée de l'armée de débarquement.

Il revint sur la question des effectifs de notre armée de campagne en insistant pour qu'on ne

of Namur and Liége were safe against a surprise attack, and that in four days our field army of 100,000 men would be ready to take the field. After having expressed his entire satisfaction at what I had said, my visitor emphasised the following points: (1) Our conversation was absolutely confidential; (2) it was in no way binding on his Government; (3) his Minister, the British General Staff, he, and myself were the only persons then aware of the matter; (4) he did not know whether his Sovereign had been consulted.

At a subsequent meeting Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston assured me that he had never received any confidential information from other military attachés about our army. He then gave me a detailed statement of the strength of the British forces: we might rely on it that, in twelve or thirteen days, two army corps, four cavalry brigades, and two brigades of mounted infantry would be landed.

He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to that part of the country where they would be most useful, and with this object in view he promised me a detailed statement of the composition of the landing force.

He reverted to the question of the effective strength of our field army, and considered it important

fît pas de détachements de cette armée à Namur et à Liége, puisque ces places étaient pourvues de garnisons suffisantes.

Il me demanda de fixer mon attention sur la nécessité de permettre à l'armée anglaise de bénéficier des advantages prévus par le réglement sur les prestations militaires. Enfin, il insista sur la question du commandement suprême.

Je lui répondis que je ne pouvais rien dire quant à ce dernier point, et je lui promis un examen attentif des autres questions.

Plus tard, l'attaché militaire anglais confirma son estimation précédente: douze jours seraient au moins indispensables pour faire le débarquement sur la côté de France. Il faudrait beaucoup plus (un à deux mois et demi) pour débarquer 100,000 troupes à Anvers.

Sur mon objection qu'il était inutile d'attendre l'achèvement du débarquement pour commencer les transports par chemin de fer, et qu'il valait mieux les faire au fur et à mesure des arrivages, à la côte, le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston me promit des données exactes sur l'état journalier du débarquement.

Quant aux prestations militaires, je fis part à mon interlocuteur que cette question serait facilement réglée.

A mesure que les études de

that no detachments from that army should be sent to Namur and Liége, as those fortresses were provided with adequate garrisons.

He drew my attention to the necessity of letting the British Army take full advantage of the facilities afforded under our regulations respecting military requirements. Finally, he laid stress on the question of the chief command.

I replied that I could say nothing on the latter point, and I promised that I would study the other questions with care.

Later, the British military attaché confirmed his previous estimate: twelve days at least were indispensable to carry out the landing on the coast of France. It would take much longer (from one to two and a half months) to land 100,000 men at Antwerp.

On my objecting that it would be useless to wait till the disembarkation was finished, before beginning the transport by rail, and that it would be better to send on the troops by degrees as they arrived on the coast, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston promised me precise details of the daily disembarkation table.

With regard to the question of military requirements, I informed my visitor that that question would easily be arranged.

As the plans of the British

l'état-major anglais avançaient, les données du problème se précisaient. Le colonel m'assura que la moitié de l'armée anglaise pourrait être débarquée en huit jours, et que le restant le serait à la fin du douzième ou treizième jour, sauf l'infanterie montée, sur laquelle il ne fallait compter que plus tard.

Néanmoins, je crus devoir insister à nouveau sur la nécessité de connaître le rendement journalier, de façon à régler les transports par chemin de fer de chaque jour.

L'attaché anglais m'entretint ensuite de diverses autres questions, savoir: (1) nécessité de tenir le secret des opérations et d'obtenir de la presse qu'elle l'observât soigneusement; (2) avantages qu'il y aurait à adjoindre un officier belge à chaque état-major anglais, un traducteur à chaque commandant de troupes, des gendarmes à chaque unité pour aider les troupes de police anglaises.

Dans une autre entrevue, le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston et moi examinâmes les opérations combinées dans le cas d'une agression de la part de l'Allemagne ayant comme objectif Anvers et dans l'hypothèse d'une traversée de notre pays pour atteindre les Ardennes françaises.

Par la suite, le colonel me marqua son accord sur le plan que je lui avais présenté et m'assura de

General Staff advanced, the details of the problem were worked out with greater precision. The colonel assured me that half the British Army could be landed in eight days, and the remainder at the end of the twelfth or thirteenth day, except the mounted infantry, on which we could not count till later.

Nevertheless, I felt bound once more to urge the necessity of knowing the numbers to be landed daily, so as to work out the railway arrangements for each day.

The British attaché then spoke to me of various other questions, *viz.*: (1) The necessity of maintaining secrecy about the operations, and of ensuring that the Press should observe this carefully; (2) the advantages there would be in attaching a Belgian officer to each British staff, an interpreter to each commanding officer, and gendarmes to each unit to help the British military police.

At another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and I examined the question of combined operations in the event of a German attack directed against Antwerp, and on the hypothesis of our country being crossed in order to reach the French Ardennes.

Later on, the colonel signified his concurrence in the scheme I had laid before him, and assured

l'assentiment du Général Grierson, chef de l'état-major anglais.

D'autres questions secondaires furent également réglées, notamment en ce qui regarde les officiers intermédiaires, les traducteurs, les gendarmes, les cartes, les albums des uniformes, les tirés à part traduits en anglais de certains règlements belges, le règlement des frais de douane pour les approvisionnements anglais, l'hospitalisation des blessés de l'armée alliée, &c. Rien ne fut arrêté quant à l'action que pourrait exercer sur la presse le Gouvernement ou l'autorité militaire.

Dans les dernières rencontres que j'ai eues avec l'attaché anglais, il me communiqua le rendement journalier des débarquements à Boulogne, Calais et Cherbourg. L'éloignement de ce dernier point, imposé par des considérations d'ordre technique, occasionne un certain retard. Le premier corps serait débarqué le dixième jour, et le second corps le quinzième jour. Notre matériel des chemins de fer exécuterait les transports, de sorte que l'arrivée, soit vers Bruxelles-Louvain, soit vers Namur-Dinant, du premier corps serait achevée le onzième jour, et celle du deuxième corps, le seizième jour.

J'ai insisté une dernière fois et aussi énergiquement que je le

me of the assent of General Grierson, Chief of the British General Staff.

Other questions of secondary importance were likewise disposed of, particularly those respecting intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps, illustrations of uniforms, English translations of extracts from certain Belgian regulations, the regulation of customs dues chargeable on the British supplies, hospital accommodation for the wounded of the allied army, &c. Nothing was settled as to the possible control of the Press by the Government or the military authorities.

In the course of the last meetings which I had with the British attaché he communicated to me the daily disembarkation table of the troops to be landed at Boulogne, Calais and Cherbourg. The distance of the latter place, included owing to certain technical considerations, would cause a certain delay. The first corps would be landed on the tenth day, the second corps on the fifteenth day. Our railways would carry out the transport operations in such a way that the arrival of the first corps, either towards Brussels-Louvain or towards Namur-Dinant, would be completed on the eleventh day and that of the second corps on the sixteenth day.

I finally urged once again, as forcibly as was within my power,

pouvais, sur la nécessité de hâter encore les transports maritimes de façon que les troupes anglaises fussent près de nous entre le onzième et le douzième jour; les résultats les plus heureux, les plus favorables peuvent être obtenus par une action convergente et simultanée des forces alliées. Au contraire, ce sera un échec grave si cet accord ne se produit pas. Le Colonel Barnardiston m'a assuré que tout sera fait dans ce but.

Au cours de nos entretiens, j'eus l'occasion de convaincre l'attaché militaire anglais de la volonté que nous avions d'entraver, dans la limite du possible, les mouvements de l'ennemi et de ne pas nous réfugier, dès le début, dans Anvers. De son côté, le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston me fit part de son peu de confiance actuellement dans l'appui ou l'intervention de la Hollande. Il me confia également que son Gouvernement projetait de transporter la base d'approvisionnements anglaise de la côté française à Anvers, dès que la mer du nord serait nettoyée de tous les navires de guerre allemands.

Dans tous nos entretiens le colonel me communiqua régulièrement les renseignements confidentiels qu'il possédait sur l'état militaire et la situation de notre voisin de l'est, &c. En même temps, il insista sur la nécessité impérieuse pour la Belgique de

the necessity of accelerating the transport by sea in order that the British troops might be with us between the eleventh and the twelfth day; the very best and most favourable results would accrue from the concerted and simultaneous action by the allied forces. On the other hand, a serious check would ensue if such coöperation could not be achieved. Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything would be done with that end in view.

In the course of our conversations I took the opportunity of convincing the military attaché of our resolve to impede the enemies' movements as far as lay within our power, and not to take refuge in Antwerp from the outset. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, on his side, informed me that he had at present little confidence in the support or intervention of Holland. He likewise confided to me that his Government intended to move the British base of supplies from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had been cleared of all German warships.

At all our interviews the colonel regularly communicated to me any confidential information he possessed respecting the military condition and general situation of our eastern neighbour, &c. At the same time he laid stress on the imperative need for Belgium

se tenir au courant de ce qui se passait dans les pays rhénans qui nous avoisinent. Je dus lui confesser que, chez nous, le service de surveillance au delà de la frontière, au temps de paix, ne relève pas directement de notre état-major; nous n'avons pas d'attachés militaires auprès de nos légations. Je me gardai bien, cependant, de lui avouer que j'ignorais si le service d'espionage, qui est prescrit par nos règlements, était ou non préparé. Mais il est de mon devoir de signaler ici cette situation qui nous met en état d'infériorité flagrante vis-à-vis de nos voisins, nos ennemis éventuels.

Le Général-Major, Chef d'E.-M.

(Initialled.)

to keep herself well informed of what was going on in the neighbouring Rhine country. I had to admit to him that in our country the intelligence service beyond the frontier was not, in times of peace, directly under our General Staff. We had no military attachés at our legations. I took care, however, not to admit to him that I was unaware whether the secret service, prescribed in our regulations, was organised or not. But it is my duty here to call attention to this state of affairs, which places us in a position of glaring inferiority to that of our neighbours, our possible enemies.

Major-General,
Chief of General Staff.

Note.—Lorsque je rencontrai le Général Grierson à Compiègne, pendant les manœuvres de 1906, il m'assura que la réorganisation de l'armée anglaise aurait pour résultat non seulement d'assurer le débarquement de 150,000 hommes, mais de permettre leur action dans un délai plus court que celui dont il est question précédemment.

Fin septembre 1906.

(Initialled.)

Note.—When I met General Grierson at Compiègne at the manœuvres of 1906 he assured me that the reorganisation of the British army would result not only in ensuring the landing of 150,000 men, but in enabling them to take the field in a shorter period than had been previously estimated.

End of September 1906.

(2.)

(Confidentielle.)

L'attaché militaire anglais a demandé à voir le Général Jungbluth. Ces messieurs se sont recontrés le 23 avril.

Le Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges a dit au général que l'Angleterre disposait d'une armée pouvant être envoyée sur le continent, composée de six divisions d'infanterie et huit brigades de cavalerie, soit en tout 160,000 hommes. Elle a aussi tout ce qu'il lui faut pour défendre son territoire insulaire. Tout est prêt.

Le Gouvernement britannique, lors des derniers événements, aurait débarque immédiatement chez nous, même si nous n'avions pas demandé de secours.

Le général a objecté qu'il faudrait pour cela notre consentement.

L'attaché militaire a répondu qu'il le savait, mais que comme nous n'étions pas à même d'empêcher les Allemands de passer chez nous, l'Angleterre aurait débarqué ses troupes en Belgique en tout état de cause.

Quant au lieu de débarquement, l'attaché militaire n'a pas précisé; il a dit que la côte était assez longue; mais le général sait que M. Bridges a fait, d'Ostende, des visites journalières à Zeebrugge pendant les fêtes de Pâques.

(Translation.)

(Confidential.)

The British military attaché asked to see General Jungbluth. These gentlemen met on the 23rd April.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the general that Great Britain had, available for despatch to the Continent, an army composed of six divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry, in all 160,000 men. She had also all that she needed for home defence. Everything was ready.

The British Government, at the time of the recent events, would have immediately landed troops on our territory, even if we had not asked for help.

The general protested that our consent would be necessary for this.

The military attaché answered that he knew that, but that as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans passing through our territory, Great Britain would have landed her troops in any event.

As to the place of landing, the military attaché was not explicit. He said the coast was rather long; but the general knows that Mr. Bridges made daily visits to Zeebrugge from Ostend during the Easter holidays.

Le général a ajouté que nous étions, d'ailleurs, parfaitement à même d'empêcher les Allemands de passer.

Le 24 avril, 1912.

The general added that, after all, we were, besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from going through.

April 24, 1912.

No. 5.

Extract from a brochure entitled "On the Violation of Belgian Neutrality," by M. J. Van den Heuvel, Belgian Minister of State.

(Translation.)

An official communiqué appeared at once in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, of the 13th October. The whole German press hastened to echo the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. Large notices were posted on the walls in Brussels and innumerable little yellow notices made their appearance in the public places of other occupied towns. The discovery was of paramount importance; it was bound to prove to all impartial people the guilt of the Governments both of England and of Belgium and to show the foresight and correctitude of Germany.

According to the communiqué, it appeared from documents found in Brussels that, at the request of Great Britain, at the beginning of the year 1906, Belgium had, in anticipation of the violation of her neutrality by Germany, concluded with the Powers of the Entente a convention which had for its object the defence of her territory. Although a marginal note on the *dossier* of 1906 stated expressly that "the entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the violation of her neutrality by Germany," the suggestion was that Belgium, in settling the arrangements for this contingent entry, had seriously misunderstood the duties of neutrals. Germany alone was the object of her suspicion and she had not "also foreseen the violation of Belgian neutrality by France, and to provide for that event, concluded with Germany a convention analogous to that concluded with France and Great Britain."

The communiqué recognises that it was open to Belgium, in the interests of self-protection, to make arrangements with the Powers

which had guaranteed her international position. Indeed a neutralised State retains the right of making defensive treaties. The fact that the inviolability of such a State is under the ægis or guarantee of certain Powers does not deprive her of this right. But the arrangements which such a State can make with the guaranteeing Powers to guard against a contingent invasion are, after all, nothing but measures for carrying out the preëxisting engagements of the guarantee.

The grievance alleged by the communiqué is that a convention should have been made by Belgium in anticipation of a penetration of hostile troops into Belgian territory, without notice being given to Germany, and without the latter Power being appealed to to make a similar convention in anticipation of an invasion of Belgium by French or British troops.

If a convention really existed, as the communiqué states, it is just to observe that a State which has prepared a plan of invasion is in an anomalous position in addressing reproaches to a State which limits its action to putting itself on guard and organising necessary measures of defence. And we must remember that the invasion of Belgium by Germany was, according to Herr von Jagow, forced upon the German General Staff by an event of long standing, namely, the Franco-Russian Alliance.

As a matter of fact the convention which forms the gravamen of the German charges never existed.

Belgium did not make any special arrangements in anticipation of the violation of her territory by Germany, either with England or with France, either in 1906 or at any other date. It is in vain that Germany has searched and will search our archives, she will not find there any proof of her allegation.

The official communiqué of the 13th October published three documents; the second communiqué of the 24th November added a fourth document to the *dossier*. None of these documents establishes the existence of any convention whatever.

The first document is a report made to the Minister of War on the 10th April, 1906, by General Ducarne, Chief of the Belgian General Staff. It relates to the conversations which took place at the request of Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, the British military attaché, between himself and General Ducarne, on the subject of the arrangements that England might be disposed to make to assist Belgium in the event of a German invasion. According to the German notices:—

> The Chief of the Belgian General Staff worked out a comprehensive plan for joint operations by a British Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men with the Belgian Army against Germany in repeated conferences with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, at the instigation of the latter. The plan was approved by the Chief of the British General Staff, Major-General Grierson. The Belgian General Staff were supplied with all data as to the strength and organisation of the British forces. . . . The latter thoroughly prepared for the transport. . . . Coöperation was carefully worked out in every detail. . . . Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne were contemplated as the points of disembarkation for the British troops.

This document shows that though the Belgian General Staff did not take the initiative, yet it did not refuse to discuss with the British military attaché a plan for the help which Britain, acting as guaranteeing Power, would be able, in case of need, to send to Belgium to repulse a German attack.

But what accusation against Belgium can be based on this?

Since it is recognised that Belgium has the right to make defensive agreements for putting into operation the guarantees given by the guaranteeing Powers, the Belgian General Staff would have found it difficult to refuse entirely to consider suggestions made by the military attachés of those Powers. Such discussions do not interfere in any way with the freedom or responsibility of the Government, and it is they alone who can decide whether it is expedient or opportune to enter into a convention and, if so, what convention they should make, having regard to the duties and interests of the country.

In 1906 the Government believed that it was proper for them to rest content, as they had rested for more than sixty years, with the general guarantee embodied in the Treaty of 1839, and that the details of carrying out the guarantee could not be fixed beforehand, that in their very nature they must vary according to circumstances. Thus no convention was entered upon. The work of the British military attaché and the Belgian officers resulted in nothing but the submission of a report to the Minister of War by the Chief of the General Staff.

The second document is a military map. "A map showing the method of deployment of the French army was found in the secret *dossier*."

The only inference to be drawn from this document—which is not connected in any way with the report already mentioned—is that the Belgian General Staff has always sought, as is the duty of all

General Staffs, to obtain the most precise information possible as to the military plans of neighbouring Powers.

But to pretend to argue from the mere possession of this map that France must have been a party to the alleged convention, of which Britain and Belgium are wantonly accused, is to transcend the bounds of fancy.

The third document is a report on the international position of Belgium sent by Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister Plenipotentiary at Berlin, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Brussels on the 23rd December, 1911.

Baron Greindl thought that a "French invasion was as probable as a German invasion."

> The combinations of the Entente Cordiale include, without doubt, the thought of an enveloping movement from the north. . . . The equally perfidious and naïf revelations of Colonel Barnardiston . . . showed us clearly what was intended. . . . This British army, landed at Calais and Dunkirk, would not march along our frontier to Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would immediately invade us from the northwest. . . .
>
> *I would strongly urge that a plan of action should be drawn up for this eventuality also.*

The inference to be drawn from this document is that the plans of the Belgian General Staff communicated to Baron Greindl dealt with the contingency either of an entry into Belgium through the gap of the Meuse or of an invasion of Luxemburg by one or other of the belligerents. Baron Greindl thought it his duty to lay stress upon another hypothesis, namely, the danger of an enveloping movement by the north of France, which he had so often heard talked about in Berlin. But the whole of this report rebuts the accusation that Belgium had formed any engagements either with England or with France. Baron Greindl's attitude towards Barnardiston's suggestions proves conclusively that he knew that these suggestions had not resulted in any convention.

Such are the three documents published on the 13th October by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* and placarded everywhere with such a flourish of trumpets. They do not contain the smallest scrap of evidence to support the German charge. No criticism adverse to Belgium can be based upon them. The German Government themselves understood this so well that they ordered fresh searches to be made in the archives.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of 24th November gave

us the result of this second search. It is a fourth document, reporting a conversation which took place between the British military attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, and General Jungbluth. It bears date the 23rd April, 1912:—

> Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the general that Great Britain had . . . an army of 160,000 men. . . . The British Government at the time of the recent events would have immediately landed troops in Belgium even if we had not asked for help. The general protested that *our consent would be necessary for this.* The military attaché answered that he knew that, but, that as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans from passing through Belgium, Great Britain would have landed her troops in any event. As to the place of landing the military attaché was not explicit. . . . The general added that we were perfectly well able to prevent the Germans from going through.

The inference to be drawn from this document is that, in a private conversation between two officers of high rank, which had no reference to any official mission, the British officer expressed the personal opinion that in case of war Great Britain could land "immediately" troops in Belgium "even if we had not asked for help." The Belgian general at once protested. He insisted that "our consent" was necessary, and that there was all the less reason for dispensing with it since we "were perfectly well able" to stop the Germans; that is to say, to make them lose sufficient time to deprive them of the advantages of a sudden attack.

How is it possible to draw any inference unfavourable to Great Britain from the personal opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges when, from what has since happened, it is certain that the British Government did not intend to send, and did not in fact send, troops to Belgium, except upon a request from the Belgian Government put forward after the violation of her territory?

How is it possible to draw an inference unfavourable to Belgium from this conversation? General Jungbluth defended her freedom and her neutrality. And the very fact that the discussion took place, and the vagueness which remained as to the places of landing, both prove that Belgium was not bound by any convention determining the manner in which help should be furnished by England.

Germany ought then to cease to accuse the Belgian Government of having given themselves since 1906 into the hands of the Powers of the Triple Entente. The first three documents which the Germans have taken from the files of the General Staff, like the fourth

which has been brought up to support them, far from establishing any improper action whatever on the part of the Belgian authorities, show clearly that they have always taken the most scrupulous care to reconcile the precautions exacted by the necessity of safeguarding the independence and maintaining the honour of the country with the duties of the strictest neutrality.

The loyal attitude of Belgium and Great Britain is clearly shown by the action which preceded the German ultimatum.

When Belgium saw the storm-clouds gathering on the darkened horizon she wanted to accelerate her military reorganisation. She worked at it for years. In 1902 she strengthened her cadres. After two years of discussion in 1905 and 1906 she decided to finish the fortifications of the fortress of Antwerp and to raise her defensive organisation to a pitch commensurate with the offensive force then at the disposal of the armies of Europe. Then came the renewal of the artillery, then the introduction of *service personelle,* finally the imposition of general liability to serve. These stages were arrived at with considerable difficulty because the nation, relying on treaties and determined herself to observe neutrality with the strictest impartiality, could not believe that in the twentieth century any one could be cruel enough to think of violating the rights of a peaceful people.

In addition Belgium had faith in the energy and the valour of her army, and she counted on the help of her guarantors should need arise.

No. 6.

Viscount Haldane, Lord High Chancellor, to Dr. A. E. Shipley, Master of Christ's College, Cambridge.

Dear Master of Christ's, *November* 14, 1914.

The enclosed memoranda have been specially prepared for me by the Foreign Office in answer to your question.

Yours truly,

(Signed) HALDANE.

ENCLOSURE 1.

Memorandum.

It is quite untrue that the British Government had ever arranged with Belgium to trespass on her country in case of war, or that Belgium had agreed to this. The strategic dispositions of Germany, especially as regards railways, have for some years given rise to the apprehension that Germany would attack France through Belgium. Whatever military discussions have taken place before this war have been limited entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to defend France if Germany attacked her through Belgium. The Germans have stated that we contemplated sending troops to Belgium. We had never committed ourselves at all to the sending of troops to the Continent, and we have never contemplated the possibility of sending troops to Belgium to attack Germany. The Germans have stated that British military stores had been placed at Maubeuge, a French fortress near the Belgian frontier, before the outbreak of the war, and that this is evidence of an intention to attack Germany through Belgium. No British soldiers and no British stores were landed on the Continent till after Germany had invaded Belgium, and Belgium had appealed to France and England for assistance. It was only after this appeal that British troops were sent to France; and, if the Germans found British munitions of war in Maubeuge, these munitions were sent with our expedition to France after the outbreak of the war. The idea of violating the neutrality of Belgium was never discussed or contemplated by the British Government.

The extract enclosed, which is taken from an official publication of the Belgian Government, and the extract from an official statement by the Belgian Minister of War prove that the Belgian Government had never connived, or been willing to connive, at a breach of the Treaty that made the maintenance of Belgian neutrality an international obligation. The moment that there appeared to be danger that this Treaty might be violated, the British Government made an appeal for an assurance from both France and Germany, as had been done in 1870 by Mr. Gladstone, that neither of those countries would violate the neutrality of Belgium if the other country respected it. The French agreed, the Germans declined to agree. The appeal made by the British Government is to be found in the Parliamentary

White Paper published after the outbreak of the war (see No. 114 of British Correspondence, page 8 [87]).[1] The reason why Germany would not agree was stated very frankly by Herr von Jagow, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador in Berlin; and it is recorded in the second White Paper (see No. 160 of British Correspondence, page 110)[2] that we published. The attitude of the British Government throughout has been to endeavour to preserve the neutrality of Belgium, and we never thought of sending troops to Belgium until Germany had invaded it, and Belgium had appealed for assistance to maintain the international Treaty.

We have known for some years past that, in Holland, in Denmark, and in Norway, the Germans have inspired the apprehension that, if England was at war with Germany, England would violate the neutrality of those countries and seize some of their harbours. This allegation is as baseless as the allegation about our intention to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and events have shown it to be so. But it seems to be a rule with Germany to attribute to others the designs that she herself entertains; as it is clear now that, for some long time past, it has been a settled part of her strategic plan to attack France through Belgium. A statement is enclosed, which was issued by us on October 14 last, dealing with this point.

This memorandum and its enclosures should provide ample material for a reply to the German statements.

Foreign Office, *9th November*, 1914.

ENCLOSURE 2.

Despatch No. 22 *in the Belgian Grey Book* (*No.* 1)

(See p. 373.)

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[1] This publication, p. 976.
[2] This publication, p. 1006.

ENCLOSURE 3.

Extract from "The Times" of 30th September, 1914.

NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM.

Official Statement.

The German press has been attempting to persuade the public that if Germany herself had not violated Belgian neutrality France or Great Britain would have done so. It has declared that French and British troops had marched into Belgium before the outbreak of war. We have received from the Belgian Minister of War an official statement which denies absolutely these allegations. It declares, on the one hand, that "before August 3 not a single French soldier had set foot on Belgian territory," and again, "it is untrue that on August 4 there was a single English soldier in Belgium." It adds:—

For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian army would oppose by force a "preventive" disembarkation of British troops in Belgium. The Belgian Government did not hesitate at the time of the Agadir crisis to warn foreign Ambassadors, in terms which could not be misunderstood, of its formal intention to compel respect for the neutrality of Belgium by every means at its disposal, and against attempts upon it from any and every quarter.

ENCLOSURE 4.

Circular telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Representatives abroad on the 14th October, 1914.

(See p. 1035.)

THE

BRITISH BLUE BOOK

(NO. 2)

THE BRITISH BLUE BOOK (NO. 2)[1]

No. 1.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 3, 1914.

Turkish ships building in Great Britain.

Arrangements are being made with the firm of Armstrong, Whitworth, and Co. for His Majesty's Government to take over the Turkish battleship "Osman I" now building with that firm.

Please inform Turkish Government that His Majesty's Government are anxious to take over the contract.

No. 2.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 3, 1914.

Grand Vizier and Minister of the Interior spoke to me with some vexation of the detention of Turkish ship, which they seemed to consider an unfriendly act as Turkey is not at war. Minister of the Interior referred to the very heavy financial sacrifices by which this ship had been paid for with money borrowed at a rate amounting to interest of 20 per cent.

[1] *Miscellaneous. No.* 13 (1914). *Correspondence respecting events leading to the rupture of relations with Turkey. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of His Majesty, November,* 1914. London: Printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office, by Harrison and Sons, 45-47, St. Martin's Lane, W. C., 1914. [Cd. 7628.]

No. 3.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 4, 1914.*

Grand Vizier to-day renewed assurances that Turkey intends to observe strict neutrality. Mobilisation had been decided upon only because it would take months to complete, and because the Government wished not to be taken by surprise in case of aggression by Bulgaria, though they had also been alarmed by rumours of action by Russia—attributable, I think, to German Ambassador. Retention of German military mission meant nothing and had no political significance. He regarded them as Turkish employés who were doing good work, and, as they had offered to remain, it would have been ungracious to refuse.

No. 4.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

Your telegram of 3rd August.*

I am sure Turkish Government will understand necessity for His Majesty's Government to keep all warships available in England for their own needs in this crisis.

Financial and other loss to Turkey will receive all due consideration, and is subject of sincere regret to His Majesty's Government. You should inform Grand Vizier.

No. 5.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 7, 1914.*

If Turkey remains neutral and Egypt remains quiet, and should no unforeseen circumstances arise, His Majesty's Government do not propose to alter the status of Egypt.

* See No. 2.

A report has reached me that it is being alleged that the annexation of Egypt is under consideration by His Majesty's Government.

You should emphatically contradict this to the Turkish Government, and say that we have no intention of injuring Turkey, and you should add an assurance in the sense of the first paragraph.

No. 6.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Gray.—(*Received August* 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 9, 1914.

An official communiqué was recently published here which showed a distinctly hostile tone towards Great Britain. This communiqué dealt with the requisition of the Turkish warships by His Majesty's Government. The Grand Vizier has told me that Turkish Government had to pretend to the Turkish public, as the latter had subscribed towards the purchase money for the vessels, that they were taking a stronger line than really was the case. He said, however, that we should not attach too much importance to publications of this kind.

Public opinion is daily growing more excited, and I think that if His Majesty's Government were able to give an assurance that Turkey would have the ships, if possible, on the conclusion of hostilities, such an assurance would have a soothing effect.

I have received a most emphatic assurance from the Grand Vizier that nothing will induce Turkey to join Austria and Germany as long as he remains in power. His position is strong enough to give a certain value to this assurance.

No. 7.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 11.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 11, 1914.

A report has reached me from vice-consul at the Dardanelles, dated evening of the 10th August, that two large warships, thought to be the "Goeben" and the "Breslau," have entered the Straits, and that

the German consul went to meet them. Arrival of these vessels at Nagara late on same evening was reported in a second telegram.

No. 8.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 11, 1914.

I learn that at 8.30 P.M. last night "Goeben" and "Breslau" reached the Dardanelles. These ships should not be allowed to pass through the Straits, and they should either leave within twenty-four hours, or be disarmed and laid up. You should point out to the Turkish Government that these are the duties entailed upon them by their neutrality, and that His Majesty's Government expect that they will act up to their obligations.

No. 9.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 11, 1914.

My telegram of 11th August.*

The Ottoman Government have bought "Goeben" and "Breslau." Officers and men will be allowed to return to Germany. Grand Vizier told me that purchase was due to our detention of "Sultan Osman." They must have ship to bargain with regard to question of the islands on equal terms with Greece, and it was in no way directed against Russia, the idea of which he scouted.

He formally asked that the British naval mission might be allowed to remain.

* See No. 7.

No. 10.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 11, 1914.

Following from consul, Dardanelles, to-day:—

"The large German ship has just left for Constantinople.

"Boats from small German ship have perquisitioned our ships here, and destroyed Marconi apparatus on French ships under threat of sinking them.

"We have protested, demanding disarmament or expulsion of German ships before night.

"It seems that they desire to force Turkey into war."

Military authorities seem to have completely lost their heads. British ships are capriciously detained at Dardanelles, and port officials here are refusing to issue papers to outgoing vessels.

No. 11.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 12, 1914.

Your telegram of 11th August.*

If the crews of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" are returned to Germany at once and if the transfer of those vessels to Turkey is *bonâ fide,* so that they can only reappear as Turkish ships with Turkish crews, there seems no reason that the British naval mission should be withdrawn.

No. 12.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 12, 1914.

I saw the Grand Vizier this morning and made strong representations to him against restrictions of free passage of the Straits, which

* See No. 9.

the military authorities are now imposing under various pretexts. I said they had been holding up passenger and grain ships in the Dardanelles, refusing to deliver papers to ships wishing to leave Constantinople, and ordering grain ships to return to Constantinople at their caprice.

The Grand Vizier admitted that the War Office had been most high-handed in their action, in violation of international obligations.

It seems that the Minister of War has now got entirely out of hand, and I gather that he alone is responsible for the present situation. Matters are undoubtedly becoming serious, but a Cabinet Council is being held this afternoon, and I hope I may be able afterwards to report some improvement.

I should add that all foreign shipping is affected by the restrictions to which I have alluded above.

No. 13.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 12, 1914.

Your telegram of 11th August.*

You should at once point out to Grand Vizier that Turkish Government must not permit German ships to commit acts of war in the Straits, and ask why British merchant ships are detained.

No. 14.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 13.)

L'Ambassadeur de Turquie présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey et a l'honneur de communiquer ci-dessous à son Excellence le texte du télégramme qu'il vient de recevoir à l'instant de son Gouvernement:—

(Translation.)

The Turkish Ambassador presents his compliments to Sir E. Grey and has the honour to communicate herewith the text of a telegram just received from his Government, which runs as follows:—

* See No. 10.

"Pour ne laisser subsister aucun doute sur l'attitude pacifique que le Gouvernement Impérial a décidé d'observer dans les conflits actuels, je vous informe derechef qu'il est résolu de garder stricte neutralité."

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres, le 13 *août*, 1914.

"In order that there may be no doubt as to the pacific attitude which the Turkish Government have decided to observe in the existing struggle, I inform you forthwith that they are determined to maintain strict neutrality."

Turkish Embassy, London, August 13, 1914.

No. 15.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 14, 1914.

Admiral Limpus has received promise from Minister of Marine that his Excellency will make crews for the "Goeben" and "Breslau." This will take time, but nevertheless it will be done; and his Excellency has undertaken to hand over the two ships bodily to the British Admiral.

Admiral Limpus informs me that a month will probably elapse before "Sultan Selim" (late "Goeben") can be even moved by the Turkish crew; but the formalities of transfer may be complete technically in a day or two. Further delay in taking delivery from the Germans is unavoidable.

Minister of Marine declared there was no intention of sending the ships outside Sea of Marmora until the end of the war.

No. 16.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 15, 1914.

Admiral Limpus and all officers of British Naval Mission have suddenly been replaced in their executive command by Turkish officers, and have been ordered to continue work at Ministry of Marine if they

remain. Although I have been given to understand by a member of the Government that they are still anxious to get officers and crew of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" out of Turkey, this will probably mean retention of mechanics and technical experts at least, which will create most dangerous situation here.

No. 17.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 16, 1914.

As soon as French and Russian Ambassadors are similarly instructed, you are authorised to declare to Turkish Government that if Turkey will observe scrupulous neutrality during the war England, France, and Russia will uphold her independence and integrity against any enemies that may wish to utilise the general European complication in order to attack her.

No. 18.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 16, 1914.

This morning Grand Vizier assured me again most solemnly that Turkish neutrality would be maintained. That Germany was doing her utmost to compromise the Turkish Government he did not deny, and he went so far as to admit that there was a danger of provoking Russia if Turkey lent herself to German designs which it served Turkey's interests to acquiesce in. This ambiguous expression no doubt refers to the fact that a certain number of German experts will be left on the "Goeben" and "Breslau," owing to the inability of the Turks to handle those ships themselves. It would have been an impossible situation for Admiral Limpus, if he had had under his direct orders a mixed crew of Turks and Germans, and perhaps reason of his withdrawal from executive command may lie in this consideration.

The "Goeben" and "Breslau" are at present lying off Constantinople. The Grand Vizier has assured me that there is no intention

of moving them from Marmora. They are now flying the Ottoman flag under nominal command of Turkish officer, and have been transferred. This at least is a good sign.

No. 19.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 16, 1914.

I have received the following telegram, dated the 15th August, from His Majesty's vice-consul at Dardanelles:—

"A new field of mines has been laid in the zone formerly sown with mines of observation type. It may be assumed that these latter had previously been removed.

"The new contact mines, to the number of forty-one, were laid by the 'Mtibah' from Kephez to Suandere in a double line. Seven were kept on the ship, and the twenty-four from the 'Selanik,' which is proceeding to Constantinople, were also taken on board.

"The 'Lily Rickmers,' a German ship which has arrived here, carries a wireless installation."

No. 20.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 18, 1914.

I have been accorded most cordial reception upon my return to my post by the Grand Vizier, of whom I enquired whether the German crews would be removed soon, and what guarantee he would give that the "Goeben" and "Breslau" would be used neither against Great Britain nor against Russia. I also expressed my surprise that the Turkish Government should be apparently entirely under German influence, and that they should have committed such a serious breach of neutrality as was involved by their action in the matter of the German ships.

His Highness said that he deeply deplored this breach of neutrality, which he could not deny. He begged me to give him time to get rid

of German crews, which he promised he would do gradually, but, until arrival of Turkish transport with crews from London, Turkish Government had no crew to replace Germans.

His Highness added that he had protested against the action of the "Breslau" in boarding British and French ships at the Dardanelles, and he expressed the hope that I would not take too serious a view of that incident.

Situation is delicate, but I have great hopes that if His Majesty's Government will exercise patience, it may yet be saved; for Grand Vizier solemnly assured me that neither the "Goeben" nor the "Breslau" would go into the Black Sea or the Mediterranean.

His Highness said that seizure of Turkish ships building in England by His Majesty's Government had caused the whole crisis, and, as almost every Turkish subject had subscribed towards their purchase, a terrible impression had been made throughout Turkey, where British attitude had been attributed to intention to assist Greece in aggressive designs against Turkey. Turkish population would have understood if Great Britain had paid for the ships, or if she had promised to return them when the war was over; but as it was it looked like robbery. Germans had not been slow to exploit the situation, of which they had taken every advantage.

His Highness was much impressed and relieved when I informed him of the declaration authorised in your telegram of the 16th August.* He said that this would be of enormous assistance to him, and he assured me that I need not be anxious lest Turkey should be drawn into war with Great Britain or with Russia. The present crisis would pass.

I am convinced of the absolute personal sincerity of Grand Vizier in these utterances.

No. 21.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 18, 1914.

I told the Turkish Ambassador, who had expressed uneasiness as to our intentions towards Turkey, that Turkey would have nothing to fear from us, and that her integrity would be preserved in any con-

* No. 17.

ditions of peace which affected the Near East, provided that she preserved a real neutrality during the war, made the "Breslau" and "Goeben" entirely Turkish by sending away the German crews of these vessels, and gave all ordinary facilities to British merchant vessels.

No. 22.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 19, 1914.

In view of the possibility that a *coup d'État* may be attempted with the assistance of the "Goeben," in coöperation with the military authorities under German influence, who exercise complete control, I wish to make it clear that in my opinion the precaution of presence of British fleet at the Dardanelles is wise. I am anxious to avoid any misunderstanding as to the gravity of the situation, notwithstanding the assurances received from the Grand Vizier.

No. 23.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 20.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 19, 1914.

I saw the Grand Vizier on the afternoon of 17th August, and made strong representations to him with regard to the detention of vessels laden with cargoes consigned from Russian ports to the Mediterranean.

He promised to give immediate instructions that ships should be allowed to proceed.

The port authorities were undoubtedly instructed yesterday morning to permit seven ships loaded with grain and one with petroleum for the Mediterranean, and one ship with coal for the Danube, to depart, but this permission was cancelled later.

It appears from this as if the military party, supported by the Germans, were determined to reassert themselves, and that a serious conflict of authority has arisen.

I propose to see Grand Vizier, whom I was unable to see last night, as early as possible this morning, and to insist upon his carrying out of his promise with regard to laden ships.

If these are permitted to leave, only four ships will remain, and no others have arrived since yesterday.

Of these four ships only one is in a position to leave immediately, but their case is different to that of the nine ships mentioned above, of which the cargoes have never touched Turkish soil, and which are covered by treaties guaranteeing free passage of the Straits at all times, thus making their detention a far more serious matter.

No. 24.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 21.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 20, 1914.

Minister of Marine came to see me to-day and expressed his relief at being able to talk to me freely.

He put forward the following proposal:—

Firstly, that the Capitulations should be abolished immediately. I pointed out the difficulty of this, and he suggested that the Minister of Finance should come and discuss the question with me.

Secondly, he demanded the immediate return of the two Turkish battleships acquired by His Majesty's Government at the commencement of the war. I told him that this was impossible, but that I would endeavour to obtain as good terms as possible for them, and that I hoped they would not be needed during the war, and would soon be returned to Turkey; in the meanwhile they should be regarded as a loan from Turkey to a friend.

Thirdly, he asked for renunciation of any interference with the internal affairs of Turkey. This need not be taken seriously, and is, of course, an absurd proposal.

Fourthly, he asked that if Bulgaria should intervene against the Triple Entente, Western Thrace should be given back to Turkey.

Fifthly, he wanted the restoration of the Greek islands. I told him that this was impossible, and he finally agreed to the basis arranged just before the present war broke out.

His final proposal was that the allied Powers should undertake to

oblige the Triple Alliance to accept any agreements which might be reached with respect to the Capitulations.

Our conversation was of the friendliest description, and at its close the Minister of Marine asked whether I would sanction the chartering of a British oil-tank steamer now at Tenedos to convey oil from Constanza. I asked him the purposes for which this oil was required, and he replied that it was for use in Turkish destroyers. I said that I thought that such a request, when the German crews of the "Breslau" and "Goeben" were masters of the situation here, would greatly surprise His Majesty's Government, and he replied that he did not wish to create any suspicion in their minds, and would therefore withdraw his request, adding that any suspicion that the German ships would be allowed to attack our shipping was absurd.

I said that, although I personally believed in the sincerity of his assurances, there seemed to be no doubt that the German admiral was now the master here. Minister seemed greatly surprised at this, but finally asked me to assure you that he would open the Dardanelles to the British fleet, if the German crews would not leave the two ships when he told them to do so.

No. 25.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 21.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 20, 1914.

Following from His Majesty's vice-consul, Dardanelles, dated 19th August:—

"Passages were stopped this afternoon, while seventeen more mines were laid in a zigzag line along one side of the channel, which has been rendered extremely narrow. There is a heavy oil-steamer to pass to-morrow, and it may not be easy.

"Mines remain, but I suspect that there are more on board 'Rickmers.'

"Weber Pasha, who has returned with other German officers, is believed to be on board the latter vessel.

"Several Hotchkiss guns have arrived and have been mounted on both sides of the Straits commanding minefield."

No. 26.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 21, 1914.

Your telegram of 12th August.*

Reply to representations received from Porte expresses regrets for unfortunate incident of which British merchant vessels at Dardanelles were object, and gives formal assurances that similar acts shall not occur again. Explanation of detention of ships given in Porte's note is that in consequence of some mines having been detached from their moorings, authorities had prevented vessels from continuing their voyage until mines had been picked up, in order to avoid accidents.

No mention is made of real reason, which was wish of military authorities to requisition grain and other cargoes.

No. 27.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 21, 1914.

I was informed by the Grand Vizier to-night that he wanted all the support that the Triple Entente could give him, and that the sooner they could give a written declaration respecting the independence and integrity of Turkey the better.

A sharp struggle, which may come to a head at any moment, is in progress between the Moderates and the German party, headed by the Minister of War, and is meanwhile creating anarchy here.

Marshal Liman † and the German Ambassador are recklessly striving to force the Turks into declaring war on Russia, in which case the "Goeben" and "Breslau" would presumably sail for the Black Sea. They are prepared to achieve this object, if necessary by a *coup d'État,* making the Minister of War dictator.

It is said that the Dardanelles forts have German garrisons, and that the "Goeben," which has been slightly damaged, will be repaired by the 2nd September, or possibly earlier.

* See No. 13.

† Head of the German military mission in Turkey.

No. 28.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 22, 1914.

Your telegram of 20th August.*

The demands made by the Turkish Government are excessive; we do not, however, wish to refuse all discussion, and you may therefore, as soon as the French and Russian Ambassadors have received similar instructions, address the following communication to the Porte:—

"If the Turkish Government will repatriate immediately the German officers and crews of the 'Goeben' and 'Breslau,' will give a written assurance that all facilities shall be furnished for the peaceful and uninterrupted passage of merchant vessels, and that all the obligations of neutrality shall be observed by Turkey during the present war, the three allied Powers will in return agree, with regard to the Capitulations, to withdraw their extra-territorial jurisdiction as soon as a scheme of judicial administration, which will satisfy modern conditions, is set up.

"They will further give a joint guarantee in writing that they will respect the independence and integrity of Turkey, and will engage that no conditions in the terms of peace at the end of the war shall prejudice this independence and integrity."

No. 29.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

L'Ambassadeur de Turquie présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey et, se référant à la conversation qu'il a eu l'honneur d'avoir avec son Excellence et dont il avait rendu compte à son Gou-

(Translation.)

The Turkish Ambassador presents his compliments to Sir E. Grey, and with reference to the conversation which he had with him, and which he reported to the Turkish Government in a tele-

* See No. 24.

vernement par un télégramme en date du 18 courant, s'empresse de l'informer que son Altesse Saïd Halim Pacha vient de lui faire savoir par une dépêche responsive expédiée hier et parvenue à l'instant:

1. Que les ordres nécessaires ont été donnés à qui de droit pour le libre commerce dans les eaux ottomanes de tout navire marchand;

2. Que le Gouvernement Impérial procédera au remplacement des officiers et équipage allemands par ceux du "Sultan Osman" dès qu'ils seront arrivés à Constantinople.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane,
Londres,
le 22 *août,* 1914.

gram of the 18th instant, hastens to state that his Highness Saïd Halim Pasha has just replied in a telegram dated yesterday, and just received, as follows:—

1. The necessary orders have been given in the proper quarter for the free navigation of Turkish waters by all merchant vessels;

2. The Turkish Government will replace the German officers and men by those of the "Sultan Osman" as soon as they arrive at Constantinople.

No. 30.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 22, 1914.

I saw Minister of Marine, as the Turkish transport has now arrived, and asked him when the crews of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" would be repatriated.

He said that it depended upon the Grand Vizier. He was himself in favour of their repatriation.

I shall press the matter strongly, but do not know whether the Moderates are sufficiently strong to insist upon such a step being taken at once.

No. 31.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 23, 1914.*

I hear that a further contingent of German officers has recently arrived viâ Sophia for service here.

No. 32.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 24, 1914.*

The Minister of War has not yet recovered from his illness. I have made it absolutely clear to the Grand Vizier that there is evidently no reason for delaying transfer of ships now that changes have come, and I said that His Majesty's Government would not tolerate that the Turkish fleet, as well as the Turkish army, should be in the hands of Germany, warning his Highness that the British fleet would not leave the Dardanelles until His Majesty's Government were satisfied that the Turkish Government had loyally carried out the condition laid down, and until British merchantmen could navigate Turkish waters without either delay or molestation. It was therefore obvious that if there was any idea of manning the Turkish fleet with German officers and men it must be given up. The situation was already quite humiliating enough for the Turkish Empire, which was in peril of total ruin if the Turkish Government allowed the domination of Constantinople by Germany. The Grand Vizier assured me that the Turkish Government had not the slightest intention of Germanising their fleet; and while it is my impression that the forces in favour of the maintenance of strict neutrality by Turkey are slowly gaining, I replied that I should not be satisfied with less than the actual departure of the German crews.

No. 33.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 25, 1914.*

I received yesterday a written assurance from Grand Vizier that merchant vessels will be allowed to go and come in Turkish ports without hindrance in accordance with treaties.

No. 34.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 25, 1914.*

His Majesty the King desires that your Excellency should convey to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey a personal message from His Majesty, expressing his deep regret at the sorrow caused to the Turkish people by the detention of the two warships which His Imperial Majesty's subjects had made such sacrifices to acquire. His Majesty the King wishes the Sultan to understand that the exigencies of the defence of his dominions are the only cause of the detention of these ships, which His Majesty hopes will not be for long, it being the intention of His Majesty's Government to restore them to the Ottoman Government at the end of the war, in the event of the maintenance of a strict neutrality by Turkey without favour to the King's enemies, as at present shown by the Ottoman Government.

No. 35.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 25, 1914.*

I hear from His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem that forty camels laden with food-stuffs have been seized from Egyptians at Gaza.

No. 36.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 25, 1914.*

Seizure of camels reported in my telegram of to-day.*

I am making strong representations to Ottoman Government. The Germans, who are no doubt responsible for the activity now reported, are doing their best to embroil us with the Turks.

The Grand Vizier vehemently denies that it is his intention to attack Egypt in any way or to attempt any sort of intrigues there. In this, I think, he is sincere. He is forming a Moderate party genuinely in favour of Turkey remaining neutral.

No. 37.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 25, 1914.*

His Majesty's vice-consul, Dardanelles, reports that former channel on the European side of the Straits was further mined on the 24th August. More buoys have been placed in new channel on the Asiatic side, and that channel may now be followed. Passages were prevented on the 24th August by the work of laying these buoys, but they have been resumed from to-day.

No. 38.

Sir Edward Grey to Tewfik Pasha.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, August 26, 1914.*

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which your Excellency was so good as to address to me on the 22nd instant.†

In reply, I have the honour to state that I have taken note that:—

* See No. 35. † See No. 29.

1. The necessary orders have been sent by the Imperial Ottoman Government to the competent authorities to allow free passage in Ottoman waters to all foreign merchant vessels.

2. That the Imperial Ottoman Government will replace the German officers and crew of the late "Goeben" and "Breslau" by those of the "Sultan Osman" the moment the latter arrive at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 39.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 26, 1914.*

Ninety German sailors passed through Sophia yesterday on their way to Constantinople. I have protested strongly, but Grand Vizier is unable to control the situation, which is dominated by the German Ambassador and generals. Weber Pasha, who is in command at the Dardanelles, is said to be urging closing of the Straits. I have brought this to the notice of the Grand Vizier. His Highness most positively repudiated any such idea, and begged me to have patience, as this situation would not last, he was gaining authority.

In the meantime, general mobilisation is proceeding feverishly, and preparations are being pushed on in the fleet. Eighty pounds' worth of surgical appliances, dressings, &c., were bought by doctor of the "Corcovado" to-day. I am informed that there is a 5-inch gun hidden by canvas at her stern. She still lies at Therapia. It is not likely that the two German men-of-war will come out of the Dardanelles, but there are grounds for thinking that German plan is to urge Turkey to attack Russia after France is beaten—about ten days hence, in their estimation. Straits would be entirely closed, and, according to the German Ambassador, quite impossible to force, since Germans have taken special measures to make them impregnable.

To sum up, the situation is most unsatisfactory, though not actually desperate.

No. 40.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, August* 27, 1914.

Press to-day reports special train from Berlin, carrying 500 German marines, passed through Bucharest yesterday for Constantinople.

Official communication this evening states that this was not a military transport, but that men were workmen, mostly Germans, under the direction of several engineers and functionaries, on the way to Turkey viâ Bulgaria for work on Bagdad Railway.

Communiqué adds that in future foreign subjects will not be allowed passage through the country in groups of more than twenty, even if their individual passports are in order.

No. 41.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 27, 1914.

German ships.

There are grounds for thinking that Germans are urging Turks to send "Goeben" into Black Sea, where they would argue that she has a right to go as a Turkish ship. Germans would count upon Russian warship attacking her, and war would ensue, seemingly provoked by Russia.

Object of Germans is to create a diversion here, draw off some Russian troops and enemies from Austria, and embroil us at the same time.

There are, it is said, 162 German officers here and many reservists.

No. 42.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 27, 1914.

My telegram of 27th August.*

Russian Ambassador is at present with Grand Vizier, whom I have just seen. I again impressed upon his Highness my apprehensions lest "Goeben" should make a raid. I expressed my conviction that, should Turkey be so unwise as to provoke the Powers of the Triple Entente, it would mean the end of the Ottoman Empire. To these observations on my part, his Highness replied that the "Goeben," manned as she was with German crew, would never be allowed by the Turkish Government to enter the Black Sea. His language on this point was most emphatic, and I believe that he was sincere in what he said. I did not fail, however, to draw his Highness's attention to the fact that, if the Minister of Marine, the Minister of War, and the German Ambassador ordered the "Goeben" to go there, I did not quite see how his Highness was going to prevent it. If the German Emperor ordered the German admiral to go into the Black Sea, it did not seem to me that the two Turkish Ministers could, even if they would, prevent the admiral from obeying those commands.

Grand Vizier assured me most emphatically that my fears were entirely without foundation, but he did not give me any reasons to back up this optimistic opinion. His Highness was much upset when I rejoined that, so long as German crews remained his Highness was not master of his own house, but at the mercy of the Germans, who had, to all intents and purposes, occupied Constantinople. His Highness admitted that Germans were urging Turkey to depart from her neutrality, and that they wished to embroil her with the Russians and ourselves, but he nevertheless solemnly assured me that Turkish Government would not depart from their neutrality. He fully understood Germany's aims in this matter, and all Turkish Government were determined not to fall into the trap.

Grand Vizier is, I am sure, absolutely sincere himself. But none the less the situation is as I have described it in the preceding paragraphs.

* See No. 41.

No. 43.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 27, 1914.

My telegram of 24th August.*

In reply to my enquiries, Grand Vizier stated that neither he nor Minister of Marine knew anything about the reported arrival of German sailors. They had not been asked for by the Turkish Government.

I said that, if this really was the case, it furnished yet another proof of how completely Germany had obtained control here. German merchantmen were, to my knowledge, arming in the port of Constantinople, and it was obvious that the German sailors were to be put into these ships or on board the Turkish fleet. This being so, it was my duty to warn his Highness of the unfortunate effect that this continued violation of Turkish neutrality in favour of Germany was bound to have upon the Governments of the Triple Entente.

No. 44.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, August* 28, 1914.

Ottoman forces are being mobilised in Hedjaz and further south, and existing military activity in Red Sea may thus be explained. About sixty Turkish officers arrived at Alexandria recently and passed through Egypt down Red Sea. Their destination was the Yemen.

Twelve thousand Turkish troops are reported in Jeddah region.

Signs are not lacking that, in case of war, an attack on Egypt is contemplated by Turkey. A few Turkish officers are now in the Delta. Steps have been taken to watch all those that are known. I learn from a good source that all information of Turkish mobilisation reported from Constantinople is correct. Meanwhile emissaries are being sent to India, the Yemen, Senoussi, and Egypt, to stir up feeling against Great Britain. Activity at Gaza is reported, but it is

* See No. 39.

uncertain whether this is more than raising of levies to replace regulars withdrawn from the north by mobilisation.

No. 45.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 28, 1914.

General situation here.

It is possible, though I consider it highly improbable, that Turks may make a dash out of the Dardanelles when their fleet is better prepared. It is equally possible that Turkey may make some forward movement against Servia or Greece on land. Nevertheless, I trust that you will not read my various reports to mean that I have abandoned last hope that neutrality will be maintained to extent of not actually attacking Russia in Black Sea. I still think that it is far from probable that Turkey will for the time being make any forward move.

News propagated by German Ambassador here this morning is that Germans are marching on Paris, and that they have decisively worsted the allies. This message has without doubt come by wireless, as the Ambassador is in direct communication with German General Staff. This news will, I fear, tend to shake Turks still further, as they now confidently expect that Triple Entente will be annihilated. There is also no doubt that very active preparations are in hand, and that Germans here are confident of hostilities. Consignments of gold from Germany have arrived for German and Austrian banks, private German residents have sent away their wives, and quantities of medical stores have been purchased and put on board German ships.

I hear that German Ambassador is adopting tone of friendly commiseration for Great Britain, who, he asserts, will never assist Russia in any movement against Turkey. He has made the remarkable statement that his Government will now offer favourable terms to France, which she will certainly accept; that Germany will then wage a platonic war with England, whose heart is not in the struggle, and who will make terms to save her fleet; and that Germany and England will then combine against Russia.

German Ambassador's attitude seems to indicate great preoccupa-

tion as regards British fleet and as regards Russian advance in East Prussia, and a desire to make terms now in order to save Germany's resources for a final struggle with us under more favourable conditions. I have made it known privately in the proper quarter that under no conditions would Great Britain abandon her allies, and that, whatever the present situation in the field may be, it is still but the beginning of a struggle from which we are firmly resolved to emerge victoriously.

No. 46.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 28, 1914.

From information that has reached me, there is no doubt that in course of time the whole area of the Dardanelles, Constantinople, and the Bosphorus will become nothing more or less than a sort of German enclave. Sailors recently arrived from Sophia will be sent to Straits forts and more will follow. This is over and above German military reservists already allotted to garrison those forts.

I hear that, although Turks have not yet any ordnance of the more modern type for mounting in Straits defences, it is very probable that consignment of guns will arrive in the near future from Germany and Austria through Constanza.

No. 47.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, August* 28, 1914.

Special train full of German sailors with officers passed Sophia last night for Constantinople, making total passed about 600.

I am informed credibly that large consignment of guns and artillery material has passed through Roumania to Giurgevo and is now being brought across to Rustchuk.

No. 48.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 30, 1914.*

I and my colleagues still do not regard situation as hopeless, and are of opinion that we should go on as long as possible without provoking a rupture. I find it hard to believe that, when it comes to the point, Turks would declare war on Russia or on ourselves.

Eventuality of a general war is doubtless counted on by Germany with the object of diverting energies of Russia from the main object of European conflict. Germans may even argue that, in the event of Russians receiving serious check in Germany, they might be induced to desist from struggle by bait of Constantinople.

There is no doubt that it is object of Germany to involve Russia and Great Britain in serious troubles here in the hope of general Balkan conflagration and of complications for us in India and Egypt. I heard to-day on good authority that it is admitted in Berlin that, if necessary, they will encourage a "jehad" * with this object.

I have strong impression that Turkish Government, with exception of its extreme chauvinists, are aware of Germany's objects, which I have not ceased to instil into them, and that time may cool their ardour for their German masters. I warned Grand Vizier this morning of inevitable results of siding with Germany against us, and said that our patience was not inexhaustible, and that consequences of allying themselves with our enemies would be serious. His Highness seemed to be impressed, and promised that German sailors should be sent away.

No. 49.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 1, 1914.*

Minister of Marine called on Russian Ambassador last night and assured him that he was working hard for neutrality, that he would send away German sailors in fortnight, and that 200 were leaving to-day, truth of which we shall verify. He may only be gaining time.

* *i.e.*, Holy War.

No. 50.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 1, 1914.

I again discussed subject of Turkish neutrality to-day with Grand Vizier. His Highness evidently relies on Minister of Interior, who returns shortly. He assured me most solemnly that Turkish Government would not depart from their neutrality. I replied that we should not be satisfied until the German sailors left, as Turkish neutrality had been so gravely compromised already. He reiterated with much vehemence that all German sailors should go.

No. 51.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 1, 1914.

Sulleiman-el-Burouni, a highly-placed senator, is in Egypt, probably in Cairo, engaged in fomenting revolutionary movement.

No. 52.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 1, 1914.

In order that there may be no room for misconception, you should inform Turkish Government that Egyptian Government are taking measures to patrol Suez Canal on both banks, and that this step is necessary to protect the safe and proper working of the Canal. You should add that no advance into Sinai, nor military operations in that region, are under contemplation.

No. 53.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 2, 1914.

I should be glad to learn whether British Admiral has instructions in case "Goeben" went into Mediterranean under Turkish flag. Should I tell Turkish Government that, so long as she has Germans on board, we shall regard her as a German ship and treat her as such, and that, before she goes out into Mediterranean, Admiral Limpus must be allowed to assure himself that there are no Germans on board?

I do not anticipate her going out, but should like to make it clear beforehand what our attitude would be in case she does so.

No. 54.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 2, 1914.

Am I authorised to make public statement that Turkey will have nothing to fear from British ships if she maintains strict neutrality and keeps peace during European conflict, if British trade is not interfered with, and if German naval officers and crews are sent out of the country?

No. 55.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 3, 1914.

I should be glad to have discretion to let it be known that if Turkish fleet leaves the Dardanelles we shall treat it as part of the German fleet, as it has German crews and officers on board.

No. 56.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 3, 1914.

Your telegram of 2nd September.*

So long as German crews have not been sent away, "Goeben" will certainly be treated as a German ship if she comes out of the Straits. It was only on express condition that German crews would be sent away that we waived demand, to which we were strictly entitled, that ship should be interned until the end of the war.

No. 57.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 4, 1914.

Your telegram of 2nd September.†

You may make statement you propose, but we cannot restrict movements of British fleet.

No. 58.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 4, 1914.

Your telegram of 3rd September: ‡ Turkish fleet.

Proposal approved.

No. 59.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 5, 1914.

I hear that Inspector from Constantinople of Committee of Union and Progress left Erzeroum on the 1st September for Persia, where

* See No. 53. † See No. 54. ‡ See No. 55.

he has previously lived. He was accompanied by three Persian revolutionists from Constantinople, one of them named Agha Mehemet Ali. They have ideas about Afghan and Indian Moslems, and also intend to stir up anti-Russian trouble in Persia.

No. 60.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 5, 1914.

I have to-day gone over the whole ground with the Minister of the Interior, who seems more inclined to be reasonable. I think there is an improvement in the situation.

Minister quite understands that "Goeben" will be treated as a German ship if she goes out. They assure me that Turkish fleet will not leave the Dardanelles on any account.

No. 61.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 6, 1914.

Surprises are always possible, but I feel fairly confident, from what I hear from many prominent people with whom I am in touch, that public opinion will change in our favour.

There is growing discontent among influential people, who are now beginning to realise that they are in German hands. This they resent, and they are openly declaring that they will not allow war.

In view of all this, I think I can safely say that there are many signs of an improvement in the situation here.

No. 62.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 7.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August* 19, 1914.

With reference to your telegram of the 12th August * to Mr. Beaumont, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a *note verbale*

* See No. 13.

addressed by him to the Sublime Porte in the sense of your instructions respecting the perquisitions effected by the German cruiser "Breslau" off British ships in the port of Chanak and the detention of British ships in the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE in No. 62.

Note verbale communicated to Sublime Porte, Constantinople, August 14, 1914.

It having been brought to the notice of His Britannic Majesty's Government that, while in the neutral port of Shanak (Dardanelles), boats of the cruiser "Breslau," flying the German flag, boarded and effected perquisitions on British ships, His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to request that the Imperial Ottoman Government will not permit German ships to commit acts of war in Turkish ports or in the Straits, the neutrality of which is guaranteed by international treaties.

Mr. Beaumont is instructed at the same time to enquire on what grounds British ships have recently been prevented from leaving the port of Constantinople, and have been detained on arrival at the Dardanelles, in some cases for several days.

According to a telegram received to-day from His Majesty's vice-consul at the Dardanelles, British ships are still being held up there, and His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has the honour to request that immediate orders may be sent to allow them to proceed.

No. 63.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

SIR, *Constantinople, August* 21, 1914.

With reference to my immediately preceding despatch,* I have the honour to forward herewith a *note verbale* from the Sublime Porte,

* See No. 62.

expressing regret for the incidents at the Dardanelles and offering explanations.

I have, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE in No. 63.

Note verbale communicated by Sublime Porte.

Le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères a eu l'honneur de recevoir la note verbale que l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu lui adresser en date du 14 courant.

En réponse, le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères s'empresse d'exprimer tous ses regrets à M. le Chargé d'Affaires de Sa Majesté britannique pour le fâcheux incident dont furent l'objet quelques bâtiments de commerce battant pavillon anglais dans le port de Chanak; la Sublime Porte est en mesure de donner les assurances les plus formelles que pareil fait ne se répétera plus.

Quant aux bateaux retenus à Chanak, des torpilles sous-marines s'étant détachées, les autorités Impériales ont cru de leur devoir d'empêcher ces bateaux de continuer leur voyage jusqu'au repêchage desdites mines, pour éviter de fâcheux incidents. Cette interdiction provisoire est donc le résultat d'une mesure générale

(Translation.)

The Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs had the honour of receiving the *note verbale* which His Britannic Majesty's Embassy was good enough to communicate on the 14th instant.

In reply, the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs hastens to express great regret to the Chargé d'Affaires for the annoying incident suffered by some merchant vessels flying the British flag in the harbour of Chanak; the Sublime Porte are able to give the most formal assurances that such an act shall not be repeated.

As regards the vessels detained at Chanak, some submarine mines having become detached, the Imperial authorities thought it incumbent upon them to prevent those vessels from continuing their voyage until the said mines had been recovered, in order that annoying incidents might be prevented. This provisional prohibi-

que le Gouvernement Impérial s'est vu obligé de prendre afin d'assurer la sécurité de la navigation dans les eaux Impériales.

Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique que les mines, ayant été repêchées, les autorités compétentes ont été invitées par le Gouvernement Impérial de lever l'interdiction de passage et de faciliter de leur mieux la navigation à tous les navires.

Le 16 *août,* 1914.

tion is, it will thus be seen, the result of a general measure which the Imperial Government have been obliged to take with a view to ensuring the safety of navigation in Turkish waters.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform His Britannic Majesty's Embassy that, the mines having been recovered, the competent authorities have been requested by the Government to raise the prohibition of free passage, and to do their best to facilitate navigation for all vessels.

August 16, 1914.

No. 64.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 6, 1914.

Minister of Interior yesterday assured me that there was no question of Turkey going to war.

I used every possible argument to dissuade Minister of the Interior from leaping on a military adventure, reminding him that in the end Turkey would inevitably pay. I told him His Majesty's Government regarded Turkish fleet as annex of German fleet, and that if it went out into the Ægean we should sink it. He quite realised this, and said that fleet had no intention of leaving Dardanelles.

I went carefully over several infringements of neutrality of which Turks had been guilty, and I said that so long as a single German officer, naval or military, remained here I should consider Turkey as a German protectorate; that I had been informed that Turkish Government attached no importance to written declaration which I and my French and Russian colleagues had made them respecting their integrity. I was greatly surprised at this attitude, but personally

somewhat relieved, as to guarantee integrity and independence of Turkey was like guaranteeing life of man who was determined to commit suicide.

We sincerely desired independence and integrity of Turkey, but he must not imagine that Great Britain was afraid of Turkey, or that we feared to face alternative if forced upon us. Most ridiculous stories about insurrections in India and Egypt and approaching downfall of British Empire were being circulated broadcast, and were apparently believed by Minister of War. I hoped that Minister of the Interior was not under those and similar dangerous illusions.

Minister of the Interior said that he understood.

He then proceeded to state that Turkish Government now wished to sell us two Turkish ships outright. They wanted money badly, as the economic situation was desperate. I replied that I did not know His Majesty's Government's views, which I would enquire, but that, personally, I should be reluctant to inflict so mortal a stab on the wounded heart of the Turkish people, who were already suffering so much by temporary detention of their ships. Their purchase might give rise to another tempest of indignation.

Moreover, I doubted whether His Majesty's Government would readily pay several millions to a country which was entirely in German hands, and which was breathing out threats against ourselves and our allies.

He replied that His Majesty's Government could make what conditions they liked if they bought ships; and that Turkish Government would send away all Germans. I said that I would reflect on proposal and repeat it to you.

No. 65.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 7, 1914.

There is fresh evidence that there has been no sale of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" to Turkey. I learn on unimpeachable authority that German Ambassador has twice sent down orders to customs for admission, duty free, of effects for His Imperial Majesty's ship "Goeben." I have brought this to notice of Grand Vizier, and have reminded him that we do not recognise sale.

Should I not tell his Highness that His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that the sale is a genuine and legal one, before they can recognise the ship as Turkish? I think that this should be done, even if the German crews go.

I have said to both Talaat and Grand Vizier that if "Goeben" and "Breslau" leave Dardanelles they will be treated as German ships. They fully realise this, and have assured me that the ships will on no account leave.

No. 66.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 8.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, September* 8, 1914.

Presence of numerous Turkish officers in Egypt is undoubtedly a danger, and measures against suspected individuals may become necessary at any moment. A Turkish naval officer recently left Egypt hurriedly for Beirout. A letter belonging to him has been found, in which it is stated that he has been doing his best to cause a strike amongst Moslem stokers and engineers of four Khedivial mail steamers, which are to be used as transports for our troops. The letter continues that he has not succeeded in his attempts, but that he will do his best to sink the vessels after the troops have embarked. It is worth noting that a strike on steamers in question has now occurred.

No. 67.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 8, 1914.

British Naval Mission.

Before any decision respecting the recall of the mission is taken by His Majesty's Government, I wish to have your views on the subject. I am reluctant to take any step, however justified it may be, that would precipitate unfavourable developments, as long as there is

a reasonable chance of avoiding them. What effect do you consider that withdrawal of mission would have upon the political situation?

The Admiralty are of opinion that the position of the mission may become unsafe and that it is already undignified. They therefore wish it to be recalled and attached to the embassy until you can arrange a safe passage home for Admiral Limpus and the other officers. There is clearly ample justification for the view taken by the Admiralty.

No. 68.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.**—(*Received September* 8.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 8, 1914.

I have on more than one occasion told Grand Vizier that resentment is probable in England, especially in present circumstances, at the slight put upon British admiral, and that, much as His Majesty's Government desire to remain on friendly terms with Turkey, such proceedings on the part of the Turkish Government cannot be indefinitely overlooked.

In many respects the situation seems to show improvement, but unless His Majesty's Government wish mission to remain indefinitely it seems to me that the present would be a suitable moment to withdraw it. The Turks could not regard this step as a grievance as it is obviously justified by their conduct. The mission are at present treated as non-existent, and their position is consequently both false and invidious. German hold on the navy is becoming stronger daily, and there is no sign of German crews leaving. As a matter of fact, far from being disadvantageous to us, this is becoming embarrassing to the Turkish Government, who are at last beginning to realise that the Germans are not an unmixed blessing. Great discontent reigns among Turkish naval officers, so Admiral Limpus tells me, as they dislike German officers, and they even hint that they would rather mutiny than serve under them.

I am of opinion that the time has come to withdraw the mission, and if this can be approved in principle, I will speak to the admiral, who feels his position acutely, and ask him to make the necessary arrangements.

* This telegram crossed Sir E. Grey's telegram of September 8, see No. 67.

No. 69.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 9, 1914.

Grand Vizier admitted this morning that the Turkish Government were going to abolish Capitulations.

I said that this information would greatly surprise my Government, whom I would at once apprise.

The Capitulations and conventions were not a unilateral agreement; we had on a former occasion informed the Turkish Government that we were willing to consider any request they might put forward in a generous spirit, but I did not imagine that my Government would acquiesce in their total abolition by a stroke of the pen. We were now under martial law. Did he expect us to allow British subjects to be judged by court-martial, especially so long as army was in hands of Germans?

His Highness made some ineffectual endeavours to defend his action, but I cut them short.

No. 70.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 9, 1914.

Minister of Interior told me to-day that note to embassies on subject of the abolition of the Capitulations had already been despatched. German Ambassador had just called to protest. Earlier in the day the Italian Ambassador had informed me that German and Austrian Ambassadors were ready to associate themselves with us in protesting against the abolition.

German Ambassador has disclaimed authorship of this move on the part of Turkey, and I think that he may be speaking the truth; but every statement he makes must be received with caution. Nevertheless, statement by Minister of Interior, to which I have alluded above, seems to bear him out in this case.

I have discussed the proposed abolition with the Minister of the Interior, and he maintains that they all feel that the time has come

to emancipate Turkey from foreign shackles. But he disclaimed any intention of hostility against foreigners. He had already sent instructions to all Valis and police officials not to inflame people against foreigners, and he would give strictest orders that no foreigners should be taken before courts-martial.

I told his Excellency that I thought the action of the Turkish Government would inevitably lead to greater interference than ever in the internal affairs of Turkey. I could only regret that they should have acted so precipitately.

No. 71.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 9, 1914.

Abolition of Capitulations.

It has been arranged that all the embassies shall send in identic notes to-morrow, acknowledging Turkish note and pointing out that abolition of the Capitulations cannot be accepted, as consent of both contracting parties is necessary.

No. 72.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 11.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 10, 1914.

Consignments of warlike material from Germany traced up to date amount to 3,000 rounds of projectiles for "Goeben," battery of field guns with ammunition, several batteries of heavy howitzers, probably for field army use, and some thousands of rifles. More consignments are on the way. All German reservists who have not been able to leave Turkish Empire have been instructed to report for enrolment with Turkish troops.

No. 73.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 11.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 10, 1914.

My telegram of 9th September.*

Note abolishing all the Capitulations was received last night. All my colleagues, including German and Austrian Ambassadors, have to-day addressed identic notes to the Sublime Porte stating that, while communicating to our respective Governments note respecting abolition of Capitulations, we must point out that capitulatory régime is not an autonomous institution of the Empire, but the resultant of international treaties, diplomatic agreements, and contractual acts of different kinds. It cannot be abolished in any part, *à fortiori* wholly, without consent of contracting parties. Therefore, in the absence of understanding arrived at before 1st October between Ottoman Government and our respective Governments, we cannot recognise executory force after that date of a unilateral decision of Sublime Porte.

No. 74.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 13, 1914.

I hear that Germans are now dominant at Alexandretta, and secretly suggest and control everything. From 7th September to morning of 12th September, 24 mountain guns, 400 horses and mules, 500 artillery troops belonging to service of 6th Army Corps and large quantity of ammunition passed through Alexandretta, proceeding by railway to Constantinople.

* See No. 71.

No. 75.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 14, 1914.

German Ambassador has received instructions from Berlin to publish widely report of revolution in India, with addition that His Majesty's Government have asked Japan to assist, and that Japan has agreed, in return for free immigration into the Pacific Coast, a free hand in China, and a 40,000,000*l.* loan. I was warned in time by the Russian Ambassador, and instructed all consuls by telegraph to deny it, if published, and wrote to the Grand Vizier.

Nothing official has appeared here, but the agencies are publishing part of the story.

No. 76.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 15, 1914.

Fleet is now entirely in German hands, and Minister of Marine is powerless. Germans consider that Dardanelles are now impassable, and they are impressing this upon military authorities. It is said that, if the Turkish fleet moved into the Black Sea, Straits would be entirely closed by additional mines, which have just been sent there on the "Nilufer."

Though I do not say that this *coup* will actually come off, danger is undoubtedly greater since news has been received of the recent successes of the allies, as the Germans are all the more anxious to create a diversion. My impression is that majority of the Cabinet and the Grand Vizier himself are entirely opposed to any such adventure, and that they are doing their utmost to prevent it; but they are finding out, though they will not admit it, that they are powerless to stop matters.

Both I and my Russian colleague have received independent information that German and Austrian Ambassadors are making a determined effort to force the Minister of War to send the "Goeben" and the rest of the fleet into the Black Sea. Fifty transports have

been ready for some time, and I understand that everything is prepared for the reception on board these vessels of a large number of Turkish troops.

Abolition of the Capitulations is now the principal card in the hands of the peace party. They would, I think, be ready to defer discussion of abolition of judicial Capitulations if abolition of fiscal and commercial treaties could be agreed to forthwith by the three Powers.

I hear that 15 per cent duties will be applied from the 1st October, but a law is at present under consideration exempting existing contracts. As nothing is at present coming into ports, application for these duties is, as a matter of fact, of little consequence. The temettu also will be applied to foreigners.

No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 16, 1914.

Your telegram of 15th September:* Abolition of Capitulations.

I am inclined to point out to Turkish Government that, so long as they maintain neutrality, what we have said to them already holds good, and that we shall be prepared to consider reasonable concessions about Capitulations; but they must not expect concessions from us while their present irregular conduct in the matter of the German officers and crews continues. Perhaps we might also say that if they break the peace we cannot be responsible for the consequences; that we hope they will keep the peace, but whether they do so or not is their own affair.

* See No. 76.

No. 78.

United Shipowners' Freight, Demurrage, and Protective Association to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)

Vienna Chambers, Bute Docks, Cardiff,
September 16, 1914.

SIR,

We are instructed by the owners of the steamship "Reliance" to seek your aid for the recovery of compensation from the Turkish Government for the detention of their steamer by the Turkish authorities.

The facts of the case are as follows:—

On the 1st August last the steamship "Reliance" sailed from Nickolaief with a cargo of barley for Hamburg and arrived off Constantinople at noon on the 3rd. The captain waited at Constantinople for orders from the owners of his steamer until the 6th, but he received no communication from his owners as the Turkish authorities had stopped the delivery of telegrams.

On the 6th August the captain proceeded on his voyage and arrived off Nagara Point, Dardanelles, on the following day at 8 A.M., when he sent his permit to pass through the Dardanelles ashore in accordance with the usual practice and received a signal from the fort that the canal was blocked. This blocking signal was kept up on the 8th, 9th, and 10th August; on the latter date several Italian vessels were piloted out and the German warships "Goeben" and "Breslau" were piloted in by Turkish torpedo craft and anchored in Nagara Bay. A German merchant vessel, the "General," was also piloted in.

The captain of the "Reliance" daily saw the British consul at Chanak, but the consul was unable to obtain permission for the "Reliance" to pass through the Dardanelles.

On the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th August the "Reliance" remained off Nagara Point, and on these days Roumanian, French, and Italian steamers were piloted in and out, but no British ships were allowed to leave.

At 5.50 P.M. on the 14th August the captain received orders from Turkish officials to proceed to Constantinople and remain there until the cargo had been discharged. Several other British steamers that were waiting received similar orders, amongst them being the steamship "Hillhouse," the steamship "Countess of Warwick," and the steamship "Barrowmore."

The captain proceeded to Constantinople and arrived there at 1 P.M. on the 15th August. On arrival he went ashore and noted protest against the detention of his steamer and also saw the British consul. On the following day the "Goeben" and "Breslau" arrived off Constantinople under the Turkish flag. On this day the "Reliance" was boarded by a Turkish officer who asked for the displacement of the vessel and for information as to the capacity for carrying horses and troops.

On the 18th the captains of all British ships at Constantinople were told by the British harbour-master, on instructions from the British consul-general, that they were now allowed to proceed and were again to apply for permits. On the same day the captain of the "Reliance" obtained a permit and sailed from Constantinople and arrived again off Nagara point at 8 A.M. the following morning (19th August), when he sent his second permit ashore, but the Turkish authorities cancelled the permit and ordered the "Reliance" to anchor. On the 20th August one Italian ship and the British ship "Ryton," in ballast, were allowed to pass through, and on the following day the steamship "Bullmouth" loaded with kerosene and three other steamers were piloted out. It was not until the 22nd ultimo at 11.40 A.M. that the "Reliance" was allowed to sail.

We respectfully submit that the Turkish authorities should be made to pay compensation for their action in detaining British ships, and on behalf of the owners of the "Reliance" we request that their claim of 640*l.*, being at the ordinary charter-party rate of 40*l.* a day, for the detention of their steamer from the 6th to the 22nd August should be made against the Turkish Government by the British Ambassador at Constantinople.

We are, &c.

DOWNING and HANDCOCK.

No. 79.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 16, 1914.

Minister of Marine has assured me that he is quite aware of German intrigues, and that Turkish Government are not so innocent as to fall into the trap that has been laid for them. His Excellency

admitted, however, that there had been an idea of sending the fleet to visit Trebizond, as he claimed that the Government had a right to do.

I pointed out, should they do so, as long as German officers were on board, there was bound to be a certain risk of some incident occurring, in view of well-known desire of Germans to provoke trouble between Russia and Turkey. His Excellency did not demur to this opinion, and said that he would at once see the Grand Vizier in order to stop it.

I have also seen Grand Vizier. His Highness said there was no intention of sending the "Goeben" into the Black Sea, and stated that the Minister of War must obtain the authorisation of the Cabinet before he could issue any such order.

No. 80.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 18, 1914.

Following telegram received from His Majesty's consul at Basra:—

"I am informed officially by Turkish commodore that a British man-of-war is lying near boundary line in Shatt-el-Arab, whole of which is within Ottoman waters. Vali intends to ask the captain to allow wireless apparatus to be sealed and to leave, as more than twenty-four hours have elapsed since ship entered the river. Vali knows that I am informing you."

No. 81.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 18, 1914.

Following sent to Basra:—

"Turkish authorities have, of course, no right to interfere with wireless on men-of-war."

No. 82.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 19, 1914.

Turkish military preparations.

In conversation with the President of the Chamber to-day, I said that if it was really Turkey's intention to go to war with Russia, I considered such a policy absolute madness.

President said that, even if Turkish fleet went into Black Sea, it would not be with any hostile intention towards Russia, with whom they were not going to war. I pointed out to him that Germany was pressing Turkey to send their fleet into the Black Sea with one object only, namely, that war might be provoked by some incident. I therefore urged him most strongly against any such action. He said that he was against it, and that he saw the force of my argument, to which I replied that as the Minister of War was supreme it was unfortunately no guarantee that it would not be done. President told me that the Cabinet had their own policy, which was to remain neutral, and that they were all alive to the aims of Germany. I pressed him hard as to what was the policy of the Minister of War.

I do not regard situation as hopeless. Party in favour of neutrality is growing, but it would be unsafe to rely on their power to restrain war party.

I hear that 156 more mines and the minelayer "Ghairet" have been sent to Roumeli Kanak, on the Bosphorus. Turkish fleet went to Halki yesterday for review, and will probably remain there till next week, when the "Hamidieh" and "Messudiyeh" will be ready. German officers and men continue to arrive by train. It is probable that there are German reservists resident in Turkey who have been incorporated in Turkish army. 200 Germans arrived at the Dardanelles on September 17th.

Cavalry and horse artillery are reported to have moved from Erzeroum towards the frontier.

No. 83.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 20.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 20, 1914.

I believe that Minister of War is the only firebrand. Committee of Union and Progress is exercising a restraining influence. I think it is undoubted that party in favour of peace is daily increasing.

French Ambassador had a conversation yesterday with Minister of Marine. Latter assured his Excellency that Turkish Government were determined not to be drawn into war, to which his Excellency retorted that if this assurance was correct, it was difficult to understand why preparations to send Turkish fleet into Black Sea were being made. Minister of Marine replied that Council of Ministers had decided that two destroyers only should go into Black Sea and that the fleet should not go. He admitted that the Minister of War, who was generalissimo of the army and navy, had as a matter of fact ordered the fleet to go, but, as all orders had to pass through him as Minister of Marine, he had insisted that this order should be referred to the Council, with the result above stated.

As an illustration of the entire lack of control possessed by the Cabinet over the Minister of War and the Germans, if any further illustration is needed, I have to report that, despite this assurance from the Minister of Marine, the "Breslau" and three other smaller ships passed us this morning and entered the Black Sea. My Russian colleague trusts that no incident will happen and proposes to ignore this proceeding.

No. 84.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 21.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 20, 1914.

I have just had an animated interview with the Grand Vizier, and I am convinced that he is sincere. Other Ministers are all peaceably inclined, with the exception of the Minister of War. So long as the latter remains supreme an incident may occur at any moment. I tackled the Grand Vizier on the subject of the "Breslau" entering

the Black Sea. He vehemently disclaimed any intention of attacking Russia, and said that Turkish Government had a right to send their fleet into the Black Sea if they wished to. I reminded him that neither the "Goeben" nor the "Breslau" were Turkish ships according to international law, and said that if they left the Dardanelles we would most certainly treat them as enemy ships. He replied that I had told him this often before, and there was no question of the ships leaving the Dardanelles. I then said that information had reached me that Council of Ministers, in order to avoid risk of an incident, had come to the wise decision that the "Goeben" and the "Breslau" should not go into the Black Sea; and yet, on the very day on which this decision had been reached by the Cabinet, it was totally disregarded by the Minister of War, as his Highness was doubtless aware. This showed how much control his Highness now exercised. Constantinople and the neighbourhood formed nothing more nor less than an armed German camp, and we all, including his Highness, were at the mercy of Liman Pasha* and the Minister of War. Many more German officers and men had arrived, and there must now be between 4,000 and 5,000 German soldiers and sailors here. Grand Vizier replied that he was determined to maintain peace, and that more adherents were joining the peace party every day. He would never allow Minister of War or anyone else to supersede him. Speaking with the utmost energy and even violence he assured me that, in spite of appearances, which he admitted looked bad, nothing would happen.

I said that doubtless peace party was growing, but, nevertheless, Minister of War was pushing forward warlike preparations uninterruptedly. I was receiving constant information respecting British official war news being stopped, cases of requisitions, &c., and I knew as a fact that intrigues against Egypt were being carried on. If his Highness could stop these things, why did he not do so, and when would he be able to do so? His Highness gave me to understand that if a crisis did come there would be a means of stopping Minister of War.

* General Liman von Sanders, Head of the German Military Mission.

No. 85.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, September* 21, 1914.

Information respecting Turkish preparations against Egypt receives fresh corroboration. There has been no slackening of military preparation in Palestine and in Syria.

If Turkish preparations continue, it may become necessary to put patrols into Sinai and to support our posts in the peninsula. Action of forces in Egypt has been hitherto confined, as you are aware, to patrol of Suez Canal, but I think that Turkish Government should be warned that measures for the protection of the Egyptian frontier may become necessary.

No. 86.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 22, 1914.

A letter was yesterday received by British postmaster from a subordinate official in the Turkish postal administration. In this letter postmaster was informed that foreign post offices in Turkey would be abolished as from 1st October next. I instructed British postmaster to return the letter, and to say that matter had been referred to his Ambassador.

This discourteous manner of communication was my first official information of any intention to abolish foreign post offices in Turkey. I accordingly saw Grand Vizier at once, and said that I resented the manner of communication, and had instructed British postmaster to return the letter. Post offices did not depend upon the Capitulations, and if Turkish Government wished to see the system modified, they should approach His Majesty's Government through the usual diplomatic channel. I warned him that His Majesty's Government would not allow themselves to be ignored in this manner, and I would not, unless by your instructions, consent to summary closing of British post offices on 1st October unless Turkish Government had given guarantees for safeguarding British interests. His Highness

said that Great Britain was not aimed at specially. A similar communication had been addressed to all the Powers. I said I was indifferent as to view of the matter taken by my French and Russian colleagues, nor had I yet had time to ascertain what they thought. Grand Vizier assured me that until an understanding had been come to with His Majesty's Government nothing further would be done in the matter.

I would observe that, in my opinion, considerable modification of existing system cannot properly be resisted. If Russian and French Ambassadors agree, may I come to some arrangement on the lines of consenting to incorporation of the British post office as a section of the Ottoman post, if the latter will undertake to take over some of the present British employés? I think we might also consent to use Turkish stamps.

No. 87.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 22, 1914.

Your telegram of 25th August.*

Sultan received me yesterday in audience, when I delivered the King's message. His Majesty expressed his earnest desire for good relations with Great Britain, and emphatically declared his firm intention of maintaining peace. He requested me to thank the King for his message. Full report follows by despatch.

No. 88.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 23, 1914.

Political situation in Turkey.

His Majesty's Government regard state of things at Constantinople as most unsatisfactory. On behalf of His Majesty's Government you should speak in the following sense to the Grand Vizier:—

* See No. 34.

British Government contemplate no hostile act towards Turkey by British fleet, and they have no desire to precipitate a conflict with her. But the fact that Great Britain has not taken any hostile action against her must not mislead Turkish Government into supposing that His Majesty's Government consider Turkey's attitude is consistent with the obligations imposed upon her by the neutrality which she has officially declared. German officers and men are participating increasingly in Turkish fleet and Dardanelles defences, and not only has Turkey failed to send away the German officers and crews, as she promised, but she has admitted more overland, and they are now in active control of the "Goeben" and "Breslau." The capital is undoubtedly now under the control of the Germans. If His Majesty's Government so desired, present state of things affords ample justification for protesting against violation of neutrality. Great Britain has not, however, so far taken action, as she cherishes the hope that the peace party will win the day. It should, however, be realised by the Grand Vizier and his supporters that unless they soon succeed in getting the situation in hand and bringing it within the limits of neutrality, it will become clear that Constantinople is no longer under Turkish but German control, and that open hostility will be forced on by Germany.

No. 89.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 24, 1914.

I hear that Egyptian frontier has been violated by armed mounted Arabs said to be encouraged by Turkish troops, and also that Hedjaz line is being reserved for troops. British military authorities consider that breach of peace on Egyptian frontier is imminent, whether with or without sanction of Turkish Government. You should bring these facts to the knowledge of the Grand Vizier and of the Khedive, who is at present at Constantinople.

No. 90.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 24, 1914.

Turkish preparations against Egypt.

I have addressed a note to the Grand Vizier recapitulating information recently received on this subject. I reminded his Highness of the assurances which I had several times given him, based upon your telegram of 7th August,* and I specially pointed out their conditional nature. Finally I warned him that the information respecting Turkish preparations against Egypt would infallibly produce a most serious impression upon His Majesty's Government.

I later communicated the contents of my note to President of the Council, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Interior, and asked them what explanation they could give, whereupon they enquired why so many thousand Indian troops were being sent to Egypt by His Majesty's Government. To this I answered that it was essential to ensure the safety of Egypt and the protection of the Suez Canal, and that as the British garrison of Egypt had been sent to France, it was necessary to replace it by British Indian troops. This seemed to satisfy them.

I cannot believe that they are not alive to the disastrous consequences of going to war with us, or that they seriously can contemplate an expedition against Egypt. They have undoubtedly been strongly urged to send such an expedition by the Germans, and I think that they have allowed preparations to be made, partly to profit as much as possible by German connexion and by allowing the Germans to think that they will act, and partly in order to be ready, if Great Britain sustains a serious defeat by land or sea.

Danger of the present situation is obvious, and developments are not improbable, and I shall see the Grand Vizier this morning and endeavour to bring him to book. There is a circumstantial report that the Germans are now making desperate efforts to force the Turks' hands and to compel them to fulfil their part of the bargain, but that at the same time their efforts are meeting with considerable resistance.

* See No. 5.

No. 91.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 24, 1914.

I have informed the Grand Vizier that Austro-German intrigues to involve Turkey in an expedition against Egypt are within my knowledge. Grand Vizier denied that such intrigues existed, but he finally admitted that pressure was being exerted. He declared that he was firmly resolved to keep out of any such intrigue, any complicity in which he disclaimed with emphasis. I strongly urged his Highness to make his position clearer, for preparations at the Dardanelles showed that he was either guilty of complicity or that he was not master in his own house. He answered that his intentions were entirely pacific, and that he did not mean to engage in any quarrel with Great Britain.

His Highness seemed more preoccupied with the Balkan situation at the moment than with anything else. He said that Turkish Government would be unable to refrain from an attempt to get back what they had lost in Balkan wars if Balkan complications ensued. No arguments of mine would induce him to change his attitude in this respect. He said he would be powerless to prevent it.

No. 92.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, September* 25, 1914.

Turkish preparations on Sinai frontier.

Two thousand men with stores passed Gaza on night of 18th September following coast towards frontier. Six more battalions are expected at Gaza. In that neighbourhood very strong and secret military preparations are being made on the frontier. Three battalions of Redif completely mobilised have marched to a place one day south of Jaffa on their way to the frontier.

No. 93.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 25, 1914.

Abolition of post offices.

You should make the best arrangements you can with regard to post offices, but it must be on record that we reserve the subject for future settlement, and that we do not agree to their abolition.

No. 94.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 25, 1914.

Your telegram of 23rd September.*

I have again seen Grand Vizier, and pointed out to him as earnestly as is within my power the fatal result to the Turkish Empire of persisting in a course of veiled hostility and petty intrigue against the British Empire. I recalled to him that time and again he had undertaken that the German crews of the "Goeben" and the "Breslau" should be sent out of Turkey, and that not only had these promises been broken, but further German officers and men had actually arrived. This proved conclusively that he was either insincere in his assurances or that he was powerless. His Highness begged that I would credit him with the fact that for eight weeks he had kept the peace. He assured me that he had every intention of seeing to it that peace was maintained. I replied that it was not his good intentions that I doubted, but I did distinctly doubt his ability to control the situation. The Germans had evidently gained complete control. An incident might happen at any moment, and the most serious consequences might be involved. His Highness was evidently nettled at what I said, and angrily replied that he was determined to keep the peace, and that, in a matter of peace and war, he was absolute master. This I met by referring him to the serious character of the preparations at present on foot, and by pointing out that, whether he wished it or not, a repetition of the Arab raid across

* See No. 88.

the Egyptian frontier might lead to incidents which would involve him. His Highness said that Minister of War was returning to-day, and that he would at once ask what the preparations were to which I referred. He asserted with violence that no incident would occur.

I have also seen Halill Bey, to whom news of preparations against Egypt seemed to be unknown. He expressed astonishment to hear of them, and was evidently horrified at the idea of war with us. He promised to go and see the Minister of War at once.

Position of Grand Vizier is difficult, and, to maintain any kind of control, he is obliged to shut his eyes to much that is going on. I am still strongly of opinion that, unless some act of gross antagonism takes place, we should maintain policy of reserve and abstain from making categorical demands with which his Highness is not yet able to reply, continuing to devote all our efforts towards preventing Turkey from taking active part in hostilities which German and especially Austrian Ambassadors are urging. Main fact of the situation is that, in spite of great pressure, Grand Vizier has kept the peace, and that his party is gaining ground.

No. 95.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 25, 1914.

On 22nd and 23rd September, 183 horses, 112 nizam, 2 officers, and 88 carts and carriages, all from Aintab, were entrained at Aleppo for Damascus.

Secret notice was given that in six days' time 120 railway waggons were to be in readiness to convey to Damascus troops arriving from Mosul viâ Tel Abiyat, and that in all from 25,000 to 30,000 troops were to be drafted from Mosul to Aleppo, of which at least half are destined for Hama or Damascus.

Two Germans connected with Bagdad Railway, one of whom is an expert in blasting operations and mine-laying, left Aleppo this morning for Damascus, the other telling his servant that they were going to Akaba. They had with them 1,600 dynamite cartridges and 1,500 metres of detonating wires. They may, perhaps, be commissioned to lay mines in Red Sea as there has been talk of Turkish military designs regarding Akaba recently.

No. 96.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 26, 1914.

Grand Vizier has been informed of the information reported by Mr. Cheetham in his telegram of 25th September,* and in my telegram of the same date.† I warned his Highness that if these preparations against Egypt were allowed to continue, serious consequences would ensue. Minister of War was with Grand Vizier when I made these representations, and his Highness informed me that he fully realised the importance of the question, with which he was occupying himself. I have taken steps to enlighten influential people with what is being done as regards Egypt, and I have seen Minister of Interior and left a memorandum with him on the subject; I have also put the facts before other promiment members of the Cabinet.

No. 97.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 27, 1914.

An incident has occurred outside the Dardanelles. At 6 o'clock this evening I heard that a Turkish destroyer was stopped last night outside the Dardanelles and turned back by one of our destroyers. Upon this, Commandant of the Dardanelles closed the Straits. When the news arrived, the Russian and French Ambassadors were with me, and we at once went to see the Grand Vizier. When I arrived the Grand Vizier was in a state of some perturbation. He said sudden action of British fleet had given rise to the belief that an immediate attack was contemplated. Having reassured his Highness that any such belief was unfounded, I said that it seemed to me highly desirable that the Dardanelles should be opened at once, for should the incident become known, it would certainly create the impression that some desperate step was intended by Turkish Government. I explained to his Highness that we were naturally apprehensive lest Germans on Turkish destroyers might endeavour to torpedo or mine

* See No. 92. † See No. 95.

our ships, and that it was for that reason that British fleet had been instructed to prevent any Turkish ships from leaving the Dardanelles, so long as any German officers or crews remained.

Grand Vizier asserted that he, personally, favoured the reopening of the Straits, and he requested me to assure His Majesty's Government, in the most formal and solemn manner, that Turkish Government would never make war upon Great Britain. I said that if the accounts that I had received were accurate, Turkish action on Egyptian frontier required explanation, where they had already committed acts of war. He said that facts had been greatly exaggerated; that I might rest assured that there would be no more acts of aggression; that there was no thought or question of attacking Egypt; and that orders had been sent for the immediate withdrawal of raiding Bedouins. He added that mobilisation was general, and therefore included those parts of the Empire contiguous to Egypt. He has promised to send a formal answer to my representations on the subject.

No. 98.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 27, 1914.

My telegram of to-day.*

I have just received a message from the Grand Vizier that, if His Majesty's Government will move the fleet a little further from the entrance to the Dardanelles, the Straits will be reopened. I said that I would ask for your instructions.

No. 99.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 29, 1914.

Dardanelles.

Germans are making capital out of closure of the Straits, and I hear on good authority that great pressure is being exerted by them

* See No. 97.

to induce Turkey to attack Russia in the Black Sea. Turks have, however, refused so far to fall in with this scheme.

Great umbrage has been caused to the Turks by fact that it was upon the German Ambassador's order that the "Breslau" went into the Black Sea the other day.

Grand Vizier is most anxious to reopen the Straits, and has again begged me this morning to let him know whether His Majesty's Government would not consent to move British fleet a little further off.

No. 100.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 29, 1914.

Information has reached His Majesty's Government that Turkish Minister of War telegraphed to Bin Saud, Emir of Nejd, several times towards the end of July that, owing to the imminence of war in Europe, arms, ammunition, and officers for training his Arabs were being sent to him.

Vali of Basra has been informed by Turkish Minister of War that thirty-two secret emissaries, including German officers, are on their way to preach a "jehad" in India, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan; that arms and ammunition are being sent to Basra under German flag, and that Turkish Government are prepared to help Germany in return for assistance received during Balkan war.

No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 29, 1914.

Under instructions from his Government, Turkish Ambassador has reverted to the continued presence in the Shatt-el-Arab of H.M.S. "Odin." Tewfik Pasha said that we would doubtless observe the rules of neutrality in other countries, since we had gone to war to defend the neutrality of Belgium. I informed him that, as Turkey had violated the rules of neutrality on her own initiative, and so

long as she persisted in her present unneutral attitude, His Majesty's Government did not admit that she could appeal to those rules.

In the event of your being approached on this matter by the Grand Vizier, you should state that His Majesty's Government will observe neutrality towards Turkey, if Turkey will do so towards us, and you should inform him of the reply which has been given to Turkish Ambassador.

No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 30, 1914.

Your telegram of 27th September * and subsequent telegrams.

Dardanelles were closed unnecessarily by Turkish authorities, and there is no reason why they should not be reopened. Turkish Government are well aware that we have no intention of initiating any aggressive action against Turkey.

The watch maintained by British fleet outside Dardanelles cannot be withdrawn so long as German officers and men remain in Turkish waters and are in control of Turkish fleet. Until, therefore, the German officers and crews are repatriated, the request that the fleet should be moved cannot be entertained.

You should inform Grand Vizier.

No. 103.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 1, 1914.

Consul at Basra reports to-day that British man-of-war has left Turkish waters.

He had previously telegraphed that he heard there was an intention to block Shatt-el-Arab in order to prevent departure of British man-of-war, and I had already called Grand Vizier's notice to this report.

* See No. 97.

No. 104.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 2, 1914.

Information continues to reach me corroborating reports of Turkish preparations against Egypt. Large transport camel corps arrived at Jerusalem yesterday, and I hear of transport of warlike materials, food-stuffs, and military stores on line Jenin-Nablus-Jerusalem, and also to Maan. Seven German military officers have been sent to Damascus and neighbourhood. This has stimulated preparations, and it is believed in Syria that Turkish Government has decided upon a movement against Egypt, Damascus division being assembled for advance by Akaba, Jerusalem division for that by Rafa. Inhabitants at Beirout and Haifa are being removed inland as a precautionary measure against any action which may be taken by British fleet when the advance on Egypt begins. It is reported from Haifa that localities along the coast are being garrisoned by newly-arrived troops. I have brought the gravity of the existing situation to the notice of the Grand Vizier in the strongest terms in a further note, though I do not view any actual movement against Egypt as imminent at the moment. In my note I have informed his Highness that the measures now undertaken can have no reason except as a threat against Egypt, and that they can no longer be regarded as incidental to an ordinary mobilisation of troops in their peace stations, and I have stated that His Majesty's Government can only view any further preparations at Jerusalem or at Maan in a serious light.

In addition to above-mentioned military measures, movements of suspicious individuals have now been supplemented by those of a German naval officer named Hilgendorf, who is at present on his way from Damascus to Petra with a party of eight Germans. It is understood that they will be joined by a smaller party from Haifa viâ Amman, and that they are conveying a large supply of explosives. I have made representations to the Grand Vizier explaining that such hostile enterprises against Great Britain cannot be allowed in a neutral country, and that these people must be arrested.

Speaking generally, I am inclined to think that both in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, on the Black Sea, the Egyptian frontier, and elsewhere, the Turks intend to have their troops all ready for action at a favourable point should the general European situation

afford a good opportunity. Should the German admiral take the "Goeben" into the Black Sea and attack the Russian fleet, or should things take an unfavourable turn for the allies, Turkish troops would be in a position to cross the Egyptian frontier without much further delay. His Majesty's Government will doubtless consider what, if any, military measures are necessary for the strengthening of strategical points in the Sinai peninsula.

No. 105.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 3, 1914.

Closing of Dardanelles.

Germans have certainly long been working for the closing of the Straits, presumably with the object of obtaining a freer hand in the Black Sea. There is every reason to suppose that the Dardanelles are closed to shipping not only by administrative act, but also effectively by mines. From information that reaches me from a reliable source, it seems that these mines have been laid by the Germans, and that the Turks are unaware of their position.

No. 106.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 4, 1914.

His Majesty's consul at Basra telegraphs as follows dated 3rd October:—

"Warships in Shatt-el-Arab.

"I have received a letter from the Vali saying that your Excellency has been informed by the Turkish Government of the measures proposed to be adopted in Turkish waters with regard to foreign belligerent warships; he says that the Shatt-el-Arab from Fao to Durna is closed to foreign warships, being inland waters just as much as Smyrna and the Dardanelles. British men-of-war must therefore leave Shatt-el-Arab within twenty-four hours. Vali ends by saying

that he will have to apply strict measures if I cannot induce captains of His Majesty's ships to go outside Fao. I told the Vali that I was asking for instructions from your Excellency, and I informed His Majesty's counsel at Mohammerah of the gist of Vali's communication.

"It is possible that H.M.S. 'Lawrence' may also be in the river."

No. 107.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 4, 1914.

Dardanelles.

It is the Germans who keep the Straits closed, to the great detriment of Turkey. If you concur, you may point out to the Turks that the British fleet will move away as soon as the German officers and crews leave and the Turkish navy ceases to be under German control. We should then have no fear of hostile action on the part of the Turks.

No. 108.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 5, 1914.

Turkey is now bankrupt. Supply of coal is, I am glad to say, cut off. Fresh provisions are not coming in, and there is some discontent in the navy and even in the army. Situation is doubtless very delicate, but Turks would be unlikely to go all lengths with Germany, at any rate until German success in the war seems more assured. I think that Turks are possibly less blind to their interests than is generally supposed, and I am still of opinion that situation may be saved. Time is now on our side, and I am strongly in favour of avoiding all occasion of conflict by temporising.

The question of reopening the Dardanelles is really no longer a practical one, for the Straits are now effectively closed by mines, and I am informed that their position is unknown to the Turks themselves.

Russian and French Ambassadors agree with me that our interests

are not primarily affected by the closure, as the requisitioning and other measures taken by the Turks against our nationals had already stopped our trade. This is the line I am taking with the Turks. I think they will begin to realise the facts before long. Total cessation of imports is already causing anxiety to Minister of Finance, and Turkish Government will soon become aware that they are the chief losers. The Germans have closed the Straits from political motives, partly, no doubt, because they believe that, by closing the Straits and preventing the entry of the British fleet, it will be easier for them to induce the Turks to take action against Russia in the Black Sea; partly, no doubt, in order to injure the trade of the allies and to prevent communication by sea with Russia.

I think that self-interested designs of Germany are not unknown to the Turks, who are playing up to Germany, not with the intention of falling in with those designs, at any rate for the present, to the extent of making war, but in order to extract as much as possible from her. In the opinion of many people, Germans are now in a position to take matters into their own hands, if they think that German interests demand it. If, however, the Turks' game is such as I have outlined above, it is undoubtedly a dangerous one. As is only natural, Turkish Government profess their ability to check any attempt on the part of Germany to take matters into their own hands, but it is not quite clear how they would be able to prevent it.

No. 109.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 6, 1914.

Military attaché had a long interview with Minister of War yesterday, from which he derived the impression that his Excellency had ambitious schemes in the Arab world and in Egypt. These may perhaps refer more to the future, and possibly measures are now being taken so as to prepare for the eventuality of Great Britain being worsted in war with Germany; meanwhile the way is being paved indirectly for present or future action. During the conversation, Minister of War disclaimed any intention on the part of the Turks of initiating, themselves, any offensive movements against Egypt, and pointed out that ordinary Syrian garrison had not been reinforced.

He said that, as in the case of other troops within the Empire, Syrian garrison had been fully mobilised. It was being equipped with necessary transport animals, &c., on a war scale, and it was being carefully trained with the help of the officers of the German mission as elsewhere throughout Turkey. Everything, he said, depended on the political situation, for which he was not responsible individually; and it was quite possible that the Syrian army corps might finally be moved in another direction, even, perhaps, to Constantinople. He scouted the idea of individual Germans undertaking enterprises against the Suez Canal or elsewhere, but he admitted that proposals had certainly been made to the Bedouin tribes to enlist their sympathies as supporters of the Empire in all eventualities. He defended the concentration of stores at Maan, Nablus, and Jerusalem, and he added that no troops, but only gendarmes, had been moved in the direction of Gaza. Nevertheless, he could not deny that some of the measures taken were certainly precautionary against Great Britain, and in justification of this he pointed to the entrance of British men-of-war into the Shatt-el-Arab, to the arrival of Indian troops in Egypt, and to the presence of the British fleet in Turkish territorial waters outside the Dardanelles. Military attaché said that, as far as the action of the fleet and of His Majesty's Government were concerned, this was due to infringement of neutrality by Turks, and Great Britain certainly had not the slightest intention of making any attack upon Turkey, it was quite ridiculous to suppose that the arrival of Indian troops in Egypt had anything to do with hostility to Turkey. Minister of War at once advanced such arguments as that Turkey had maintained her neutrality; that German officers and men on auxiliary ships were entirely under Turkish control, indeed they were in the Turkish service. Military attaché said that Turks could not be surprised that Great Britain should be preoccupied if Turkish troops were assembled further south than Jerusalem or Beersheba on the one side, or Maan on the other.

No. 110.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 6, 1914.

His Majesty's consul at Basra telegraphs to-day as follows:—

"Vali says that he must obey the orders which he has received. He has communicated a copy of these to me. They are to the effect

that the whole of the Shatt-el-Arab and sea within six miles of the shore are closed to warships, as they are territorial waters. Any men-of-war disregarding this prohibition will be fired upon by the guns at Fao. These regulations will be enforced from to-morrow evening, Wednesday, 7th October. They are somewhat obscure, but they mean that H.M.S. 'Espiègle' in the Karun and H.M.S. 'Dalhousie' at Abadan will be interned, unless they leave before the time fixed. No other British man-of-war is this side of Fao. H.M.S. 'Lawrence' is in the Shatt-el-Arab to the best of my belief. His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah has been informed of the above."

No. 111.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 7, 1914.

British warships in the Shatt-el-Arab.

H.M.SS. "Espiègle," "Odin," and "Dalhousie" are not in Turkish waters. There can be no question of their being ordered out of waters which are not Turkish nor of their being interned by the Turkish Government. According to generally accepted principles of international law, Turkish territorial waters extend to 3 miles out to sea from the coast. Two of His Majesty's ships are being instructed to keep outside the 3-mile limit, while the remaining ship is being told to remain at Mohammerah, which does not belong to Turkey. Our long-established right to pass freely up and down Shatt-el-Arab at all times is not in question, and it must be recognised that we fully reserve that right.

No. 112.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 8.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 22, 1914.

Referring to your telegram of 25th August,* in which I was authorised to convey to His Imperial Majesty a message from the

* See No. 34.

King, on the occasion of my reception in audience after my return from leave of absence, I have the honour to state that I was received in audience by His Imperial Majesty yesterday.

In view of the difficulty of conversing with His Majesty in an ordinary way, I prepared a written statement containing the message, and I read a separate statement of my own on the subject of the withdrawal of Admiral Limpus, having previously arranged with the Master of the Ceremonies, who was to act as interpreter, that this should be translated clause by clause as I read it. I enclose a copy of these statements which read as arranged, subject to some slight modifications necessitated by the turn which the interview took.

His Imperial Majesty seemed not only fully to grasp the sense of the communication, to which he listened with eager attention, but responded to it immediately with great vivacity and vehemence, showing a considerable grasp of the issues with which his country is now confronted.

I was much impressed with the earnestness of His Imperial Majesty's repeated assurances of his desire and determination to maintain the ancient friendship between the two Empires and to avoid war with any Power.

A memorandum is enclosed recording what passed at my audience.

I have, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE 1 in No. 112.

Communication read to the Sultan by Sir L. Mallet on September 21, 1914.

Mon Souverain m'a chargé d'exprimer à votre Majesté son profond regret de ce que les exigences d'une situation imprévue aient forcé son Gouvernement à détenir les deux vaisseaux de guerre destinés à la marine Impériale. Sa Majesté le Roi se rend compte des sentiments douloureux que cet

(Translation.)

My Sovereign has commanded me to express his profound regret to your Majesty that the exigencies of unforeseen circumstances have compelled his Government to detain the two warships intended for the Imperial Turkish Navy. His Majesty the King is aware of the painful impression

acte a dû inspirer à votre Majesté, mais il espère que la décision prise par son Gouvernement de rendre ces vaisseaux à la Turquie à la fin de la guerre actuelle suffira pour la convaincre que leur détention ne fut motivée par aucune intention inimicale envers l'Empire, qui est lié avec le sien par une amitié plus que séculaire. C'est parce que cette amitié n'a jamais été rompue que mon Souverain espère que la Turquie ne fera rien qui puisse empêcher son Gouvernement de donner suite à cette décision, qu'elle gardera une neutralité stricte et absolue pendant la guerre actuelle, et que l'on ne tardera pas à mettre fin à quelques faits contraires à la neutralité que ont provoqué quelque inquiétude au sujet de l'attitude du Gouvernement ottoman.

that this action must have made upon your Majesty, but he thinks that the decision of his Government to return these vessels to Turkey at the end of the present war will suffice to convince you that their detention was due to no unfriendly intention towards an Empire bound to his by a friendship of more than a century. It is owing to the fact that this friendship has never been broken that my Sovereign trusts that Turkey will do nothing to prevent his Government from acting up to this decision, that she will maintain strict and absolute neutrality during the present war, and that there will be no delay in putting an end to certain facts contrary to neutrality which have caused some anxiety as to the attitude of the Turkish Government.

ENCLOSURE 2 in No. 112.

Statement by Sir L. Mallet with regard to Admiral Limpus on September 22, 1914.

L'Amiral Limpus, qui, sous les auspices de votre Majesté, a rendu de si grands services à la marine Impériale, m'a prié de faire part à votre Majesté de son regret de ne pas avoir pu déposer ses hommages au pied de son trône avant de quitter Constantinople. Votre Majesté n'ignore pas les circon-

(Translation.)

Admiral Limpus, who, under your Majesty's auspices, has rendered such great services to the Turkish navy, has begged me to inform your Majesty of his regret that he was unable to pay his respects to your Majesty before leaving Constantinople. Your Majesty is aware of the circum-

stances qui ont nécessité son départ, du moment que lui et la mission navale qu'il présidait ont été rélégués à une position où ils ne pouvaient plus rien faire pour le bien de la marine ottomane. Rappelé par mon Gouvernement dans ces circonstances regrettables, l'Amiral Limpus s'est vu forcé de se rendre aux ordres de ses chefs et à quitter Constantinople dans un délai trop court pour lui permettre de demander une audience de votre Majesté.

stances necessitating his departure from the moment when he and the naval mission under his command were relegated to a position in which they could no nothing further for the welfare of the Turkish navy. Recalled in these regrettable circumstances by my Government, Admiral Limpus was obliged to obey the orders of his superiors and to leave Constantinople within too short a space to be able to request an audience of your Majesty.

ENCLOSURE 3 in No. 112.

Memorandum.

The Sultan listened to my communication in silence until the Master of Ceremonies translated the clause containing the words "quelques faits contraires à la neutralité." He then broke in with an eager disclaimer of any unneutral conduct on the part of Turkey. On my mentioning, as a specific instance, the retention of German officers and crews on board the "Goeben" and "Breslau," His Majesty explained with some lucidity that they had been kept for a short time to train the Turkish crews. The "captains" available in the Turkish navy were unequal to the task, and it was necessary for that reason to do what had been done. The German crews would be sent away in "five or ten days," and the officers also. Only one or two of the latter would be retained. He would speak frankly, he said. Great Britain was a great Power with a great navy, and had no need of the two ships of the Ottoman fleet. Great Britain had taken them, but he knew they would be given back at the end of the war. On my remarking that Great Britain wished to make absolutely sure of the position at sea, the Sultan again said that she was too great a maritime Power to need these ships, but he once more stated his conviction that they would be given back. Anyhow, he and his Government were not going to depart from their neutrality. His Majesty repeated this

more than once, saying that they knew that that was the only path of safety, and that his great desire was to keep the peace. He laid stress on the friendship between Great Britain and Turkey. This was the more striking, because the words were not put into his mouth, as might be supposed, by myself, the Master of Ceremonies having quite failed to render the parts of my communication in which I dwelt on past relations between England and Turkey.

When, referring to what the Sultan had said about the need for training his navy, I expressed regret that the British naval mission had not been allowed to complete that task. His Majesty did not seem to grasp the main point, but on my referring to the circumstances of Admiral Limpus's departure, he broke in with some emotion, and said twice over that it was not by his wish that the admiral had left Constantinople without an audience. The admiral had not asked for one or come to the Palace. Had he done so he, the Sultan, would have postponed all other business in order to see him. I said I would convey this to Admiral Limpus. I also promised to communicate the Sultan's assurances, which I said I sincerely believed, to the King, who would be gratified at receiving them.

Just before I took my leave, His Majesty was good enough to express his warm personal regard, and made some further kind remarks about the value which he attached to his personal relations with me. The Sultan spoke throughout in the most homely language, but with great liveliness and point, and with obvious sincerity. His assurances about his desire to observe neutrality and remain at peace, rather lost than gained in force by the way in which the Master of Ceremonies (whose mind is slow and whose French is defective) translated them. His remarks on the embargo on the two ships were plainly, but not discourteously or resentfully, worded.

No. 113.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 8.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 7, 1914.

British warships in Shatt-el-Arab.

Grand Vizier assured me this afternoon that Vali of Basra had been instructed to avoid all interference with His Majesty's ships in the Shatt-el-Arab.

No. 114.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 8.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 7, 1914.

There has been fighting during the last few days on frontier between Russian troops and Kurds supported by Turkish troops. Last night Russian Ambassador made strong representations to the Grand Vizier, and said that the Turkish Government must restrain the activities of their troops on the frontier. Furthermore, Russian consul had been arrested. Replying to these representations, Grand Vizier assured Russian Ambassador, in writing, that the consul should be released at once and that the fighting should cease. Russian Ambassador has certain information that Turks are being incited to fight by Germans and Austrians. His Excellency agrees with me that Grand Vizier is honestly exercising what influence he has in favour of peace, but it is doubtful if he has the power to restrain the military party under Enver Pasha.

No. 115.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 11.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 10, 1914.

It is highly probable that for some time past money has been sent to Syria mainly with the object of subsidising the Bedouins. It is also supposed that the Germans in Syria have had sums of money with them. The following is the number of German military officers known to be in Syria at present: Seven who went there some time ago, of whom Colonel Kress von Kressenstein is one, four who arrived 2nd October at Damascus, and five more who arrived there on 6th October. My information is to the effect that seven more may since have arrived at Alexandretta. Meanwhile, another party of Turkish sailors is leaving Constantinople overland for Bagdad and the Tigris. Information has just reached me from Damascus to the effect that Colonel von Kressenstein had gone to Maan to inspect, but only two military trains with details and stores had left in the last two days. West of the Jordan no movements had taken place. Two

railway vans of dynamite had left Damascus for Beirout; 4,000 Mosul troops had reached Aleppo, but were waiting there for the present.

No. 116.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 11, 1914.

It seems to me that the key of the situation lies in Constantinople. It would be fatal to give way to Turkish demands beyond a certain point, especially in the Persian Gulf, but, nevertheless, I entirely share your view that His Majesty's Government should avoid giving even a plausible cause of offence to Turkey. I think that our attitude during the past eight weeks has shown irrefutably that we desire to avoid a rupture with Turkey.

No. 117.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 12, 1914.

I have received note dated 11th October from Porte, of which following is substance:—

From information received by Porte, two British men-of-war have one after the other passed up the Shatt-el-Arab to anchor at Mohammerah.

According to Treaty of Erzeroum, the town of Mohammerah and its port belong to Persia, whilst Shatt-el-Arab is under Turkish domination.

This principle was affirmed by Turco-British Declaration of 29th July, 1913, which specifies that from Nahr Nazaille, above Mohammerah, frontier follows river to sea, leaving under Turkish sovereignty river itself and all the islands except ten, and modern port and anchorage of Mohammerah. This port and the anchorage thus formed an enclave in Ottoman waters which must be traversed in

order to reach them. Consequently men-of-war in question have not respected Imperial territory in penetrating into her internal waters and have disregarded neutrality of the Porte, whose duty it is not to allow passage of foreign men-of-war.

On these grounds the Porte asks me to cause instructions to be sent to commanders of men-of-war in question to leave the port of Mohammerah within eight days and to go to sea.

No. 118.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 12, 1914.

My despatch of 4th October.*

I have received note from the Porte in reply to my note of 2nd October respecting Turkish preparations against Egypt.

It says that military activity in Syria is common to all provinces of the Empire, and is natural consequence of mobilisation, having no other object than to put Turkey on a footing to defend her neutrality. Turkey's position being one of simple and legitimate precautions, it will be readily recognised that it would not be conceivable that she should change it in order to attack Egypt, which is one of her own provinces.

The Porte goes on to observe that, although I have on several occasions assured Grand Vizier that His Majesty's Government have no intention of altering status of Egypt, yet declaration that Egypt is in a state of war, dismissal of German and Austrian agents, who receive their exequaturs from the Porte, and above all arrival in Egypt of important contingents from India as well as other acts, have attracted serious attention of Imperial Government and have created real anxiety.

Note concludes by reiterating to me assurance that Turkey has no hostile intention towards any Power whatever, and that military preparations have purely and exclusively defensive character.

I think that it would be right to remind Grand Vizier that I have always made it perfectly clear that undertaking not to change the status of Egypt was conditional on Turkey maintaining strict neutrality.

* Received on October 19. See No. 143.

No. 119.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 12, 1914.

This morning Turkish fleet left Constantinople and steamed into the Black Sea.

No. 120.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 12, 1914.

I do not think that we could now leave Mohammerah without loss of prestige. In view of receipt of Vali's note respecting presence of British men-of-war in the Shatt-el-Arab, effect of moving His Majesty's ships at the request of the Turkish Government, once they were sent to Mohammerah, might have led the Arabs to misinterpret the action of His Majesty's Government.

I would not regard the note in the light of an ultimatum, though it is not impossible that Turks might close the channel, and thus prevent His Majesty's ships from going out, except in agreement with the Turkish authorities.

General belief is that Germans are at present applying considerable pressure upon the Turks to take part in the war, but that the Turks are so far resisting. My anxiety is lest the resistance which the Minister of War is encountering from the Moderates should be weakened by any act on our part which could be interpreted as aggressive by the Turks. Enver Pasha is said to be in favour of immediate coöperation with the Germans.

No. 121.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 12, 1914.

My telegram of 12th October.*

I have informed Grand Vizier that I was surprised to receive his

* See No. 117.

Highness' note, inviting His Majesty's ships to leave Mohammerah within eight days. I knew his Highness had no intention of creating difficulties, but it sounded almost like an ultimatum. Mohammerah was, as his Highness was aware, a Persian port. Grand Vizier replied at once that there was no question of an ultimatum. I explained His Majesty's Government's point of view, and he said that he was at present awaiting your reply to Turkish note.

In the course of ensuing conversation, his Highness seemed as confident as ever that he was able to resist German pressure, and he repeated that he was absolutely determined to avoid war in any case.

In reply to some observations of mine in regard to Turkish fighting recently reported in Persia, he said that strict orders had been sent that no Turkish troops were to cross the frontier.

No. 122.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 13, 1914.

Consular officer at Basra telegraphs as follows:—

"I have been notified by Vali that H.M.S. 'Espiègle' must be interned until the end of the war unless she departs from Mohammerah and the Shatt-el-Arab within eight days from the 11th instant. If she attempts to leave after the expiration of the said period, her passage through the Shatt-el-Arab will be stopped by force of arms, The 'Dalhousie' departed several days ago.

"I have informed His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah of the Vali's communication."

No. 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 13, 1914.

Your telegram of 12th October.*

Your Excellency should make the following reply to the Turkish

* See No. 117.

note protesting against the presence of British men-of-war in the Shatt-el-Arab:—

"As regards the passage through the Shatt-el-Arab to and from the port of Mohammerah, His Majesty's Government maintain in principle the legitimacy of such passage, but express themselves quite ready to examine in a friendly spirit any representation that the Ottoman Government may make on the subject, if the Sublime Porte themselves strictly observe their neutrality, which they have gravely violated by continuing to retain the German officers and crews on the 'Goeben' and 'Breslau,' in spite of all assurances and promises to the contrary.

"His Majesty's Government are prepared to respond in a conciliatory spirit whenever the Ottoman Government shall have conformed, as a neutral, to the principles of international law prescribing the duties of neutral Powers.

"As regards the presence of British warships at the port of Mohammerah, this is a matter with which the Sublime Porte is in no wise concerned, since Mohammerah is not in Ottoman territory; Porte have, therefore, no right to request their departure."

No. 124.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 14, 1914.

Moslems in Aleppo district are reported to have been so inveigled and incited by German and Turkish deliberate official misrepresentations and falsehoods of every kind that masses seem to believe German Emperor has embraced Islamic faith, and that Germans are fighting for Islam against Russia.

No. 125.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 15.)

SIR, *Cairo, September* 30, 1914.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of two interrogatories which I have received from the Adviser to the Ministry

of the Interior, regarding the case of Lieutenant Robert Mors, a German employé of the Alexandria City Police, who was arrested on his return from leave, viâ Constantinople. He explained his return by stating that he had been excused from military service in Germany.

I have, &c.

MILNE CHEETHAM.

ENCLOSURE 1 in No. 125.

Interrogatories of Lieutenant Mors.

(1.)

Mulazim Awal Robert Casimir Otto Mors, Egyptian Police, examined, states:—

"At Constantinople I was acquainted with a German official who was formerly in the German diplomatic agency in Cairo. This gentleman, whose name I must refuse to give, was in agreement with the Turkish Government on the subject of military operations in Egypt, and as he knew that I knew Egypt very well, he conducted me to Enver Pasha, the Turkish Minister of War. The latter questioned me on the military situation; if it were true that the British had disarmed the Egyptian army, &c. I replied that I did not know, and thought it unlikely. I then left the presence of Enver, and he remained talking with the German official. I forgot to mention that he asked me if I would participate in operations in Egypt. I replied that I would only participate in open military action. I was afterwards informed by the German official that Enver had sent officers from the Turkish army to Egypt to prepare native public opinion for action in favour of Turkey. I also heard from the German official that one of Enver's emissaries was an officer of the Egyptian army, but I did not know his name then. I must mention here that I understood from various things and from conversations that I overheard between the said German official and various people that he had the intention of sending printed matters and explosives to Egypt. I also understood that it was the Egyptian army officer who was charged with the transport of these things. We were held up in the Dardanelles for six days owing to the wreck of a cargo boat. On the second we were stopped

there; the 'Bash Reis' (boatswain) of the 'Saidieh' brought me a small leather bag (which I recognised as being the property of the said German official), and told me that somebody on board had given it to him to give to the passenger in No. 7 cabin, *viz.*, my cabin. At the same time the 'Bash Reis' asked me if it belonged to me. I said 'Yes,' because I began to suspect that the contents of the bag were the explosives that I had heard about. I opened the bag and found it was half full of packing material; and on probing it I found there were hard substances underneath. I thought that if I said that the sack did not belong to me it might be handed over to the ship's captain, and it would then be discovered what the contents were, and an accident might even occur. I did not know at this time that the 'Bash Reis' had guilty knowledge of the contents of the bag, and therefore told him that there was nothing in it. I then took it into my cabin to examine it, and found the two tin boxes which you seized. Whilst we were still in the Dardanelles—as far as I can remember it was the fourth day there—the Egyptian officer came to me and said in Arabic: 'Are you not the passenger occupying No. 7 cabin?' I said: 'Yes; why?' and he said: 'Have you received the things?' ('Wasallak el shay?') I replied: 'Was it you who sent it to me?' He said: 'Perhaps' ('Yimkin').

"I then said: 'What have such things to do with me?' He said: 'I cannot keep such things myself.' I then asked him who gave them to him. He replied: 'Fouad.' I do not know who this Fouad is exactly, but it is possibly Ahmad Fouad at Constantinople, whom I have seen with the German official, and who is an intimate friend of Sheikh Abd-el-Aziz Shawish, according to all reports. He then told me his name was Ahmad Hamuda, and that he had fought against the Italians in Tripoli. He showed me his card, on which was written: 'Ahmad Hamuda, Officer of the Egyptian Army.' I do not remember if the card bore his rank or not. I saw Ahmad Hamuda Effendi after leaving Piræus, when he came and asked me what I had done with the tin boxes. I understood, from the way he put it, that he wanted to take them from me, but this is only an idea I had. I told him I had thrown them overboard. When we were anchored in the harbour, he again came and asked me to take his revolver ashore. I replied that I had my own revolver, and that I should be searched like everybody else. He then asked me if they would search his wife. I said: 'Naturally; they have female searchers at the Customs.'

"I had the intention of throwing the tin boxes overboard, but I

was afraid that they might explode on striking the water. I therefore procured some cord with which I meant to lower them into the water. I never got a chance, and I was afraid that the propeller would catch the cord, and the steamer might be blown up or damaged.

"Another thing which deterred me was that I was afraid the boxes might float and be dangerous to shipping, so I postponed it until our arrival at Smyrna, where I telegraphed to the German official at Constantinople stating that two tin boxes with unknown contents had been handed to me, and I desired instructions. At Piræus I received a telegram telling me to throw them overboard, which, for the reasons I have just given, I again postponed."

Q. Have you any witnesses to prove that the boatswain gave you the bag containing the tin boxes?—*A.* Yes; a certain Fortunato, the cabin steward, was present, and I gave him the bag with the packing after removing the tin boxes, asking him to throw the packing overboard. He did so, and returned me the bag.

On arrival in port here I gave the tin boxes to Mohamed Ali, the purser, and asked him to keep them with him until he had a chance to throw them overboard without being observed by the various launches. I also recommended him not to throw them from the deck, but to descend the gangway and drop them into the sea carefully after weighting them with a piece of iron. I told him they contained dangerous substances, and to be very careful. I noticed he seemed afraid, and told him if he did not wish to do it he should give them back to me. He said he did not mind doing it, and if I wished he would pass them through the Customs for me without difficulty.

Q. Why did you select Mohamed Ali for the mission?—*A.* Because I heard at Piræus that he was a Turkish agent.

Q. From whom did you hear this?—*A.* From a Turk at the German consulate at Piræus.

Q. How did you meet this Turk?—*A.* He was introduced to me by the German vice-consul.

Q. What is his name?—*A.* I do not remember. He gave me his visiting card, and I destroyed it.

Q. How did you approach Mohamed Ali on the subject?—*A.* I showed him the visiting card of the Turk, to which he said at once, salaaming with his hand, "Ahlan wa Sahlan."

Q. Where did you procure the map of the Suez Canal?—*A.* It was given to me by the German official.

Q. Why did he give you the map?—*A.* I do not know. We were

talking together, and he showed me the map. I admired it, and he told me to take it.

Q. Where did you get the cypher found with your effects?—*A.* I invented it with the assistance of the German official, for correspondence with him at Constantinople.

Q. Where is the key to it?—*A.* I destroyed it.

Q. Can you tell me what it was?—*A.* It was to let him know if the Egyptian army had been disbanded; if there were difficulties for me here to enter the country; by what route I intended to return, &c.

R. MORS.

Alexandria, September 28, 1914.

(2.)

Enquiry into Mors's Case, held on September 28, 1914.

1. *Mors interrogated.*

Q. Can you explain this telegram (telegram addressed to "Prill, Bacos, Bulkely, Alexandria," from Schneider)?—*A.* No. You must ask the French lady who is staying with us ("il faut demander à Mademoiselle chez nous"), as it is a private telegram of hers. It seems to be asking news of her health.

Q. Who is Schneider?—*A.* I do not know.

Q. Who is Omar Fawzi and Suliman Askari?—*A.* Two officers I met in Constantinople whom the German introduced to me.

Q. Where did you meet them?—A. At the hotel Tokatlian in Constantinople.

Q. What is the name of this German official?—*A.* I do not know.

Q. When was he in Cairo?—*A.* Two years ago.

Q. Was this your first visit to Constantinople?—*A.* Yes.

Q. Did you know this gentleman before?—*A.* No.

Q. You realise that your position is a serious one?—*A.* Yes.

Q. You refuse to give his name?—*A.* Yes.

Q. Can you tell me the name of the Turk whom you met in Alexandria?—*A.* I must refuse, but if you suggest his name I will tell you if you are right or wrong.

Q. Do you deny that the German official is Baron Oppenheim?—*A.* Yes; Oppenheim is at Berlin.

Q. Do you know Baron Oppenheim?—*A.* I have never seen, but often heard of him. He is over 50 years of age. According to Berlin opinion, he is merely a "blagueur," and of no importance.

Q. Did you see Ezzedin Fawzi in Constantinople?—*A.* No; he had left before I arrived.

Q. What did he do there?—*A.* I do not know. I heard from my sister-in-law that he had left for Constantinople. He was charged with my private affairs.

Q. Was not this rather a serious arrangement to make?—*A.* No; he was always a great friend of mine.

Q. Do you know his political opinions?—*A.* No.

Q. You appear to have had some previous knowledge of the preparation of explosives for use in Egypt?—*A.* I heard in Constantinople that something of the nature of explosives were to be prepared and sent to Egypt.

Q. What was the ultimate destination of these things?—*A.* I don't know. I was only three days at Constantinople.

Q. Have these explosives penetrated into Egypt?—*A.* I don't know. Perhaps other emissaries arrived in Egypt at the same time as I did.

Q. Who is Fahmy Bey?—*A.* Mohamed Bey Fahmy, Master of Ceremonies in the Khedive's household, who arrived in Constantinople in the "Saidieh."

Q. How did you get to know him?—*A.* He rented our house three years ago.

Q. Who sent you this telegram?—*A.* It was the answer to my telegram.

Q. Why did you send the first telegram?—*A.* To see if it were possible and advisable, in view of the reported state of things in Egypt, for me to return here, or if it would be better for my family to join me there.

Q. Is this the bag you brought with you?—*A.* Yes.

Q. Who sent it to you?—*A.* I do not know. The boatswain brought it to me saying it was for whoever occupied cabin No. 7. Probably Ahmed Hamuda gave it to him to give to me.

Q. Did you see Enver Pasha in Constantinople?—*A.* Yes. I had a conversation with him.

Q. How was it that you had this conversation?—*A.* The German official introduced me to Enver at the War Office.

Q. What did Enver Pasha say to you?—*A.* He questioned me as to the state of affairs in Egypt.

Q. Is the German official a German naval officer?—*A.* No.

Q. Did Enver Pasha express any opinions?—*A.* He said that he wanted a campaign against Egypt, should war break out, for which two army corps would be required.

Q. What did he want you to do here?—*A.* He asked me if I would help.

Q. What did you reply?—*A.* I agreed to do so in the event of a military expedition.

Q. Who gave you the idea that explosives were being prepared to be sent to Egypt?—*A.* I suspected the German officer, whom I saw with an Egyptian Effendi unknown to me.

Q. How did Ahmed Hamuda get to know you?—*A.* He came to see me on the voyage—in the Dardanelles, I think.

Q. Why did he trust *you*?—*A.* I do not know.

Q. Had you made no previous promises?—*A.* No.

Q. Whom did you see at the Piræus?—*A.* The consul, where I saw the telegrams and the Turkish gentleman who told me of Mohamed Ali, the purser.

Q. Why did you send this telegram?—*A.* Because I knew something was being prepared, and suspected that the bag had some connexion with it. Besides there were several emissaries on board, and there had been many circulars in the hotels in Constantinople.

Q. Who were these emissaries?—*A.* I do not know, but I heard that Sheikh Shawish had said there were thirteen who had left.

Q. Will you explain how you knew of these preparations?—*A.* Through the German official and various people I met casually at odd times. The German official arrived in Constantinople from Berlin the day before me.

Q. Did Omar Fawzi speak to you of Egypt?—*A.* Yes; he said he had fought in Tripoli and had been to Egypt, where he had many friends.

Q. Where did you meet the Turk at Piræus?—*A.* At the German consulate.

Q. Have you ever visited Tchiboukli Palace?—*A.* No.

Q. Why did you write Omar Fawzi's name in the piece of paper?—*A.* Because I had to meet him at the "Petit Champs," a restaurant in Constantinople, and I wished to remember.

Q. Will you explain what the code found in your tarbush was?—*A.* The references to cotton were information about troops, the best quality denoted British and the inferior Native soldiers. Kantars referred to the number of men. Certain phrases referred to the dis-

armament of Egyptian troops. "Suis disposé," I recollect, meant that I should return.

Q. When did you want to leave the country?—*A.* As soon as possible, for I understood that all Germans serving under foreign Governments had to resign.

Q. What did "venez par le premier bateau" mean?—*A.* That things were in a dangerous state here.

Q. And No. 15?—*A.* "Don't come to Turkey."

Q. "Ne venez pas-tout arrangé"?—*A.* I have forgotten.

Q. "Venez de suite"?—*A.* I have forgotten.

Q. "Bébé va mieux"?—*A.* I have forgotten—all this was made up hurriedly before I left Constantinople during the last half-hour when I was packing my luggage. I did not look at it again before I destroyed the key; it is now three weeks since I left Constantinople.

Q. How is it that you know some of the expressions and not others?—*A.* In view of what I have explained, it seems clear. Those referring to the "Santé de la famille" refer to Turkish officers, but I cannot remember the details.

Q. Did it refer to their going to the Red Sea?—*A.* I don't know, but I have an idea it was with a view to finding out what difficulties were placed in the way of Turkish officers in Egypt.

Q. Who was to have taken charge of the explosives here?—*A.* The agents of Sheikh Shawish.

Q. Who?—*A.* I do not know.

Q. Did you not know that the German official was going to give you these things?—*A.* No.

Q. How did you recognise the bag?—*A.* I saw it in the hotel at Constantinople and recognised the repair which I had seen at a restaurant in the hands of an effendi.

Q. How did you get to know so many people?—*A.* I met them casually at the hotel and the German Embassy, where I called and learnt that it was difficult to get to Egypt.

Q. How did you meet the German official?—*A.* I met him at the embassy.

2. *Boatswain interrogated.*

Q. Have you seen this bag before?—*A.* Yes. I first saw it on board the "Saidieh" in Constantinople on the 3rd September with a sailor called Ali, who asked me to give it to the occupant of cabin No. 7.

Q. Where was it given to you?—*A.* I think on deck. I told Ali that he had better give it to a steward in the first class, which he did. The next morning Mors asked me who had given me the bag.

Q. Why should Mors have asked you this? How was it that he connected the bag with you?—*A.* Because I told the steward to give it to him, and perhaps he told Mors so.

Q. When did Mors speak to you?—*A.* The next morning at about 8 A.M. He brought me the bag and asked me who gave it to me, as he wanted to give me a tip. I refused the latter as it was not I who brought the bag.

Q. Who gave Ali the bag?—*A.* He told me an Arab did so.

Q. Was the latter on the steamer?—*A.* I do not know.

3. *Mors and Boatswain confronted.*

Q. (To Mors.) Who brought you this bag?—*A.* This boatswain with the steward.

Q. Did you offer the boatswain a tip?—*A.* Yes, but he refused it.

Q. Why did you want to give it to him if the bag was not yours?—*A.* I accepted the bag for the reasons I have already given you.

Q. Why offer him a tip?—*A.* For the sake of my friend, and because I did not want the matter exposed.

Q. Who gave him the bag?—*A.* I do not know, but it must have been Ahmad Hamuda.

Q. (To the Boatswain.) Do you know Ahmad Hamuda?—*A.* No.

Alexandria, September 29, 1914.

No. 126.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 14, 1914.

The whole of the Turkish fleet has reëntered the Bosphorus.

The "Leros" and "Erissos," two German steamers which have been convoyed from Sulina by the "Breslau," sailed under the Turkish flag until they were inside the Bosphorus. The same thing was done on a former occasion, when two ships from Black Sea ports were similarly convoyed by the "Breslau."

No. 127.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 14, 1914.

About 600 Moslem "fedahis," dressed in various guises, have arrived at Aleppo in batches during past fortnight, their head being an officer related to Ottoman Minister of War; 400 of these came from Smyrna, where they had incited Moslems against Greeks. At Aleppo they intrigued, with the aid of Committee of Union and Progress, with sheikhs against Great Britain. Discourses of a guarded anti-British tendency were pronounced in mosques. The last batch left Aleppo 12th October by rail. Parties of them have proceeded to Hama, Homs, Baalbek, Damascus, the Hauran, to incite sheikhs against Great Britain, and they are to continue their journey south by Hedjaz Railway, and to find their way into Egypt to incite Moslems there. Many of the principal sheikhs of Aleppo seem now gained over to the side of Germany.

No. 128.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 14, 1914.

With the object of spreading the belief that Great Britain is the enemy of Islam, the German Embassy daily emits a stream of mendacity and calumny, which is circulated throughout the country by the Turkish newspapers, all of those in the capital being in the pay of the German Embassy as a result of the large sums spent by it in corruption both in Constantinople and in the provinces.

No. 129.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 15, 1914.

Son of Kurdish chief Issa, who is stated to have influence in Mesopotamia, and who has been in Constantinople for instructions, is said

to have left for Basra to work anti-English propaganda, and other agents, including Germans, are said to be on their way to Afghanistan on similar errand.

I learn that Zekki Pasha, commander of 8th corps, has lately received 5,000*l.* to distribute amongst Bedouins, and that as much as 35,000*l.* in gold left here by train on 12th for Syria. Senator Abdurrahman is working among Bedouins at Maan and Muntaz Bey on the west by Beersheba and Jerusalem.

Party of Turkish sailors mentioned as having left here by train for Basra are now stated to be on the way to Akaba with consignment of metal boats. Another lot of boats is at Rayak, possibly on the way to Beirout. Quantities of dynamite have been sent to the coast towns of Syria, probably to serve for mining purposes of land defence. This is in addition to sea mines which have been also forwarded. Numbers of "working battalions" (soldiers as yet untrained) are road constructing in southern Syria.

All above and previous reports in a similar sense show that there is very considerable activity being directed in a sense hostile to us, and this activity is being worked by German influence and agents in every conceivable direction. Probably Government as a whole have little control over these activities, but do not disapprove of them. As regards actual military preparations, German element has sufficient power to persuade the authorities on certain points. German press is directing movement, and has obtained despatch of numbers of German officers to Syria to superintend preparations and training of corps there for war, concentration of stores and supplies at suitable spots, preparation of lines of communication and defence of coast.

No. 130.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 15, 1914.

German plots have been so extensive that it is conceivable that they may introduce individuals into Egypt who, impersonating Indian soldiers, may cause mischief.

In substantiation of this I have to state that His Majesty's consul at Aleppo has learnt that a tailor in that town has been commissioned to make a variety of Indian costumes and head-dresses on design and measurement supplied by German officers there.

No. 131.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October* 16, 1914.

Ninety-seven cases of bullion passed through Rustchuk yesterday for Constantinople, accompanied by six Germans. This consignment was preceded by 200 other cases. In the last three weeks many heavy cases and stores have passed through same town.

Armaments are believed to be sent through in the night.

No. 132.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 16, 1914.

Local authorities at Jaffa have distributed 10,000 rifles amongst Bedouins, each with 100 cartridges, 5,000 ten-shot to owners of horses and riding camels, and 5,000 single-shot to owners of baggage camels. Bedouins have been employed to dig wells, and Germans to fit them with motor pumps; ovens have been built near frontier.

It is believed that Bedouins' next move is to be towards Akaba.

Horses and mules throughout the whole district are being requisitioned most energetically.

No. 133.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 16, 1914.

Major Omar Fevzi Bey, son of Arimm Effendi, ex-Governor-General of Damascus, accompanied by five German officers, arrived at Aleppo 14th October from Constantinople bringing 25,000 liras. The officers passed for engineers, and are buying saddle horses to proceed to Bagdad viâ Ana. From Ana they are to take two batteries of guns,

which, together with money and loads of rifles and ammunition taken from Aleppo, they are to deliver to Ibn-el-Reshid.

Railway trucks full of dynamite for Alexandretta and Damascus are expected to arrive from Constantinople. German officers of "Breslau" have already laid thirteen mines at Alexandretta according to report that has now reached me.

No. 134.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 16, 1914.

Minister of War, who is willing tool of Germans, is now supreme. Minister of the Interior was most influential Minister before mobilisation, but is so no longer. His position now is rather mysterious. Whilst taking advantage of European struggle to carry through so-called emancipation of Turks from foreign control, he is not supposed to be in favour of war, which he thinks would end badly for Turkey. If this diagnosis is correct, he and others like him are more or less powerless at present, and, though they declare their ability and intention to stop military preparations, evidently are unable to check them.

No. 135.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 17, 1914.

Reliable information reaches me that mines are being sent to Basra, and will reach Bagdad in a day or two.

No. 136.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October* 17, 1914.

One Bouhadi Sadil has been discovered buying arms for importation into Egypt. He had already bought 700 Gras rifles and ammunition. I understand that two of this man's accomplices were recently convicted in Egypt.

No. 137.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 17, 1914.

Any attack upon H.M.S. "Espiègle" by Turkish authorities will be a wanton act of aggression, as she is not in Turkish territorial waters.

You should inform Turkish Government that there is no present intention of her passing down the Shatt-el-Arab, but His Majesty's Government consider they have a right to claim that passage so long as "Goeben" and "Breslau" with German crews and officers, have free use of Turkish territorial waters and the Straits.

No. 138.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 17, 1914.

Since end of September following have reached Constantinople:—

Six thousand nine hundred cases of Mauser ammunition, 540 cases of Mauser rifles, 13 trucks of war material, and about 800,000*l.* in bar gold.

Arrival of a submarine in sections is expected shortly, and I am informed that such a consignment, together with two aeroplanes, left Rustchuk on 8th October.

Two German ships were recently escorted from Sulina by "Breslau," and are reported to have brought submarine. But there is no evidence at present to prove this.

No. 139.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 18, 1914.

Aeroplane, three airmen, and several mechanics left Beersheba yesterday.

Governor left Jaffa with a view to allaying panic.

Following is résumé of a telegram from Minister of War to commandant at Jaffa which has come to my knowledge:—

"On the approach of enemy warships destroy boats and lighters, kill horses, break carriages, and destroy railway. Strictly guard telegraph. When surrender of town is demanded ask for time to consult Jerusalem. If Jerusalem instructs you not to surrender, oppose landing of the enemy by force of arms. See no looting of town takes place, and find suitable place to shelter your archives. Explain above to the population and arm them, taking oath from them. At signal not to surrender send away women and children. Hoist flag on konak and barracks so as not to have other places bombarded. Break enemy's flagstaff and remove insignia from the door of his consulate."

No. 140.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 19.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 2, 1914.

With reference to my telegram of the 22nd September * and your telegram of the 25th September,† I have the honour to forward herewith copies of notes exchanged between the Grand Vizier and myself respecting the suppression of the British post offices in the Turkish Empire.

I have, &c.

Louis Mallet.

* See No. 86.

† See No. 93.

ENCLOSURE 1 in No. 140.

Grand Vizier to Sir L. Mallet.

Constantinople,
le 27 septembre, 1914.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Pour faire suite à ma note du 9 courant, j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que par suite de l'abrogation des Capitulations à compter du 1er octobre, 1914, les bureaux des postes étrangères fonctionnant provisoirement dans l'Empire devront cesser leurs opérations à partir de cette date.

Je prie, par conséquent, votre Excellence de vouloir bien inviter les directeurs des bureaux de postes anglaises se trouvant en Turquie à agir en conformité des communications qui leur ont été faites par le Ministère Impérial des Postes et Télégraphes et dont copies ont été déjà transmises à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique en date 24 septembre, 1914.

Veuillez, &c.
SAÏD HALIM.

(Translation.)
Constantinople,
September 27, 1914.

Your Excellency,

In continuation of my note of the 9th instant, I have the honour to inform you that, in consequence of the abolition of the Capitulations as from the 1st October, 1914, the foreign post offices provisionally existing in the Turkish Empire must cease working from that date.

I accordingly request your Excellency to be so good as to request the directors of British post offices in Turkey to act in conformity with the communications addressed to them by the Imperial Minister of Ports and Telegraphs, copies of which have already been communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Embasy on the 24th September, 1914.

ENCLOSURE 2 in No. 140.

Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.

M. le Ministre, *Constantinople, October* 1, 1914.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note dated 27th September, by which your Highness requests me to instruct the

directors of the British post offices established in the Ottoman Empire to act in accordance with the communications which have been addressed to them by officials of the Imperial Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs with a view to their ceasing their operations from to-day onwards.

The fact that a measure of such importance affecting an official department of His Majesty's Government should have been adopted in virtue of an unilateral decision of the Sublime Porte, and that effect has been given to the measure in so precipitate a manner, compels me to formulate the most express reservations both as to the procedure followed and as to the principle underlying the question.

With a view to avoiding incidents of a public nature I have instructed the British post offices in the Empire to suspend their ordinary postal operations from to-day onwards. By so doing and by authorising a verbal exchange of views, in order to mitigate the inconvenience resulting from this suspension, I must not be considered to have prejudiced the question of principle. It will be for my Government to consider what further action shall be taken in the matter.

I avail, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 141.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 19.)

SIR, *Constantinople, October* 2, 1914.

I have the honour to transmit a copy of a note which I have addressed to the Sublime Porte referring to the repeated assurances which the Grand Vizier has given me that the German crews will be sent back to Germany, assurances which were confirmed to me by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan on the occasion of my audience of His Imperial Majesty on the 21st ultimo, and enquiring whether the Ottoman Government have the intention of fulfilling their undertakings, and, if so, on what date this will take effect.

I have, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE in No. 141.

Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.

YOUR HIGHNESS, *Constantinople, October* 2, 1914.

On the occasion of the audience which His Imperial Majesty the Sultan was graciously pleased to accord me on the 21st ultimo, I had the honour to convey to His Imperial Majesty a message from the King, my Sovereign, respecting the detention in England of the two Turkish vessels of war. I had previously communicated to your Highness the substance of this message, as your Highness will doubtless remember. His Imperial Majesty deigned in reply to charge me with his thanks to the King, my Sovereign, and whilst regretting that His Majesty's Government should have detained the vessels, which seemed unnecessary in view of the large naval supremacy of Great Britain, His Imperial Majesty said that he was unalterably determined to maintain the historic friendship between the two countries and on no account to depart from the neutrality which had hitherto been observed by his Government. Referring to a passage in the King's message, expressing His Majesty's regret at certain events which had seemed to impair that neutrality, His Imperial Majesty authorised me to inform the King that the services of the German admiral, officers, and crews of the German warships had been temporarily retained in order to train the Turkish officers and crews, but that the task was on the point of accomplishment, and that they would return to Germany within a few days' time.

I replied that these assurances—which I had also received repeatedly from your Highness—would not fail to give great satisfaction to the King, coming as they did from the lips of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan himself.

I now address myself to your Highness to enquire whether the Ottoman Government have the intention of repatriating the German officers and crews in accordance with the oft-repeated assurances of your Highness, which have now been solemnly confirmed by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

If such is their intention, I should be grateful if I might be informed of the date on which their departure will take place.

I avail, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 142.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 19.)

SIR, *Constantinople, October* 4, 1914.

I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a note which I addressed to the Sublime Porte, protesting against the abrogation of the Capitulations.

I have, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE in No. 142.

Note Verbale communicated to Sublime Porte.

His Britannic Majesty's Embassy has received instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to make the following statement to the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs:—

His Britannic Majesty's Government expressly confirm the protest against the suppression of the Capitulations which His Majesty's Ambassador addressed to the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 10th ultimo.

The régime of the Capitulations being founded on synallagmatic instruments the Porte cannot abrogate them by a unilateral act. His Majesty's Government therefore reserve their full liberty of action as regards the measures which the Ottoman authorities may have taken or may take in violation of the Capitulations and will demand due reparation for any prejudice which their subjects may suffer in consequence of such measures.

His Majesty's Government, desirous of maintaining the friendly relations which have hitherto existed with the Ottoman Empire, feel constrained to call the serious attention of the Porte to the consequences which may follow upon the adoption of the new policy upon which the Imperial Government would seem to have embarked.

It is not in the interests of the Ottoman Government to alienate the sympathy of Great Britain, which constitutes a guarantee of present tranquillity and a pledge of future support.

Constantinople, October 1, 1914.

No. 143.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 19.)

SIR, *Constantinople, October* 4, 1914.

I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a note which I addressed to the Grand Vizier protesting against certain military preparations in Syria.

On the 2nd October I addressed a further note, copy of which is also enclosed, pointing out that no answer had been received either to my previous note or to two letters of the 25th and 26th on the same subject.

I have, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE 1 in No. 143.

Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.

Constantinople,
le 23 septembre, 1914.

Altesse,

Au cours de notre entretien d'hier matin, j'ai eu l'honneur de faire part à votre Altesse de l'inquiétude que m'inspiraient les nouvelles que je recevais de la Syrie au sujet des préparatifs militaires et des complots contre l'Égypte que l'on fait dans cette région. Aussi longtemps qu'il s'agissait de préparatifs semblables à ceux qui se sont faits partout dans l'Empire à la suite de la mobilisation générale, je n'en ai rien dit à votre Altesse,

(Translation.)
Constantinople,
September 23, 1914.

Your Highness,

In the course of our interview of yesterday morning, I had the honour to inform your Highness of the anxiety that the news which reached me from Syria in regard to the military preparations and plots against Egypt now going on in that province, was causing me. So long as it was a question of preparations similar to those made in other parts of the Empire, as a consequence of the general mobilisation, I did not mention the matter to your High-

bien que l'on pût attacher une importance toute particulière à tout ce qui se faisait dans ce genre dans le voisinage de la frontière égyptienne. De même ai-je jusqu'à présent rejeté comme des racontars invraisemblables les bruits qui me sont parvenus de plus d'une source, et d'après lesquels on projetterait un coup subit contre le Canal de Suez dans le but d'en rendre impossible le passage, quoique je sache que les ennemis de la Grande-Bretagne aient mené des intrigues ayant pour leur but d'emmener le Gouvernement de votre Altesse dans des aventures aussi folles et même plus folles que cela. Cependant, je manquerais à mon devoir envers mon Gouvernement, et je puis ajouter envers votre Altesse, si je ne la mettais pas au courant des derniers rapports qui me sont parvenus. Il résulte de ces rapports que les esprits des Bédouins sont travaillés par des agents provocateurs qui, encouragés par le Gouvernement ottoman, voudraient les exciter contre l'Angleterre. Les préparatifs militaires, qui jusqu'à un certain moment ne différaient pas dans leur caractère de ceux faits dans les autres provinces de l'Empire, se sont transformés dernièrement dans un mouvement vers le sud. On fait venir des troupes d'un centre aussi lointain que Mosul. Une activité générale règne partout, de Damas jusqu'à

ness, although special importance might attach to all such doings in the neighbourhood of the Egyptian frontier. Similarly, I have been able up to the present to reject, as improbable tales, the rumours which have reached me from more than one source, according to which a sudden blow directed against the Suez Canal was being planned with the object of rendering it impassable, although I am aware that the enemies of Great Britain are intriguing with the object of leading your Highness's Government into adventures as insensate, and even more insensate, than this. I should, however, fail in my duty towards my Government, and I may add also towards the Government of your Highness, if I did not bring to your Highness's knowledge the latest reports which have reached me. It appears from these reports that the minds of the Bedouins are being excited by professional agitators, who, encouraged by the Ottoman Government, are desirous of inflaming them against England. The military preparations, which up to a certain moment bore a similar character to those in the other provinces of the Empire, have lately changed into a converging movement towards the south. Troops are being brought from such distant centres as Mosul. General activity reigns everywhere from Damascus to

Maan. Une accumulation d'indices fait croire à mon consul à Jérusalem que l'on projette pour ces jours-ci même une expédition en règle contre l'Égypte.

J'aime à espérer que les rapports dont je viens de faire un résumé pour votre Altesse interprètent mal des faits qui en eux-mêmes sont indiscutables. Mais je répète que je manquerais à mon devoir si je ne faisais pas part à votre Altesse des graves préoccupations qu'ils m'occasionnent et l'impression qu'ils font sur le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, et si je ne la mettais pas en garde contre les conséquences désastreuses qui résulteraient pour votre Gouvernement s'il suivait une voie si contraire à ses propres intérêts que celle de se faire le complice de l'Allemagne dans une attaque contre l'Égypte.

Votre Altesse se rappellera qu'au commencement de la guerre actuelle Sir E. Grey chargea Mr. Beaumont de lui déclarer que pourvu que la Turquie gardât une neutralité stricte et absolue pendant la guerre et tant que des circonstances imprévues ne surgissent pas, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique n'avait aucun désir ni intention d'annexer l'Égypte ni de modifier son régime d'une façon quelconque. J'eus l'honneur de confirmer cette assurance à votre Altesse

Maan, and cumulative evidence leads my consul at Jerusalem to the belief that an organised expedition against Egypt is in project for the next few days.

I trust that the reports, the contents of which I have just summed up to your Highness, put a wrong interpretation on facts which, as such, cannot be discussed. But I repeat that I should fail in my duty, if I did not bring to your Highness's knowledge the grave preoccupation which they cause me, and the impression which they make upon His Britannic Majesty's Government, and if I did not place you on your guard against the disastrous consequences, which would ensue for your Highness's Government, if they were to follow a course so contrary to their own interests as that of becoming the accomplice of Germany in an attack upon Egypt.

Your Highness will remember that at the beginning of the present war, Sir E. Grey instructed Mr. Beaumont to give you the assurance that, provided that Turkey maintained strict and absolute neutrality during the war, and so long as unforeseen circumstances did not arise, His Britannic Majesty's Government had no desire to, nor intention of annexing Egypt, nor of modifying her régime in any way whatsoever. I had the honour to confirm this assurance to your High-

peu de temps après ma rentrée à Constantinople. Depuis lors désireux d'éviter toute possibilité de malentendu avec le Gouvernement Impérial, j'ai à plusieurs reprises appelé l'attention de votre Altesse sur le caractère conditionnel des assurances données par Sir E. Grey. Or, je crois de mon devoir de déclarer encore une fois à votre Altesse que mon Gouvernement voit sous un jour des plus sérieux les violations de neutralité sans précédent commises déjà par le Gouvernement ottoman en gardant des officiers et des équipages allemands à bord des vaisseaux de guerre allemands et en prenant dans son service plus tard beaucoup d'autres Allemands ayant le même caractère militaire.

Je ne trouve pas nécessaire en ce moment de récapituler les détails d'encore autres écarts de la neutralité commis par la Turquie en faveur des ennemis de la Grande-Bretagne. Je n'ai pas besoin non plus d'insister sur des conséquences qui pourraient en suivre, si pour mettre le comble à une situation tellement grave, mon Gouvernement acquerrait la conviction que le Gouvernement Impérail envisageait sérieusement une attaque contre l'Égypte ou qu'il se prêtait à des menées déloyales contre la sûreté du Canal de Suez ou contre le régime actuel de l'Égypte. Votre Altesse peut elle-même apprécier toute l'im-

ness shortly after my return to Constantinople. Since then, being desirous of avoiding any possibility of misunderstanding with the Imperial Government, I have repeatedly called your Highness's attention to the conditional character of the assurances given by Sir E. Grey. Now, I hold it to be my duty to declare once more to your Highness that my Government take the most serious view of the unprecedented violations of neutrality already committed by the Turkish Government in retaining German officers and men on board the German warships, and by subsequently taking into their service numerous other Germans in a similar military capacity.

It does not seem to me necessary at this moment to recapitulate the details of still further departures from neutrality committed by Turkey in favour of the enemies of Great Britain. Nor need I insist on the consequences which might ensue if, to add the last touch to so grave a situation, my Government were to become convinced that the Imperial Government were seriously meditating an attack against Egypt, or that they were a party to disloyal intrigues against the security of the Suez Canal, or against the present régime in Egypt. Your Highness can judge of the whole importance and pos-

portance et toute la portée possible de ces conséquences.

Votre Altesse trouvera annexé à cette note un mémoire détaillant les faits qui peuvent être considérés comme le prélude d'une attaque contre l'Égypte.

Je profite, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

possible extent of these consequences.

I enclose in this note a Memorandum, enumerating in detail the facts which can be considered as indications of a forthcoming attack upon Egypt.

I avail, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

Memorandum.

D'un rapport en date du 18 courant, il résulte que les autorités déployaient tous leurs efforts pour exciter les tribus bédouines contre l'Angleterre, en la représentant comme l'ennemi de l'islamisme, et que 30,000 hommes appartenant à ces tribus étaient prêts à se soulever. Un rapport complémentaire porte que les instigateurs de ce mouvement sont Muntaz Bey, officier à l'armée; Essad Choucair, député ou ancien député; et un certain Beheddine Bey, aidés de plusieurs autres personnes et appuyés par les autorités locales tant civiles que militaires. Le rapport ajoute sans réserves qu'après le bruit qui courait, des tribus devaient s'armer tout de suite pour marcher contre l'Égypte.

Il résulte d'un autre rapport du 18 courant qu'un mouvement militaire de Damas vers le sud était attendu pour environ le 20

(Translation.)

From a report dated the 18th instant, it appears that the authorities were using all their efforts in order to excite the Bedouin tribes against England by representing her as the enemy of Islam, and that 30,000 men belonging to these tribes were ready to rise. A supplementary report states that the instigators of this movement are Muntaz Bey, an officer of the army, Essad Shoucair, deputy or former deputy, and a certain Beheddine Bey, aided by several other persons, and with the support of the local, civil, and military authorities. The report adds categorically that, according to current rumour, these tribes were to arm immediately in order to march on Egypt.

From a further report dated the 18th instant, it appears that a military movement from Damascus towards the south was ex-

septembre; que les troupes de Mosul étaient en route pour Damas; que l'on préparait de grandes provisions de vivres; que l'on avait assemblé 3,000 chameaux à Maan; et que deux officiers d'état-major étaient rentrés d'Akaba après avoir étudié la possibilité d'un mouvement à travers le désert. Ce rapport se complète par un autre de la même date portant que l'on projetait d'envoyer un grand nombre d'hommes de Homs à Damas par chemin de fer, entre le 20 et le 23 septembre, et que l'on s'attendait à une grande concentration vers le sud. D'un troisième rapport reçu postérieurement il résulte qu'encore 5,000 chameaux avaient été réquisitionnés à Maan; que tout le matériel roulant de la partie sud du Chemin de Fer du Hedjaz se trouvait concentré à Deraa; et que les troupes de Mosul étaient parvenues à Tel-Abiad près d'Alep.

Un rapport en date du 21 courant déclare qu'il y avait une accumulation d'indices établissant presque la certitude qu'une attaque contre l'Égypte sur une grande échelle aurait lieu dans un avenir très proche; que les troupes marcheraient des deux côtés, par Akaba et par El-Ariche; et que l'on préparait une grande quantité de choses nécessaire pour leur transport à travers le désert. Un autre rapport

pected about the 20th September; that the Mosul troops were on their way to Damascus; that large stores of food-stuffs were being prepared; that 3,000 camels had been collected at Maan; and that two staff officers had returned from Akaba after studying the posibility of a movement across the desert. This report was supplemented by another of the same date to the effect that it was intended to send a large number of men from Homs to Damascus by rail, between the 20th and 23rd of September, and that a great concentration converging towards the south was expected. From a third report, which was received subsequently, it appears that another 5,000 camels had been requisitioned at Maan; that all the rolling-stock of the southern section of the Hedjaz Railway was being concentrated at Deraa; and that the Mosul troops had reached Tel-Abiad, near Aleppo.

A report, dated the 21st instant, stated that there was cumulative evidence to show almost certainly that an attack against Egypt on a large scale would take place in the very near future; that the troops would advance on both sides by way of Akaba and by way of El Arish; and that a large provision of things necessary for their transport across the desert was being prepared. A further report of

de la même date porte que des chameaux et des hommes sont arrivés de Homs à Damas; que l'on s'attendait à l'arrivée de trente bataillons au courant de la semaine; que le chef d'état-major de Damas s'était rendu à Maan; et que des chefs des tribus bédouines étaient partis pour le sud après avoir conféré avec le Vali.

Constantinople,
le 23 septembre, 1914.

the same date stated that camels and men had arrived at Damascus from Homs; that thirty battalions were expected to arrive during the week; that the chief staff officer from Damascus had proceeded to Maan; and that the chiefs of the Bedouin tribes had left for the south after a conference with the Vali.

Constantinople,
September 23, 1914.

ENCLOSURE 2 in No. 143.

Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.

YOUR HIGHNESS, *Constantinople, October* 2, 1914.

In my communication of the 23rd September and subsequent letters of the 25th and 26th, various military and other preparations in Syria, initiated by the Ottoman Government, were brought to the notice of your Highness, as likely to cause apprehension to His Majesty's Government.

1. To the representations made in these communications, no written reply has yet been received, and it appears that not only has the verification of the details already given been confirmed, but further news of a disquieting nature has now arrived. For instance, the transport of food-stuffs, military stores, and material of war to Maan continues. As this place is in no wise a Turkish military centre in peace, and has no connexion with a mobilisation of the Syrian divisions in their ordinary stations, but is, on the other hand, in proximity to the Egyptian frontier, His Majesty's Government would desire to be informed why it is considered necessary to make the preparations in question, which are evidently for the maintenance of a considerable body of troops, or for their transit further in the direction of Akaba.

2. Similar preparations are also apparently being made on the road Jenim-Nablus-Jerusalem, and the collection of a camel corps at the latter place was announced yesterday. These measures tend to

show a projected concentration of troops on the limits of Syria to the west, and again in proximity to the Egyptian frontier.

3. The above steps have latterly coincided with the sudden arrival of Colonel Kress von Kressenstein and six other German officers, with the result that it is openly rumoured in Syria that the Jerusalem division is preparing to move towards Rafa and that of Damascus towards Akaba.

4. From Beirout arrive reports that the inhabitants are retiring inland, and from Haiffa that the customs and railway staff have also been transferred from the coast. These measures are stated to be taken as precautionary steps against the hostile action of the British fleet, which is expected to ensue on the movement of Turkish forces against Egypt.

5. In view of all these circumstances, it is undoubtedly the case that it is fully believed in Syria that an offensive movement against Egypt is contemplated by the Ottoman authorities, and, although His Majesty's Government do not necessarily share this view, they cannot but regard any continuance of the military movement in anything but the most serious light.

6. Apart from recognised military measures, the movements of a German engineer belonging to the Bagdad Railway with a large consignment of explosives destined for an attempt on the Suez Canal has already been brought to your Highness's notice in my letter of the 25th ultimo.

Not only have the movements of this individual been confirmed, but the departure of a German naval officer named Hilgendorff is now also announced with the same purpose. This individual has left Petra with a party of eight Germans, ostensibly on a shooting expedition, but with a large amount of stores, including explosives, and intending to meet another similar party journeying viâ Haiffa-Amman.

As both these parties are acting from neutral territory with the avowed intention of committing acts hostile to Great Britain, it is incumbent on the Porte to secure their apprehension, coupled with an assurance that all necessary steps will be taken to put an end to any enterprises of this nature.

I have been repeatedly assured by your Highness and by other members of the Ottoman Government that Turkey is firmly determined to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality during the European war. To these assurances I have been unfortunately obliged to reply that the Ottoman Government have failed in several most

essential particulars to maintain their neutrality, and I would now desire to point out, with all the emphasis at my command, that, if these preparations continue, only one conclusion can be deduced—namely, that the Ottoman Government are taking preliminary steps to send an expedition against Egypt and that they are conniving at the preparation of a plot against the Suez Canal on the part of German subjects, who are either in the Ottoman service or are acting independently.

I cannot too earnestly impress upon your Highness the absolute necessity of putting an end to this situation of uncertainty at the earliest moment possible, in order that those relations of confidence and sincerity may be restored between the two Governments which it has constantly been my object to foster.

I avail, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

No. 144.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 19.)

SIR, *Constantinople, October* 6, 1914.

I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a note which I have addressed to the Grand Vizier referring to the circular note * enclosed in my immediately succeeding despatch, recently received from the Sublime Porte, defining the rules which they propose to apply during the war in order to defend their neutrality, expressing my satisfaction that they should have adopted views in regard to the use of wireless in neutral waters, by belligerent merchantmen, identical with those of His Majesty's Government, and enquiring when they propose to dismantle the wireless apparatus on the "Corcovado."

I have, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

* See Enclosure in No. 145.

ENCLOSURE in No. 144.

Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.

YOUR HIGHNESS, *Constantinople, October* 2, 1914.

I have received a *note verbale* from the Sublime Porte dated the 28th ultimo defining the rules which the Government of your Highness propose to apply during the present war in order to secure respect for their neutrality and to enable them to perform what they recognise to be their duty as neutrals.

I propose to reply to this circular in detail, but in the meantime I desire at once to express my satisfaction that the Imperial Government should have adopted views which, in so far as the installation of wireless stations on land and the use of wireless apparatus by belligerent merchantmen in neutral ports and waters are concerned, are identical with those of His Majesty's Government.

I have had the honour to discuss this question on frequent occasions with your Highness during the last few weeks, in special reference to the notorious case of the German vessel "Corcovado," amongst others.

The "Corcovado" has since the beginning of the war lain at Beicos, almost opposite to the British Embassy, and has, in gross violation of the laws of neutrality, which should have been enforced by the Ottoman Government, regularly received and transmitted, and still, so far as I am aware, continues to receive and transmit, wireless messages in such a way as to serve as a base of radio-telegraphic communication for the general purposes of the German Government.

In deference to the wishes of your Highness, I have hitherto confined my remonstrances to verbal representations, but in view of the circular note now received from the Sublime Porte defining the attitude of the Government of your Highness in regard to the question, I feel at liberty to address to your Highness a formal note asking, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that the Ottoman regulations may be applied without further delay to the "Corcovado" and other vessels which still fly the German flag, or which flew it at the beginning of the present war, and that their wireless installations may be at once dismantled.

I feel convinced that your Highness will see the justice and the propriety of this step.

I avail, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 145.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 19.)

SIR, *Constantinople, October* 6, 1914.

I have the honour to forward herewith copies of notes from and to the Sublime Porte on the subject of the Turkish regulations for belligerent warships in Turkish territorial waters.

I have, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE 1 in No. 145.

Note verbale communicated by Sublime Porte.

Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, en vue d'observer ses devoirs de neutralité pendant toute la durée des hostilités, porte les dispositions qui suivent à la connaissance de l'Ambassade d'Angleterre:—

1. L'entrée dans les ports, rades et eaux territoriales ottomans est interdite aux navires de guerre des Puissances belligérantes, sauf pour cause d'avarie, ou à raison de l'état de mer. Dans ces cas, ils ne devront résider que le strict temps matériel nécessaire pour réparer lesdites avaries, ou pour attendre que l'état de la mer soit amélioré.

2. Tout navire belligérant qui demanderait à entrer dans un port ou dans une rade ottomans pour cause de ravitaillement en

(Translation.)

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, with a view to the observance of their duties of neutrality throughout the hostilities, brings the following regulations to the notice of the British Embassy:—

1. Entry to Turkish ports, roadsteads, and territorial waters, is forbidden to warships belonging to belligerent Powers, except in the case of damage, or by reason of the state of the sea. In these cases they may only remain strictly the length of time actually necessary for the repair of the said damage, or to wait until the state of the sea has improved.

2. Every belligerent vessel, which shall ask permission to enter a Turkish port or roadstead for purposes of refuelling or re-

combustible ou approvisionnement, pourra y être autorisé à la condition d'en obtenir l'autorisation de l'autorité Impériale locale, après avoir établi les motifs de son arrivée; de ne résider plus de vingt-quatre heures dans lesdits port ou rade et de n'être à la fois pas plus de trois unités du même pavillon dans le même port ou rade.

3. Les ports de Smyrne et de Beyrouth sont interdits auxdits navires, ainsi que les eaux intérieures dont l'accès est barré soit par des mines sous-marines, soit par d'autres moyens de défense.

4. Si le navire de guerre ne quitte pas les eaux ottomanes à l'expiration des délais prévus plus haut, le Gouvernement Impérial prendra les mesures qu'il jugera nécessaires pour rendre le navire incapable de prendre la mer pendant la durée de la guerre.

5. Les bâtiments de guerre sont tenus de respecter les droits souverains de l'Empire ottoman, de s'abstenir de tous actes contraires à sa neutralité, de ne point se livrer dans les eaux territoriales ottomanes à des actes d'hostilité, y compris la capture et le droit de visit.

6. Si des navires de guerre belligérants ennemis se trouvent simultanément dans le même port ou rade ottoman, il doit s'écouler

victualling, may be authorised to do so, on condition that the authorisation of the local Turkish authority is obtained, after having declared the reasons for her arrival; that she does not remain more than twenty-four hours in the said port or roadstead; and that there be not more than three vessels under the same flag simultaneously in the same port or roadstead.

3. The ports of Smyrna and Beirout are prohibited to the said ships, as are the inland waters, access to which is barred either by submarine mines or by other defensive means.

4. If the warship does not leave Turkish waters within the period provided for above, the Turkish Government will take such steps as they may deem necessary to render the vessel incapable of putting to sea during the war.

5. Warships are expected to respect the sovereign rights of the Turkish Empire, to refrain from all acts prejudicial to Turkish neutrality, and not to commit any hostile acts in Turkish territorial waters, including capture and the right of search.

6. If enemy belligerent warships happen to be simultaneously in the same Turkish port or roadstead, at least twenty-four

au moins 24 houres entre le départ du navire d'un belligérant et celui du navire de l'autre belligérant ennemi, l'ordre de départ étant déterminé par celui des arrivées, à moins que le bâtiment arrivé le premier ne soit oblige de rester en raison des causes prévues plus haut sur No. 1. De même un bâtiment de guerre belligérant ne peut quitter un des ports ou rades ottomans que 24 heures après le départ d'un navire de commerce sous pavillon de son adversaire.

7. Dans les ports et rades ottomans non interdits les bâtiments de guerre des belligérants ne pourront réparer leurs avaries que dans la mesure indispensable à la sécurité de la navigation et ne pourront accroître, d'une manière quelconque, leur force militaire. Les autorités Impériales ottomanes constateront la nature des réparations à faire; elles devront ête exécutées le plus rapidement possible.

8. Lesdits bâtiments ne pourront s'y ravitailler que pour compléter leur approvisionnement normal du temps de paix. Toutefois, étant données les circonstances exceptionnelles de la guerre actuelle, les autorités Impériales pourront réduire cet approvisionnement, suivant les nécessités des lieux, au stricte nécessaire pur suffire à se rendre dans un port étranger neutre le plus proche une première fois, et re-

hours must elapse between the departure of one belligerent warship and that of the other enemy belligerent warship, the order of departure being decided by that of arrival, unless the vessel which arrived first be obliged to remain for reasons foreseen above in No. 1. Similarly a belligerent warship may only leave a Turkish port or roadstead twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant vessel under an enemy flag.

7. In non-prohibited Turkish ports and roadsteads belligerent warships may only repair their damages to such an extent as is consonant with the safety of navigation, and may not increase their military strength in any manner whatsoever. The Turkish authorities will verify the nature of the repairs to be made; these must be carried out as quickly as possible.

8. The said vessels may only revictual up to their normal supply in peace time. Nevertheless, in the exceptional circumstances of the present war, the Turkish authorities may, in the first instance, reduce this supply according to the requirements of the districts, to what is strictly necessary to reach the nearest neutral foreign port, and may refuse all supplies in the case of a second return

fuser tout approvisionnement en cas de retour une seconde fois de bâtiments d'une même nation belligérante.

9. Ces navires ne peuvent prendre de combustible que pour gagner le port le plus proche de leur propre pays, ou de celui dont l'administration est confiée à leur Gouvernement, ou du pays allié, au choix de l'autorité Impériale locale. Les restrictions précédentes concernant les approvisionnements seront applicables au combustible.

10. Les règlements sanitaires, de pilotage, de douane, de port et des phares ottomans devront être observés et respectés par les bâtiments de guerre des belligérants.

11. Est défendu d'amener des prises dans un des ports ou rades ottomans (non interdits) sauf pour cause d'innavigabilité, de mauvais état de mer, de manque de combustible ou de provisions, auquel cas, autorisation devra être demandée aux autorités Impériales locales; celles-ci l'accorderont après constatation de la cause précitée. La prise devra repartir aussitôt que ladite cause aura cessé; l'approvisionnement en combustible et en provision se fera dans les conditions prévues pour les navires de guerre.

Aucun tribunal des prises ne peut être constitué par un belligérant ni sur le sol de l'Empire ni sur un navire dans ses eaux territoriales.

by vessels of a like belligerent nation.

9. Such vessels may only take in sufficient fuel to reach the nearest harbour in their own country, or of a country the administration of which is entrusted to their Government, or of an allied country, at the discretion of the local Turkish authority. The preceding restrictions concerning supplies will be applicable to fuel.

10. The Turkish sanitary, pilotage, customs, port and lighthouse regulations must be observed and respected by belligerent warships.

11. It is forbidden to bring prizes into any of the (non-prohibited) Turkish ports or roadsteads, save in the case of impossibility of navigation, of roughness of the sea, lack of fuel or provisions, in which case permission must be asked from the local Turkish authorities; the latter will grant it after verification of the aforesaid cause. The prize shall be required to leave as soon as the said cause shall have ceased to exist; the taking in of fuel and provisions shall be carried out in accordance with the conditions laid down for warships.

No Prize Court may be established by a belligerent either on Turkish territory or on a vessel in Turkish territorial waters.

12. Est interdit aux belligérants de faire des ports et eaux ottomans la base d'opérations navales contre leurs adversaires; d'installer sur le sol et dans les eaux territoriales des stations radio-télégraphiques ou tout appareil destiné à servir comme moyen de communication avec les forces belligérantes sur terre ou sur mer; d'établir des dépôts de combustible soit sur le sol ottoman, soit sur des navires stationnés dans ses eaux territoriales.

13. Les dispositions qui précédent ne dérogent en rien au régime des Détroits, qui reste le même, tel qu'il est établi par les traités internationaux.

14. Le droit international général est applicable dans toutes les questions non prévues par les dispositions qui précèdent.

Constantinople,
le 28 *septembre,* 1914.

12. Belligerents are forbidden to make Turkish harbours and roadsteads a base for naval operations against their adversaries; to erect on land or in territorial waters any wireless telegraphy station or installation destined to serve as a means of communication with belligerent forces by land or sea; to establish depôts of fuel either on Turkish territory or on ships stationed in Turkish territorial waters.

13. The above provisions in no way supersede the regulations governing the Straits, which remain as established by international treaty.

14. General international law is applicable in all questions not provided for in the above regulations.

Constantinople,
September 28, 1914.

ENCLOSURE 2 in No. 145.

Note verbale communicated to Sublime Porte.

His Britannic Majesty's Embassy is in receipt of the *note verbale* of the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 28th September, in which are set forth at length the rules laid down by the Imperial Ottoman Government with a view to securing proper respect for their neutrality during the present hostilities in Europe.

In the preamble to this *note verbale* the Imperial Ministry states that the rules contained in it have been adopted in order to enable the Imperial Government to discharge their duties as neutrals. The rules themselves indicate a conception of those duties closely in accord

with the general principles held by His Majesty's Government. It is all the more, therefore, a matter of surprise to His Majesty's Embassy that the practice of the Ottoman Government should have hitherto been so entirely at variance with these principles.

Rule 1 prohibits the entrance into Ottoman ports of belligerent warships, except in case of damage or on account of the state of the sea, and requires their departure as soon as circumstances permit.

Rule 2 prescribes that no belligerent warship, even though authorised for special reasons to enter an Ottoman harbour, shall remain more than twenty-four hours. These rules were not applied by the Imperial Ottoman Government when they allowed the German warships "Goeben" and "Breslau" to enter the Dardanelles and to remain in Turkish waters for an indefinite period, on the pretext that a sale, as to the genuineness of which no evidence exists, had taken place.

Neither did the Imperial Ottoman Government apply to these ships the provisions of Rule 4, which requires that vessels which have exceeded a visit of twenty-four hours should be incapacitated from taking part in any hostilities during the war, as both these vessels, which remain under German control, are notoriously in a state of complete preparation to proceed to sea.

Rule 5, which prohibits the performance of acts prejudicial to Ottoman neutrality, including acts of capture and search, was violated in a flagrant manner by the "Breslau," when it visited and searched British ships in the Dardanelles shortly after its arrival in those waters. The Imperial Government have never demanded any public satisfaction from the Government whose ship committed this indefensible outrage on their neutrality. By thus condoning the act of the "Breslau," the Imperial Government failed signally in their own duties as a neutral.

The Imperial Ottoman Government have not applied the provisions of Rule 7, prohibiting foreign war vessels from increasing their military value in an Ottoman port, where they are only permitted to make such repairs as their own security demands and within the shortest possible period of time, nor the provisions of Rule 8, regarding the prohibition of all revictualling, &c., of belligerent warships returning a second time to the same Ottoman port. The "Goeben" and the "Breslau" remaining, as has been said above, under German control, have been repaired under the auspices of the official representatives of the German Government, have put to sea under German command, and have been revictualled at German expense on returning from the various cruises in the Black Sea. By tolerating these

violations of their own rules, the Turkish Government have again failed in their duty as neutrals.

The Imperial Ottoman Government have further neglected the obligation to prevent foreign warships from making an Ottoman port a base of naval operations against their enemies; for installing wireless stations on land or in territorial waters, to serve as a means of communication with the belligerent forces on land or sea, obligations which are clearly recognised by the adoption of Rule 12. The flagrant violation of this rule by ships like the "General," the "Lily Rickmers," and the "Corcovado," has not been checked by the Imperial Government. They have, indeed, departed from their duty as neutrals, not merely by tolerating the proceedings of those ships, but they have in some cases facilitated them by allowing German ships to fly the Ottoman flag, as a result of illegal and fictitious transfers. The special case of the "Corcovado" has formed the subject of a separate communication, to which His Majesty's Embassy trusts that an early reply will be returned.

Finally, Rule 13, which states that the status of the Straits is unaffected by the measures taken by the Imperial Government, has been violated by the Ottoman authorities themselves, who, in violation of a series of international acts, have interfered with the free passage of the Dardanelles by British merchant vessels.

In the presence of the facts set forth above, it is impossible for the Imperial Ottoman Government to maintain that they have hitherto observed that duty as neutrals, the performance of which the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs declares them to have had in view when drawing up the rules embodied in its circular note of the 28th September. If, after consecrating their recognition of these duties by an official communication, the Imperial Government should continue to tolerate the use of its territory by German ships and agents for purposes connected with the war, His Majesty's Embassy will feel itself constrained to protest with renewed vigour against what it cannot but consider a partial and unneutral attitude on the part of the Imperial Ottoman Government, and must reserve to His Majesty's Government complete liberty of action. If, on the other hand, the object of the communication is to prove that the Imperial Government are prepared to embark on a new line of action, His Britannic Majesty's Embassy will have the utmost satisfaction in taking act of an assurance in that sense and bringing it to the knowledge of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

Constantinople, October 4, 1914.

No. 146.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 19.)

SIR, *Constantinople, October* 6, 1914.

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note I have addressed to the Grand Vizier on the subject of the measures the Porte propose to take against British warships in the Shatt-el-Arab, expressing the hope that no action be taken which might have serious consequences.

I have, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE in No. 146.

Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.

YOUR HIGHNESS, *Constantinople, October* 4, 1914.

I have just received a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Basra stating that the Vali has written to him saying that the Porte have communicated to me the measures which they propose to take against a British man-of-war which is in the Shatt-el-Arab unless it leaves within twenty-four hours, and that the Shatt-el-Arab from Fao to Gurna is inland water, like the Dardanelles, and closed to foreign warships.

I am instructed by His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to enquire on what grounds the Sublime Porte base their objection to His Majesty's ship remaining in Mohammerah, a Persian port?

In the meantime I would express the hope that your Highness will instruct the Vali without loss of time to avoid taking any measures against a British man-of-war which might have serious consequences at this critical period.

As a matter of fact, H.M.S. "Odin" left the Shatt-el-Arab some days ago, and I am not aware what British ship has taken her place.

I avail, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

No. 147.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

SIR, *Constantinople, October 6, 1914.*

I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a note addressed by me to the Imperial Ottoman Government on the 5th instant with regard to the hostile attitude of the Ottoman press towards Great Britain and British interests.

I also enclose copy of a letter I addressed to Talaat Bey on the previous day on the same subject.

I have, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE 1 in No. 147.

Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.

YOUR HIGHNESS, *Constantinople, October 5, 1914.*

I have on several occasions complained to your Highness of the hostile tone of the Ottoman press towards Great Britain and British interests, and I have frequently represented to your Highness and to the Minister of the Interior the unfavourable impression which His Majesty's Government will derive of the sentiments of the Ottoman Government from the deliberate misrepresentations and the malicious accusations of the organs of public opinion.

Your Highness has assured me from time to time of your regret that the press should display so hostile a spirit towards my country and to the cause for which we have taken up arms, and owing to your Highness's intervention I most willingly admit that there have been short periods during which it has displayed a greater moderation in the volume and frequency of its abuse. Your Highness has also begged me not to attach too great an importance to the newspapers, which you have assured me do not influence public opinion to any appreciable extent, and are not therefore deserving of serious attention.

In ordinary circumstances I should have been in agreement with your Highness, except in regard to the extent of the harm done by

these irresponsible writers, a matter of which I am incompetent to judge, but it must be remembered that the Ottoman Empire is now living under martial law, and that vigorous press censorship is enforced—apparently in the interests of Germany—which has rendered the publication of news from British sources difficult, and the public expression of opinion favourable to England impossible both at Constantinople and in the provinces.

The press articles of which I complain are, therefore, authorised and approved by the press censor, or in other words by the Ottoman Government, whose views they must be held to represent.

This state of affairs is the more grave, as one of the main objects which certain newspapers have had in view, has been to misinform public opinion in this country as to the true character of British rule in India and British control in Egypt, and as to the attitude of the populations of those countries towards Great Britain.

It is, however, difficult to reconcile these hostile utterances with those of your Highness, who has always assured me of the friendly sentiments of the Ottoman Government towards Great Britain, and of their desire and intention to maintain good relations with His Majesty's Government.

In these circumstances, I am at a loss to know what I should report to my Government, who will doubtless desire to know why the Ottoman Government permit the publication of inflammatory articles against Great Britain if their sentiments are well-intentioned. I would call your Highness's special attention to two articles which have appeared in the "Terdjuman-i-Hakkikat" of the 16th (29th) September and the 19th September (2nd October). The first of these articles gives an entirely untrue account of the action of the British fleet outside the Dardanelles, which it accuses of preventing merchandise from coming into the port. The object of these accusations is to mislead public opinion with regard to the intentions of Great Britain, and to hide the real reason for the presence of the British fleet, which, as is well known to your Highness, is the retention of the German officers and crews.

The second article which I enclose * not only misrepresents the motives which induced my Government to embark on the present war, but characterises England as the enemy of small nations, declares that she wishes to drive the Moslem Powers into a holy war against Germany, and traduces the character of British control in Egypt. Both articles are only examples of the innumerable utterances of a

* Not printed.

similar kind in which the "Terdjuman-i-Hakkikat" and other papers indulge. I will not weary your Highness with other specimens in Turkish, but to prove how varied are the attacks made on my country and my Government with the express sanction of the authorities responsible for the press, I enclose a copy * of a paper called the "Défense nationale," a French organ which is specially distinguished for its virulent and calumnious attacks on Great Britain, and which, while purporting to represent authorised military opinion, is in reality, as your Highness is doubtless aware, produced by a person of non-Ottoman and non-Moslem origin and of most disreputable antecedents.

I venture to beg your Highness, who has laboured unceasingly and devotedly in the interests of peace, to give instructions to the responsible authorities not to allow the publication in future of articles so totally at variance with what your Highness has repeatedly declared to be the policy of the Imperial Government. I would at the same time beg of your Highness to secure publicity for the enclosed statement which I have prepared, the object of which is, as your Highness will see, to correct one of the most specific calumnies recently published.

I avail, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE 2 in No. 147.

Statement.

The statement made in the "Terdjuman-i-Hakkikat" of the 16th (29th) September that the British and French fleet outside the Dardanelles have prevented the importation of merchandise into the port of Constantinople is an entire misrepresentation. The allied fleet has never in a single instance interfered with the export or import trade of this country.

The retention of the allied fleets in the neighbourhood of the entrances to the Straits is solely due to the continued presence of the German admiral, officers, and crews on the warships recently sold to Turkey, and to the officering of the rest of the Turkish fleet by Germans.

* Not printed.

ENCLOSURE 3 in No. 147.

Sir L. Mallet to Talaat Bey.

Constantinople,
le 4 octobre, 1914.

Mon cher Ministre,

Sauriez-vous m'expliquer pourquoi la censure a supprimé une partie importante du discours prononcé dernièrement par l'Agha Khan?

Je vous transmets une copie * du discours sur lequel est marqué la partie supprimée. Voudriez-vous le faire imprimer dans les journaux ottomans? Il n'est que juste qu'on publie dans un pays neutre toutes les opinions.

Je vous signale aussi un article qui a paru dans le "Terdjuman-i-Hakkikat" du 2 octobre, qui est mensonger et plein de malveillance pour la Grande-Bretagne.

Puisque la presse est censurée, je ne puis qu'en conclure que les sentiments d'Agha-olu Ahmed sont approuvés ou inspirés par le Gouvernement. Dans tous les cas, le Gouvernement est responsable tant que la censure existe. Dans les circonstances, à qui dois-je croire? Car le Gouvernement parle avec deux voix différentes, mais toutes deux officielles.

Bien sincèrement à vous,

LOUIS MALLET.

(Translation.)

Constantinople,
October 4, 1914.

My dear Minister,

Can you explain to me why the censor suppressed an important part of the speech recently made by the Agha Khan?

I enclose a copy * of the speech, showing the part that was suppressed. Would you please have it printed in the Turkish press? It is only right that every opinion should be published in a neutral country.

I would also draw your attention to an article which appeared in the "Terdjuman-i-Hakkikat" of the 2nd October, which is untrue and full of malevolence towards Great Britain.

As the press is censored, I can only conclude that the sentiments of Agha-olu Ahmed are approved or inspired by the Government. In any case, so long as the censorship exists the Government are clearly responsible. In the circumstances, whom can we believe? For the Government speak with two conflicting voices, both of which are none the less official.

LOUIS MALLET.

* Not printed.

No. 148.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 19, 1914.

New Governor-General of Basra with six army officers, including two German officers, also six naval officers, including two Germans, and 150 Turkish sailors with three columns of ammunition, arrived at Alexandretta on morning of 18th October by railway from Constantinople. Their final destination is believed to be Basra. I am also informed that Maan is their true destination.

No. 149.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 19, 1914.

Within last few days following have passed through Adana in direction of Syria: 450 gendarmes with 600 sailors, of whom 200 were German, 52 German naval and military officers, a commandant of police, 45 civilian officials, of whom two were German, 10 engines, and 3 or 4 automobiles, said to contain German officers.

No. 150.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October* 19, 1914.

I am informed that Bimbashi Gamil, staff officer in Turkish army, Khoga (Imam) Ali Haider, Khoga (Imam) Amin, and Khoga (Imam) Rustom, have left Smyrna in order to carry on a Turcophile propaganda in India.

No. 151.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 20.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 19, 1914.

It is pretty clear that naval parties are on their way both to Akaba and the Persian Gulf, as well as smaller groups to Syrian coast ports. There are plenty of German reserve mercantile marine officers available, in addition to "Goeben" and "Breslau" officers and others who have subsequently arrived. Although there is at present no actual confirmation of arrival in Constantinople of Austrian officers and sailors, this is regarded as also possible.

It is very likely now that consignment of mines has actually got as far as Maan.

At Akaba it is not impossible that floating mines may be let loose penetrating into the Red Sea; in Persian Gulf defence of waterway will no doubt be prepared.

Consul at Damascus reports that fifty Germans arrived at Akaba quite recently. These are believed to be wounded from East Africa.

No. 152.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 21, 1914.

Battery of six guns which left Constantinople on 11th instant, and which I think were heavy guns, have, together with aeroplane, arrived at Alexandretta and left for the south.

Since 18th October there have been no movements of troops to or from Damascus. Some trucks of ammunition went round by rail to Nablus Sidi, and cases of rifles arrived from Aleppo.

No. 153.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 21, 1914.

It should not be forgotten that one of the elements in the situation that cannot be overlooked is possibility of *coup d'État* by Minister of War, supported by Germans.

No. 154.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 22, 1914.

A manifesto, the authorship of which is attributed to Sheikh Aziz Shawish, is being secretly circulated at Beirout. Manifesto bears alleged signatures of ten representatives of Moslem countries under foreign rule. It incites Moslem soldiers to mutiny in their respective countries in defence of Islam, and bids them desert the allies and join Germany. Whole tenour is fanatical and inflammatory.

No. 155.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 22, 1914.

My immediately preceding telegram.

I understand that several thousand copies of manifesto are to be smuggled into Egypt and India and other Moslem countries through Syria.

No. 156.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 22, 1914.

German officers now on frontier seem bent on forcing matters. General Officer Commanding Egypt anticipates Arab raid at any moment at their instigation.

No. 157.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 22, 1914.

I have seen the Russian Ambassador again this morning. He is sure that unless Turks mean to betray Germans, the possibility of which he does not exclude, they will make war on Russia on receipt of first half of a sum of 4,000,000*l.* which Germany is providing.

It is currently reported about 1,000,000*l.* has already arrived.

Russian successes on Vistula will spur on Germans to further efforts here, but it is difficult to say whether it will increase or diminish chance of Turkish participation in the war.

Virulent attacks and propaganda against Great Britain seem to show Government are anxious to justify themselves in public estimation if war breaks out, and it may indicate that they mean to provoke war themselves, as they are aware that we shall not do so.

No. 158.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 22, 1914.

One of objects of press campaign here now is to prove that Great Britain is aiming deliberate blows at Islam, as such, and a statement is being circulated here that British Government are preventing pilgrimages from Egypt this year. One form of this statement

is that a Fetva has been issued prescribing that as Egyptian Government cannot protect pilgrims there shall be no pilgrimage. It is insinuated that this Fetva has been extorted by British.

No. 159.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 23, 1914.

Mining of the Shatt-el-Arab.

Your telegram of 17th October.*

The ancient right of free navigation of the river was solemnly affirmed as late as 29th July 1913, in Article 1 of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement signed on that day. It is a right which His Majesty's Government cannot allow to be nullified by the mining of the channel. They will be forced to regard any attempt to lay mines in the river as an act of open hostility and provocation to this country, and they must reserve to themselves the right of taking their own measures, if necessary, to maintain the freedom of navigation.

You should make a representation in these terms to the Turkish Government, and add a firm protest against the apparent intention of blocking the international waterway of the Shatt-el-Arab, which offers the only means of access to the port of Mohammerah and the neighbouring Persian littoral.

No. 160.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Cheetham.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 23, 1914.

I hear that Turkish Minister at Sophia has left his post for Germany. Reported object is to arrange with German Government for stirring up of Moslem fanaticism in India, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis.

* See No. 135.

No. 161.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 23, 1914.

Twenty projectors, 10 electric mines, 4 electric motors, 500 cases of Mauser ammunition have arrived viâ Rustchuk, in addition to arrivals already reported previously.

No. 162.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 23, 1914.

Very large quantities of bar gold have recently arrived. Nearly a million's worth was taken to Deutsche Bank three nights ago under escort, and there is information that previous consignments have been similarly conveyed. It is probable that between two and three millions have arrived altogether.

No. 163.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 23, 1914.

German named Kellerman has just left Aleppo for Haiffa or the south. 2,000 camels, 1,500 water-skins, 400 bicycles, all canvas and canvas bags, together with food-stuffs, are being requisitioned in Aleppo.

Information goes to show that an Arab raid has been possible during last few weeks, and contingency has certainly to be watched.

No. 164.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 23, 1914.

Last night Minister of Marine sent me message to say that neutrality would be maintained by Turkish Government. He gave same assurances in categorical terms yesterday to French Ambassador, and said that Minister of Interior's views were the same. Ambassador said that it was reported that an agreement existed with Germany to go to war on certain terms being fulfilled. Minister of Marine denied this absolutely, and also declared that Turkey was not going to war. My French colleague then enquired what was meaning of preparations in Syria and of all the violent talk about Egypt. Minister of Marine replied that England was treating Egypt as if it belonged to her, whereas it formed part of Ottoman dominions. Turks were indifferent about India, Tripoli, and Tunis, &c., but Egypt was on their frontier, and they felt about it as French did about Alsace-Lorraine. They would do nothing officially, but would shut their eyes to any agitation which was directed against English occupation of Egypt. Continuing, he referred to a proposal which he had made me a fortnight ago, to the effect that England and Turkey should now sign convention on lines of Drummond-Wolff Convention, providing for evacuation of Egypt by British troops at end of war. It is quite true he made this suggestion. I did not report it at the time because it was so entirely unpractical. This shows that Germans are turning all their attention to Egypt, and are inciting the Turks against us, so that we must expect to have a considerable amount of trouble on frontier.

Turkish newspapers are full of Egypt just now and of our high-handed proceedings. It is, *e.g.*, announced to-day that we have closed El Azhar mosque. There is no doubt that Germans are at bottom of this, and are inciting religious fanaticism of Turks against us.

No. 165.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 23, 1914.

United efforts of Germans and Ottoman Government at Haiffa are being concentrated on arousing anti-English feeling amongst the Moslems; German consul is touring the district with this view. The worst offender is the Ottoman Telegraph Agency. Yesterday, for example, it announced that the Ameer of Afghanistan will start a Holy War, and that he is invading India.

No. 166.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 24, 1914.

Your telegram of 23rd October * gives the impression that Turkey considers sending an armed force over the frontier of Egypt as being in some way different from acts of war against Russia. You should disabuse the Turkish Government of any such idea, and inform them that a military violation of frontier of Egypt will place them in a state of war with three allied Powers.

I think you should enumerate to Grand Vizier the hostile acts of which we complain, and warn him that, if German influences succeed in pushing Turkey to cross the frontiers of Egypt and threaten the international Suez Canal, which we are bound to preserve, it will not be we, but Turkey, that will have aggressively disturbed the *status quo.*

The following is a convenient summary of Turkish acts of which we complain, and which, combined, produce a most unfavourable impression. You might send it to Grand Vizier:—

"The Mosul and Damascus Army Corps have, since their mobilisation, been constantly sending troops south preparatory to an invasion of Egypt and the Suez Canal from Akaba and Gaza. A large body of Bedouin Arabs has been called out and armed to assist in this

* See No. 164.

venture. Transport has been collected and roads have been prepared up to the frontier of Egypt. Mines have been despatched to be laid in the Gulf of Akaba to protect the force from naval attack, and the notorious Shiekh Aziz Shawish, who has been so well known as a firebrand in raising Moslem feeling against Christians, has published and disseminated through Syria, and probably India, an inflammatory document urging Mohammedans to fight against Great Britain. Dr. Prüfer, who was so long engaged in intrigues in Cairo against the British occupation, and is now attached to the German Embassy in Constantinople, has been busily occupied in Syria trying to incite the people to take part in this conflict."

No. 167.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 25, 1914.

Whole fleet has been at Kadikeui since 20th October.

"Breslau" took seventy mines on board yesterday, and had steam up in company of mine-layers "Nilufer" and "Samsun."

There is fairly sure evidence that no submarine has yet arrived in parts or otherwise.

No. 168.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, October* 26, 1914.

Forty-two Germans, disguised as tourists, are said to have arrived at Aleppo. They are members of General Staff and of crews of "Goeben" and "Breslau." It is believed that they have 150 mines with them. Some of the officers are bound for Bagdad and Basra. others for Beirout and Tripoli.

No. 169.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 27, 1914.

Enver Pasha, Jemal, and Talaat Bey are making every preparation for an expedition against Egypt, which is evidently now their uppermost thought. A majority of the Committee are, however, said to be against war, and are showing considerable opposition to the scheme. I am unable to vouch for this, but the news appears to be fairly well authenticated. Halill Bey started for Berlin this morning, and he is said to be about to negotiate with the German Government. It seems difficult to explain his journey on any other hypothesis than that the Turks wish to postpone any decisive action.

No. 170.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 27, 1914.

It is now clear that, with exception of Minister of War, Turkish Government are seeking to temporise.

I have reliable information that on the 22nd October Austrian Ambassador urged immediate war on Minister of Interior and Halill. Both these officials maintained that it would be wiser to wait until the situation in Egypt and Caucasus cleared before moving, and suggested it would be time enough to move in the spring. They were not sure that, if they went to war, Italy might not join the allies. Austrian Ambassador retorted that spring would be too late, and that it was essential to Germany and Austria that Turkey should declare herself with them at once. His Excellency was clearly greatly dissatisfied at their attitude.

Enver Pasha, on the other hand, whom Austrian Ambassador saw subsequently, said that he was determined to have war, whatever his colleagues might desire. Turkish fleet would be sent into Black Sea, and he could easily arrange with Admiral Suchon to provoke hostilities.

Fleet has, in point of fact, to-day gone into Black Sea, so it is impossible to foretell what is in store.

No. 171.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 28, 1914.

Porte regrets that owing to pressure of military requirements they are unable to accept wireless telegraphy messages sent from England for His Majesty's Embassy.

No. 172.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October* 28, 1914.

I have received reliable information that some German officers unsuccessfully endeavoured to persuade commandant of Turk post to attack our post at Kossaimo, and that, on making further efforts with this object, they were arrested and sent to Beersheba. If true, story shows desire of Germans to precipitate matters.

No. 173.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October* 28, 1914.

Two thousand armed Bedouins are advancing to attack the Canal, and have watered at Magdaba, which is 20 miles inside Egyptian frontier, 26th October.

No. 174.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 28, 1914.

It is reported that four Turkish gunboats are intending to proceed from Alexandretta.

You should warn Turkish Government that, as long as German officers remain on "Goeben" and "Breslau" and Turkish fleet is practically under German control, we must regard movement of Turkish ships as having a hostile intention, and, should Turkish gunboats proceed to sea, we must in self-defence stop them.

As soon as Turkish Government carry out their promise respecting German crews and officers and observe the laws of neutrality with regard to "Goeben" and "Breslau," and free the Turkish fleet from German control, we shall regard Turkish ships as neutrals, but, till then, we must protect ourselves against any movements that threaten us.

No. 175.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 28, 1914.

On 26th October a special train left Aleppo for Jerablus with two German and four Turkish naval officers and 100 Turkish sailors, with large quantities of ship's tackle and accessories.

No. 176.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 29, 1914.

I have seen the Grand Vizier and informed him that, in spite of his assurances, the Bedouins had crossed the frontier and were in occupation of wells of Magdaba, 20 miles within Egyptian territory. I reminded him of the warning which I had addressed to him on the receipt of instructions contained in your telegram of 24th October,* and asked him for explanation. His Highness replied that he had instructed Minister of War, after representations which I had made to him, on no account to allow movement of any force across the frontier. If it were true, he would give immediate orders for recall of Bedouins, but he did not believe accuracy of the information.

* See No. 166.

I replied that it was necessary at such a crisis that I should speak quite frankly, that it was a matter for public notoriety that there were divisions of opinion in the Cabinet, that his Highness was not master of the situation, and that, if Minister of War and extremists had decided upon an expedition against Egypt, his Highness could not prevent it. Grand Vizier replied that I was absolutely mistaken, and that, if it came to that, military party would not act without full assent of the Government. I said that in that case the time had come to put them to the test, and that unless expedition were immediately recalled, I could not answer for the consequences. As it was, I might at any moment receive instructions to ask for my passports, in which case Turkish Government would be at war with the Triple Entente at a time when German official communiqués admitted defeat on the Vistula.

No. 177.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, October* 29, 1914.

Russian gunboat at Odessa has been sunk, and Feodosia bombarded by Turkish fleet. Turkish officers who were sent on shore to demand surrender of Novorossiisk were arrested by prefect and ship left without taking further action.

Above information just communicated by Russian Government.

No. 178.

Mr. Roberts to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Odessa, October* 29, 1914.

Before dawn this morning two or three Turkish torpedo-boats raided Odessa harbour and sank Russian gunboat "Donetz." French ship "Portugal" damaged; two of the crew killed, two wounded. Russian steamships "Vitiaz" and "Liazaref" and "Whanpao" damaged. Some loss of life was caused in the town itself by shell fire.

No. 179.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1914.

In view of hostile acts that have been committed, Russian Government have instructed Russian Ambassador to leave Constantinople with all his staff.

Should his Excellency leave, you should yourself send in a note to the Sublime Porte to say that His Majesty's Government have learnt with the utmost surprise of the wanton attacks made upon open and undefended towns of a friendly country without any warning and without the slightest provocation, and that these acts constitute an unprecedented violation of the most ordinary rules of international law, usage, and comity. Russia has shown the utmost patience and forbearance in face of repeated violations of the rules of neutrality by Turkey, and in face of most provocative acts, amounting in reality to acts of hostility, and in this attitude of restraint her allies, Great Britain and France, have coöperated. It is evident that there is no chance of a return to a proper observance of neutrality so long as the German naval and military missions remain at Constantinople, and such a situation cannot be prolonged.

Unless, therefore, the Turkish Government will divest themselves of all responsibility for these unprovoked acts of hostility by dismissing the German military and naval missions, and fulfilling their often repeated promises about the German crews of the "Goeben" and "Breslau," and will give you a satisfactory reply to this effect within twelve hours from the date of the delivery of the note, you should ask for your passports and leave Constantinople with the staff of the embassy.

No. 180.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 30, 1914.

Russian Ambassador asked for his passports this afternoon and I and my French colleague have followed suit.

Minister of the Interior, in conversation with a neutral colleague

this afternoon, practically admitted that Turkey had thrown in her lot with Germany.

I have had a very painful interview with the Grand Vizier, who had been kept in the dark as to his colleagues' intentions, and who will doubtless be set aside to-night.

No. 181.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 2.)

SIR, *Cairo, October* 20, 1914.

With reference to my despatch of the 30th ultimo,* I have the honour to submit copies of further interrogatories of the German spy, Robert Mors.

I have, &c.
(For Mr. Cheetham),
ROBERT GREG.

ENCLOSURE in No. 181.

Further Interrogation of Lieutenant Mors.

Mulazim Awal Robert Mors, recalled and reëxamined, states:—

"I arrived in Constantinople on the evening of the 4th September, 1914, and put up at the Hotel Germania. I met M. Curt Prüfer there, and he introduced me to Omar Fauzi Bey, the Turkish staff officer who asked me to call upon him at the War Office. I did so on the 6th September. He questioned me on the state of Egypt and on the chances of success of a native rising in this country. He mentioned that the German diplomatic and consular officials had been expelled, and that all German subjects had been arrested and were to be deported. He also asked me if I knew M. Dusreicher, who, he declared, had also been sent out of the country. He stated likewise that he had heard that the Egyptian army and police had been disarmed, and asked me if it were true, to which I replied that I

* See No. 125.

thought it was very improbable. He then told me he had emissaries in Egypt fomenting trouble, to prepare the way for a Turkish invasion, and to compel the British to split up their forces. In reply to my enquiry, he explained that two bands of native marauders were to be organised in each Imdiria, to attack the railway, and commit outrages on the property of British subjects, &c. These bands were to be recruited from the malefactor class, and there would be a Turkish officer in every province to direct their operations. Each band would be composed of from ten to fifteen men, and when an important *coup* was contemplated in any Imdiria the two bands would unite, the idea being to oblige the British to scatter their forces all over the country. Fauzi Bey said he had a list of fifty Egyptian army and police officers, from whom he expected either active or passive assistance. Four strong bands of Bedouins were also being formed to operate in the Suez Canal zone, two east and two west. Each band was to be fifty strong. Fauzi Bey made a rough sketch of the Canal to explain to me the rôle of these Bedouins. He said the British had detached posts at intervals along the Canal. Two of the most isolated of these would be attacked simultaneously and, if possible, annihilated. The intermediate posts would then go to their assistance, whereupon the third and fourth troops of Bedouins would raid the weakened points and fire on the steamers in the Canal. The instructions given to the bands were to retire into the desert if the post attacked was strongly reinforced, and then to return and attack another post, &c.

"Fauzi Bey asked me if I would help to carry out these plans, and suggested that I should assist a Turkish officer who was already in Alexandria to carry out these *komitajis* operations in that district. If not, I could take part in some way in the military operations to be undertaken in Egypt. I replied that, as an officer, I could have nothing to do with the *komitajis* part of his programme, which, from a German point of view, was beneath the dignity of an officer, but that I was quite disposed to participate in military operations against Egypt on condition (1) I was granted the rank of officer in the Turkish army, (2) that the German Ambassador approved of my decision, and (3) that I was not required to start before my family arrived from Egypt. At this stage of our conversation a Bedawi sheikh arrived, and I rose to take my leave, but Fauzi Bey begged me to remain. The sheikh talked to Fauzi Bey on the Canal part of the programme, and I gathered from their remarks that it had already been discussed between them. I should mention that the sheikh on arriving asked the Bey if he could speak in my presence, to which

Fauzi assented. They then discussed plans for destroying the embankment between the fresh-water canal and the Suez Canal, in order to cut off the drinking water supply of Ismaïlia and Suez. I asked the sheikh how he proposed to divert the fresh-water canal into Suez Canal. He replied that with 200 men and sufficient dynamite he could do it in thirty-four hours. Fauzi Bey interposed that he could easily have 1,000 kilog. of dynamite if he required it. I asked the sheikh sarcastically if he meant to employ Bedouin or fellaheen on the job, to which he replied, somewhat nettled, that it did not matter which. The sheikh left us and Fauzi Bey, and I continued our conversation. I asked him how he was going to organise a revolution in Egypt without arms, and mentioned that the Arms Law had been vigorously applied since two years ago. He replied that he had a sufficient quantity of arms in the country, and in any case arms could be smuggled through with ease. I reverted to the subject of the fresh-water canal, remarking that I thought it an absurd project, to which he replied that he believed it quite practical and that the sheikh was a man of intelligence and sense. He went on to say that it was not the only means which he had with which to deal with the Canal problem. A wealthy Turk had presented the Government with a steamship which sailed under the Italian flag and was commanded by an ex-officer of the Turkish navy. This ship was to take a full cargo of cement from an Italian port and her manifests were to be made out for Massowa. The captain was to submit to any search by British warships without demur, and on reaching Port Saïd to steam at full speed down the Canal. He was then to sink her by one of three methods, *viz.:* (1) to collide with a British ship; (2) to provoke a British warship to sink her by ignoring signals; (3) to sink her himself. Fauzi Bey told me he had a trustworthy Egyptian officer who was leaving for Egypt by the first Khedivial mail steamer to take part in the operations there and to bear instructions to his agents. I afterwards spoke to Dr. Prüfer about Fauzi's Canal project. He did not seem to approve, but gave me the map of the Suez Canal. I met Fauzi again at the passport office as I was about to embark on the steamship 'Saidia.' He only greeted me, and said he hoped to see me back soon. He is the officer whom I mentioned in my former evidence as having seen me at the quays and who may have overheard my cabin number."

Q. Who are the police officers in league with Fauzi Bey?—*A.* He did not give me their names. I mentioned the names of several officers

of my acquaintance, but after scrutinising the list he gave me a negative answer.

Q. Do you know the names of any of the army officers who figured on the list?—*A.* No.

Q. Who were the officers despatched to Egypt in connexion with the organisation of the *komitaji* bands?—*A.* I do not know; they left for Egypt before me.

Q. Who was the Bedawi sheikh who discussed the fresh-water canal project?—*A.* *I* do not know his name. He was a man of about 50 years of age, with a full grey beard. He was about my height, but broad-shouldered and stout. He spoke educated Arabic without a Bedawi or Maghrabi accent.

Q. Who was the officer in Alexandria with whom you were to coöperate?—*A.* He gave me no inkling as to who he was.

Q. Did Enver Pasha speak to you on the subject of military operations in Egypt, the destruction of the Canal, &c.?—*A.* Yes, on the day before I sailed, when I called upon him with Dr. Prüfer and the officer of the "Lorelei." He questioned me on public opinion here, whether the natives would revolt against the English if the Turks marched against Egypt, and suggested that I should see Fauzi Bey on the subject. I replied that I had already seen him, and I recapitulated what he had told me. Enver Pasha replied that there would be certainly something for me to do in Egypt when the time came for action there if I was then still disposed to accept. He also asked me if I spoke Arabic.

Q. Did Fauzi Bey mention the name of the Egyptian officer who was leaving for Egypt by the first Khedivial mail steamer?—*A.* No; but in the light of subsequent events I believe it was Hamuda Effendi.

Q. When you told Fauzi Bey that you were disposed to participate in military operations against this country, did he accept your offer?—*A.* Yes; but it was agreed between us that this should take effect after I returned from Alexandria with my family.

Q. Then why were you given the detonators to take to Egypt?—*A.* I do not know. I am convinced that Hamuda Effendi was the person designed for the enterprise connected with the detonators. I do not think that this mission was connected with the subject which Omar Fauzi Bey discussed with me. I think it must have been a secret between Sheikh Abd-el-Aziz Shawish, Drs. Ahmad Fuad and Prüfer, and Hamuda Effendi.

Q. Have you no idea what Hamuda was to do with the detonators?

—*A.* I knew they were for use with bombs to be manufactured in this country.

Q. How do you know that?—*A.* Because once I found Sheikh Shawish sitting with Dr. Prüfer in the latter's room at the Hotel Germania. They were copying in Arabic a receipt for making bombs. The paper from which Sheikh Shawish was copying contained directions, a list of the component chemicals, and a sketch of a bomb in the right-hand bottom corner. I heard them mention that it was to be given to the Egyptian officer, and Sheikh Shawish said to me in Arabic "Hua zaòit aryak."

Q. To what use were the bombs to be put?—*A.* I have no idea.

R. O. C. MORS.

No. 182.

Telegram communicated by Count Benckendorff on November 2.

M. Sazonof télégraphie en date du 1er novembre, 1914:—

"Le Chargé d'Affaires ottoman vient de me lire le télégramme suivant du Grand Vizir: 'Vous prie de dire au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères que nous regrettons infiniment qu'un acte d'hostilité provoqué par la flotte russe ait compromis relations amicales des deux pays. Vous pouvez assurer Gouvernement Impérial de Russie que la Sublime Porte ne manquera pas de donner à la question la solution qu'elle comporte et qu'elle adoptera des mesures propres à prévenir un renouvellement de faits analogues. Vous pouvez déclarer dès à présent au Ministre que

(Translation.)

M. Sazonof telegraphs on the 1st November, 1914, as follows:—

"The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires has just read me the following telegram from the Grand Vizier: 'I request you to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that we infinitely regret that an act of hostility, provoked by the Russian fleet, should have compromised the friendly relations of the two countries. You can assure the Imperial Russian Government that the Sublime Porte will not fail to give the question such solution as it entails, and that they will adopt fitting measures to prevent a recurrence of similar acts. You can declare forthwith to the Minister that we

sommes décidés à ne plus permettre à la flotte Impériale de passer dans la mer Noire et que nous espérons que la flotte russe, à son tour, ne viendra plus croiser dans nos parages. J'ai le ferme espoir que le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie voudra bien faire preuve en l'occurrence du même esprit de conciliation au nom des intérêts communs des deux pays.'

"J'ai répondu au Chargé d'Affaires de Turquie que je donne le démenti le plus catégorique à ce qu'il venait de me dire au sujet d'une initiative d'hostilités à la charge de la flotte russe; je lui dis que je craignais qu'il était trop tard pour négocier; que pourtant si la Sublime Porte se décidait au renvoi immédiat de tout le personnel militaire et marin allemand, on y pourrait penser et que des pourparlers ne seraient pas impossibles pour une satisfaction que la Turquie aurait à donner pour l'aggression illégitime de nos côtes et les dégâts commis.

"J'ai autorisé Fahr-Eddin à expédier un télégramme chiffré en ce sens, lui faisant pourtant observer que sa démarche ne changeait rien à la situation créée. Fahr-Eddin recevra demain ses passeports, et la résponse du Gouvernement ottoman pourra être transmise par l'organe de l'Ambassade d'Italie."

have resolved no more to allow the Imperial fleet to enter the Black Sea, and that we trust that the Russian fleet, on their side, will no longer cruise in our waters. I have the firm hope that the Imperial Russian Government will give proof, on this occurrence, of the same spirit of conciliation in the common interests of both countries.'

"I replied to the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires that I most categorically denied what he had just said respecting the initiation of hostilities by the Russian fleet; I told him that I feared it was too late to negotiate; that nevertheless, if the Sublime Porte decided upon the immediate dismissal of all the German military and naval officers and men, it might be possible to consider the question, and that discussion might not be impossible to reach some basis of satisfaction to be given by Turkey for the illegal act of aggression against our coasts and for the damage thereby inflicted.

"I authorised Fahr-Eddin to send a cypher telegram in this sense, but pointed out to him at the same time that the representation he had made in no way altered the situation. Fahr-Eddin will receive his passports to-morrow, and the reply from the Turkish Government can be sent through the Italian Embassy."

No. 183.

Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir G. Buchanan, and Sir C. Greene.

SIR, *Foreign Office, November* 3, 1914.

The Turkish Ambassador called on the 31st ultimo and enquired whether this Department could give his Highness any information regarding the telegrams which had appeared in the press on the subject of a Turkish attack on certain Russian ports.

Sir A. Nicolson informed his Highness of what had actually occurred in the Black Sea. Tewfik Pasha expressed surprise, and enquired what he should do in the extremely difficult position in which he now found himself. Sir A. Nicolson assured his Highness that His Majesty's Government would treat him personally with all respect and consideration, and that he would be given notice if it became necessary for diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Turkey to cease.

On the 2nd instant Tewfik Pasha again called and communicated to Sir A. Nicolson the text of a telegram which he had just received from the Grand Vizier, a copy of which is enclosed herein.

Sir A. Nicolson replied, and he was sure that I would agree with him, that he strongly demurred to the statement in the last paragraph of the Grand Vizier's telegram, to the effect that "His Majesty's Government had provoked a rupture of diplomatic relations." It was absurd to state that we had done so in view of the indisputable fact that Turkish ships had bombarded the ports of one of our allies, and had burnt and sunk a British steamer lying peaceably in a friendly port. Furthermore, there were active, not to say feverish, military and other preparations directed against the Suez Canal and Egypt. If the Ottoman Government were as desirous as they asserted of maintaining friendly relations with Great Britain they should at once dismiss the German naval and military missions.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

ENCLOSURE in No. 183.

Text of Telegram to be communicated to Sir Edward Grey on behalf of Saïd Halim Pasha.

Je suis très peiné de voir que, par suite de l'incident déplorable survenu dans la mer Noire, le Gouvernement britannique a décidé de rappeler son Ambassadeur à Constantinople.

Ainsi que je l'ai déclaré à maintes reprises à Sir Louis Mallet, je tiens fermement au maintien des relations d'amitié existant entre nos deux pays et je travaille toujours à ce qu'elles ne soit compromises en aucune façon.

Je regretterais donc beaucoup, si un incident, dû à des circonstances imprévues, était considéré par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique comme une cause de conflit entre les deux pays.

Par conséquent, j'aime à espérer que le Gouvernement Royal voudra bien, en témoignage de son désir réciproque de garder intact les relations amicales des deux pays, mettre fin un moment plus tôt à la rupture des relations diplomatiques qu'il vient de provoquer.

Constantinople,
le 1er (14) *novembre,* 1914.

(Translation.)

I am much grieved that, in consequence of the deplorable incident that has occurred in the Black Sea, the British Government have decided to recall their Ambassador from Constantinople.

As I have many times declared to Sir Louis Mallet, I am deeply desirous to maintain the relations of friendship existing between our two countries, and I am working without cease in order that they may not be compromised in any way.

I should therefore much regret if an incident, due to unforeseen circumstances, were to be considered by His Britannic Majesty's Government as a cause of conflict between the two countries.

Consequently, I hope that His Majesty's Government will be willing, in witness of their reciprocal desire to maintain intact the friendly relations of the two countries, to put an end, at the earliest possible moment, to the rupture of diplomatic relations which they have just provoked.

Constantinople,
November 1 (14), 1914.

No. 184.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, Sir F. Bertie, and Sir C. Greene.

SIR, *Foreign Office, November* 4, 1914.

Tewfik Pasha called upon me this afternoon, and informed me that he had received instructions to ask for his passports, as His Majesty's Ambassador had already left Constantinople.

I expressed to Tewfik Pasha my personal regret at our official relations being terminated, as he had always acted in a loyal, straightforward, and friendly manner, and I had much appreciated the intercourse which we had had together during the past few years. I informed Tewfik Pasha that if his Government wished that hostilities between the two countries should cease, the only chance was to dismiss the German naval and military missions, and especially the officers and crews of the "Goeben" and "Breslau." So long as German officers remained in complete naval and military control at Constantinople, it was clear that they would continue to make war against us.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. —.

Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople summarising events leading up to rupture of relations with Turkey, and reply thereto.[1]

SIR, *London, November* 20, 1914.

I have the honour to report on the circumstances which preceded and accompanied my departure from Constantinople on the 1st November.

On my return to my post on the 16th August, a fortnight after the outbreak of the European war, the situation was already such as to give ground for the apprehension that Turkey would be driven by Germany sooner or later to take part in it as her ally. The Ottoman army, under the supreme command of Enver Pasha, who was entirely

[1] This despatch, as also the reply of Sir Edward Grey, which follows, was printed by the British Government as a special document in continuation of *Miscellaneous.* (*No.* 13) 1914. These despatches are included in *The British Blue Book* (*No.* 2) for the purpose of completing the diplomatic correspondence respecting the rupture of relations with Turkey.

in German hands, had been mobilised, and although the Government had declared their intention of preserving their neutrality, they had taken no proper steps to ensure its maintenance. They had, on the contrary, jeopardised their ability to do so by the admission of the German warships "Goeben" and "Breslau" into the Dardanelles on the 10th August. Events have confirmed what I and my French and Russian colleagues constantly impressed upon the Grand Vizier and other Ministers at the time, that so long as the German admiral and crews remained on board the German warships, the German Government were masters of the situation, and were in a position to force the hand of the Turkish Government if at any given moment it suited them to do so.

So far as the Grand Vizier was concerned, the warning fell upon deaf ears, and it was at no time possible to persuade his Highness to admit that he would not be able to control developments to which he was himself opposed and which had not the approval of the whole Government. It is quite possible that he was sincere in this conviction, but he was fully alive to the precarious nature of his own position and to the fact that any real attempt on his part to run counter to the policy of Enver Pasha and the military authorities would have meant his elimination. This event would have brought matters to a head at once, which would have been contrary to the policy of the allied Powers of postponing for as long as possible, if they were unable to avert altogether, the intervention of Turkey in the war, with the vast and complicated issues involved in the raising of the Eastern question, so that my rôle and that of my French and Russian colleagues, with whom I acted in complete accord throughout, was necessarily restricted to one of remonstrance and to an endeavour to expose and defeat the German intrigues.

In pursuance of a long-prepared policy, the greatest pressure was at once exercised by Germany to force Turkey into hostilities. German success in the European war was said to be assured. The perpetual menace to Turkey from Russia might, it was suggested, be averted by a timely alliance with Germany and Austria. Egypt might be recovered for the Empire. India and other Moslem countries represented as groaning under Christian rule might be kindled into a flame of infinite possibilities for the Caliphate of Constantinople. Turkey would emerge from the war the one great Power of the East, even as Germany would be the one great Power of the West. Such was the substance of German misrepresentations. It is a matter of common consent that Enver Pasha, dominated by a quasi-Napoleonic ideal,

by political Pan-Islamism, and by a conviction of the superiority of the German arms, was from the first a strong partisan of the German alliance. How far his several colleagues and other directing spirits outside the Ministry entered into his views is to some extent a matter of speculation; but it may be taken as certain that the Sultan, the Heir Apparent, the Grand Vizier, Djavid Bey, a majority of the Ministry, and a considerable section of the Committee of Union and Progress were opposed to so desperate an adventure as war with the allies. At what moment Talaat Bey, the most powerful civilian in the Cabinet and the most conspicuous of the Committee leaders, finally threw in his lot with the war party cannot be ascertained precisely. His sympathies were undoubtedly with them from the beginning, but the part which he actually played in the earlier stages is shrouded in mystery. I have reason to think that for some time he may have thought it possible, by steering a middle course, to postpone a decision until it was clearer what would be the result of the European war; and he may well have been anxious to gain time and to secure in exchange for Turkey's adhesion to the German cause something more solid than promises. These were tendered, indeed, on a lavish scale, but I am not aware that they were given in a form which could be considered binding. It is certain in any case that Talaat Bey's hesitations were overcome, and that he had definitely joined the conspiracy to bring about war this autumn some three weeks before the crisis was precipitated.

Whatever the views of individual Ministers or others may have been, the Turkish Government made no effort to emancipate themselves from German influence or to stem the tide of its progress. The material hold established by the introduction of the two German ships was on the contrary allowed to be strengthened. Not only did these ships remain under effective German control, but a strong German element was imported into the remainder of the fleet, even before the British naval mission, which had been reduced to impotence by order of the Minister of Marine, had been recalled by His Majesty's Government. Large numbers of Germans were imported from Germany as unostentatiously as possible, to be employed in the forts of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and at other crucial points. Numerous German merchant vessels, of which the most important were the "Corcovado" and the "General," served as bases of communication and as auxiliaries to what had become, in effect, a German Black Sea Fleet. Secret communications with the German General Staff were established at the outbreak of the war by means of the wireless appa-

ratus of the "Corcovado," which was anchored opposite the German Embassy at Therapia, and which was continuously used for this among other purposes throughout the whole period under review, in spite of my urgent representations and those of my French and Russian colleagues. Other German ships played with the Turkish flag as they pleased, in order to facilitate their voyages or cloak their real character while in port, and a department was constituted at the German Embassy for the purpose of requisitioning supplies for the use of the German Government and their ships. All these things were tolerated by a complaisant Turkish Government, who appeared to be indifferent to the incessant encroachments on their sovereignty if not to welcome them.

On land, the officers of the German military mission displayed a ubiquitous activity. Their supremacy at the Ministry of War, combined with the close coöperation which existed between them and the Militarist party, made it easy to fortify an already strong position. Acting in conjunction with other less accredited agents of their own nationality, they were the main organisers of those military preparations in Syria which so directly menaced Egypt, and which became a serious source of preoccupation and a constant theme of my remonstrances.

The evidence of these preparations became daily more convincing. Emissaries of Enver Pasha were present on the frontier, bribing and organising the Bedouins. Warlike stores were despatched south, and battalions of regular troops were posted at Rafah, whilst the Syrian and Mosul army corps were held in readiness to move south at short notice. The Syrian towns were full of German officers, who were provided with large sums of money for suborning the local chiefs. As an illustration of the thoroughness of the German preparations, I was credibly informed that orders were given to obtain estimates for the making of Indian military costumes at Aleppo in order to simulate the appearance of British Indian troops. Under directions from the Central Government the civil authorities of the Syrian coast towns removed all their archives and ready money to the interior, and Moslem families were warned to leave to avoid the consequences of bombardment by the British fleet. The Khedive himself was a party to the conspiracy, and arrangements were actually made with the German Embassy for his presence with a military expedition across the frontier.

However difficult it would have been for the Ottoman Government to regain their control over the armed forces of the State after the

arrival of the "Goeben" and "Breslau," the insidious compaign carried on with their encouragement by means of the press, the preachers in the mosques, and the pamphleteers, is evidence that its most powerful members were in sympathy with the anti-British movement. I had, indeed, actual proof of the inspiration by Talaat Bey and Djemal Pasha of articles directed against Great Britain. Every agency which could be used to stimulate public opinion in favour of Germany and to inflame it against the allies was set at work with the connivance, and often with the coöperation, of the Turkish authorities. All the Turkish newspapers in Constantinople became German organs; they glorified every real or imaginary success of Germany or Austria; they minimised everything favourable to the allies.

The enclosures in an earlier despatch will have shown to what depths of scurrility some of the more corrupt and unbridled of them descended in their onslaughts on Great Britain, and how unequally the censors of the press held the balance when exercising their practically unlimited powers. The provincial papers were no less enthusiastically pro-German; the semi-official telegraphic agency, which is practically worked by the Ministry of the Interior, was placed at the disposal of German propaganda. Through these agencies unlimited use was made of Turkey's one concrete and substantial grievance against Great Britain as distinguished from other European Powers, that is, the detention of the "Sultan Osman" and the "Reshadie" at the beginning of the European war. Other grievances, older and less substantial, were raked out of the past; and the indictment of Great Britain and her allies was completed by a series of inventions and distortions of the truth designed to represent them as the enemy, not merely of Turkey, but of the whole of Islam. Attacks of the latter kind became especially frequent in the latter half of October, and were undoubtedly directly inspired by Germany. My urgent representations to the Grand Vizier and to Talaat Bey, both verbal and written, had hardly even a temporary effect in checking this campaign.

It may seem strange that, thus equipped and thus abetted, those who sought to involve Turkey in the European war failed so long to achieve their object. The reasons were manifold. As I have already indicated, the party which stood for neutrality contained men who, lacking though they were in any material means of enforcing their views, could not easily be ignored. By whatever various routes they may have been arrived at, the ideas of these men coincided with a body of less sophisticated and hardly articulate opinion which, however

wounded by England's action in preventing delivery of the "Sultan Osman" and the "Reshadie," could still not reconcile itself to a war with England and France. In my despatch of the 22nd September I had the honour to report how frankly and how emphatically the Sultan himself voiced this feeling in conversation with me. There can be little doubt that the Grand Vizier exercised what influence he had in favour of neutrality. Djavid Bey, the Minister of Finance, whose influence in favour of neutrality was of weight as representing the Jewish element, and whose arguments in favour of peace were supported by the fact that Turkey was already absolutely bankrupt, and not in a position to embark upon war with the allies, became towards the end so formidable an obstacle to the fulfilment of the German plan that instructions were sent from Berlin to force his resignation.

Again, seriously convinced as most prominent Turks appear to have been of the ultimate success of Germany, their confidence could not but be a little dashed by the actual course of events in the two main theatres of war; and the more thoughtful realised that even in the event of Germany being victorious, the fact of Turkey having fought by her side would not necessarily ensure any advantage to the Ottoman Empire. As for the Germans themselves, it was true, as I have said, that they could at any moment force Turkey to march with them, but to do so before every means of suasion had proved useless would obviously not have been politic. It was clearly only in the last resort that the Monarch whom Pan-Islamic pro-Germans acclaimed as the hope of Islam, and whom the devout in some places had been taught to regard as hardly distinguishable from a true believer, would run the risk of scandalising the Moslem world, whom he hoped to set ablaze to the undoing of England, Russia, and France, by using the guns of the "Goeben" to force the hands of the Sultan-Caliph. But the factor which more than any other delayed the realisation of the German plans, and which enabled me and my French and Russian colleagues to protract the crisis until they could only be realised in such a way as to open the eyes of the Moslem world to the real nature of the conspiracy, was the inherent tendency of Turkish statesmen to procrastinate, in the hope that by playing off one side against the other they might gain more in the long run.

However slender the chances in our favour, it was obviously my duty, in conjunction with my French and Russian colleagues, to support and encourage by all possible means those forces which were obscurely striving for the preservation of peace.

If this policy necessarily involved the acceptance of acts on the

part of the Ottoman Government which, in ordinary circumstances, would have called for more than remonstrance and the reservation of our rights, and which it would have been easy to make the occasion of a rupture of relations, the patience displayed by the allies was justified by the results achieved.

Although unsuccessful in averting war, two objects of main importance were gained by delaying its commencement. On the one hand, the allied Powers are now in a position to deal with the problem with a freer hand, and, on the other, Germany has been forced to show her cards and to act independently of a majority of the Turkish Cabinet.

Under the stress of events in the main theatre of the war, and owing to the vital necessity of providing a diversion in the Near East, Germany was constrained to intensify still further their pressure on the Turks. During the first three weeks of October their pressure took yet another form, and a new weight was cast into the scale by the importation into Constantinople, with every circumstance of secrecy, of large quantities of bullion consigned to the German Ambassador and delivered under military guard at the Deutsche Bank. The total amount was estimated at some 4,000,000*l*. This sum was far more than was necessary for the maintenance of the German military and naval establishments, and I have every reason to believe that a definite arrangement was arrived at between the Germans and a group of Ministers, including Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey, and Djemal Pasha, that Turkey should declare war as soon as the financial provision should have attained a stated figure. My information establishes the fact that a climax was reached about the middle of the third week in October, when it had been decided to confront the Grand Vizier with the alternative of complicity or resignation, and that only the Russian successes on the Vistula, or some other more obscure cause, prevented this plan from being carried out.

Whatever the exact history of the first three weeks of October, it is certain that on or about the 26th of that month the German conspirators realised that the pace must be forced by still more drastic measures than they had yet used, and that any further attempts to win over the Grand Vizier and the Turkish Government as a whole to their ideas and to induce them to declare war would be useless. On that afternoon an important meeting of Committee leaders was held, at which Enver Pasha was present, but which only decided to send Halil Bey, the President of the Chamber, on a mission to Berlin. In the

circles in which this decision became known it was regarded as a partial triumph for the Peace party, and as a fresh attempt to gain time for the sake either of mere procrastination or of securing more concrete offers from Germany. Be that as it may, Halil Bey never left on his mission, and it is believed that its abandonment was due to a more than usually blunt hint from the German representative in Constantinople. Whilst Constantinople generally was comforting itself with the reflection that nothing could well happen until after the four days' Bairam festival, beginning on the 30th October, two events of capital importance occurred.

On the morning of the 29th I received intelligence from Egypt of the incursion into the Sinai peninsula of an armed body of 2,000 Bedouins, who had occupied the wells of Magdaba, and whose objective was an attack upon the Suez Canal. On learning this news I at once proceeded to the Yali of the Grand Vizier, to acquaint him of the serious consequences which must ensue if the expedition were not at once recalled. His Highness received the intelligence with every appearance of surprise. He emphatically disclaimed all knowledge of it, and gave me the most solemn assurance that if the facts were as stated he would at once issue orders for the withdrawal of the invading party. He assured me once more that nothing was further from the intention of the Government than war with Great Britain. It was unthinkable, he said, that an expedition of this kind could have been organised by any member of the Government; and he felt certain that if anything of the kind had occurred, it could only have been a raid by irresponsible Bedouins. I told his Highness that I feared that he deceived himself. I reminded him of the various occasions on which he had given me similar assurances, and of the negative results of the instructions which he had given on previous occasions. I warned him of the disastrous consequences to the Ottoman Empire of a crisis which could not now be long postponed unless he and the friends of peace were prepared to take some serious stand against the conspiracy of which I was fully cognisant, to involve it irretrievably in the general war. On this, as on every occasion of my interviews with the Grand Vizier, I was impressed with his inability to realise the facts or to disabuse himself of the conviction, in spite of his many unfortunate experiences, that he would be able, in a really serious crisis, to exert his authority with effect.

The second event of capital importance was the attack on Odessa and other Russian ports in the Black Sea on the morning of the same

day, the 29th October. It is now certain that the actual orders for these attacks were given by the German admiral on the evening of the 27th October, but it was not until after they had actually taken place, that is, on the afternoon of the 29th October, when news of the raid on Odessa was telegraphed to me direct by Mr. Consul-General Roberts, that my Russian and French colleagues and myself realised that the die had actually been cast and the crisis that we had so long feared and striven to avert had occurred. Immediately on receiving the news M. Bompard and I called on M. de Giers and decided to ask for authority from our respective Governments to confront the Porte with the alternative of rupture or dismissal of the German naval and military missions. On the morning of the 30th, however, I learnt from my Russian colleague that he had received instructions from his Government immediately to ask for his passports. He had written to the Grand Vizier to ask for an interview, which his Highness had begged him to postpone until the following day owing to indisposition. The instructions of my Russian colleague being in a categorical form, he had therefore been constrained to address a note to the Grand Vizier demanding his passports; and I and my French colleague, acting on the instructions with which the Ambassadors of the allied Powers had at my suggestion already been furnished to leave Constantinople simultaneously, should any one of them be compelled to ask for his passports, owing either to a Turkish declaration of war or to some intolerable act of hostility, decided without further delay to write to the Grand Vizier and ask in our turn for interviews to enable us to carry out these instructions. In view of his Highness's indisposition we had not expected to be received that day, but a few hours later the Grand Vizier sent us word that he would, nevertheless, be glad to see us, and notwithstanding the excuse which he had made earlier in the day he received the Russian Ambassador also in the course of the afternoon. My interview with the Grand Vizier partly coincided with that of M. de Giers, and preceded that of M. Bompard. It was of a painful description. His Highness convinced me of his sincerity in disclaiming all knowledge of or participation in the events which had led to the rupture, and entreated me to believe that the situation was even now not irretrievable. I replied that the time had passed for assurances. The crisis which I had predicted to his Highness at almost every interview which I had had with him since my return had actually occurred, and unless some adequate satisfaction were immediately given by the dismissal of the German missions, which could alone prevent the recur-

rence of attempts upon Egyptian territory and attacks on Russia, war with the allies was inevitable. My Russian colleague had already demanded his passports, and I must, in pursuance of the instructions I had received, follow the same course. The Grand Vizier again protested that even now he could undo what the War party had done without his knowledge or consent. In reply to the doubt which I expressed as to the means at his disposal, he said that he had on his side moral forces which could not but triumph, and that he meant to fight on to the end. He did not, indeed, hint at a possibility of immediately dismissing the German mission, but he informed me that there was to be a meeting of the Council at his house that evening, when he would call upon his colleagues to support him in his determination to avert war with the allied Powers.

The Council was duly held, and, as he had predicted, the majority of the Ministers supported the Grand Vizier, who made a strong appeal in favour of peace, and was seconded by Djavid Bey. But the powerlessness of the Sultan's Ministers to do more than vote in the Council Chamber was evident. The question of dismissing the German naval officers was discussed, but no decision to do so was taken, and no Minister ventured even to propose the expulsion of the military mission. In the interval the War party had sealed their resolution to go forward, by publishing a communiqué in which it was stated that the first acts of hostility in the Black Sea had come from the Russian side. Untrue and grotesque as it was, this invention succeeded in deceiving many of the public.

It is not possible to establish by proof which of the Ministers had pre-knowledge of the German admiral's *coup*, but it may be regarded as certain that Enver Pasha was aware of it, and highly probable that Talaat Bey was also an accomplice.

The story of a Russian provocation was plainly an afterthought, and if the official report of the Russian Government were not sufficient to disprove it, I could produce independent evidence to show that the orders to begin hostilities were given at the mouth of the Bosphorus on the evening of the 27th October, as the result of a conspiracy hatched between the German representatives in Constantinople and a small and unscrupulous Turkish faction.

My Russian colleague left Constantinople without incident on the evening of the 31st October. My own departure was eventually arranged for the following evening, when I left for Dedeagatch, accompanied by my staff of sixty officials and their families, the British advisers in the service of the Turkish Government and some

other British subjects also travelled with me. My French colleague and his staff left by the same train.

Owing to the wanton refusal of the military authorities at the last moment to allow the departure of a great number of British and French subjects who were to have left by an earlier train than that which had been placed at my disposal, the station was for some hours the scene of indescribable confusion and turmoil.

My protests and those of the French Ambassador were disregarded, and after protracted discussion we agreed to leave matters in the hands of the United States Ambassador, who undertook to use all his influence to procure the departure of our fellow subjects on the following day. The "sous-chef de protocole" of the Sublime Porte and the "chef de cabinet particulier" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were sent to bid farewell to M. Bompard and myself at the railway station, and two Secretaries of the Political Department of the Ministry accompanied us to the frontier.

It would be impossible to exaggerate the assistance which I have received from Mr. Morgenthau, the United States Ambassador. During the last two days especially the difficulties arising out of the abnormality of the situation would have been immeasurably greater had it not been for his invaluable help and his untiring efforts on behalf of myself and my staff. We are heavily indebted not only to Mr. Morgenthau himself, but to every member of the United States Embassy. It is entirely owing to their exertions that the British and French subjects who were detained at the station on the night of my departure were allowed to leave on the following evening.

Before concluding this despatch I desire also to place on record my sense of the cheerful courage displayed by the British community in Constantinople, as well as in other towns, during the whole of this trying period. A large proportion of them have suffered severely in their business from the instability of the situation in Turkey. Many have suffered heavily and more directly by the military requisitions which from the beginning of August were carried out in an inconceivably arbitrary manner. By the suppression of the Capitulations all saw themselves deprived at a moment's notice of the secular privileges which had hitherto secured the persons and the property of foreigners against caprice and injustice. But they have one and all faced these adversities with a reasonable and manly fortitude.

Shortly after my return to my post, I recommended those British subjects who applied to me for advice to send home, when oppor-

tunity offered, those members of their families who had no particular reason to stay in the country.

A certain number left during the autumn, and many have left since. Those who have chosen to stay, or who have not been in a position to leave, remain under the protection of the United States Ambassador. As regards the British community at Bagdad, I instructed the acting British consul-general at Bagdad, early in October, to charter a steamer for the conveyance to the coast of any British subjects who might wish to leave. A large number of British and British-Indian subjects availed themselves of this opportunity.

I cannot conclude this report without calling your attention to the zeal shown by the junior members of my staff, including Mr. Ovey, Lord Gerald Wellesley, Mr. Charles Lister, Mr. Thomas, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Astell, and by Mr. Fuller, Archivist to His Majesty's Embassy, in the performance of their duties in the Chancery, as well as to the able and conscientious work of the members of the Dragomanate and consulate-general.

The Chancery was greatly assisted by the voluntary help kindly offered to them by Judge Cator, the Rev. Canon Whitehouse, Chaplain to His Majesty's Embassy, and by Dr. Clemow, Physician to His Majesty's Embassy, as well as by Mr. Weakley, Commercial Attaché.

I need not do more than refer to the work of Lieutenant-Colonel Cunliffe Owen, Military Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, whose information respecting the military preparations was often obtained with considerable difficulty.

I should like to place on record my high appreciation of the conduct of His Majesty's consular officers throughout the Ottoman Empire during the whole period of the crisis. They one and all performed their often difficult duties with zeal and discretion. I was especially indebted to Mr. Cumberbatch, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, Mr. Heathcote Smith, acting British consul-general at Smyrna, and to Mr. Palmer, vice-consul at the Dardanelles, for the valuable information which they supplied.

I would wish to bring to your particular notice the services rendered by Mr. Ryan, Acting First Dragoman of His Majesty's Embassy. His ability, knowledge of Turkey, sound judgment and untiring industry, were of invaluable assistance to me, and are deserving of your special commendation.

I have, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. —.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

SIR, *Foreign Office, December* 4, 1914.

I have received your Excellency's despatch of the 20th ultimo, in which you summarise the events since your return to your post on the 16th August last until your departure on the 1st November.

I have read with great appreciation and pleasure of the invaluable assistance rendered to your Excellency in the difficult circumstances of your departure by the United States Ambassador and every member of the United States Embassy, and I have already requested the United States Government to convey to Mr. Morgenthau the most sincere thanks of His Majesty's Government for the valuable services rendered by his Excellency on that occasion, and subsequently in helping the British community to leave Constantinople.

I have also been much gratified to receive your Excellency's testimony of the cheerful courage of the British community in Turkey under exceptionally trying circumstances, and I have noted with great satisfaction your Excellency's appreciation of the valuable services of the embassy and consulate staff, and of the members of His Majesty's consular service throughout the Ottoman Empire.

I desire also to convey to your Excellency my high sense of the marked ability, patience, and discretion shown by your Excellency in carrying out, in the face of great difficulties, the policy of His Majesty's Government. War was eventually forced by wanton and unprovoked hostilities of the Turkish fleet under German inspiration and orders, but it was the desire of His Majesty's Government to avoid a rupture with Turkey; and your Excellency rightly directed all your efforts to encourage those influences at Constantinople that were moderate and reasonable. To your efforts it was at any rate in some degree due that the inevitable catastrophe did not occur sooner.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

THE

ITALIAN GREEN BOOK

THE ITALIAN GREEN BOOK[1]

No. 1.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 9th December,* 1914.

I request your Excellency to convey the following verbal communication to Count Berchtold.

The present military advance of Austria-Hungary into Serbia constitutes a fact which cannot avoid becoming the subject of examination by the Italian and Austro-Hungarian Governments on the basis of the stipulations contained in Article VII. of the Triple Alliance. The same article places the Austro-Hungarian Government, in the case of even temporary occupations, under the obligation of first coming to an agreement with Italy and also of granting compensation. The Imperial and Royal Government should therefore have consulted us and entered into agreement with us before causing its army to cross the Serbian frontier. To render our attitude effectively clear we must remind the Imperial and Royal Government that, basing its actions precisely upon what is set forth in Article VII., it restrained us during our own war against Turkey from carrying out several military operations which would certainly have shortened the duration of that war. The naval operations in the Dardanelles also gave rise to formal reservations on the part of the Imperial and Royal Government. Italy has an interest of the first importance in the preservation of the full integrity and political and economical independence of Serbia. The Austro-Hungarian Government has certainly declared upon several occasions that it has no intention of making acquisitions of territory to the prejudice of

[1] *Acts of Parliament. Legislature XXIV—Sessions* 1913-15. *Chamber of Deputies N. XXXII (Documents). Diplomatic Documents submitted to the Italian Parliament by the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Sonnino). Austria-Hungary. Session of the 20th May,* 1915. Published for the Royal Italian Embassy in London by Hodder and Stoughton. London. New York. Toronto. Title of publication in the original text: *Atti Parlamentari Legislatura XXIV—Sessione* 1913-1915. *Camera dei Deputati N. XXXII (Documenti) Documenti Diplomatici presentati Al Parlamento Italiano dal Ministro Degli Affari Esteri (Sonnino) Austria-Ungheria. Seduta del* 20 *maggio* 1915. *Roma: Tipografia Della Camera dei Deputati,* 1915.

Serbia, but a declaration so formulated does not amount to a binding engagement, and assurances of the same general character afforded us by the Imperial and Royal Government on the occasion when Turkey embarked upon war, allow us to foresee the possibility of certain political modifications in the Balkan Peninsula. Moreover the very invasion of Serbia, although this should prove in the end to be no more than temporary, has already sufficed seriously to disturb the equilibrium that prevailed in the Balkan Peninsula and to afford us the right to compensation. It should further be observed that the stipulation of the aforesaid Article VII. gives Italy the right to compensation also on the score of advantages other than territorial which the Austro-Hungarian Government might secure in the Balkan region. The Italian Government considers that it is necessary to proceed without delay to an exchange of views and thence to a specific treaty with the Imperial and Royal Government concerning this intricate situation which closely affects the most vital political and economical interests of Italy. Unmistakable signs of uneasiness are to be observed in the Italian Parliament and in Italian public opinion, and these clearly manifest the tendency of Italy's national aspirations. The Royal Italian Government is compelled to take this uneasiness and these aspirations seriously into account. The understanding which I earnestly invite upon these grounds between the two Governments would have the result of eliminating in the future all danger of those deplorable incidents arising out of friction and diffidence which are to-day so painfully frequent, and it would render instead possible and natural between the two nations those relations of cordial and constant friendship which are the common desire of both and without which all official agreement necessarily remains incomplete and barren. Therefore in making clear to Count Berchtold the friendly spirit which has prompted these representations, I beg your Excellency to invite him to make known to us, with the diligence demanded by the case, the point of view of the Imperial and Royal Government.

SONNINO.

No. 2.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 9th December,* 1914.

I request your Excellency to inform Herr von Jagow of the full text of my telegram to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna. You will

also please make clear to that Minister for Foreign Affairs the state of Italian public opinion and the connexion established in Italy between questions of foreign and of internal policy. The trend in favour of neutrality manifested by a section of public opinion does not imply the renunciation of Italian interests in the Balkans and the Adriatic or of the national aspirations, but rather the persuasion that these interests and these aspirations will be effectively safeguarded if neutrality is maintained. And should it happen that the contrary became manifest, the reaction in public opinion would be extremely grave and would have consequences which it is the duty of the Royal Italian Government to foresee and if possible to forestall.

SONNINO.

No. 3.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 12*th December,* 1914.

(Telegram.) *recd.* 12*th.*

I have conveyed to Count Berchtold the verbal communication with which your Excellency charged me. He replied that the military operations of Austria-Hungary had not yet led to a real, or even to a temporary, occupation of Serbian territory. That such occupations as followed upon those operations were abandoned on the following day or in the course of the following days. In fact that the city of Valjevo, occupied some fifteen days ago, had shortly afterwards been evacuated in consequence of the subsequent military operations, and that on the score of such momentary occupation it was certainly not admissible to cite Article VII. and demand compensation. When I then pointed out to him that the occupation of Belgrade had already taken place some days ago, and that Austro-Hungarian troops were still present in that city, Count Berchtold replied that these troops would perhaps be obliged to evacuate it shortly. I considered it advisable to draw Count Berchtold's attention to the fact that Article VII. was clear and explicit, since it referred in precise terms to temporary occupation and drew no distinction regarding the character of the time-limit contemplated. Therefore, whatever their character, the occupation so far effected by the Austro-Hungarian troops from the first day of their penetration into Serbian territory evidently came

under the provisions of that article, which imposed upon the Imperial and Royal Government the obligation of a previous agreement with ourselves. Moreover, as I had already pointed out to him, the very invasion of Serbia, although no more than temporary, entitled us to compensation, since in itself it was sufficient to disturb the equilibrium established in the Balkan Peninsula by the treaty. When further I reminded him of the opposition by the Imperial and Royal Government to our military and naval operations during the Italo-Turkish war on the occasion of which that Government had invoked Article VII., Count Berchtold observed that he had declared himself opposed to those operations on the strength of the principle of *status quo* upon which the treaty was based. And he added that it was not possible to compare such operations with those upon which the Imperial and Royal Government was now engaged in Serbia. The former were, in fact, contrary to the spirit of the treaty, since had they been carried into effect they must have jeopardised the very existence of the Ottoman Empire; whilst the latter had for their only purpose the defence of the integrity of the Monarchy threatened by Serbia, whose aim was to deprive it of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore the war against Serbia was not aggressive but defensive, and the Imperial and Royal Government was now fighting to maintain the *status quo.* I replied that I certainly could not admit that the temporary occupation of territory hitherto carried out by Austria-Hungary in Serbia was other than opposed both to the spirit and to the letter of the treaty. It was in fact evident that such occupation threatened the equilibrium of the Balkan Peninsula and would moreover destroy the balance of power which the treaty itself provided should be maintained. And in this connexion I reminded him that on several occasions and at the very moment when war broke out, the Royal Italian Government had declared to the Imperial and Royal Government that it could never consent to any measure detrimental to the integrity and political and economical independence of Serbia, since that was opposed to our interests and opposed also to the provisions of the treaty. Count Berchtold replied that the Imperial and Royal Government had no intention whatever of annihilating Serbia. I remarked that as early as the 25th July last I had, in the Count's absence, declared to Baron Macchio that if Austria-Hungary should proceed to even temporary occupation of territory without previously obtaining our consent she would be acting in violation of Article VII. of the Triple Alliance, and that we therefore made all reservations to safeguard our eventual liberty of action as well as our rights and interests.

The Royal Italian Government considered that the time had come to refer to that declaration, being certainly unable to admit the proposition advanced by the Imperial and Royal Government to the effect that Austria-Hungary had carried out so far no occupation, even of a temporary nature, of Serbian territory. To this Count Berchtold replied that he did not understand how Article VII. could be cited in connexion with temporary occupation, the result of occupation of war, which might be abandoned from one day to the other according to the fortunes of war, and which could not, therefore, be the subject of a previous agreement based upon the principle of compensation. But should real occupation of Serbian territory, even though of a temporary character, have taken place, the Imperial and Royal Government was disposed to conform with us to the stipulations of the said agreement. Notwithstanding my repeated and urgent insistence to convince Count Berchtold that the advance of Austro-Hungarian troops into Serbia, and the temporary occupation of territory effected by these imposed upon the Imperial and Royal Government the obligation of a previous agreement with us based upon the principle of compensation, he persisted in the opinion manifested above, and concluded by saying that he did not think that this was at present a case calling for an exchange of views with the Royal Italian Government.

AVARNA.

No. 4.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 13th December, 1914.

(Telegram.) *recd.* 13*th.*

The principal argument adduced by Count Berchtold to avoid a conference with the Royal Italian Government on the subject of the application of the stipulations of Article VII. of the Treaty of Alliance concerning the occupation of a part of Serbian territory by Austro-Hungarian troops, was that the occupation itself was neither of a temporary nor of a permanent character, but was merely momentary, since it was no more than the inevitable and immediate consequence of military operations, and since it might therefore come to an end from one moment to another as a result of changes that might take place in the Serbian military situation.

In view of this I consider it advisable, in support of our contention, to inform your Excellency that the issue No. 342 of the Gazette of the Austro-Hungarian Army contains the appointment of Major-General Oscar to the post of Commandant of the city of Belgrade.

AVARNA.

No. 5.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 14th December, 1914.

(Telegram.) *recd.* 15*th.*

I learn indirectly that Herr von Tschirscky, in pursuance of instructions communicated to him by Herr von Jagow, was yesterday successful in prevailing upon Count Berchtold to enter into an exchange of views with the Royal Italian Government on the subject of Article VII. and to settle the matter of the compensation due to us in the event of military or permanent occupation of Balkan territory by Austria-Hungary.

AVARNA.

No. 6.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 16th December,* 1914.

I am surprised at the proposition advanced by Count Berchtold. I approve the answers returned to him by your Excellency. We cannot accept the distinction drawn by Count Berchtold between temporary occupation and momentary occupation resulting from military operations.

Such a distinction is contrary to the spirit and the letter of Article VII.

By the fact of the advance of the Austro-Hungarian troops into Serbia and of the occupation of that territory to such an extent even that a military governor of Belgrade has been appointed, that Government is placed under the obligation of coming to an agreement with Italy on the basis of compensation.

Nor yet can we accept the arguments of Count Berchtold on the subject of the precedent of the Libyan war. On that occasion the Austro-Hungarian Government based itself upon Article VII. to hinder us not only from temporary and momentary occupation but also from simple military operations such as bombardments without occupation. That attitude on the part of Austria-Hungary was a source of very serious loss to us, alike in a military and a political sense, since it encouraged the resistance of Turkey, which felt indirectly supported and protected. The argument that during the Libyan war the *status quo* was threatened by us cannot be sustained. Article VII. refers expressly to the *status quo* in the East and in the Balkan region, and not to the Ottoman Empire. And the military expedition of Austria-Hungary into Serbia has disturbed definitely the *status quo* and the equilibrium provided for by Article VII. I repeat that we have not given Article VII. the prohibitive application set up by that Government during the Libyan war, but we have not thereby intended nor do we intend to renounce the rights guaranteed to us by the article itself.

It is well in this connexion to remember the exact terms employed by that Government in its communications during the Libyan war.

In your telegram of the 5th November, 1911, your Excellency informed us that Count Aehrenthal had declared to you that "action of ours on the Ottoman coast of Turkey in Europe or on the islands of the Ægean Sea, could not be permitted either by Austria or by Germany, because it would be opposed to the Treaty of Alliance." Such a declaration was made to your Excellency in consequence of a rumour current to the effect that Italian warships had made use of searchlights in the neighbourhood of Salonica. In your telegram of the 7th November, 1911, your Excellency informed us that "Count Aehrenthal considers the bombardments of ports in European Turkey, such as Salonica, Cavalla, etc., opposed to the provisions of Article VII." In April of 1912 (your Excellency's telegram dated 21st April) Count Berchtold lodged strong protests because the Italian squadron before the Dardanelles had damaged the forts in replying to the shots that were fired upon it from them; on that occasion Count Berchtold declared to you that "if the Royal Italian Government desired to recover its liberty of action the Imperial and Royal Government could do the same. But he could not admit that we should in future undertake similar operations or any action whatsoever that should be opposed to the point of view manifested in the preceding conferences.

Should any such operation be undertaken by us it might be attended by grave consequences.''

To your Excellency's statements that the Royal Italian Government had repeatedly declared that it could not admit that the integrity and the political and economical independence of Serbia should be attacked, since that was opposed to our interests and to the provisions of the Treaty, Count Berchtold replied that the Imperial and Royal Government had no intention of ''annihilating'' Serbia. I cannot consider this reply satisfactory. Between the maintenance of integrity and of political and economical independence on the one hand, and annihilation on the other, there is a wide margin, and it is precisely this margin that must become the subject and basis of negotiation and of agreement between ourselves and Austria in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. Permanent or temporary occupations of territory, even if only partial, or any advantage of a character other than territorial, even if merely involving political influence or economical privileges, are to be the subject of previous agreement. Hence it does not suffice that Count Berchtold should have declared to you that he is disposed to come to an understanding in the event of a real occupation even if only temporary.

And I regret that Count Berchtold should not think that this is at present a case calling for an exchange of views with us. I beg your Excellency to insist on sustaining our point of view. The agreement, according to Article VII., should be made before and not be contemporary with or subsequent to the fact or facts which may give rise to negotiations or to the agreement itself.

I beg your Excellency to bear in mind that we consider gravely detrimental to our interests the possibility of protracted conversations with Vienna concerning the interpretation of Article VII. whilst events are maturing that may lead to our finding ourselves confronted by a *fait accompli.*

In your conference with Count Berchtold please confirm all that I communicated to you in my telegram of the 9th instant on the subject of the tendencies to be observed here both in Parliament and in public opinion, and also on the subject of the great importance, in our common interest, of establishing relations between our two countries on a solid and permanent basis of trust and enduring friendship.

SONNINO.

No. 7.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 20th December, 1914.
(Telegram.) *recd. 21st.*

I conveyed to Count Berchtold the substance of your Excellency's instructions.

He informed me that he was disposed to enter at once into an exchange of views with your Excellency on the subject of Article VII. to determine the indemnities to which Italy is entitled in the event of any temporary or permanent occupation in the Balkans carried out by Austria-Hungary. He therefore stated that he agreed as follows:—

(1) That between the maintenance of the integrity of Serbian independence and that State's annihilation there was a wide margin which should become the subject and basis of agreement between ourselves and Austria-Hungary as provided by the Treaty;

(2) That according to the provisions of the Treaty even partially permanent or temporary occupations of territory, or any advantages of a character other than territorial, even if merely of political influence and economical privileges, are to be the subject of previous agreements on the basis of compensation;

(3) That the agreement provided for by Article VII. should be anticipatory of and not contemporary with or subsequent to the fact or facts which gave rise to negotiations and to the agreement itself.

When I had, finally, confirmed all that I had communicated to Count Berchtold in the course of our last interview, to which matters reference is made in the last sentence of your Excellency's telegram, Count Berchtold reminded me of how in the past he had constantly and assiduously laboured to render ever more intimate our reciprocal relations. There had been, it is true, certain incidents, some of them extremely disagreeable, such as the Hohenlohe decrees, which he had profoundly deplored, but which could not hurt the bonds in which the two countries were united. Further, the question of Albania, notwithstanding the grave vicissitudes through which it had passed and the difficulties to which it had given rise, had caused the two Governments to coöperate in a common action and had been the basis of an understanding. He could not, therefore, in the common interest, fail to agree with your Excellency on the supreme importance of

establishing between the two nations relations based upon enduring trust and constant friendship, this being the object which he had always kept in sight.

AVARNA.

No. 8.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassadors at Vienna and Berlin.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 20th December,* 1914.

I received a visit yesterday for the first time from Prince von Bülow. He informed me that he had come to Italy for the purpose of being in a better position to interpret to Berlin our present state of mind and point of view, and to explain to us the point of view of Germany. His intention was to strive to improve the good relations and the understanding between the two nations.

Before leaving Berlin he had received news of the representations made by us at Vienna with a view to a discussion on the subject of Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. He had stated at Berlin that we were in the right and that we had every reason to desire this discussion concerning the compensation which would be accorded us when Austria should have obtained any given results. And he claimed that this expression of his opinion had produced its effect also at Vienna.

I remarked to Prince von Bülow that the situation in Italy could be summed up in very few words. That the majority of the nation was in favour of the preservation of neutrality and ready to support the Government in this, but only upon the presupposition that by means of neutrality it should be possible to obtain the fulfilment of certain national aspirations. This task, the practical difficulties of which I fully recognised, was what the Government aimed at accomplishing.

Its accomplishment might involve prejudicial consequences reaching far beyond so negligible a matter as the mere fate of a Ministry. The Savoy Monarchy derives its greatest strength from its representation of the national sentiment. And Prince von Bülow, who was acquainted with our country, might easily verify for himself the truth of this assertion.

He had said on one occasion in the Reichstag that the Triple Alliance was the best means of averting war between Austria-Hungary and Italy.

To this Prince von Bülow remarked that he had quoted a dictum of Count Nigra to the effect that Austria-Hungary and Italy could not be other than either allies or enemies. I replied that if in such a statement there should be a little exaggeration there is also a deal of truth. The alliance, however, could not be advantageous and fruitful if there was a lack of perfect cordiality between the parties and if it became necessary to pause at every step to verify the terms of the signed agreements. It was incumbent to foresee and to provide for the future, even beyond the present war, and it was our duty therefore to place things upon a more solid and permanent basis. Wherefore it was necessary to remove all possible sources of misunderstanding and friction, so that future relations with Austria, the existence of which were also necessary in the interests of Italy, might become as cordial and natural as those prevailing between ourselves and Germany.

Prince von Bülow thanked me for my frankness and recognised the necessity of working for this object. It was his desire that the relations between Germany and Italy should become even more cordial.

To-day I have seen Baron Macchio.

He told me that having been compelled in August suddenly to leave Vienna and come to Rome to replace Herr von Merey, he is taking advantage of the present holiday-time to pay a brief visit to his home. I replied that it gave me pleasure to think that he would thus be able better to inform Count Berchtold of the situation in Italy, and I alluded to the representations made by us at Vienna on the subject of the application of Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance.

Baron Macchio said that he was aware of the representations made by us, and that as a consequence his Government contemplated entering into a discussion on the subject, unless it should be enabled to determine the matter more satisfactorily at once as a result of the development of the war. He again pointed out that in the Austrian operations in Serbia there were none of the elements of a "temporary occupation" in the sense of Article VII.

I replied that this did not appear to me to be exact. A Governor even had already been appointed to the city of Belgrade. And if a comparison were made between the invasion of Serbia and all that

had happened during the Libyan war when Austria had placed her veto upon our bombardment of Salonica and the Dardanelles, there could be no doubt on the score of our present right to demand the application of Article VII. It was my desire to create a situation that should place the relations between Austria and Italy on a basis of increased cordiality, so that it should be possible to avoid the daily incidents which at present tend to ruffle them, incidents which are aggravated in consequence of this very state of mutual diffidence.

SONNINO.

No. 9.

The Italian Ambassador at Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, 6th January, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd. 6th.*

In compliance with the general instructions conveyed to me by your Excellency I have neglected no opportunity to seek to obtain the support of the German Government to the representations made at Vienna by the Royal Italian Government on the subject of the interpretation of Article VII. of the Treaty. Having referred to it again in the course of my interview yesterday with Herr Zimmermann, I was informed by him that Prince von Bülow had made from Rome the same statements which I have several times made to him here: namely, that it would be extremely difficult for the Royal Italian Government to maintain, without some of the national aspirations being satisfied, the attitude of neutrality in which it had the support of the majority of Parliament and of the people. Herr Zimmermann assured me that he took this state of things fully into account and that he had never ceased to insist that they should also be taken into account in Vienna and that the inevitable conclusions drawn from them should be carried into effect. But that so far he had invariably met with a refusal, the motives of which, although perhaps not based upon the dictates of practical politics, were yet such that he could not find them unjustifiable.

Nevertheless, he persisted in his efforts and he did not yet despair of the result. The conviction that it is absolutely necessary for Austria to resign herself to some sacrifice to Italy if she wishes to avoid disagreeable events has by now penetrated all governing circles here.

BOLLATI.

No. 10.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 7th January,* 1915.

In the course of an interview which I had yesterday with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, he told me that he observed now a more warlike inclination in Italian public opinion than had been evident when he was leaving for Vienna in December last.

I replied that I did not think that this was so; that in the last two months public opinion had become calm, accepting a state of neutrality according to the programme of the Government; that nevertheless it was desirable freely to recognise that even the most neutralist section of public opinion proceeded on the assumption that by our neutrality we should be able to realise some of the national aspirations; and that it was precisely out of this assumption that all the difficulties of the situation arose.

This led me back to the question of compensation in accordance with Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, which was the subject of the representations I made to Vienna about a month ago. Count Berchtold had now admitted Italy's right in the present circumstances to cite Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance and the desirability of discussing the compensation eventually to be granted to Italy in consequence of action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire which tended to modify the equilibrium of the Balkan States.

The withdrawal of the Imperial troops from Serbia seems perhaps to render such a discussion less timely, depriving its character of urgency if not of actuality, nor could I wish by over-insistence to convey the impression that I was seeking a quarrel with Austria-Hungary.

But, on the other hand, the logical and political reasons calling for a discussion of the question of compensation remain unimpaired; besides which the circumstances of an attack by the Imperial armies upon Serbian or other Balkan territory may, and, indeed, probably will, present themselves again.

The fundamental logical reason that justifies and demands the discussion which I invited lay in the war undertaken by the Empire, the ultimate aims of which were absolutely opposed to the clearest and most obvious political interests of Italy in the Balkan Peninsula.

The political reason is to be found in the necessity to create once and for all between Austria-Hungary and Italy, if it is desired to provide for the future and to render advantageous and fruitful the alliance of the two States, a situation calculated to eliminate the continual friction and misunderstandings between these nations and to provide instead relations of sympathy and cordiality such as will render possible a normal coöperation towards common aims of general policy.

Any alliance that is not sustained by friendship and that does not of itself contribute to the increase of that friendship must necessarily be barren and futile.

To arrive at such a situation it is necessary when discussing the indemnities due, according to Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, to have at once the courage and the tranquillity to face serenely the delicate question of the possible cession of territories at present forming part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Is the Imperial and Royal Government disposed to discuss the question even if carried on to these grounds?

Being neutral it was not possible for us at present to discuss the matter on a basis of eventual compensation involving territory possessed at present by other belligerents, because that would be equivalent to our taking part as from to-day in the contest.

Baron Macchio in answer admitted the expediency of a free discussion of the entire matter, putting aside all considerations of susceptibility and *amour propre*. He pointed out the possibility of compensation in relation to Albania, a country in the neighbourhood of Italy, and easy of access.

I answered that in Albania I could perceive only one real interest for Italy, a negative one, consisting, that is to say, in our hindering any other Power from invading it; and that, for the rest, it was a region that had no attractions for us.

The Austrian Ambassador remarked that every reciprocal engagement should be founded upon the principle of *do ut des;* wherefore Italy, too, would have to determine what share she would contribute, or else it would become necessary to determine the share of advantages which should accrue to Austria-Hungary at the end of the war and Italy's advantages would be proportioned thereto. Austria-Hungary did not look for territorial increase at the expense of Serbia.

I replied that the advantages might be other than territorial; and that it was possible to ensure many advantages of influence and of

political, economical, and moral preponderance, all of which were within the sphere of Article VII.

And the principle of *do ut des* would also be observed if, within predetermined limits, one of the contracting parties were to allow the other a free hand in its actions in return for precise and settled concessions.

To Baron Macchio's repeatedly urged observation that all agreement should be allowed to depend upon the ultimate results of the war I replied that if we were to control Italian public opinion, inclining it favourably towards our agreement we must be able from the outset to show a minimum of advantages that were tangible and assured, and not merely dependent upon uncertain and remote eventualities. Otherwise any engagement must remain without practical effect.

Baron Macchio having indicated the extreme difficulty of discussing questions of this nature, not only on the score of *amour propre* and susceptibility but also on account of the precedents which would be set up in an Empire constituted as was the Austro-Hungarian, I answered him that the detachment of the few Italians who had remained Austrian subjects could not set up a precedent dangerous to the Empire because since 1859 and 1860 the Italian element had become so exiguous in numbers as not to be able to hold its own against the other nationalities associated with it and could never entertain the aspirations common to the other nationalities of any development within the ambit of the Empire. I cited the instance of Trieste, where at the very time when the relations between the two States had become most cordial, the pressure of the Slavs had induced the Imperial Government to make decrees that were adverse to the Italian element, notwithstanding the harm resulting from this to the international situation itself. For the Italian element in Austria the only possible alternatives were either to disappear, stifled by the pressure of the other nationalities, Slav and German, or else to detach itself from the Empire.

It might be more advisable in the interests of the general and international situation for that Empire to proceed to such amputation.

It was agreed between us that all these questions should be discussed in a friendly spirit, each party putting forward its ideas and proposals, and thus debating the matter both at Vienna and at Rome.

SONNINO.

No. 11.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 15th January,* 1915.

For your Excellency's exclusive information I give you the substance of some recent interviews of mine.

11*th January,* 1915. *First interview.*

Prince von Bülow informed me that Germany was sending to Vienna Count von Wedel, who was Ambassador at Rome, and afterwards for many years at Vienna, and this with the object of inducing the Austrian Government to cede the Trentino to Italy.

The chief difficulties that are foreseen and from which it would be desirable to discover an issue, are, said Prince von Bülow, of two kinds:

First, of a military character; the military element would oppose the discharge of all soldiers proceeding from that region which it is proposed to cede. It is said that the Trentino in the Imperial Army are sturdy fighters. Would it not be possible to postpone the discharge of these soldiers until peace shall have been declared?

Second, of a dynastic character, it would be undesirable to hurt the susceptibilities of the Emperor who bears among his titles that of Count of Tyrol. A formal way out of this might lie in the cession of the territory of the ancient Bishopric of Trent, which formed part of the Germanic Roman Empire and which was incorporated with the Tyrol at a comparatively recent date. But what precisely, Prince von Bülow asked me, were the confines of the Bishopric?

I replied that in regard to the military questions, I could not perceive the possibility of postponing the discharge of the soldiers derived from the provinces to be ceded; that given the cession of territory, the retaining under arms of its conscript soldiers would have a deplorable effect upon Italian public opinion.

In regard to the question of the Bishopric of Trent, I could not now say anything.

In the formation of the first Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy the Trentino had been detached from Tyrol and it extended as far as Bolzano.

Prince von Bülow remarked that at least the greater part of the

population of Bolzano was German, whilst in the valley of Merano it was entirely German.

He suggested that I should go into the question of the confines of the ancient ecclesiastical Principality of Trent, saying that he, too, would seek information, and adding that it was desirable to do everything possible in order to facilitate Count von Wedel's task.

Prince von Bülow talks as if it should be understood that in the event of our being offered Trentino by Austria in return for our engagement to remain in absolute neutrality, we are to exact nothing further.

Second interview.

In the afternoon of the same day, the 11th January, Baron Macchio whilst discussing with me Article VII. and the question of eventual indemnities, spoke of Albania, saying that he could not understand why Italy should no longer attach to it that importance which it had manifestly attached to it in years past.

I replied, repeating that our interest in Albania was, if anything, a negative one, namely that no other Power should occupy it; and that we had no desire to be caught in the toils of internal Balkan questions and to find ourselves inevitably and permanently in opposition to Serbia and Bulgaria. That, for the rest, Austria, too, now appeared to attach less importance to Albania. That we would confine the question of compensation to the provinces that were the object of popular nationalist sentiment.

Baron Macchio was persistent, being unable to resign himself to this dismissal of Albania from the subject. He remarked that Article VII. concerned the Balkans only.

I replied that it concerned Balkan modifications as grounds upon which to treat for compensation, but that this did not at all imply that all compensation should be exclusively confined to the Balkans.

Baron Macchio referred to our armaments and to our concentration of troops, particularly in the provinces nearest the Austrian frontier. He pointed out the friendly neutrality which was to be observed when one of the allies considered that it was not obliged to take part with the others in hostilities.

Third interview.

Prince von Bülow called upon me to-day, the 14th January, and asked me whether it were not possible eventually, when an agreement regarding the Trentino should have been concluded, to refrain from

announcing the fact to the public or even to Parliament, the Government merely informing the latter that it held assurances that the greater national aspirations would be satisfied.

I told him that this would be absolutely impossible; that the public imagination would become excited to such an extent that when eventually it learnt what was really involved universal disillusion and reaction must follow. It would be even better to do nothing; or to announce nothing as concluded.

As to the form of the cession, so far as the Trentino was concerned, the Emperor might perfectly well, even after that had taken place, retain his title of Count of Tyrol, because the Trentino was administratively united to the County of Tyrol only in 1802. It would suffice that in making the cession the boundaries should be precisely determined because in the course of centuries the boundaries of the ecclesiastical Principality of Trent had varied considerably. I added that I did not believe that popular Italian sentiment would content itself with the Trentino alone. That a permanent condition of harmony between Austria and Italy would not be attained until it were possible entirely to eliminate the irredentist formula of "Trent and Trieste."

Prince von Bülow urged that we should not increase our demands because Austria would certainly prefer war to the cession of Trieste. And he pointed out to me all the importance attached by Austria to the possession of that port. He was of opinion that he could succeed in the matter of the Trentino, but not further. He repeated that it was of the first importance to Germany and to Italy that an agreement should be reached and war avoided.

SONNINO.

No. 12.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 18*th January,* 1915.
recd. 18*th.*

(Telegram.)

In a conversation to-day with the Minister for Foreign Affairs here I submitted the various arguments expounded by your Excellency to Baron Macchio in the course of the interview with him concerning the application of Article VII. of the Treaty of Alliance.

Baron Burian remembered that he desired again to declare to me that in the event of a real temporary occupation by Austria-Hungary, the Imperial and Royal Government was prepared to give Italy the compensation due as agreed by the said Article.

He then observed that he did not understand how it could be asserted that Austria-Hungary had undertaken this war with aims opposed to the interests of Italian policy in the Balkan Peninsula; the object which Austria-Hungary had in view upon going to war with Serbia was that of safeguarding the interests of the Monarchy, and consequently, the existing *status quo* which was threatened by that Power.

The war, therefore, as the Imperial and Royal Government had repeatedly declared, was defensive and not aggressive in its aims.

I drew Baron Burian's attention to the fact that we were interested in the maintenance of the political and economical independence of Serbia and the equilibrium of the Balkan Peninsula.

It was evident that this independence and this equilibrium were gravely menaced by the present war, and that consequently it could not be regarded by us as other than contrary to our interests in the Balkans.

When Baron Burian rejoined that Austria-Hungary did not at all aim at modifying the *status quo* in the Balkans or at the acquisition of Serbian or other territory, since it was not intended to increase the Serb population of the Monarchy, I remarked that the independence of Serbia and the equilibrium of the Balkans would have been threatened not only by territorial acquisitions that Austria-Hungary might have effected in that kingdom or elsewhere, but also by any advantage of influence and political preponderance, and further by economical, moral and other influences which undoubtedly were all contemplated by Article VII. of the Treaty.

Baron Burian told me then that he was disposed to coöperate with your Excellency so as to eliminate the continual friction and misunderstanding between the two nations and to set up reciprocal relations upon a basis of sympathy and cordiality, and, further, that he was prepared to endorse your Excellency's remarks to Baron Macchio concerning the sterility and unprofitableness of an alliance that was not sustained by friendship.

Alluding then to the eventual cession of territories at present appertaining to the Monarchy, he expressed his surprise that the question should have been carried on to such delicate grounds, these territories being looked upon here as *"erbland."* In pointing out

the grave difficulties to which such a question will give rise, he added that if the demand formulated by Italy were known to the public it could not fail to provoke the liveliest resentment in all quarters of the Monarchy. I remarked that it did not seem to me that the demand to which he alluded need hinder the friendly discussion of the question itself, starting out upon the assumption that this prejudicial condition might come to be eliminated in the course of that discussion.

When Baron Burian pointed out that the cession of territory we requested might constitute a precedent in a Monarchy such as the Austro-Hungarian, I explained to him that the detachment of a few Italian subjects of Austria could not amount to a precedent dangerous to the Monarchy, and on that subject I submitted to him the other arguments employed by your Excellency with Baron Burian. In speaking thereafter of our occupation of the Dodecanesian Islands and Valona, Baron Burian remarked that Article VII. of the Treaty might have been cited on the score of these occupations, and he alluded in passing to an ulterior expansion on our part of the occupation of Valona.

I replied that it did not appear to me that the said article could be cited on the score of those occupations. It was well known how the occupation of the Dodecanesus came to take place. As for the occupation of Valona, it was occasioned by the state of disorder then prevailing in Albania and it aimed at safeguarding the deliberations of the Conference of London, Italy being the only Power that was not involved in the war.

For the rest, the efforts of the Royal Italian Government had for object to preserve as far as possible at present the Albanian *status quo* pending the ultimate deliberations concerning Europe to be held at the conclusion of the war. I added that Albania had for us no interest other than a negative one, namely that of hindering any other Power attempting to invade it, and that it was a region offering no attractions to Italy. We had no desire to be caught perforce in the toils of internal Balkan questions and to find ourselves in permanent conflict with Serbia or any other Balkan Power. I had no doubt that Baron Macchio would have informed him of what was really the situation in Italy. The majority of the population desired neutrality and was determined to support the Government, but this upon the presumption that the national aspirations would obtain some satisfaction.

It must not be forgotten that our Monarchy derived its strength particularly from its representation of the national sentiment. It

was in consequence of this that the Royal Italian Government had carried the question of compensation into the region towards which the eyes of popular sentiment were turned, so that it might derive thence the necessary strength to undertake and maintain the eventual diplomatic engagements. I reminded Baron Burian of what he had declared to me on the occasion of my first visit, namely that he would strive to the end that the alliance might subsist in the future. But to attain that object it was necessary, as I had already pointed out, to give the alliance what it lacked at present, namely a perfect reciprocal cordiality, placing matters upon an assured and enduring basis, and such was your Excellency's aim in carrying the question of compensation on to the grounds which I had indicated to him. To this Baron Burian replied that he recognised that the object was a friendly one and that he was grateful to your Excellency, but that he could only remind me of what he had already said on the subject.

In conclusion Baron Burian remarked that he did not understand how Italy, as a neutral Power, could not consent to a discussion on the subject of compensation relating to territory appertaining to other belligerent States whilst it could demand on the score of compensation territories appertaining to Austria-Hungary which was also a belligerent State. It did not seem to him that something could be demanded from Austria-Hungary which yet could not be demanded from other Powers that were likewise belligerent. He engaged me therefore to invite your Excellency to a more complete and clear expression of ideas on the subject.

Baron Burian concluded by saying that he would further consider the question which I had brought before him, and that he would consult more closely the terms of Article VII. of the Treaty, which he had not at hand just now, and that he expressed himself as prepared to discuss the question itself with me in a friendly spirit, going into the suggestions and proposals that might be put forward concerning it.

AVARNA.

No. 13.

The Italian Ambassador at Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, 22nd January, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd. 22nd.*

The Chancellor having come to Berlin for a couple of days, expressed the wish to see me, and I had an interview with him yesterday evening. He told me that he was informed of the exchange of views that had been initiated between the Italian and the Austro-Hungarian Governments, and that he ardently desired that this might lead to a mutually satisfactory result, so as to maintain and consolidate the good relations between the two Powers, since these constitute a cardinal point in the policy of the German Government. To this end the German Government had supported the representations we made at Vienna and will continue to support them with all possible insistence; but it was necessary, he added, that the Royal Italian Government should also do what it can to make the task easy, conducting the operations with that prudence and moderation demanded by the peculiarly delicate nature of the subject under discussion.

BOLLATI.

No. 14.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 23rd January,* 1915.

With regard to the request made to your Excellency by Baron Burian in the interview of the 18th instant, for fuller particulars on the subject of my exclusion of territories belonging to a third belligerent, and to Baron Burian's remark that Austria-Hungary is also a belligerent State, it seems to me almost superfluous to explain that we are asking Austria-Hungary to cede territories already possessed by that State as its own, whilst the Austro-Hungarian Government would prefer to discuss the cession of territories appertaining at present to one of its adversaries, and that in this lies all the difference.

Whether belligerent or not, any State can give to a neutral some-

thing that is its own or it can enter upon an exchange, without acceptance on the part of the latter constituting the least violation of neutrality; always provided (and this would not be now in question) that the thing transferred should not be the very subject of contention between the donor and the third parties; but the same may not be said when it becomes a question of granting a territory which the conceding State does not possess as its own, but which belongs instead to one of its belligerent adversaries; in such a case the acceptance of such an offer of territory on the part of the neutral State must obviously be considered an unfriendly act, and tantamount to taking sides against the present owner of the actual territory.

From all quarters to-day a new Austro-Hungarian expedition against Serbia is announced. Such an expedition tends to disturb the political situation in the Balkans, increasing on the one hand the influence and interests of Austria-Hungary, and imperilling on the other the conditions of Serbia, the preservation of whose full political and economical independence represents an Italian interest of the first magnitude.

In these circumstances it is now desirable once more to draw the attention of that Government to the particular importance and urgency assumed by the preliminary discussion concerning the compensation to be stipulated by Italy in accordance with Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance.

I beg your Excellency to lay the foregoing before Baron Burian immediately upon his return to Vienna, and to telegraph.

SONNINO.

No. 15.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassadors at Vienna and Berlin.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 26th January,* 1915.

Prince von Bülow informed me to-day that it will not be possible to arrive at a practical conclusion of the negotiations with Austria-Hungary regarding the application of Article VII. of the Treaty unless the Italian Government states precisely what it requires, since the Austro-Hungarian Government fears that if it concedes anything the demands will be multiplied and it will have to face a *"Schraube ohne Ende."*

We are urged once more not to demand too much.

I replied that as long as the Government of Vienna declines to agree explicitly and clearly that the discussion be carried into the region of the cession of territories at present belonging to the Empire, it is not to be exacted that we should detail the quantity and quality of our demands. So far Vienna has always replied in a vague and general manner, urging prejudices or objections upon grounds of principle.

Let Vienna announce that it accepts this basis of discussion and I can then consult my colleagues for the purpose of formulating precise demands.

I added that I was somewhat discouraged by the course of events. The officious Press of Vienna (as, for instance, the *Tageblatt* and the *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung*) published inopportune declarations that excluded all possibility of the cession of territories now appertaining to the Empire. In this manner any eventual concession was rendered extremely difficult.

Meanwhile the news of the concentration of Austro-German troops on the frontiers of Roumania and Serbia, for purposes of aggression, against the latter, according to some, or against the former, according to others, foreshadows a new impending danger and is giving rise in Italy to a strong movement of public opinion in favour of our taking part in the war.

I have laboured strenuously to pacify the public mind, to moderate its desires and hopes, and to urge confidence in diplomatic measures; but I am becoming only too well convinced that whilst at home I am shouldering the daily increasing burden of political responsibility, abroad no effort will conduce to any practical result, and that notwithstanding the indubitable good-will, which I willingly recognised, on the part both of Prince von Bülow and of the German Government, we shall be completely *"bernés"* by Austria-Hungary.

SONNINO.

No. 16.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 28th January, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd. 29th.*

I conveyed to Baron Burian the particulars he requested on the subject of the refusal of the Royal Italian Government to accept a discussion on the basis of eventual compensation in connexion with territories belonging to other belligerents. Commenting upon the expression "offer of territory," contained in your Excellency's telegram, Baron Burian said that according to Article VII. of the Treaty it was not for the contracting party that had obtained advantages to put forward an offer of compensation, but for the other contracting party to formulate its demands on the subject. Therefore it was not for Austria-Hungary to offer to Italy the compensation due, but for Italy instead to make known her demands.

To begin with I pointed out to Baron Burian that it did not seem to me that your Excellency was alluding by that expression to Article VII., which, for the rest, referred to a preliminary agreement between the two contracting parties and was based upon the principle of reciprocal compensation. And I added that the Royal Italian Government had already communicated its demands concerning compensation to the Imperial and Royal Government.

After remarking that by an examination of the text of Article VII. he might have convinced himself of the exactitude of the comment which I had put forward at our last interview, to the effect that compensation was not to be sought in the Balkan region, Baron Burian remarked that the question of compensation had been carried by us on to extremely delicate grounds, thus giving rise to grave difficulties as we ourselves could not fail to realise. He wondered, therefore, why Italy should not have sought in other territories the compensation to which she was entitled.

I replied that the Royal Italian Government must take into account the national aspirations that were being manifested in Italy. Wherefore, as I had already made clear to him in our last interview, the question of compensation had been carried into that region towards which the eyes of popular sentiment were turned. Baron Burian then remarked that it would not be possible to determine the compensation to be made to Italy, because Austria-Hungary had not yet made any

acquisitions or obtained any advantages, and that moreover it had no intention of obtaining any.

I added that to enable the Imperial and Royal Government to maintain its engagements with us it was necessary that we should come to a timely agreement concerning the manner in which these were to be maintained, because the course of events might bring us face to face with a *fait accompli*. In this connexion I reminded him that in accordance with Article VII. the agreement should be in anticipation of and not contemporary with or consecutive to the facts which had occasioned it.

Seeing that Baron Burian continued to express himself to me as he had done at our previous interviews, in a vague and general manner, answering me by urging prejudices or objections on the score of principle, without entering into the merits of the question of compensation, I thought it advisable to draw his attention to the fact that it was necessary he should make known explicitly whether he admitted that the discussion should be carried into the region of the cession of territories belonging to the Monarchy, as it was not desirable that our conversations should be protracted without conducing to any practical and positive result before events should have matured.

Baron Burian repeated that the question of compensation such as had been framed by us was an extremely grave one, because it demanded that the Imperial and Royal Government should cut off a portion of the Monarchy. He was now considering it in his own "*for intérieur*," and it was become the subject of his most serious reflections. He had not yet, however, found a way to determine it, and he was debating between the external and the still more serious internal difficulties by which the solution of the question was beset. It was to be examined not only by himself but also by the various responsible agents of Austria and of Hungary, since it interested both sections of the Monarchy. He added that he admitted the principle of compensation due to us by virtue of Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. He also accepted in principle our demand for compensation and he was disposed to examine and discuss it, but he had not yet reached the point of being able to declare that he admitted our point of view to the effect that the question of compensation should be carried into the region of the cession of territories at present belonging to the Monarchy. It was desirable that the Royal Italian Government should convince itself of the magnitude of the sacrifice which this would entail for Austria-Hungary.

He remarked that our demand required rigid scrutiny on ac-

count of the grave consequences that might arise in Austria-Hungary from the point of view of internal and external policy, which were at all costs to be avoided. Therefore sufficient time in which to reflect and decide should be allowed to himself and the competent Austrian and Hungarian agents.

He certainly had no wish to increase the embarrassments of the Royal Italian Government, but that Government should be able to understand those in which the Imperial and Royal Government also found itself, and it should do nothing on its own side to increase these. On this subject Baron Burian informed me that in his interviews with the Chancellor of the Empire and with Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann, he had pointed out to them the grave difficulties evoked by the question of compensation in consequence of the delicate grounds on to which this had been carried by Italy, whence arose the necessity on the part of the Imperial and Royal Government seriously to consider it before coming to a decision. The German Government had entirely convinced itself of these difficulties and had undertaken to place them before the Royal Italian Government urging upon the latter that moderation and prudence which had been urged upon itself.

Baron Burian finally divulged to me that the German Government was determined to strive to the end that an agreement between Austria-Hungary and Italy might be reached and that he did not himself despair of seeing this attained. Germany and Austria-Hungary now formed one single person, and it was their desire that the alliance with Italy might continue in the future, this being also his own ardent wish.

But the two Governments, the Austrian and the Hungarian, seem at present to hesitate to accept our aspirations, as is shown by the language employed by Baron Burian himself, and this on account of the consequences to which the cession of territories belonging to Austria might give rise throughout the entire Monarchy.

AVARNA.

No. 17.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 2nd February,* 1915.

At the weekly reception yesterday Prince von Bülow asked me whether there was news of Baron Burian and of his conversations with the Duke of Avarna.

I read out to him the greater part of the Duke of Avarna's last telegram. I pointed out how extremely discouraging is all this to those who desire to come to an understanding; since although Baron Burian had joined the Government, if not to treat of this very question, at least with full knowledge of it, yet after visiting German Headquarters and discussing the said question with the Emperor William and with the German Government, he could to-day find nothing more definite to say to us than that he felt the need calmly to consider it further.

In answer to Prince von Bülow's questions, I repeated that we shall not present our demands until we know that Austria-Hungary accepts for discussion the question of the cession of territories at present belonging to the Monarchy, and that until that day I shall define nothing and exclude nothing, whether concerning the Trentino, Trieste, Istria, or any other territory; and I begged him to urge all concerned to expedite a decision, because the greater the delay, the greater would be the difficulties and the higher our demands.

SONNINO.

No. 18.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 4th February,* 1915.

Baron Macchio having come to see me upon another matter, I introduced the subject of the interview between your Excellency and Baron Burian after his return from Berlin—an interview from which it appeared that all remained still uncertain and overclouded—concerning the question of compensation covered by Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. And I seized the opportunity to repeat

what I had said to Prince von Bülow (my telegram of the 2nd February), namely that to the reproach addressed to us of not defining our demands, we must answer that until it should become clear that the Austro-Hungarian Government would admit as a subject for discussion the eventual cession of territories now possessed by the Monarchy, it was not possible for us to define anything; but that we should do so as soon as that subject was admitted to discussion.

SONNINO.

No. 19.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 7th February,* 1915.

As is shown by your Excellency's telegram of the 28th January last, your Excellency had drawn Baron Burian's attention to the fact that it was advisable that the Italo-Austrian conversations on the subject of the compensation as provided by Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance should not be protracted without conducing to a practical and positive result before events should have matured.

I am therefore surprised that ten days should have elapsed without my having received either from Baron Macchio or from your Excellency any fresh advices on the subject.

I beg of you to see Baron Burian again, representing to him the urgency and the necessity of an early reply on the question of principle regarding the territories now possessed by Austria-Hungary, upon which we have requested that the discussions should turn.

SONNINO.

No. 20.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 9th February, 1915.

(Telegram.) *recd. 10th.*

In reminding Baron Burian of what I had submitted in our interview of the 28th January last, I conveyed to him the substance of your

Excellency's instructions. Baron Burian repeated all that he had told me in our last interview, namely that the question was one which concerned both the Governments of the Monarchy; in the first place the Austrian Government, which was directly interested, and in the second place the Hungarian Government. Therefore, to shelter his own responsibility he must come to an understanding with the said two Governments. He had already entered into an exchange of views on the subject with the Austrian Government. The President of the Council of Ministers, Count Sturgck, had made known to him that he was not favourably disposed towards our plans and that he did not consider justified the reasons we put forward for claiming the cession of territories belonging to Austria-Hungary; Count Sturgck had shown himself very uncompromising on the subject, but he had declared that he would submit it to the Council of Ministers, so that our demands might be examined and discussed. With regard to the Hungarian Government, Baron Burian informed me that during the sojourn of Count Tisza in Vienna, he had been unable through lack of time to do more than give him a simple outline of our demands, and Count Tisza had not looked upon these with any favour. He intends however to visit Budapest one of these days to see the Hungarian Government and to discuss the question calmly and at length with Count Tisza, and he would subsequently advise me of the attitude of the latter towards it. I drew Baron Burian's attention to the fact that it was necessary to expedite a decision on the question of principle involved, because a further delay might give rise to fresh difficulties in view of the imminent reopening of Parliament. This delay was certainly not encouraging to those who desired to arrive at an understanding. It could not fail to occasion uncertainty as to the attitude of the Imperial Government, and to create, through the excitement and demonstrations to which it might lead, a situation of great difficulty for the Royal Italian Government, which would have been unable to hold out anything of a concrete and definite nature to appease the national aspirations. It was hence desirable that the Imperial and Royal Government should put an end to this uncertainty, affording us an answer frankly and at the earliest opportunity, so that the respective exchange of views might be embarked upon.

Baron Burian replied that he was working, and that he would continue actively to work, to the end that he might discuss and examine the question with both Governments; but he observed that an uncommonly persuasive force would be needed to induce him to enter into the point of view of the Royal Italian Government. He then remarked

that to accept the discussion of the question as it had been presented by the Royal Italian Government was not as easy as it appeared, since it would, in his view, have implied on the part of the Imperial and Royal Government an undertaking towards us to listen to our proposals. And he concluded by saying that he was not yet in a position to listen to them, as conversations on the subject were still being continually held by the Austrian and the Hungarian Governments.

Baron Burian then said that he desired to carry our conversation to another subject. In recalling the reasons, logical and political, given in your Excellency's telegram of the 7th January, he remarked that he associated himself fully with all that your Excellency urged on political grounds, namely to create between Austria-Hungary and Italy a situation calculated to eliminate the continual friction and misunderstanding between the two nations, and to establish reciprocal relations upon a basis of sympathy and cordiality. And he added that he was a thorough partisan of the Triple Alliance. Referring then to Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, he observed that in consequence of a fresh and careful examination of the text of the article itself and of various documents relating to our temporary occupation of Valona and the Dodecanesus, he had formed the conviction that those occupations imposed upon Italy the obligation of a preliminary agreement with Austria-Hungary based upon the principle of compensation.

I considered it advisable in this connexion to remind Baron Burian of what I had already stated to him in our interview of the 17th January, namely that it did not appear to me that Article VII. could be invoked in relation to the said occupations. The occupation of Valona had been occasioned by the general state of disorder prevailing in Albania, and had for object to safeguard the deliberations of the Conference of London, Italy being the only Power that was not implicated in the war. For the rest, the efforts of the Royal Italian Government were being applied at this moment to the preservation as far as possible of the Albanian *status quo*, pending the deliberations which would be held concerning Europe at the conclusion of the war.

With regard to the occupation of the Dodecanesus, it was well known how this had come about. If it had not yet been possible for the Royal Italian Government to abandon those islands, this was due to the fact that Turkey had not fulfilled the obligations imposed upon her by the Treaty of Lausanne, failing in them inasmuch as there were still in Libya numerous officers and soldiers belonging to the Ottoman army.

To my further observations that those islands were, unless memory failed me, in the Mediterranean, Baron Burian remarked that eight of them were in the Ægean Sea, and were therefore covered by Article VII. And he added that my objections did not diminish the grounds of his assertion, which was fully justified by the stipulations of Article VII., which gave the Imperial and Royal Government, in consequence of the aforesaid occupations, a clear and absolute right to a preliminary agreement based upon the principle of compensation. For the rest, Article VII. made no distinctions or restrictions of any kind between temporary and permanent occupation. Its text was explicit and left no doubt whatever that our occupations came under the provisions of it. He added that our occupation of Valona had been aggravated by the despatch thither of further troops and by the measures taken by our authorities which had established themselves there. Passing on to speak of the discussion with Count Berchtold regarding distinctions between temporary and momentary occupation, Baron Burian said that any occupation of Serbia effected by the Imperial and Royal Government in consequence of military operations by the Austro-Hungarian troops, gave us the right to discuss compensation in accordance with Article VII.

I replied to Baron Burian that by this declaration, of which I took note, he abandoned the proposition sustained by Count Berchtold, which drew a distinction between a temporary and a momentary occupation, and that he came thus to recognise as exact the interpretation placed by us upon Article VII. Baron Burian concluded by saying that he had thought it well to oppose to our demands for compensation the two above-mentioned counter-proposals for compensation, which certainly, however, did not aim at hindering the discussion of those presented by us. But the moment had seemed to him opportune to formulate them, with a view to removing all questions pending between us, and to clearing the ground of anything that might in future give rise to friction. He added that he deemed it advisable specially to insist upon this point, but he assured me that his counter-proposals were not on that account to be interpreted as indications of ill-will or of an unfriendly spirit towards us.

As your Excellency will have gathered, Baron Burian was not yet able to-day to afford a complete answer to our demands, entrenching himself behind the difficulty of inducing the Austrian and the Hungarian Governments to consider these demands.

AVARNA.

No. 21.

The Italian Ambassador of Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 12th February, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd.* 13*th.*

With reference to our interview of the 9th instant, Baron Burian has just sent me a memorandum of the grounds upon which the Austro-Hungarian counter-proposals are based.

Memorandum.

At the outset of the conversations which have been current for some time between Austria-Hungary and Italy on the subject of the compensation which Italy might claim on the basis of Article VII. of the Treaty of Alliance, in case of territorial or other advantages accruing to Austria-Hungary from her action against Serbia and Montenegro. the Italian Government had developed the idea that the political reasons in favour of such a discussion were the creation of good faith between the two States, so as to eliminate continual friction and to render possible the coöperation of the two nations towards objects of general policy. The Austro-Hungarian Government, sincerely actuated by the same propensities, recognises as fully the advantages of clearing the ground of any element that might in the future trammel the development of cordial relations between the two States. With this end in view it is considered necessary in the first place to bring about an agreement upon all questions regarding our reciprocal rights arising out of Article VII. of our Treaty of Alliance, and particularly upon two questions, one of which goes back several years, whilst the other is of recent date, both of them closely affecting our well-founded interests.

We are concerned with the question of the islands in the Ægean occupied by Italy, and with that of Italy's action in Albania. As for the first of these questions, it would be superfluous to recapitulate here the various phases, quite fresh in our minds, of the conversations which took place on the subject in 1911 and 1912 between Vienna and Rome, and which should be found recorded in the archives of the Consulta. It will suffice to state the following points:

(1) Notwithstanding the obvious danger introduced by the modification of the *status quo* in consequence of the occupation by Italy of the Dodecanesian islands, which would sooner or later be reflected

in the Balkan Peninsula, Austria-Hungary did not formally oppose it, since it was not her wish to trammel in any way the operations of her ally.

(2) Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian Government called attention at the time to Article VII. of the Treaty of Alliance, and declared to the Italian Government on several occasions, on the 6th, 7th and 14th November, 1911, on the 13th, 15th and 20th April, 1912, on the 20th, 21st and 31st May, 1912, and on the 5th June, 1912, that the fact of these occupations, declared to be of a temporary character, brought into force Austria-Hungary's right to a preliminary agreement, based upon the principle of compensation, formulated in the said article, and that we reserved to ourselves the right of claiming its fulfilment at a given time. With regard to the duration, in any case irrelevant, of these occupations which should constitute a sound title to compensation, Italy assured the Austro-Hungarian Government several times, and in the most categorical manner, that these occupations were no more than transient, and that they would come to an end after the cessation of hostilities between Italy and Turkey. The question was even discussed of a written declaration on the subject which the Italian Government should deliver to the Austro-Hungarian Government, without, however, its having been possible to agree to the terms of this document. Nevertheless the Austro-Hungarian Government desires to reproduce here the following text of that declaration as it was proposed by the Italian Government: "It is understood that in the mind of the Italian Government the occupation so far effected, or which might be effected hereafter, in the islands of the Ægean Sea, is of a provisional character, and that the said islands will be restored to Turkey after the cessation of hostilities between Italy and Turkey, and, consequently, after the evacuation of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica by the Ottoman troops and officers, and as soon as the conditions indicated to the Great Powers in the Italian note of the 15th March, 1912, shall have been realised. It is equally understood that the present declaration which arises out of the provisions of Article VII. of the Treaty of Alliance shall be considered strictly secret and confidential by the Austro-Hungarian Government and also by the Italian Government, since otherwise it would not achieve the common object of the two Powers, which is to hasten and facilitate peace." It results from this declaration, on the one hand, that the conditions to which Italy had subordinated the evacuation of the Dodecanesus at present no longer obtain, and also that although nearly three years have elapsed since then, Italy has

not yet restored these islands to Turkey. On the other hand, this declaration proves that Italy recognised the correlation existing between these occupations and Article VII. of the Treaty of Alliance. It seems, therefore, evident that if the Government desires to discuss at once the compensation to which the article in question would entitle it in the case of a future and, as it happens, uncertain Austro-Hungarian occupation, the Austro-Hungarian Government may in its turn demand, and with still greater reason, a discussion of the compensation to which it is already entitled in consequence of the prolonged occupation of the Dodecanesus on the part of Italy.

Passing on to the question of Italy's action in Albania, the Austro-Hungarian Government desires to state that it has received on this subject only two communications from the Italian Government. On the 23rd October last the Duke of Avarna informed Count Berchtold that, in view of the penury manifested among the refugees in Valona and of the anarchy prevailing there, Italy saw herself induced to provide, by the despatch of a small sanitary police mission, for "certain necessary police operations and humanitarian measures in favour of the refugees, without giving these operations the character of a military expedition amounting to an occupation, in the proper sense of the term, of the city of Valona."

The Duke of Avarna was desired to add that, in conformity with the declarations which she had made at the commencement of the present war, Italy would continue to remain faithful to the agreement in force between herself and Austria-Hungary concerning Albania and the Epirus, and to maintain the decisions of the Conference of London particularly in what concerned the neutrality and the frontiers of Albania.

The Austro-Hungarian Government made a note of this communication. On the 26th December last the Duke of Avarna informed Count Berchtold that, to put an end to the local anarchy, the Italian Government found it necessary to disembark a detachment of sailors at Valona. It would be a matter of purely provisional measures which would not extend beyond the city of Valona. The declarations quoted above were renewed on this occasion. Count Berchtold confined himself to making a note of this communication. Now, since then the action of Italy in Albania has been gradually changed and, above all, intensified. The disembarkation of a detachment of Italian sailors at Valona was followed by the despatch of Italian infantry and artillery and of a considerable quantity of war material. The city of

Valona, as well as Kanina and Svernez, have been occupied in a military sense.

The number of Italian warships in Albanian waters has constantly increased. When the invasion of Durazzo by the enemies of Essad Pasha was feared, one of these ships fired upon the besiegers, a thing which last year, and in very much graver circumstances, the Italian Government had considered its duty to refuse to do in conjunction with the Austro-Hungarian Government. Apart from this military action, Italy has also taken possession of the civil administration of Valona, where the prefecture, the financial administration, the police and the municipality are controlled by agents of the Italian Government, some of whom are invested with the title of Royal Commissioners. An analogous measure has just been applied to the Custom House at Valona. Another provision of the Italian Government requires that all persons repairing to Valona shall be supplied with a passport bearing the Italian *visé*. Although in our view the aggregate of these measures is not at all in accordance with the terms and meaning of the reiterated Italian declarations, the Austro-Hungarian Government abstains for the moment from all protest, but it finds itself obliged to state that the action of Italy comes unquestionably under the definition of a temporary occupation, according to our interpretation of Article VII., and, like the occupation of the Dodecanesus, gives us at once the right to compensation.

The case of the Italian occupation of Valona ceasing to be entirely transient has not yet arisen, but it follows naturally that that alternative, since it is incompatible with the Italo-Austro-Hungarian agreement concerning Albania, and since it produces a modification of the Adriatic equilibrium so often cited by the Italian Government, would give Austria-Hungary also an additional right to adequate compensation.

To sum up the foregoing, the Austro-Hungarian Government is of the opinion that the conversations so happily embarked upon between Italy and Austria-Hungary on the subject of compensation might be pursued still more advantageously if they were to take into consideration also the compensation to be accorded Austria-Hungary for the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesus and for the Italian occupation, though it be only temporary, of Valona.

AVARNA.

No. 22.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 12th February,* 1915.

With regard to the temporary occupations of the Dodecanesus and Valona, which according to Baron Burian imposed upon Italy the obligation of a preliminary agreement with Austria-Hungary based upon the principle of compensation, I must point out the following:

(1) *Dodecanesian Islands.*—Your Excellency was informed by telegram on the 20th May, 1912, that the islands already occupied by the Italian troops were the following: Astylalaea, Rhodes, Casos, Carpathos and Chalce; and that those to be occupied immediately were Syme, Piscope, Nisyros, Calymna, Leros, Lypsos and Patmos.

By our telegram of the 21st May, 1912, your Excellency was informed that we were proceeding immediately to the occupation of Cos.

By your telegram of the 23rd May, your Excellency informed us that you had made the respective communication to Berchtold. Count Berchtold replied, "that such a decision was opposed not only to the declarations previously made to us but also to the engagements into which we had entered by virtue of Article VII. of the Triple Alliance," and that "he would have the right to demand, on the basis of the said article, compensation for these occupations. In view, however, of the considerations submitted to him, and to show his goodwill and his sincere desire to refrain as far as possible at the moment from placing obstacles in the way of our freedom of action, Count Berchtold would not raise any opposition to the aforesaid occupations and *would not avail himself on this occasion of the due right to compensation.* He must, however, formally declare that if he were to proceed to the ulterior occupation of islands in the Ægean it would not be possible for him to consent, on account of the grave consequences which might result, and in leaving upon us the full responsibility of such eventual occupation, he must reserve himself the right to compensation, of which he might avail himself should the occasion arise."

It results from the foregoing that Count Berchtold declared to your Excellency that he waived the right to avail himself of the clause relating to compensation so far as Rhodes and the Dodecanesus

were concerned. Such a declaration obviates the necessity of ascertaining if and how many of the islands occupied by Italy are in the Mediterranean or the Ægean, having regard to Article VII. which concerns the Ægean only.

Further, however, in view precisely of Austria's opposition, and in consequence of the aforesaid declaration that "ulterior occupation" would render operative the clause relating to compensation, the Royal Italian Government took the grave resolve to abstain from the occupation of Chios and Mitylene, notwithstanding that from news received and from facts ascertained it was clear that it was precisely the occupation of Chios and Mitylene that would have stricken our enemy in a manner calculated to weaken his resistance and to constrain him to enter into peace negotiations to set an end to the war.

Italy, therefore, respected the obligations imposed by Article VII. with the result of grave detriment to herself by consequent protraction of the war.

The occupation of Rhodes and the Dodecanesus was prolonged for reasons of two kinds:

(*a*) The evacuation of the islands is subject to the fulfilment by Turkey of the terms of the treaty of Lausanne, to the obligations of which Turkey has not so far submitted. Nor has Turkey yet submitted to the obligation, which she herself recognised, of indemnifying Italy by concessions in Asia Minor, for the expenditure borne in consequence of the protraction of Italian military occupation of islands.

(*b*) By the occupation of the islands, Italy rendered a signal service to Turkey inasmuch as those islands would inevitably have been conquered by Greece, as were Chios, Mitylene and other islands now in possession of Greece. And it follows that Turkey was extremely eager that the Italian occupation should continue, nor did she ever request us to evacuate the islands, clearly perceiving that in the prevailing uncertain political situation and in view of the precariousness of Graeco-Turkish relations, grave indeed would be the danger incurred by the islands if they were restored to Turkey while militarily incapable of defending them. Therefore the occupation of the islands during the Balkan war and during the present European conflict, in which Turkey is participating, constituted and constitutes a service rendered by Italy to the ally of Austria-Hungary.

(2) *Occupation of Valona.*—The Italian occupation of Valona arises out of and is based upon the actual situation in which the Powers that were signatories of the Treaty of London found them-

selves as a result of the European war. By that treaty Albania was created and her frontiers were defined in relation to the contiguous Balkan States.

The Italian Government has maintained ever since the commencement of the present war that the Treaty of London concerning Albania should continue valid and obligatory.

Italy alone, as a neutral Power, was in a position to undertake to safeguard the Treaty of London, and this explains and justifies the fact that from no quarter were any objections raised when we provisionally occupied Sasena and Valona with the object of preserving those important Albanian localities from events which would have produced grave internal consequences. It is, in fact, well known that Valona was imminently threatened by disorders in consequence of the conflicting ambitions of the Geghs and Epirotes. The Epirotes were disowned by the Government of Athens, but there can be no illusions on the score of the consequences which would have followed an Epirote occupation of Valona.

If so far as Valona was concerned it was indispensable to proceed to a provisional military occupation, so far as the rest of Albania was concerned diplomatic measures proved sufficient to curb the ambitions of the neighbouring Balkan States. The urgent representations made to the Governments of Belgrade, of Athens and of Cettinje have had the happy effect of restraining those Governments so far from any incursions or military operations. It is therefore thanks to the firm attitude of the Italian Government that Albania, as established by the conference of London, suffered no radical curtailment.

After answering thus the "counter-proposals" formulated by Baron Burian, which, as I have shown, have no place in the present negotiations, I submit what follows:

More than two months have elapsed since we put the question concerning Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance before the Austro-Hungarian Government, inviting a friendly discussion of the subject of the compensation to be accorded to Italy for the disturbance provoked by that Government in the Balkan equilibrium.

Although we have never received a precise refusal to treat, weeks and months are elapsing and we have not yet succeeded in obtaining a reply even on the preliminary subject of the principle involved, namely, as to whether the Imperial and Royal Government would be disposed to accept discussion on the ground of the cession of territories at present possessed by Austria-Hungary.

On the contrary, whilst on the one hand fresh questions and subjects for debate are being propounded, with the evident object of evading all discussion of the question submitted by us and of prolonging matters, on the other hand fresh military expeditions into the Balkans are meanwhile being prepared.

In view of this persistently dilatory attitude towards us, it is no longer possible to entertain illusions regarding the practical issue of the negotiations. Hence, the Royal Italian Government finds itself constrained, in order that it may preserve its own dignity, to withdraw its every proposal or initiation of discussion, and to confine itself strictly to the provisions of Article VII., declaring that it considers directly opposed to the article itself any military action entered into from to-day by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, whether against Serbia, Montenegro or another, unless there should be a previous agreement as that article demands.

It is not necessary for me to observe that should the Austro-Hungarian Government display in the event a disregard of this declaration and of the provisions of Article VII., such a course might lead to grave consequences, the responsibility for which is forthwith disclaimed by the Royal Italian Government.

On this subject it is as well to recall the intimations made to Italy on several occasions during the Libyan war by the Austro-Hungarian Government.

Count Aehrenthal declared to your Excellency on the 5th November, 1911, that "action by us upon the Ottoman coast of Turkey in Europe, or upon the islands of the Ægean Sea, could not be permitted either by Austria-Hungary or by Germany, because contrary to the Treaty of Alliance." (Your Excellency's telegram of the 5th November, 1911.)

And on the 7th November of the same year your Excellency telegraphed: "Aehrenthal considers bombardment of ports of Turkey in Europe such as Salonica, Cavalla, etc., as contrary to Article VII."

In 1912 our navy, being at the entrance of the Dardanelles, and having been bombarded by the forts of Kum Kale, replied with damage to the forts. Count Berchtold complained of the event, adding that "if the Government desired to regain its liberty of action, the Imperial and Royal Government *could do the same.*" Therefore he would be unable to admit that in the future we should undertake similar operations or indeed any operations that were opposed to the point of view manifested in the previous interviews. Should any

similar operation be undertaken by us *"it might lead to grave consequences."*

Your Excellency will kindly convey the foregoing to that Government.

SONNINO.

No. 23.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Vienna, 14th February,* 1915.

I conveyed to Baron Burian the matter of your Excellency's instructions.

Baron Burian said that he was entirely in ignorance that Count Berchtold could have renounced his right to avail himself of the clause of compensation with regard to our occupations of Rhodes and the Dodecanesus. When I then showed him, in confirmation of the statement contained in your Excellency's telegram, the letter addressed to me by Count Berchtold of the 22nd May, 1912, in which he expressed himself in the very terms which I textually reproduced, Baron Burian remarked that such a renunciation would be not only contrary to the opinion held by the Imperial and Royal Ministry upon Article VII., but also to the provisions of the article itself, and that no document was in existence at the Ballplatz in which it was stated that the right to compensation had been waived. He added that in his opinion the expression used by Count Berchtold, "that he would not avail himself on this occasion of the due right to compensation" was to be interpreted as meaning that he did not intend to avail himself of the right to compensation at the time when the occupation of the islands had taken place or at the time when he discussed the matter with me, but that he retained the power of availing himself of it in proper season. I disputed this interpretation, remarking that if that had been what Count Berchtold had meant he could not have failed to add that he retained the power to avail himself of the right to compensation at another time, whilst the expression used instead by Count Berchtold could have no other meaning but that which we placed upon it, as was clearly shown by the next sentence in which, with reference to ulterior occupation by us on islands in the Ægean Sea, he did reserve the right to compensation so that he might eventually avail himself of it.

Coming then to speak of the decision taken by the Royal and Imperial Government to withdraw its every proposal or initiation of discussion and to confine itself strictly to the provisions of Article VII., Baron Burian remarked that the first question of principle, regarding which your Excellency complained of not having yet received a reply, re-opened the whole matter. He had consented to enter into a discussion with the Royal Italian Government so as to arrive at an agreement, being actuated therein by the best intentions. And he proposed to go to Budapest on the day after to-morrow to discuss the matter with Count Tisza. The Royal Italian Government should, however, recognise that it had placed the matter upon very thorny grounds, and it certainly could not demand that the Imperial and Royal Government should proceed to an immediate discussion of a question affecting the interests of the Monarchy.

Baron Burian informed me that he took note of the communication I made to him in your Excellency's name. But just as the Imperial and Royal Government never desired to depart from the provisions of Article VII., so it would not fail, in the eventual continuation of the campaign against Serbia, to bear in mind the stipulations of that article.

I considered it proper to point out to Baron Burian that the article itself imposed upon the Imperial and Royal Government the obligation, before initiating any military operations, of proceeding to an agreement that should be preliminary to and not contemporary with or consecutive to those operations.

AVARNA.

No. 24.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 17th February,* 1915.

From the answer given by Baron Burian to the communication your Excellency made to him concerning the mistrust of any Austro-Hungarian military action in the Balkans without a previous agreement with the Royal Italian Government, it is evident that there is the intention of permitting such military action to precede the discussion of the indemnities which are the subject of Article VII. I approve of your Excellency's reply. And I beg you to avail your-

self of the very first opportunity clearly to repeat to Baron Burian, so as to avoid regrettable and dangerous misapprehensions, that the clear interpretation of Article VII. imposes that the agreement should be previous to the action, unless the other party consents to a different procedure. In the present circumstances the Royal Italian Government cannot give any such consent; hence the communication made by us to the Imperial and Royal Government amounts precisely to a veto, opposed by us to any military action of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans until the agreement demanded by Article VII. concerning compensation should have been reached. It is necessary to make it quite clear that any other proceeding on the part of that Government could not now be interpreted by us as other than an open violation of the terms of the Treaty and a manifestation of that Government's intention to resume its liberty of action, in which case we should account ourselves fully justified also in resuming our own full liberty of action so as to safeguard our interests.

SONNINO.

No. 25.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 18th February,* 1915.

In an interview on the day before yesterday with Prince von Bülow I told him of the communications made by the Duke of Avarna to Baron Burian regarding the withdrawal on our part of all discussions of the compensation with which Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance is concerned and of our mistrust of any Austro-Hungarian action in the Balkans whenever there was no previous agreement with ourselves. The Prince, after taking a note of what I told him, asked me in confidence whether, speaking between ourselves and not officially, I myself believed that in the supposititious event of Austria's persisting to refuse any concessions concerning the Trentino, there were no other territories, either in Albania or elsewhere, that might be discussed in connexion with the advantages to be ensured to Italy so as to avoid the great calamity of a war between our countries.

I answered that I had always spoken to him in the fullest sincerity, and that I was quite ready to express, apart from all official

character, my own intimate and profound conviction; I did not now wish to enter into discussions regarding the extent of the concessions that might suffice to ensure our neutrality by satisfying in some measure our national aspirations; that on this score there might be greater or less doubt or difference of opinion; but that outside of this basis of concessions no negotiations were possible. It was not a question of the lust of conquest or of megalomaniac ambitions; but of the appreciation of the popular mind and the national sentiment.

The Monarchy of Savoy, as I had previously pointed out to him, finds its strongest roots in the personification of the national ideals, and these roots were so strong as to have been able to hold firmly and to prevail against the prolonged contentions with the Papacy and the spread of socialism in its most revolutionary period.

Therefore, apart from concessions calculated to satisfy, at least in some degree, the national sentiment, there is no basis of discussion.

That all this did not depend upon the will or caprice of this or that Ministry; the tide of public opinion would overwhelm any other question, would sweep away any other force, would overthrow all obstacles; and no subtle arguings, or gloomy presages or exaggeration of dangers, would avail to restrain it.

At Vienna they either could not or would not convince themselves of this situation, and they accounted it mere *bluff* on our part, or else just the fantastic dreams of Prince von Bülow.

In these circumstances the responsibility weighing upon men who direct the Government was enormous. I was conscious of having done everything possible on the one hand to curb impatience and moderate aspirations, and on the other to represent the situation in its crude reality both to Vienna and Berlin.

SONNINO.

No. 26.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 21st February,* 1915.

I saw Prince von Bülow yesterday.

Since he expressed a doubt whether Baron Burian might not have gathered from the communications made to him in the name of the Royal Italian Government by the Duke of Avarna a very dif-

ferent impression from that which he himself (von Bülow) had gathered from all that I had told him on the subject, I repeated to him the substance of the communications made to Vienna, formulating them in a textual résumé, as follows:

"The Government has declared throughout that it could not admit the utility of any discussion concerning the compensation which forms the subject of Article VII., unless this were to relate to the cession of territories at present in the possession of Austria-Hungary; because such discussions, since they could not in any way satisfy Italian national sentiment, could not lead to any agreement.

"Until now the two Governments have discussed rather vaguely Balkan events which have already taken place or which may lie in the future.

"By confining itself to Article VII., according to the last communication made by the Duke of Avarna to Baron Burian, and by withdrawing all previous proposals of discussion, the Italian Government desired clearly to establish the following: the Italian Government does not consent in the future to any military action by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans unless an agreement, as demanded by Article VII., should have been previously reached on the subject of compensation, an agreement which it would be idle to hope to reach otherwise than upon the basis of the cession of territories at present in the possession of Austria-Hungary. If the Austro-Hungarian Government were not in the subsequent events to take into account this declaration of the Italian Government, the latter would perceive in this the proof that Austria-Hungary had resumed its liberty of action with regard to the provisions of the Treaty, and this would justify the Italian Government in resuming its liberty of action also."

SONNINO.

No. 27.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 22nd February, 1915.

(Telegram.) *recd. 23rd.*

I have communicated to Baron Burian what your Excellency telegraphed me, and in adhering scrupulously to your Excellency's instructions I endeavoured to make clear to him the various points

involved. Baron Burian told me that he would reply in the first place to the interpretation placed by your Excellency upon Article VII., according to which the agreement concerning the eventual indemnities was to be concluded, and not merely initiated, before the inception of any military operations of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. In this connexion he remarked that the conclusion of the preliminary agreement would have depended upon us, that we might have prolonged the discussion and that in the meanwhile Austria-Hungary would have been exposed to every attack on the part of Serbia without being able to reply. Further, the compensation to be accorded to Italy should be equivalent to the advantages which might accrue to Austria-Hungary.

But before settling the compensation it was desirable to establish and to proportion the advantages.

These two causes showed, in his opinion, the impossibility of reaching an agreement antecedently to Austria's military operations in the Balkans. I pointed out to Baron Burian that the term "previous agreement" showed in itself that this was to be concluded, and not merely initiated, before the inception of those operations. In fact, the word "agreement" meant definite consent upon a given point, and this meaning acquired greater force from the preceding word, which signified that the thing was to be decided and determined before proceeding further. If that were not the meaning to be attributed to the aforesaid expression by the negotiators of the Treaty, then the conditions to which Article VII. subordinated every modification of the *status quo* would be of no effect.

Further, if the preliminary agreement were not to be concluded, what guarantee would there be for the other contracting party that the agreement itself once it were initiated would be concluded during military operations? Differences of opinion might render impossible its conclusion, in which case the condition provided by Article VII. would not have been fulfilled, and the other contracting party would have incurred the risk of remaining uncompensated. Baron Burian replied that whilst finding my observations reasonable, he, nevertheless, could not admit them or consider them to be in accordance with the spirit or the letter of the Treaty, because by such reasonings the liberty of action of one of the contracting parties might be trammelled, a state of things which certainly could not agree with the intentions of the negotiators of the Treaty. Nor yet could he admit that the non-conclusion of the agreement before any military operations should have taken place constituted a negation of guarantees

for the other contracting party. The word of the contracting party which had engaged itself to enter into negotiations regarding the preliminary agreement seemed to him a sufficient guarantee. Baron Burian added that in his view Article VII. did not permit of a formal and absolute veto of any military operations by Austria in the Balkans, but that it established the need for and the right to compensation for the advantages which might accrue therefrom.

After referring to the intimations addressed to us by the Imperial and Royal Government on various occasions during the Italo-Turkish war, I observed that it was beyond doubt that the Royal Italian Government was entitled to pronounce this veto in the absence of an agreement regarding the compensation as provided by Article VII., which agreement should moreover be carried to a conclusion, and not merely initiated, before the inception of military operations. And in reminding him of what I had already said, namely that any other procedure on the part of the Imperial and Royal Government might be interpreted by us as an open violation of the terms of the Treaty, I conveyed to him the actual substance of your Excellency's instructions. To this Baron Burian replied that in his view the agreement should certainly be initiated before the inception of military operations, but that it should be elaborated afterwards in accordance with the progress of those operations. He recognised, however, that it was possible to outline the general basis of the preliminary agreement, determining the subject of the compensation which the Royal Italian Government desired to obtain. And he declared to me that it was not at all his intention to avoid the obligations imposed by Article VII., to which he desired to submit with all good-will. But he could not agree to the interpretation, placed by your Excellency upon that article, whereby the preliminary agreement must be determined in all its particulars before any military operation is undertaken by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, because this might place the Imperial and Royal Government in an impossible position. And he repeated that the protraction of the conversations, even irrespectively of the wishes of the Royal Italian Government, would place Austria at the mercy of Serbia, since she would be unable to defend herself from Serbian attacks for as long as the negotiations lasted.

Baron Burian then turned to the question of the uselessness of opening a discussion of the eventual compensation unless it concerned the cession of territories now possessed by Austria-Hungary. And he told me that if the Imperial and Royal Government were in a position to enter into negotiations for a preliminary agreement with

Italy before undertaking any military operations in Serbia, he would not fail to announce it opportunely to the Royal Italian Government so as to set on foot the conversations regarding that agreement; but he could not at present bind himself concerning the basis of the compensation to which your Excellency had alluded. In insisting that he should pronounce upon this point I repeated all that I had already said to him, namely that if the Imperial Government were to show hereafter in the events that it did not take our declarations seriously into account, the Royal Italian Government would perceive in that a violation of the Treaty of Alliance, and the consequences might be extremely grave. Baron Burian answered me that the question of the basis of the compensation had not at present any character of actuality. He remarked further that if your Excellency had the right to interpret the Treaty, he also had a similar right, and that a transient difference of opinion or of interpretation could not be considered as a violation of the Treaty itself.

Notwithstanding my repeated and urgent insistence, Baron Burian persisted in his refusal to agree to your Excellency's point of view regarding the interpretation of Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance and the basis of the compensation to which we are entitled.

On this last point it is idle to entertain illusions. The Imperial and Royal Government will never, under present conditions, consent to the cession of territories belonging to the Monarchy.

AVARNA.

No. 28.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 25th February,* 1915.

I approve the answers given by your Excellency to Baron Burian.

The text of Article VII. speaks of a preliminary agreement (*accord préalable*) respecting the compensation, and not of a discussion regarding an agreement to be concluded later, when one of the parties should have completed its operations in the Balkans and should already have obtained the advantages sought, when it would be at liberty to cavil indefinitely about the compensation to be accorded to the other contracting party.

The word *"préalable"* shows that it is exacted by Article VII. that, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the agreement, by which is meant the concurrence of the parties determining the quality and quantity of the indemnity, should be concluded prior to any action. There is nothing to forbid, in given circumstances, when both sides consent and the facts of the case render it advisable, that the agreement may even be formulated in a conditional manner, proportioning the compensation to the future results that may actually be yielded by the military operations to be undertaken; but Article VII. further admits that compensation may also be exacted upon the simple fact of the initiation of action in the Balkans.

It would be entirely opposed to the spirit, as well as to the letter of Article VII., and contrary to all the interpretations put upon it in 1911 and 1912 by Austria-Hungary during the Libyan war, to admit, as Baron Burian would now desire, that the article itself provides that before determining the compensation it is necessary to be able to make a valuation of the advantages actually yielded by given action in the Balkans of one of the contracting parties. Otherwise one of the parties might undertake and carry through a war in the Balkans before the other party should so much as have a claim to know with certainty whether it was entitled in theory to any compensation, whilst in practice it might never, even after the conclusion of operations, receive any compensation at all.

In these circumstances the Royal Italian Government, with a view to eliminating future protractions of the discussion of the agreement, such as might trammel in too grave a manner the military action of Austria-Hungary, has clearly declared as from now, without awaiting the effectuation of any such new undertaking of Austria-Hungary's in the Balkans, that any future proposal to discuss compensation not concerned with the cession of territories now actually possessed by Austria-Hungary, could lead to no practical result, since it would thus be impossible ever to reach that agreement which should precede the intended action.

Upon the grounds indicated by us, however, such an agreement between the two States might presumably be reached; and if the Austro-Hungarian Government were to admit at once the principle of basing eventual discussions upon these grounds, such a course must render the negotiations easier and more fruitful, and lead to the agreement itelf.

SONNINO.

No. 29.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 25th February,* 1915.

In your telegram of the 21st instant your Excellency communicates that the Chancellor Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg had declared to you that "from what he had been told by Baron Burian, he considered himself authorised to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government was also of opinion that the agreement in question should be completed before the military operations should have begun."

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna transmits me a series of arguments by Baron Burian which aim at showing that the Austro-Hungarian Government is not at all of this opinion, "being unable to admit the interpretation of Article VII. according to which the preliminary agreement must be determined in all its particulars before any military operation is undertaken by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans."

We insist upon our interpretation as the only one possible, and as being in accordance with that which Herr von Bethman-Hollweg stated was also admitted by Austria-Hungary; but it seems to me desirable that your Excellency should draw that Government's attention to the above-mentioned contradiction.

SONNINO.

No. 30.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, 24th February, 1915.

(Telegram.) *recd. 25th.*

I think it well to correct a slight error which occurred in my last telegram. I said therein that Baron Burian refused to admit your Excellency's point of view regarding the interpretation of Article VII. of the Treaty of Triple Alliance and regarding the basis of the compensation to which we are entitled. Although it is correct that Baron Burian refused to admit the first of these points of view

it is not strictly correct to say the same of the second one, since his reply was not in the negative, but merely evasive.

AVARNA.

No. 31.

The Italian Ambassador at Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, 26th February, 1915.

(Telegram.) *recd. 27th.*

Our interpretation on the subject of the necessity that the preliminary agreement covered by Article VII. should be carried to a conclusion and not merely initiated, had been admitted by the Chancellor not merely implicitly, but explicitly and repeatedly. For, to the enquiry which on two occasions he addressed to me as to whether the statement he had made to me of the communication presented by the Duke of Avarna to Baron Burian was exactly in conformity with the fact, I had replied that the only point to be cleared up was precisely the one above-mentioned, and he had answered that he agreed with our interpretation and added that he accounted himself authorised to assert that it was also the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian Government that the agreement should be accomplished (*erfolgt*) and completed (*volkommen*) before the military operations were begun. And Herr von Jagow, to whom I subsequently submitted this, confirmed to me the words of the Chancellor.

Therefore in speaking to him this morning I manifested my surprise at the declarations made by Baron Burian to the Duke of Avarna in a sense entirely opposed to these assurances. Herr von Jagow, who also could not understand how this could have happened, supposed that in the interview between Baron Burian and the Chancellor there might have been some misunderstanding, to clear up which he would telegraph at once to Herr von Tschirscky. The better to explain to him the ideas of the Royal Italian Government I read to him the telegram addressed by your Excellency to the Duke of Avarna. He made a note of the essential points therein and told me that he would submit them to a careful examination.

BOLLATI.

No. 32.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 26th February, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd. 27th.*

I have communicated to Baron Burian the various considerations put forward by your Excellency, and in conveying to him the substance of your instructions, I expressed the trust that he would persuade himself of the reasonableness of those considerations. Baron Burian told me that the arguments adduced by your Excellency, to show that the discussion of an agreement to be reached subsequently when one of the parties should have completed its operations in the Balkans and obtained the advantages sought, might be indefinitely protracted on the subject of the compensation to be accorded to the other contracting party, might similarly be adduced even if the agreement were to be concluded before any military operations were undertaken. And he recalled in this connexion what he had pointed out in our interview of the 22nd instant. In his view, if the negotiations regarding the agreement were begun in due season, before the inception of any military operations, it would be possible, granted the goodwill of both parties, to establish quickly the bases of the actual negotiations. But in settling the details of the agreement it might happen that delays might ensue independently of the will of either party. And there would certainly be no justification in that for suspending the military operations until the agreement should be concluded. If, therefore, your Excellency's interpretation of Article VII. were to be admitted, Austria-Hungary would be exposed to detriment in her military operations in Serbia, with which she was at war and against which she must continue to combat. In fact, if Austria-Hungary did not attack Serbia but were attacked by Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government would find itself in an impossible position, because it would not be able to defend itself. He considered it advisable to submit to me these considerations in support of his proposition that the agreement was to be initiated but not carried to a conclusion before any military operations were undertaken.

Baron Burian further pointed out that without following the rigid interpretation given by your Excellency to Article VII., it was not yet possible to adopt the idea to which your Excellency alluded, and he accepted the principle, namely that in given circumstances, when

both sides consent and the facts of the case render it advisable, the agreement may be even formulated in a conditional manner proportioning the compensation to the results which may in effect accrue from a military action to be undertaken. And he added that the special circumstances for Austria-Hungary lay in the fact which he had already pointed out that she was at war with Serbia and exposed to the attacks of this Power, from which she would be unable to defend herself in the event of her being compelled to conform to the interpretation given by your Excellency to Article VII., a fact which would have placed Austria-Hungary in the impossible situation aforesaid. And your Excellency would find it impossible to do other than agree with him in this. Proceeding, Baron Burian remarked that if both parties were actuated by good-will, a circumstance not to be doubted, it would be possible thus, conditionally, to establish the lesser details of the agreement in proportion to the future or possible result of the action to be undertaken. It was impossible to define compensation on the eve of military operations the advantages accruing from which were not to be foreseen. Moreover, the adoption of your Excellency's idea would avoid all delays, and it would also avoid that either Austria-Hungary or Italy should be baulked; therefore he could not but associate himself with that idea because it would lessen the difficulties to be overcome in arriving at an agreement in the event of its being necessary to adhere to your Excellency's aforesaid interpretation. In declaring to me, therefore, that he was inclined to accept the idea itself and to put it into practice, he desired me to beg your Excellency to make known to him your views on the subject.

Baron Burian then informed me that he persisted in the point of view which he had manifested in the interview of the 22nd inst., namely, that before settling the compensation it is necessary to be able to estimate the advantages accruing in effect from given action in the Balkans on the part of one of the contracting parties. I indicated to Baron Burian that this point of view, as I had already stated, was opposed not only to the spirit and to the letter of Article VII., but further to the interpretation given to it by Austria-Hungary in 1912 and 1913.

Referring to what he had said to me in the above-mentioned interview, Baron Burian stated that the idea expressed by your Excellency, which he thought it would be in the interests of both Governments to adopt if it were practicable, might eliminate the divergencies of opinion existing between your Excellency and himself in connexion with that argument. Replying then to my remarks that any proposal

to discuss compensation that did not concern the cession of territories at present possessed by Austria-Hungary would never lead to that agreement which should precede the intended action, Baron Burian replied that he must refer me on the subject to what he had already said in our interview of the 22nd inst., namely, that he could not at present bind himself regarding the basis of the compensation, such a question possessing at the moment no character of actuality.

Having then repeated to him the declaration contained in the last part of your Excellency's telegram, Baron Burian recalled what he had said to me in the interview of the 22nd, that is to say that a transient difference of opinion or of interpretation could not be looked upon as a violation of the Treaty.

AVARNA.

No. 33.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 27th February,* 1915.

For the reasons several times expressed in my telegrams, it is not possible in the present case to anticipate a discussion on the agreement to be concluded antecedently to any military action whatever by Austria-Hungary against Serbia and Montenegro, even though it were question of an agreement proportioning the compensation, in all or in part, to the advantages accruing in effect from the action itself, because the Royal Italian Government, for the reasons repeatedly advanced, cannot accept any discussion that does not concern the cession of territories already now in the possession of Austria-Hungary; and on this point it has not succeeded during three months in obtaining a reply even on the question of principle, namely, whether the Imperial and Royal Government will accept the discussion upon such grounds; so much is this the case, that to preserve its own dignity the Royal Italian Government has been constrained to withdraw all its proposals of such discussion. The special circumstance to which Baron Burian appeals, that in the case of Austria-Hungary's being already at war with Serbia the eventual agreement should be framed in a conditional and proportional manner, does not seem to me to be invocable in the present case, since that war was undertaken by Austria-Hungary without any previous concert with Italy, but, on the

contrary, against all the advice proffered by her and in opposition to the majority of Italy's political interests. At most that circumstance might be invoked in connexion with only one part of the compensation to be agreed, namely, the proportional one, but not in connexion with all compensation, since the fact itself of the inception of fresh military operations in the Balkans, would constitute in our eyes a sufficient reason for claiming a minimum of territorial compensation independently of the results to be obtained. All this, however, remains subordinate to the initial question of principle, that is to say of the grounds upon which all discussion of compensation should take place. Until Austria-Hungary can make clearly known her views on this question of principle, which concerns the nature of the eventual compensation, it is quite useless to initiate or prolong any discussion concerned with the amount of the compensation itself or with proportioning it, in all or in part, to the eventual results of the military operations, because such a discussion could never lead to any useful issue.

SONNINO.

No. 34.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 3rd March, 1915.

(Telegram.) *recd. 3rd.*

I have conveyed to Baron Burian the substance of the instructions imparted to me by your Excellency's telegram.

Baron Burian expressed to me his regret at being unable to share your Excellency's opinion that the special circumstance to which he had appealed, namely that Austria-Hungary was already at war with Serbia, should not be invocable in the present instance, adding that it certainly could not be denied that a state of war existed between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

I remarked that what he said was certainly true, but that nevertheless he could not fail to recognise the sound basis of your Excellency's reasons which I had conveyed to him. Furthermore, he was not to forget that upon several occasions I had begged him to note that we were interested in the maintenance of the political and economical independence of Serbia and of the Balkan equilibrium. It

was beyond doubt that war was undertaken by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, threatening her independence and the aforesaid equilibrium and that this could not be considered by us as other than opposed to our vital interests. Baron Burian expressed himself as recognising that before embarking upon a discussion of the question of compensation it was necessary to establish the basis of it. But he must recognise at the same time that the question of compensation in general, like that placed by the Royal Italian Government upon grounds of the cession of territories possessed at present by the Monarchy, had no character of actuality. Therefore he could not pronounce at present upon this because the Imperial and Royal Government was not yet in a position to undertake a military action against Serbia. I remarked that it did not seem to me that he had considered the question of compensation in the same light when I had declared to him that it was carried by the Royal Italian Government on to the ground of the cession of territories effectively belonging to Austria-Hungary. On that occasion he had, in fact, declared to me that he was disposed to enter into discussion with us, and that he was actuated by the best wishes to arrive at an agreement. But Baron Burian, proceeding, added that as soon as the time should have come to initiate the said action against Serbia he would not fail to keep our declaration before him, and seeing that the diplomatic measures would keep pace with the military action, no operation would be undertaken before the agreement should be initiated. I remarked that the question of compensation had, in my view, not only the character of actuality, but even of urgency, and it was desirable to take it up since all delay could not be other than detrimental.

On this subject I pointed out to him that the question of the eventual satisfaction to be given by us to our national aspirations ranks in importance above all other considerations, and that this question could not be left without an early solution, because in view of the state of mind of our public opinion it might give rise to grave dangers.

To this Baron Burian replied that the considerations I submitted to him were certainly of importance to us, but that Italy should also take into consideration the position of the Imperial and Royal Government, and he added that we had established a limit which would be reached automatically, Austria-Hungary being at war with Serbia. The military actions of the Austro-Hungarian troops against that Power could certainly not be delayed, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would not fail then to fulfil its obligations, which should re-

assure us on every score. I answered that it did not seem to me that these statements could reassure us. In the first place, in fact, he had declared to me that he could not admit our interpretation of Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, namely that the agreement contemplated by that article should be not merely initiated but actually carried to its conclusion before the inception of any military operations against Serbia and Montenegro. In the second place he persisted in declining to bind himself at once on the subject of the basis of the compensation to which we were entitled, asserting that such a question had no character of actuality. Baron Burian rejoined that it was certainly true that, in his view, the agreement should be only initiated, and not carried to its conclusion, before any military operations were undertaken against Serbia; he would, however, do everything possible to carry it to a conclusion, and it was only in the event of this proving impracticable that the military operations would nevertheless have to pursue their course. It was also true that he did not consider himself able to pronounce at once upon the subject of the basis of the compensation, but he would do so when the proper time should have arrived.

I told Baron Burian, in answer, that it was useless to speak of initiating at what he should consider the proper moment a discussion concerning the agreement, considering that he was not disposed to make a pronouncement upon the subject of the basis of the compensation proposed by us. Such a discussion, as I had already intimated to him, could not be accepted by the Royal Italian Government for the reasons which I had previously stated, on several occasions, saving only when it should concern such compensation as the cession of territories actually possessed by Austria-Hungary. Baron Burian replied that in his opinion the moment had not yet arrived for a pronouncement upon the question, but that when that happened he would keep this declaration in sight and that he would take care to make a pronouncement before the initiation of the negotiations for the agreement. Deeming it advisable, finally, to repeat once more to Baron Burian that the Royal Italian Government maintained the declaration in the last part of your Excellency's telegram, he told me that he would not fail to bear it in mind at the proper time.

Baron Burian's replies show once more how little he is disposed, at least at present, to adopt your Excellency's views on the subject of the question of principle and of the interpretation of Article VII. of the Treaty of Alliance.

My conversations with him on this subject might be indefinitely prolonged without attaining any practical result, since he would always formulate new arguments in support of the proposition which he advances. It would therefore be idle, notwithstanding all my endeavours, to believe it possible to induce him to a change of attitude.

AVARNA.

No. 35.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 4th March,* 1915.

I, too, conclude that there is nothing to be expected from the protraction of the discussion with Baron Burian regarding territorial compensation under Article VII. But I think that it may not be without purpose clearly to recapitulate the following settled points in the declarations successively made by us in the course of the interviews:

(1) That no military action by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans may be undertaken unless the agreement relating to compensation should antecedently have been carried to its conclusion, we adhering rigidly to the text of Article VII.;

(2) That any infraction of the above would be considered by us as an open violation of the Treaty, in view of which Italy resumes her full liberty of action so as to protect her proper rights and interests;

(3) That no proposal to discuss compensation can conduce to any agreement unless it has in view the cession of territories actually possessed by Austria-Hungary;

(4) That availing ourselves of the provisions of Article VII., we insist on compensation on the ground of the inception of military action by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, independently of any result to which such action may lead; not excluding, however, that other indemnities may be stipulated for conditionally and proportionately to the advantages which Austria-Hungary may, in effect, succeed in obtaining.

(5) That the fixed quota of compensation correlative to the actual inception of military action independently of its results, far from being kept secret, should be given effect to by the actual transference

of the ceded territories and their immediate occupation on the part of Italy.

(6) That we do not admit any discussion of compensation on our part regarding the occupation of the Dodecanesus and Valona, and this for various reasons already submitted by your Excellency to Baron Burian.

SONNINO.

No. 36.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 4th March,* 1915.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires at Cettinje telegraphs that the Minister for Foreign Affairs there has made the following communication:

"At 3 o'clock this morning five Austrian torpedo-boats invaded Port Antivari, sank Royal Yacht, disembarked during bombardment sailors with mitrailleuses, which they fired to keep back Montenegrins whilst they set fire to the Government depot, only succeeding, however, in burning a small part of it. One person killed, three others wounded."

It is desirable that your Excellency should see the Minister for Foreign Affairs there regarding these military operations of Austro-Hungarian forces against Montenegro, which are in open conflict with our communications of the 22nd February last to that Government, and also with the declarations of Baron Burian.

SONNINO.

No. 37.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 7th March, 1915.

(Telegram.) *recd. 7th.*

Baron Burian informed me spontaneously that his reply to our question of principle would not be long delayed. I remarked that

his consistent refusal until now to pronounce upon this point, repeated to me even in our interview of the 2nd March, certainly had not encouraged me to hope that he would make me to-day a similar communication. Baron Burian replied that he could not find this remark of mine other than just, but that he should point out that in the said interview he had assured me that when the proper moment arrived he would pronounce upon this question, which it was desirable to clear up so as to provide some result from the present situation.

AVARNA.

No. 38.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 8th March,* 1915.

Prince von Bülow informs me that he has received despatches from Berlin which after informing him that the German Government had laboured strenuously at Vienna to induce Austria-Hungary to enter into negotiations with Italy, was able to assure him that at last the attitude of Vienna had undergone a change to such an extent that there was every hope that the said negotiations might be carried to a satisfactory conclusion.

I replied that the Duke of Avarna had also telegraphed me to the same effect, having received news of this from Herr Tschirscky and that, further, Baron Burian had told him the day before yesterday that he hoped soon to afford him an answer on the question of principle concerning the grounds upon which the negotiations might be conducted.

SONNINO.

No. 39.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 9th March,* 1915.

Prince von Bülow has communicated to me a despatch received from his Government in the following tenour: "Baron Burian has begged us to declare to the Italian Government that Austria-Hungary is ready to enter into negotiations with Italy, in accordance with the proposal of Baron Sonnino and on the basis of the cession of Austrian territory. The declaration to be made to the Italian Parliament would be edited in concert with Vienna. Baron Burian will do all possible to the end that the formula may be edited by mutual concurrence as quickly as possible."

I pointed out to Prince von Bülow that it was necessary to avoid all misapprehensions, and that I had never referred to declarations to be made to Parliament concerning the opening of negotiations, but to the necessity of not keeping secret the agreement regarding compensation as soon as this should be concluded.

Prince von Bülow made the following note:

"Baron Sonnino has no objection, once the agreement is concluded, to the respective declaration which is to be presented to Parliament being prepared in concert with Baron Burian, but he has no intention of making any declaration to Parliament of the fact that negotiations had begun or were being transacted.

"This because, according to Baron Sonnino, any declaration of that nature would render more difficult the issue of those negotiations by exciting public opinion. He, too, desires that all despatch should be employed."

I added to Prince von Bülow that I would await the communication from the Duke of Avarna on the conference which he may have to-day with Baron Burian.

SONNINO.

No. 40.

The Italian Ambassador at Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, 9th March, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd.* 10*th.*

Herr von Jagow has just informed me that Baron Burian had begged him to convey to us his answer in the affirmative to the question of principle which we had submitted. The Austro-Hungarian Government definitely consents, in conformity with the demands of the Royal Italian Government, that the discussion regarding the compensation arising out of Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance should be carried on to the ground of the cession of territories at present belonging to the Monarchy. Baron Burian expressed the wish to place himself at the earliest moment in communication with the Italian Ambassador at Vienna, so as to come to an understanding regarding the declaration which the Royal Italian Government might desire to make to Parliament on the subject.

BOLLATI.

No. 41.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 9th March, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd.* 9*th.*

Baron Burian has informed me that the Imperial and Royal Government consented to discuss the question of compensation covered by Article VII. of the Triple Alliance on the actual basis proposed by the Italian Government, that is to say on the ground of the cession of territories belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He indicated in this connexion the careful examination to which that question had been submitted by the Imperial and Royal Government and to the great difficulties which it had been necessary to overcome so as to arrive at the said decision. And he pointed out that this decision resulted from the desire to come to an understanding with the Royal Italian Government that should maintain good reciprocal relations, avoiding all friction, and thus rendering possible the coöperation of the two Governments towards common aims of

general policy. This point of view which he had several times manifested to me was that by which he had always been guided and it corresponded to what I had submitted at our first interview, of the 17th January last, on this subject of compensation, when I spoke to him of the logical and political reasons involved.

Baron Burian next remarked that the various particulars concerning the question, such, for instance, as those concerned with the stipulation of a previous agreement, should in his opinion be examined in our further conversations.

Finally, Baron Burian told me that if your Excellency thought it advisable, from considerations of expediency, to make public the fact that the two Governments had already entered into conversations on the question of compensation, he begged your Excellency to divulge to him in confidence the actual terms of that publication.

I replied that I was in ignorance of your Excellency's intentions, but that as a matter of my own personal opinion I supposed that as long as the negotiations lasted your Excellency would desire to keep secret the fact that they were taking place and the object at which they aimed.

Nevertheless, I would refer his request to your Excellency.

AVARNA.

No. 42.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 10th March,* 1915.

The Italian Government had already withdrawn all proposals of discussion on the subject of the compensation covered by Article VII., but the general situation is too serious and the matter too important to permit to-day of any question of mere form; therefore we accept the discussion upon the basis at length admitted by the Imperial and Royal Government. We do not intend to make any communication to Parliament or to the public regarding the inception of the negotiations.

Now that the divergence on the score of principle, regarding the basis of the negotiations, has been removed, I hope that we shall enter immediately into treaty and that this may be carried speedily forward so that we may reach an agreement, the conclusion of which

must absolutely precede, in accordance with my reiterated declarations, any Austro-Hungarian military action in the Balkans.

These negotiations are to be conducted directly between the two Governments without the intervention of third parties.

The points of departure to be made clear previously are:

(1) Absolute secrecy regarding the negotiations. Any indiscretion concerning their inception or progress would compel the Royal Italian Government to withdraw its proposals and to break off all discussion.

(2) When the agreement is concluded it should immediately be given effect. Otherwise the Royal Italian Government would lack the necessary political force to obtain from the nation that moral ratification which would be indispensable for the performance of the concluded agreement.

(3) To eliminate fresh contention or friction and the recurrence of regrettable incidents, and at the same time to leave the necessary liberty of action to the Imperial and Royal Government in the conduct of the war, it is necessary that the agreement should cover the whole duration of the said war in all that regards the possible invocation of Article VII.

Given that Government's acceptance of these bases, we declare ourselves ready to specify our demands, restricting ourselves to that minimum of compensation which we consider indispensable to fulfil the actual aims of the agreement invoked, namely to eliminate permanently between the two States all subject of discord, creating instead between them a normal condition of cordiality and of possible coöperation towards common aims of general policy.

And in the great and common interest of speedily reaching an agreement, eliminating from the outset all suspicion of intentional dilatoriness, I would suggest that a term of say two weeks should be established for the conduct of the negotiations, and if at the end of that term no conclusion should have been reached, it should be understood that all proposals made by either of the parties would be withdrawn and considered as of no effect, the parties returning to the *status quo ante* of reciprocal liberty.

SONNINO.

No. 43.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 13th March, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd. 13th.*

I have conveyed to Baron Burian the various points contained in the telegram of the 10th March, expressing myself in accordance with the instructions communicated to me by your Excellency.

Baron Burian informed me that he took note of the intentions of your Excellency not to make any communication to Parliament or to the public concerning the inception of the negotiations. With regard to the declaration several times repeated by your Excellency that the conclusion of the agreement must absolutely precede all military operations by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, Baron Burian indicated that he could not change his opinion regarding the interpretation of Article VII. of the Treaty of Alliance, the reasons for which he had had occasion to explain to me in previous conversations. I remarked that the objection by virtue of which he withheld his consent that the agreement should be carried to a conclusion before any military operation took place in the Balkans did not appear to me now to have any foundation after the hope manifested by your Excellency that we should enter immediately into treaty and that this might be speedily carried forward. To this Baron Burian replied that he recognised that his objection was, in fact, eliminated by the considerations put forward by your Excellency, according to which both parties were to establish a term within which the negotiations concerning the agreement were to be concluded. He would therefore strive, in accordance with your Excellency's wishes, to expedite the negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement.

With regard to the three points previously to be made clear, Baron Burian told me:

(1) That he agreed to preserve absolute secrecy on the subject of the negotiations but with the condition that Germany should be kept informed, for the reasons aforementioned.

(2) That if Article VII. provided that the agreement should be anticipatory, it did not, however, provide that its fulfilment should also be anticipatory because thus in the main the meaning of that article would be violated. I pointed out that if he admitted that the agreement should be anticipatory of, and not contemporary with,

or consecutive to the action, he could not avoid admitting at the same time that the substance of this agreement in which the compensation was defined must be considered as of like character. Therefore the fixed quota of the compensation correlative to the inception of military operations in the Balkans independently of their results, should not be kept secret but rather should be given effect by the actual transference of the territories ceded and by the immediate occupation of these on the part of Italy. I had already conveyed to him the considerations of a political order which rendered necessary the effective transference of the territories ceded. Further, I thought it well to remind him of what I had said in our first interview, on the 17th January, namely that to direct public opinion in Italy and to dispose it favourably towards the agreement, it was necessary to show at the outset a minimum of advantages that were sure and tangible and not merely dependent upon uncertain and remote eventualities. Baron Burian replied that in the case with which we were concerned it would be impossible for the Imperial and Royal Government to admit the transference of any territory of the Monarchy until peace should be concluded, and this owing to several considerations rendered imperative by the very nature of things. He added that the reasons of internal policy which I had advanced might be of importance to us, but that for the Imperial and Royal Government there also existed reasons which on his side he could not disregard.

He concluded by manifesting the hope that the Italian Government would not refuse to reconsider this second point. As for the third point raised, Baron Burian informed me that he associated himself entirely with all that your Excellency set forth in it, namely that the agreement should cover the whole duration of the war in all that regards the possible invocation of Article VII. Finally, on the subject of your Excellency's proposals to establish a term of two weeks for the conduct of the negotiations, Baron Burian said that if that statement of a term was the expression of your Excellency's wish that the negotiations should be conducted in a speedy manner, he entirely concurred, but it seemed to him that it would be very difficult to decide at the outset upon a given number of days. In the course of the interview Baron Burian, having incidentally referred to his counter-proposals of compensation on the score of our occupation of Valona and of the Dodecanesus, I judged it advisable to declare to him that for the reasons already set forth we could not admit any discussion of compensation on our part in connection with those occupations. To this Baron Burian replied that he maintained

his right to compensation in connexion with those occupations, in accordance with Article VII., and that he would in due season return to the subject.

As your Excellency will have gathered, Baron Burian expressed himself to me in such explicit terms with regard to the second point raised, that it is to be doubted if he can subsequently modify the opinion given, namely that he cannot consent that the agreement, when concluded, shall be given immediate effect.

AVARNA.

No. 44.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 13th March,* 1915.

I must declare that the interview with Baron Burian of which your Excellency informs me leaves little room for hope, not indeed that a discussion may be speedily carried to fulfilment, but even that it may be initiated with regard to the territories actually in the possession of Austria-Hungary.

I might even disregard for the moment the first serious divergence of opinion, relating to the interpretation to be placed upon the words "*accord préalable*" of Article VII., in view of the assurance that if the present negotiations, which should relate to the whole duration of the war, could be conducted to a speedy conclusion, it would be a long time before the hypothetical case upon which the dissension hinges would arise, namely that of a military action undertaken in the Balkans before an agreement should have been concluded, although its discussion were already initiated.

I should have no objection to offer to Germany's being kept currently informed of the course of the negotiations, so long as it remains firmly established that these are to be conducted directly between the Austro-Hungarian and the Italian Governments.

As for the length of the term to which the discussion is to be confined, it is useless to dwell upon this as long as we are confronted by the other substantial divergence of opinion on the principal point which I indicated in my last telegram as a condition *sine qua non* of the initiation of a discussion, namely the preliminary compact for immediate performance of the agreement to be concluded.

As I have already explained, this condition is from our point of view essential, since without it no government in Italy to-day could have the necessary political force to guarantee the practical fulfilment of the engagements contracted. Therefore, it would be more than fruitless, it would be detrimental, to enter into treaties of eventual reciprocal obligations whose effective fulfilment it would be impossible to guarantee.

Nor will I dwell upon the insistence of Baron Burian to invoke now Article VII. on the score of our occupations of the Dodecanesus and Valona. For the reasons already given the Royal Italian Government cannot accept the discussion of this. But this insistence, on the part of Baron Burian, may be accepted as a proof of how slight is the probability of success that would now attend the resumption of negotiations concerning the compensation to which Article VII. relates, given the present frame of mind of the Imperial and Royal Government.

SONNINO.

No. 45.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 16*th March,* 1915.

(Telegram.) *recd.* 16*th.*

I have conveyed to Baron Burian your Excellency's intimations on the subject of the declarations which he made to me at our last interview, and insisting upon the principal one among the points I had submitted in that same interview, namely that which regards the preliminary compact for the immediate performance of the agreement to be concluded, I gave him the substance of the actual telegram. Baron Burian told me, in regard to the interpretation to be given to the words "*accord préalable,*" that although he could not modify his opinion on the subject of that interpretation, he could at least declare to me that once he should have entered upon the negotiations leading to an agreement he would not disturb them, avoiding all military action in the Balkans during the period to be established by mutual consent for the conduct of those negotiations. With regard to the preliminary compact, respecting the immediate performance of the agreement, Baron Burian recalled what he had

said to me in our interview of Friday last, namely that Article VII. of the Treaty of Alliance spoke of a preliminary agreement, and he added that the realisation of the compensation by one of the contracting parties must be simultaneous with the advantages which the other party would have assured itself. Therefore he could only persist in the declaration made in the said interview, namely that the transference of territory belonging to the Monarchy would not be possible until peace should be concluded.

I replied that this refusal on his part to engage himself in anticipation to carry the agreement into effect as soon as concluded, rendered useless the initiation of any discussion, since that preliminary engagement must be accounted a condition *sine qua non* of the initiation of the said discussion.

On this subject I should remind him that such a condition was essential to us, seeing that without it no government in Italy could wield the political force necessary to guarantee the practical fulfilment of the engagements to be undertaken. Therefore it would be not only fruitless but actually detrimental to enter into negotiations of eventual reciprocal obligations whose effective performance it would be impossible to guarantee.

To this Baron Burian replied that besides the various considerations of an imperative order already pointed out to me, which did not permit the Imperial and Royal Government to enter into the preliminary engagement in question, there existed others of a moral and legal character. The former of these concerned the dignity of the Sovereign and the prestige of the Monarchy as a great Power; the latter concerned the immediate transference of the territories to be ceded, which it would be impossible to effect through administrative channels.

To these considerations which rendered impossible the performance of the agreement immediately upon its being concluded, were further to be added the circumstance that the Imperial and Royal Government could certainly not decide during the war the fate of populations whose sons were now fighting for the integrity of the Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government had consented to discuss the question of compensation on the basis proposed by the Royal Italian Government, but the various members of that Government were already agreed not to admit the immediate transference of the territories to be ceded, since this should be postponed until the end of the war.

On the above basis the Imperial and Royal Government was still disposed to enter into negotiations with the Royal Italian Government, actuated in that respect by the best of intentions. But the condition

made by the Royal Italian Government rendered the situation difficult, and increased, moreover, the great sacrifice which the Imperial and Royal Government was prepared to make with the object of reaching a friendly and complete understanding with Italy.

Baron Burian concluded by saying that the German Government entirely shared his opinion on the subject of the immediate transference of the territories to be ceded. And the demand in this connexion made by the Royal Italian Government to the Imperial and Royal Government was considered by the German Government to be inadmissible.

I answered Baron Burian that on that subject I could only refer him to what I had already said regarding the preliminary compact for the immediate performance of the agreement to be concluded, this being considered by the Royal Italian Government as a condition *sine qua non* of the initiation of the discussion, and one from which we did not think it possible to depart.

Finally, on the subject of our occupation of Valona and of the Dodecanesus, Baron Burian declared that he maintained the right to the compensation due to the Imperial and Royal Government, this right being based upon Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance.

He did not, however, think it necessary to insist upon the question, particularly as he had not yet formulated precise demands for compensation. At the present moment he had no wish to trammel the negotiations, but was on the contrary actuated by the desire that these might proceed and lead to results.

Notwithstanding the renewed and urgent representations which I repeatedly made to Baron Burian so as to induce him to enter into your Excellency's point of view, he persisted in his own opinion concerning the immediate performance of the agreement, and I cannot think, judging by the manner in which he expressed himself, that he will depart from this.

AVARNA.

No. 46.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassadors at Vienna and Berlin.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 17th March,* 1915.

Prince von Bülow came to see me on the 15th, and appeared deeply concerned by the news which had reached him of the state of our negotiations with Vienna and by the preliminary conditions submitted by us to Baron Burian.

The condition which causes him the greatest anxiety, because he deems it such as to render impossible an agreement, is that of the *immediate performance* to be given to the cession of territories that might be agreed. He does not think this should be exacted of Austria. He states that there is no precedent in history; he cites the instances of Nice and Savoy, which were transferred after the conclusion of war; and says that this condition imposed by us is new. The Austrian Government accepted our proposal that the agreement should not remain secret after its conclusion and until the end of the war. Once the agreement were concluded we should have every guarantee of its fulfilment in the signature of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Austria. And in addition there would be the guarantee of Germany as mediator and approver of the agreement.

The immediate transference of the ceded territories would provoke a revolution in Vienna. It is necessary to obtain the consent of Parliament for the cession of territories. And to-day an Austro-Hungarian Parliament would rebel against any such proposal.

I replied that the condition had been imposed by us as indispensable because if the effective cession of the territories in question were postponed until after the restoration of peace, no Government could guarantee to restrain throughout the whole duration of the war the bellicose impulses of the nation.

Every feature of the war, every oscillation of the vicissitudes of the struggle would give rise to suspicion, agitation, and tumult.

The case of Nice and Savoy is not comparable with the present one; it was a case then of concessions to be made conditionally to the effective acquisitions of territory on the part of Piedmont, and the compact lay between those who were companions in arms.

The soldiers of Nice and Savoy fought during that war on the same side and against the same foe whether the cession were to be

made or not. What, instead, in the present war, would be the position of the soldiers belonging to the ceded territories? If they deserted with what justice could they be punished? How could it be avoided that public opinion in Italy must rise against the harsh fate imposed upon them of continuing to fight and die for a cause which was no longer their own?

This question of immediate performance was not a new condition imposed by us. I had referred to it in my interviews with Prince von Bülow from the very beginning, speaking precisely of the soldiers under the Austrian banner.

The argument adduced of the need for the sanction of the Austro-Hungarian Parliament was a two-edged weapon. The Emperor today exercised full powers. Every stipulation whose fulfilment and whose very validity remained in suspense justified all the mistrust of the Italian people. At the end of the war if the Parliament were to withhold its sanction of the cessions accorded, nothing could then be done and Italy would have been deluded.

Prince von Bülow replied that he was morally convinced that apart from this condition of immediate performance, an agreement between Austria-Hungary and Italy regarding the territorial question could be reached; but he did not account an understanding possible upon that point. He referred to all the terrible consequences, both in the immediate and distant future, of a rupture, between Italy and Germany.

He proposed in the end that for the present the discussion on this question of immediate performance should be put aside, leaving it until we should have come to an agreement on all the other points to be discussed.

He was convinced that in this way it would still be possible to arrive at a conclusion, "unless," he added, "you should already have made up your minds for war in March."

I replied that I had frankly expressed to him my opinion; but that being unable to take upon myself alone the responsibility of a decision I would refer in all sincerity and exactitude his arguments to the President and Council.

SONNINO.

No. 47.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome*, 17 *March*, 1915.

Baron Burian, in announcing his opposition to the compact of immediate performance, added that "The realisation of compensation on the part of one of the contracting parties must be simultaneous to the advantages which the other party should have assured itself." But by putting the question in this way there is an end to the premise which appeared to have been accepted, that the territorial concessions were to be made to us as compensation for the liberty of action to be granted Austria-Hungary for the whole duration of the war, whatever its results. If we subordinate compensation to advantages, then the preliminary and definitive *forfait* that was sought at once disappears. Whereas immediate performance is logically inherent in an agreement thus conceived.

Baron Burian has declared that "The Imperial and Royal Government certainly could decide during the war the fate of populations whose sons were now fighting for the integrity of the Monarchy." It is not possible that this assertion should exactly represent the intimate thoughts of Baron Burian, because, if that were so, it would be idle to negotiate an agreement regarding the cession of territories now possessed by the Monarchy from the moment that the ceding party did not account itself entitled to decide upon the matter of the actual cessions and upon the fate of the respective populations.

With regard to the immediate execution of the agreements considering that the Imperial and Royal Government has accepted the proposition that such agreements are to be made public immediately upon their conclusion, I am unable to account for Baron Burian's persistent refusal to admit the required performance. The moral and political effect which the cession of territories might produce upon the Austro-Hungarian public in general, and upon that of Vienna in particular (see what was said by Prince von Bülow), would be discounted immediately on the morrow of their announcement, and, from another point of view, with regard to the general defence of the Empire, any decrease in the ranks of the combatants resulting from the discharge of soldiers derived from the ceded territories, would be more than compensated by the freer disposal of the remaining forces, in

consequence of the increased security resulting from concluded agreements.

SONNINO.

No. 48.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassadors at Vienna and Berlin.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 17th March,* 1915.

Prince von Bülow came to see me to-day and began by pointing out the grave danger that the negotiations between Austria-Hungary and Italy may be rendered abortive through the condition we had appended demanding immediate performance. He said further that the Emperor of Germany might also guarantee the fulfilment of the agreement after the war.

I replied giving various reasons why we must insist upon our demand, reasons which take into account the general conditions of public opinion in Italy as also in Austria. I pointed out to him how difficult it is to settle firm grounds of negotiation with the Austro-Hungarian Government, and I quoted the words uttered on the 15th inst. by Baron Burian to the Duke of Avarna, showing that the former appears ever to seek to make the cession of Austrian territories to Italy depend upon the effective attainment of advantages on the part of Austria at the end of a victorious war. Prince von Bülow made the following note:—

"Baron Sonnino points out to me that the advantages at once accruing to Austria-Hungary from the agreement consist in the guarantee she would thus obtain of Italy's neutrality throughout the war. Baron Burian, on the other hand, appears to subordinate all actual cession of territory to Italy to the condition that Austria should in effect realise territorial acquisitions and other advantages at the end of the war.

"Baron Burian's point of view renders impossible an agreement acceptable to Baron Sonnino, that is to say, an agreement having the nature of a *forfait:* the cession of territory at present Austrian, on the one side, against a guarantee of neutrality for the duration of the war on the other, whatever may be the issue of that war."

I told Prince von Bülow that I had no wish to precipitate matters, but that I would no longer undertake the initiative or make any

proposals; that if the Austro-Hungarian Government desired to arrive at any conclusion, it could submit its proposals clearly, making them as wide as possible so that there might be a probability of result.

Prince von Bülow informed me that he would communicate the above to Berlin.

SONNINO.

No. 49.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 20th March,* 1915.

Prince von Bülow has announced to me, in pursuance of instructions from the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg after audience with the Emperor William, "that he is requested to declare to me that the Imperial German Government offers to Italy a full and complete guarantee that the agreement to be concluded between Italy and Austria-Hungary should be faithfully and loyally given effect as soon as peace should be concluded.

Further, he is informed by Herr von Jagow that there is a rumour to the effect that Austria-Hungary does not yet desire the agreement with Italy, and that she wishes to protract the negotiations concerning it. Herr von Jagow is convinced that there is no truth in this rumour. The Emperor Franz-Josef once having taken this grave resolve will loyally adhere to it. The Ambassador, Herr von Tschirscky, had telegraphed to him from Vienna that Baron Burian had the earnest intention of coming as soon as possible to an understanding with Italy on the subject of a cession of territory as a basis for more trustful and friendly relations henceforth between the two nations.

As to a guarantee to be given to Italy for the faithful fulfilment of the Treaty, he is ready to discuss this further with the Duke of Avarna. Herr von Jagow believes that "it is incontestable that Baron Burian is disposed to the cession of territory, and as a correlative *(gegenleistung)* he requires only that Italy shall renounce the demands based upon Article VII." Jagow adds that in this manner, he believes, a basis of negotiations has been found, it being clear that

"Austria-Hungary consents to a cession of Austro-Hungarian territory, and that she demands of Italy no more than the absolute maintenance of neutrality throughout the war."

He is under the impression that Baron Burian's words regarding the Dodecanesus and his other expressions of uncertain tenour, were employed rather to explain his own point of view concerning the past, and that a practical value is not to be attached to them. Prince von Bülow exhorted us to a resumption of the conversations between Baron Burian and the Duke of Avarna at Vienna.

I replied pointing out some of the chief reasons, already submitted to him in our last interview, that rendered indispensable the immediate performance of the agreement to be concluded.

SONNINO.

No. 50.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 20th March,* 1915.

Baron Macchio asked me what stage things had reached at Vienna.

I gave him the history of the negotiations down to to-day, telling him that the question of performance, immediate or postponed, had checked all progress. Prince von Bülow had suggested putting aside, without prejudice, this point, and discussing meanwhile the rest. I had not opposed this, although I entertained the doubt that without the settlement of the question of performance the discussion must remain in the air. In any case I consented that the conversations at Vienna should be resumed if Baron Burian would make clear and definite proposals upon which they might turn.

Baron Macchio considered it expedient first to determine the question of performance during or after the war. He maintained that it was impossible it should be immediate. I pointed out to him various very grave difficulties which militated against postponed performance. At the end of the war the party that would have pledged itself to neutrality would already have performed all that it should and could perform, whether or not Parliament approved the action of the Government; whilst the other party, instead, would have done nothing beyond assuming an engagement to make territorial concessions condi-

tionally on Parliamentary consent, an engagement which would come to nothing if this consent were withheld.

I pointed out the other and extremely grave question concerning the soldiers who would be obliged to continue to fight for a cause which would no longer be their own. How could public opinion tolerate that? In Austria there prevailed the territorial system which facilitated the discharge of soldiers in groups corresponding to the regions whence they were derived.

Baron Macchio recognised the reasonableness of the first point, regarding the engagements dependence upon Parliamentary sanction; he would refer it to Baron Burian to the end that the latter should discover and propose some other guarantee.

With regard to the soldiers he said that their dismissal during the war would disorganise the army. There were also many difficulties of an administrative nature in the way of the transference of territories during hostilities.

He concluded that it was being proposed to resume these conversations, which might prove fruitful, although Baron Burian held that the negotiations should be conducted at Vienna.

SONNINO.

No. 51.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 21st March, 1915.

(Telegram.) *recd. 21st.*

I have seen Baron Burian on the subject of the contents of your Excellency's telegrams, conveying to him the substance of those same telegrams.

Baron Burian gathered, first of all, that the phrase used by him in our interview of the 15th inst., according to which "the realisation of compensation by one of the contracting parties should be simultaneous with the advantages of which the other should come to be assured," had given rise to a misapprehension on your Excellency's part, of which he had already been informed by the German Ambassador here.

He pursued that in his view the word "simultaneous" was not to be interpreted as having the meaning that the compensation to be ac-

corded to one of the contracting parties was to be proportioned to the advantages which the other should have received. On this subject he declared to me that if the agreement were concluded now, that is to say, before any military operation by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, the stipulations of the agreement tacitly concerning the compensation would preserve their validity and would be realised at the end of the war independently of the results of the said military action.

Baron Burian further informed me that he would draw up the outlines of an agreement having the nature of a *forfait*, conceived in the very terms indicated by your Excellency, but that he could not pronounce upon it, or even accept it in principle, until he knew in full detail the demands of the Royal Italian Government on the subject of compensation, and until he himself should have had occasion on his side to formulate his own conditions.

With regard to your Excellency's statement that immediate performance was logically inherent in such an agreement, Baron Burian remarked that he could not admit the justice of this corollary.

For the rest, he persisted in affirming that for the reasons already urged, the cession of territories of the Monarchy could not be given effect until after the conclusion of peace.

With reference to that which concerns the sanction of the Parliaments of Austria and Hungary, Baron Burian observed that there was no doubt whatever that the agreement to be drawn up would be duly approved by the Parliaments, since they could not reject an act discharged in accordance with the full powers vested in His Majesty the Emperor.

When I had communicated to Baron Burian the matter of your Excellency's intimations to Prince von Bülow, he told me that he was making the proposal to enter into negotiations with the Royal Italian Government and he had already informed Baron Macchio of this. He therefore begged your Excellency to follow the programme projected some time ago, namely to formulate the demands, and then he on his side would make known his answers and his conditions.

And he added that he hoped your Excellency would reconsider the decision not to take any initiative or to make proposals, a decision which he supposed had been occasioned by the misapprehension which was now cleared up.

AVARNA.

No. 52.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 22nd March,* 1915.

I take note both of the explanations supplied by Baron Burian of some earlier phrases of his which admitted of dubious interpretation, and of his formal proposal to enter into negotiations with the Royal Italian Government.

I regret, extremely, however, that he should not realise the utter impossibility for any Government in Italy seriously to undertake engagements trammelling its own liberty of action over and at present indefinite but unquestionably protracted period, against no more than promises of territorial cessions that are not to be put into effect until the end of the present war. Moreover it is clearly to be seen that the prospect of an immediate performance would greatly enhance in public opinion the arguments favouring moderation in the demands, whilst every postponement must incite it to greater exactions.

Nevertheless I profess myself ready, as I have already announced, to Prince von Bülow and to Baron Macchio, seriously to examine any concrete proposal that the Imperial and Royal Government may place before us, and let me add that with intent to facilitate discussion I should also be disposed to consider as if never made, so far as future effects are concerned, any proposal submitted that should not be accepted by us.

SONNINO.

No. 53.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 23rd March,* 1915.

Baron Macchio, whom I saw this morning, told me that he had received two telegrams from Baron Burian regarding the conversations he had held with the Duke of Avarna. These agree with the communications of the latter. Baron Burian supposes that since he has cleared up the misapprehension concerning words which he had

previously uttered, I should now formulate the demands of Italy; particularly since the fulfilment of the agreement at the end of the war would be guaranteed by Germany.

I replied that I must adhere to the conditions explained to the Duke of Avarna again in my telegram of yesterday. I take note of the proposal of Baron Burian to open negotiations; but I continue in doubt regarding the possibility of arriving at an understanding until we are agreed upon the immediate performance of all that should be concerted, so that I cannot at present make proposals or take the initiative. But I shall welcome and examine any proposal that Baron Burian may place before us, and with a view to facilitating matters I should consider any proposal not accepted by us as if never made and I should observe all secrecy with regard to such proposals and the respective negotiations.

I therefore explained again in a friendly manner to Baron Macchio the various practical reasons that justify the great importance attached by the Royal Italian Government to the question of the immediate fulfilment of any agreement; that is to say, of the immediate transference of the territories that it may be agreed that Austria-Hungary should cede to Italy; and this to the end that throughout the indefinite duration of the war the maintenance of the accepted undertaking of neutrality may be absolutely assured.

Austria-Hungary has to-day in the territories that may come into question a number of soldiers greater than that which she would have to discharge on the day when those territories came to be effectively ceded; and in view of the system of territorial recruiting it would not be any more difficult quickly to concentrate within the said territories all the soldiers appertaining to them by birth or residence than it would be to dismiss a class to their homes. Nor can this in any way disorganise the army. On the other hand the maintaining under arms by the Empire of between 40,000 and 50,000 men belonging to territories whose cession to Italy had been decreed would give rise to a thousand daily incidents, to unheard-of difficulties and to a continual reaction of public opinion.

Then, too, the Austro-Hungarian Parliamentary question was of no little importance. It is possible that public opinion should consent resignedly to the cession of territories in consideration of the advantage of acquiring thus a greater liberty of action and of not having to defend a whole line of frontier; but this only as long as there is hope of obtaining the victory.

I am disposed to believe that a victorious Austria would faithfully

maintain at the end of the war the terms of the compact that in a certain measure would have contributed to the victory; but it is contrary to human nature that the Austrian public, and with it the Parliament, on the day when it should issue defeated from the war and be compelled to relinquish provinces to the victorious enemy, should not rebel against the cession of other territories for the benefit of one who had taken no part in the struggle and whose abstention was proven by the facts to have been insufficient to ensure victory. The guarantee of Germany would hold good in the case of a victorious Germany, which presupposes also the victory of Austria, but it would be of less value in the event of both being defeated.

SONNINO.

No. 54.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 24th March, 1915.

(Telegram.) *recd. 24th.*

Baron Burian has told me that it is not correct to state that the cession of territories to be made at the end of the war would be conditional and dependent on the Austro-Hungarian Parliament's approval of the stipulated agreement on the subject between the two Governments. Since all international treaties must be sanctioned by the Parliaments of the Monarchy it was necessary that the said agreement should be submitted to them for approval. But this was not a condition concerning its validity towards Italy nor did it constitute a condition of its performance.

As for the approval of the agreement by the Parliaments, that was not for a moment to be held in doubt, for the reasons stated to me in the course of our conversation of the 20th inst. In what regards the other and extremely grave question of the soldiers who were to continue to fight in a cause that was no longer their own, Baron Burian observed that this argument was being the subject of his reflections, and that we could revert to it in our subsequent conversations.

Baron Burian intimated to me then that he had been informed by Herr von Tschirscky of the full and entire guarantee which the German Government proffered the Royal Italian Government that the agreement to be concluded between Italy and Austria-Hungary should

be faithfully and loyally put into effect as soon as peace is concluded. Baron Burian declared to me that he consented to make concrete proposals provided that he obtained authority to do so from His Majesty the Emperor, and that he would inform me as soon as he should have obtained it. He was also disposed, equally with your Excellency, to consider on his side as if never made, so far as future effects are concerned, any proposal submitted but not agreed upon by the two Governments. With regard, finally, to the question of the immediate performance of the agreement to be concluded, Baron Burian told me that he regretted to be unable on his side to share your Excellency's point of view on the subject. In his opinion it would be in fact impossible to qualify as a simple promise an agreement duly concluded and signed by the two Governments with the observance of all the formalities required to bestow upon the said agreement the character of an international covenant.

And he added that he was equally unable to share your Excellency's opinion that in this matter the Royal Italian Government would be the only one that assumed a serious undertaking trammelling its liberty for an indefinite period. Austria-Hungary too would assume on her side, upon signing the agreement, future engagements of an equally serious nature, which, by the mere circumstance of their publicity, would trammel her quite as effectively, and this independently of any provision that in the course of the conversations might be recognised as expedient to that end and practical.

As your Excellency will perceive, Baron Burian has persisted again on this occasion in his intention to postpone the effective cession of the territories to be ceded until after peace is restored.

I fear that it would be difficult to convince him of the reasons which render it absolutely necessary for us that such a cession should take place immediately upon the conclusion of the agreement.

AVARNA.

No. 55.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 24th March, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd. 25th.*

I went, at Baron Burian's invitation, to the Ballplatz, and he told me that he had begged me to go and see him so that he might

inform me that he had been authorised by His Majesty the Emperor to make precise and concrete proposals upon which our conversations might turn. He intended to acquaint me "as soon as possible" with these proposals, and he would beg me for that purpose to visit him again.

AVARNA.

No. 56.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 27th March, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd. 28th.*

I went to the Ballplatz in response to a request from Baron Burian, and he informed me that the friendly conversations that had been proceeding for some months between Italy and Austria-Hungary, with the object of consolidating their reciprocal relations, founding them upon complete good faith and aiming at eliminating all subjects of friction, thus rendering possible a mutual collaboration towards common ends of general policy, had led both Governments to recognise the expediency of an agreement for the conclusion of which he proposed the following stipulations:

(1) Italy should undertake to observe until the end of the present war a friendly neutrality, from political and economical points of view, towards Austria-Hungary and her allies.

(2) Similarly, Italy should further engage herself for the whole duration of the present war to leave Austria-Hungary full and complete liberty of action in the Balkans, and to renounce in advance any fresh compensation for the advantages, territorial or other, that might eventually accrue to Austria-Hungary from such liberty of action.

This stipulation, however, was not to include Albania, regarding which the agreement already in existence between Austria-Hungary and Italy, besides the decisions of the Conference of London, would remain in force.

Baron Burian then informed me that Austria-Hungary would, on her side, be prepared to make a cession of territory in Southern Tyrol comprising the city of Trent. The specified delimination would be determined in such a manner as to take into account both the

strategical exigencies which a new frontier would create for the Monarchy, and for the economic needs of the population.

When I observed that in my opinion such a proposal seemed to be somewhat vague, Baron Burian replied that he thought it was necessary first of all to acquaint us with the general principle of the cession that Austria-Hungary was disposed to make, without at present entering into particulars; these, however, he was prepared to communicate to your Excellency as soon as you desired it. Baron Burian added that the said cession of territory by Austria-Hungary would imply on the part of Italy the undertaking to assume the quota appertaining to the territory in question of the Austro-Hungarian Public Debt and of the provincial, muncipal and other debts, in so far as these enjoy a State Guarantee. Similarly Italy would have to undertake the payment to Austria-Hungary of a lump sum in compensation for all the investments made by the State in the territory to be ceded, independently of the acquisition of the railways in this territory, and of collective and individual compensation (ecclesiastical properties, entails, pensions to old functionnaires, etc.).

Having requested Baron Burian to explain this last point, he replied that he thought it well to establish conditions that would guarantee henceforward the rights acquired from the clergy.

Proceeding, Baron Burian announced to me that as soon as the principles of the agreement were established on the above basis, Austria-Hungary would enter into discussion of the details.

The definitive understanding resulting from the discussions would be drawn up in a secret convention to be concluded between Austria-Hungary and Italy. I reminded Baron Burian of what I had already made known to him, namely, that the agreement, far from remaining secret, must, as soon as concluded, be carried into effect by the transference of the ceded territories and their immediate occupation by Italy. And I submitted to him in this connection the various considerations which I had already put before him in previous interviews and which your Excellency had also recently laid before Baron Macchio.

To this Baron Burian replied that, notwithstanding those considerations of mine, he thought it well to make the said proposal to your Excellency, and that he would reply immediately to such proposals as your Excellency, in your own turn, should make on the subject.

Baron Burian has informed me that the transaction in question will render equally necessary the revision of certain treaties existing

between the two Powers, such as those concerning the new railway connexions, the arrangements regarding frontier traffic, the navigation of Lake Garda, etc.

I told Baron Burian that I should not fail to communicate immediately to your Excellency the proposals he made for the conclusion of the agreement to be stipulated between the two Governments.

Although Baron Burian refrained from revealing the substance of the cession of territories in Southern Tyrol which the Imperial and Royal Government would be disposed to make, I was able nevertheless to infer that this would not extend much beyond Trent.

AVARNA.

No. 57.

The Italian Ambassador at Petrograd to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Petrograd, 29th March, 1915.

(Telegram.) *recd. 29th.*

I learn from an unimpugnable source that a serious attempt at peace has been addressed to this Government by someone speaking in the name of the Austro-Hungarian Government.

CARLOTTI.

No. 58.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 31st March,* 1915.

Having carefully examined the proposals put forward by Baron Burian as the basis of an agreement, I find them on the one side too vague and indefinitive, and, on the other, absolutely inadequate to attain the object at which both parties aim, namely, to create a situation which, by consolidating their reciprocal relations and eliminating all causes of friction, should render possible their cordial collaboration towards common ends of general policy.

I put aside for the moment the very grave question regarding the

immediate or postponed fulfilment of the eventual agreement, which, whatever it may be, according to its alternative settlement, will inevitably affect the actual merits of the compacts to be made.

On the part of Italy, Baron Burian claims in the first place an undertaking to observe a friendly neutrality from the political and economical point of view. On this score it is necessary that we should have a clear understanding. If by these words is meant an undertaking to continue to maintain a perfect and sincere neutrality, such as we have hitherto maintained, I should have no objection to raise; but I must point out that the geographical situation of Italy in the Mediterranean forbids her showing any favour to one group of belligerents that might provoke reprisals on the part of the other who dominates the sea, unless she wishes to jeopardise the whole of her economical existence, subjecting her people to all the actual evils of a war, or else to be dragged, despite herself, into the struggle.

Baron Burian requests further that with regard to Albania, the agreement existing between Austria-Hungary and the decisions of the Conference of London should remain in force.

Now it is not possible for Italy to accord liberty of action to Austria-Hungary in the Balkans without at least obtaining that Austria-Hungary should completely cease to interest herself in Albania.

Coming next to the substance of the cession offered, I would refer merely in passing to some of the lesser and secondary questions enumerated by Baron Burian, because it is impossible to discuss them profitably until we are agreed upon the main point—that of the extent of the territories to be ceded.

I do not understand what justification there can be for the request for a lump sum as compensation for the investments made by the State in the territories to be ceded. Such investments, in so far as they were not repaid by the taxes levied upon the said territories, were necessarily repaid through the emission of the Public Debt, so that the point is covered by the quota of this public debt which we should come to assume.

Moreover, when Burian speaks of a public debt, of which a proportionate quota is to be assigned to Italy, to what period does he refer? Does he refer to the debt such as it was at the beginning of the war, or such as it is now when the cession comes to be agreed, or, yet again, such as it may be at the end of the war, to which time Baron Burian would adjourn the fulfilment of the agreement? I may point out that, so as to hope to arrive at an understanding upon questions

of this nature, it is absolutely necessary to bring the discussion down to precise and settled figures.

From the expressions employed by Baron Burian I cannot so much as infer what may be the extent of the territory he offers us in Southern Tyrol. Even independently of any appraisement, on the possibility of the compensation being confined only to a cession in the Tyrol, the phrase employed by Baron Burian, in which he refers to the City of Trent alone, adding that, in being more definite, it would be necessary to take into account the strategical exigencies of the Monarchy and the economic needs of the population, appears to me so sibylline that I cannot understand what it really is that the Imperial and Royal Government intends to offer us. And the reference subsequently made to a covenant regarding the navigation on Lake Garda renders the offer still more uncertain, since it seems to imply that even after the cession of Southern Tyrol the Imperial territory would reach as far as that lake.

If it is really desired to create a situation of harmony and cordiality between the two States for eventual future coöperation towards common ends of general policy, it is indispensable to eliminate for ever all serious grounds upon which may be reproduced the frequent outbursts of irredentism, besides establishing conditions of greater equality and common security in the frontiers between the two States and in the Adriatic; and to effect this the cession of a strip of land in the Trentino would certainly not be sufficient.

For these reasons I repeat that even apart from the question of the more or less prompt fulfilment of the eventual agreement, I must consider Baron Burian's proposals altogether insufficient as a basis of negotiations, inasmuch as they do not sufficiently satisfy national aspirations, appreciably improve our military conditions, or represent compensation adequate to the liberty of action accorded during the present war in the Balkans, the fate of which cannot but represent a primary political and economical interest for Italy.

SONNINO.

No. 59.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 1st April,* 1915.

The Italian Minister at Cettinje telegraphs as follows:

"Last night an aeroplane dropped several bombs, doing some slight

damage and wounding four persons. Two bombs fell in the neighbourhood of the Royal Palace. Population greatly alarmed."

I beg your Excellency to see Burian in accordance with instructions contained in my telegram of the 4th March (Document No. 36).

SONNINO.

No. 60.

The Italian Minister at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 2nd April, 1915.

(Telegram.) *recd. 2nd.*

I communicated to Baron Burian the result of the careful examination to which your Excellency submitted the proposals formulated by him as a basis of an agreement, and in conveying to him the substance of your Excellency's telegram I intimated that you considered those proposals vague, indefinite and absolutely insufficient to reach the object aimed at by both Powers. Baron Burian told me that in pointing out that Italy should assume the undertaking to observe a friendly neutrality from the political and economical point of view, he had referred to the provisions of Article IV. of the Treaty of Alliance, but that by this demand he had not meant that Italy should absolutely act in such a manner as to expose herself to the danger of reprisals from other belligerent States.

As for your Excellency's demand that Austria-Hungary should completely cease to interest herself in Albania, Baron Burian remarked that this was contrary to the interests of the Monarchy, as Italy herself had recognised by the engagements assumed by the two Powers in accordance with the known understanding. Therefore Austria-Hungary could not agree to that demand.

Baron Burian recognised that the material settlement of the questions of the investments made by the State in territories to be ceded, and of the Public Debt upon which the quota to be assigned to Italy was to be proportioned, were matters entirely subordinate to the essential point, namely the extent of those same territories. It was therefore useless to occupy ourselves at present with these questions, which would be examined in due season and in detail, and which will not hinder the two Governments from arriving at an understanding.

Referring then to what I had pointed out to him, namely that from the expressions he had employed, your Excellency could not succeed in ascertaining what was the extent of the territory which he offered in Southern Tyrol, Baron Burian gave me a brief memorandum indicating the limits of these cessions. And he added that he had already intended to give me this memorandum before I had requested an audience to-day, so that he might thus follow up his communication of last Saturday.

I transcribe here the text of this memorandum.

"The territories which Austria-Hungary would be disposed to cede to Italy on the conditions indicated would comprise the districts *(Politische Bezirke)* of Trent, Rovereto, Riva, Tione (with the exception of Madonna di Campiglio and its surroundings), as well as the district of Borgo. In the valley of the Adige the frontier should reach to Lavis, a locality which would belong to Italy."

When I then referred to the sentence uttered by him in our interview of Saturday and reproduced in your Excellency's telegram, namely, that it was necessary to take into account strategic exigencies and the economic needs of the population, Baron Burian observed that he had spoken of those two elements because not only in the interests of Austria-Hungary, but also in those of Italy, it was necessary to take them into consideration in tracing the frontier. As for his mention of a covenant regarding navigation on Lake Garda, Baron Burian said that he had thought it well to mention this because that covenant, like the others existing between the two nations with regard to border commerce, would be submitted to revision, and naturally that which related to Lake Garda would cease to be in force, since Lake Garda would be comprised within the territories to be ceded to Italy.

Baron Burian further stated that he agreed with all that your Excellency said regarding the expediency of creating in reality a situation of harmony and cordiality between the two States for their eventual future coöperation towards common aims of general policy. That corresponded entirely with his own views, and he had several times so expressed himself to me; but he found it difficult to follow your Excellency's ideas where you mention the possibility of the repetition of outbursts of irredentism, and the need to establish conditions of greater equality and of common security on the frontier between the two States and in the Adriatic. And he added that it certainly was not right to speak of the cession of "a strip of territory in Southern Tyrol" when he was offering all the districts forming what is commonly known as the Trentino.

Having finally repeated to him the declaration contained in the last part of your Excellency's telegram, Baron Burian expressed the hope that when your Excellency was acquainted with the extent of the territory he offered you would change your opinion as to the importance of the cession, which could not be described as a mere strip of territory.

AVARNA.

No. 61.

The Italian Ambassador at Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, 2nd April, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd. 3rd.*

From certain indications clearly confirmed from an authoritative source, I gather that Germany would not refuse to treat for peace with Russia.

BOLLATI.

No. 62.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 6th April, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd. 7th.*

Baron Burian begged me to visit him to-day at the Ballplatz.

He asked me whether I had received from your Excellency an answer to what he had communicated to me in our interview of the 1st instant, and when I had replied in the negative, he expressed the wish to address the following request to you: Since your Excellency had considered vague and insufficient his first proposal and had not yet replied to his precise proposal, he begged you to make known in your turn what were your own proposals, so as to enable him to endeavour to come to a reciprocal understanding on the question regarding the cession of territory.

AVARNA.

No. 63.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 8th April,* 1915.

Telegrams from Cettinje communicate that yesterday an aeroplane dropped four bombs on Podgoritza with several casualties, dead and wounded, amongst whom many soldiers.

I beg your Excellency to see Baron Burian in accordance with previous instructions, pointing out that this is a fresh violation on the part of Austria-Hungary of the agreements between the two Governments.

SONNINO.

No. 64.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 8th April,* 1915.

To satisfy the wish expressed by Baron Burian I here formulate the conditions which the Royal Italian Government considers indispensable if a normal and enduring situation of reciprocal cordiality and of possible future coöperation towards common aims of general policy is to be created between the two States.

Your Excellency will more fully explain to Baron Burian the reasons that support each of the proposals, in formulating which I have taken fully into account the various observations laid before me in the past regarding the needs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

I trust that the Imperial Government will grant us with the least possible delay an answer which I hope may be acceptable.

Article I. is inspired by an important historical precedent, as well as by obvious reasons of a military character regarding the tracing of the new frontier.

Article II. is also justified by military considerations, as well as by ethnological reasons.

Article III. represents the only possible compromise between the announced exigencies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and those of the national principle.

Article IV. aims at slightly lessening the painful conditions of inferiority in which Italy finds herself in the Adriatic.

Article V. represents the condition *sine qua non* by which any agreement may to-day be concluded; without it no government in Italy could seriously undertake for the whole duration of the war the engagements with which the last two articles, X. and XI., are concerned.

Articles VI. and VII. remove for the future a subject of friction and of disagreement between the two States, legitimately safeguarding Italian interests in the Adriatic without hurting those of Austria-Hungary.

Articles VIII. and IX. explain themselves.

Here follows the text of the articles:

Article I.

Austria-Hungary cedes to Italy the Trentino with the frontiers which were those of the Italian Kingdom in 1811, that is to say, after the Treaty of Paris on the 28th February, 1810.

Note to Article I.

The new frontier detaches from the present one at Mount Cevedale; it follows for some way the counterfort between Val Venosta and Val Del Noce; then it descends the Adige to Gargazone between Merano and Bolzano, reascends the higher ground on the left bank, divides the Val Sarentina and the Valley of the Isarco at Chiusa and the dolomitic territory on the right bank of the Avisio; excluding the valleys of Gardona and Badia and including Ampezzano, it rejoins the present frontier.

Article II.

Italy's eastern frontier is to be corrected in her favour, so as to bring the cities of Gradisca and Gorizia within the ceded territory. From Troghofel the new frontier is to detach from the present one, and to run eastwards as far as Osternig, thence descending from the Carnic Alps down to Saifniz. Thence by the counterfort between Seisera and Schliza it is to ascend the Wirsehberg and then to follow the present frontier as far as the summit of Nevea, and to run down from the base of the Rombone to the River Isonzo, passing to eastward

of Plezzo. It is then to follow the line of the Isonzo as far as Tolmino, where it leaves the Isonzo to pursue a more easterly line, which passing on the eastern side of the heights of Pregona-Planina and following the track of the Chiappovano runs up to eastward of Gorizia and crossing the Carso di Comen ends at the sea between Monfalcone and Trieste in the neighbourhood of Nabresina.

Article III.

The city of Trieste with its territory, which is to be extended on the north until it includes Nabresina, so as to reach to the new Italian frontier (Article II.), and on the south until it includes the present judiciary districts of Capo d'Istria and Pirano, is to be constituted an autonomous and independent State in all that regards its internal, military, legislative, financial and administrative policies, and Austria-Hungary shall renounce all sovereignty over it. It is to remain a free port. It should not be entered by either Austro-Hungarian or Italian soldiers. It should assume a quota of the present Austrian Public Debt proportionate to its population.

Article IV.

Austria-Hungary cedes to Italy the Archipelago of Curzola, including Lissa (with the neighbouring islets of St. Andrea and Busi), Lesina (with Spalmadori and Torcola), Curzola, Lagosta (with the neighbouring islets and rocks), Cazza, Meleda and Pelagosa.

Article V.

Italy should immediately occupy the ceded territories (Articles I., II. and IV.), whilst Trieste and its territory (Article III.) should be evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian authorities and military forces, with the immediate discharge of all soldiers and sailors derived from one and the other.

Article VI.

Austria-Hungary is to recognise Italy's full sovereignty over Valona, and its bay comprising Sasseno, together with such territory in the *hinterland* as may be required for their defence.

ARTICLE VII.

Austria-Hungary is to cease completely to interest herself in Albania as comprised within the frontiers traced by the Conference of London.

ARTICLE VIII.

Austria-Hungary is to grant a complete amnesty followed by the immediate release of all those prosecuted and convicted upon military and political grounds who are natives of the ceded territories (Articles I., II. and IV.) and of the evacuated territorities (Article III.).

ARTICLE IX.

For the delivery of the ceded territories (Articles I., II. and IV.) from their quota of responsibility in the Austro-Hungarian Public Debt as well as in the debt resulting from pensions to retired Imperial and Royal functionaries, and against the integral and immediate transference to Italy of all domanial property, movable or immovable, with the exception of arms, situated in the said territories, and in compensation for every State right concerned with the said territories, in all that may refer to them whether at present or in future, without any exception whatsoever, Italy will pay Austria-Hungary the capital sum in gold of 200,000,000 Italian lire.

ARTICLE X.

Italy undertakes to maintain perfect neutrality throughout all the present war with regard to Austria-Hungary and Germany.

ARTICLE XI.

For the entire duration of the present war Italy renounces all power subsequently to invoke in her own favour the provisions of Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance; and Austria-Hungary is to make the same renouncement in all that regards Italy's effected occupation of the islands of the Dodecanesus.

SONNINO.

No. 65.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 10th April, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd.* 11*th.*

I have communicated to Baron Burian your Excellency's proposals contained in the eleven articles; and in explaining to him in the most detailed possible manner the reasons supporting those proposals, I pointed out to him that in formulating them your Excellency had taken into the fullest account the various observations submitted to you in the past regarding the needs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

I have expressed to him the hope that he would let me have a reply as soon as possible on the subject, and also the hope that this might be acceptable. At his request I then left him a written note in French giving the text of the said articles.

After attentively listening to me, Baron Burian confined himself to saying that he would examine with the greatest care your Excellency's proposals and would let me know his answer at the earliest possible moment.

AVARNA.

No. 66.

The Italian Ambassador at Nisch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Nisch, 10th April, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd.* 10*th.*

According to confidential information a separate peace between Austria-Hungary and Russia might be possible.

SQUITTI.

No. 67.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 13th April,* 1915.

It is most urgent that your Excellency should expedite a reply to our demands.

SONNINO.

No. 68.

The Italian Ambassador at Sofia to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sofia, 13th April, 1915.

(Telegram.) *recd. 14th.*

Rumours are in circulation of a possible separate Austro-Russian peace.

In Viennese political circles there is talk of peace between Austria-Hungary and Russia, and even that it is with the object of being free to deal with Italy.

CUCCHI.

No. 69.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 14th April, 1915.

(Telegram.) *recd. 14th.*

I saw Baron Burian to-day, and I requested a reply to our demands which we accounted most urgent.

Baron Burian said that he hoped to give me a reply on Friday evening.

AVARNA.

No. 70.

The Italian Ambassador at Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, 15th April, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd.* 16*th.*

The rumours of a movement towards a separate peace between Germany and Austria-Hungary and Russia are persistently maintained and are constantly gaining ground.

BOLLATI.

No. 71.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 16th April, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd.* 17*th.*

Baron Burian asked me to go to the Ballplatz to-day so that he might communicate to me his reply to your Excellency's proposals. He began by saying that the proposals of the Italian Government had been submitted to a careful examination on the part of the Imperial and Royal Government, which had been compelled with keen regret to record that for political, ethnological, strategical, and economical reasons, into which it would be superfluous to enter, a great part of these proposals, especially those formulated in Articles II., III. and IV., were unacceptable. The aggregate of these proposals would, in fact, create for the Imperial and Royal Government a situation irreconcilable with its vital interests, and would be but little calculated to attain the object at which the Italian Government had always declared that it aimed, namely that of consolidating the reciprocal relations between Austria and Italy, basing them upon complete good faith, eliminating every source of friction and rendering possible the collaboration of the two States in questions of general policy. On this subject Baron Burian pointed out that a modification of the frontier towards the Isonzo would render difficult the military defence of that frontier of the Monarchy and would bring the Italian frontier too close to the

city of Trieste. Then the detachment of this city from Austria-Hungary would deprive the latter of her most important maritime outlet and would place in the hands of Italy the principal communications between that port and Germany. Finally, the question of the islands of Curzolari, which dominated Dalmatia, would render Italy mistress of those regions, whilst the Adriatic would become an Italian sea from the moment that Italy retained possession of Valona. Baron Burian added that being sincerely actuated by the above considerations which he had submitted to me, upon which he considered it necessary to insist, and which had already been placed before your Excellency, and wishing to attest to Italy to the furthermost possible limits his desire to arrive at a definite and lasting understanding, the Imperial and Royal Government was disposed for its own part with regard to the territories of Southern Tyrol to extend the cession to which he had consented in the communication made to me on the 1st instant.

According to this fresh proposal the future line of frontier would detach from the present one near the Zufallspitze, and would follow for a distance the line between the district of Cleo on the one side and the districts of Schlanders and of Merano on the other, namely the line of the watershed between Noce and the Adige as far as Illmenspitze. The line of frontier would pass to the west of Proveis, so that this commune would continue to form part of the Tyrol, it would rejoin the Pescara torrent and follow the thalweg of the latter to its confluence with the Noce, whence the northern frontier would detach from the district of Mezzolombardo and would rejoin the Adige to the south of Salorno. It would ascend the Geiersberg, follow the watershed of the valley of the Avisio by Castiore and would run towards the Horspitze and Mount Comp.

It would turn thence to the south, describing a semicircle which would leave the commune of Altrei to the Tyrol and would reascend as far as the hills of San Lugano. It would follow the confines between the districts of Bolzano and Cavalese, namely, the watershed between the valleys of the Avisio and the Adige and it would pass over Rocca and the Grimmjoch to Latemar. From the Carnon hill it would run down to the Avisio crossing this river between the communes of Moena and Forno, and rising again towards the watershed between the valleys of San Pellegrino on the north and of Travignolo on the south. It would rejoin the present frontier on the east of the heights of Bocche.

Consequently the Imperial and Royal Government would not be

prepared to accept the line of frontier indicated by Article I. of your Excellency's proposals.

With regard to the proposal contained in Article V., according to which the territories ceded by Austria-Hungary would be immediately transferred to Italy, Baron Burian pointed out that the provinces accompanying that proposal, which even in time of peace would be impracticable for various reasons of general administration, etc., would be so in an even greater degree in time of war. And in this connexion he added that without attempting to cite other historical instances, it sufficed to recall the procedure adopted on the occasion of the cession of Nice and Savoy to France in 1860, in which case also after peace had been concluded a certain number of months elapsed between the settlement of the respective covenants and the effective transference of the territories ceded.

I pointed out to Baron Burian that the precedent of Nice and Savoy did not apply to the present case.

But Baron Burian after replying that he could not agree with me on that point, added that nothing on the part of the Imperial and Royal Government opposed the acceptance of the proposal contained in Article VIII., regarding the amnesty to be accorded to persons belonging to the territories ceded to Italy and sentenced or subjected to prosecution upon military and political grounds.

Coming next to speak of the question of Albania in general and that of Valona in particular, Burian told me that the Imperial and Royal Government could not do other than place upon record that it would be difficult to reconcile the proposal formulated by the Royal Italian Government in Articles VI. and VII. with the engagements undertaken by the Italian Government on four different occasions, namely: the Austro-Hungarian-Italian agreement of 1900 and 1901, and the decisions of the Conference of London; Italy's declaration of the 4th August of last year that she would remain faithful to the engagements assumed towards Austria-Hungary as well as to the decisions of the Conference of London, and that she did not wish to derive any profit in Albania from the fact that Austria-Hungary was engaged in war; and her formal declarations on the occasion of the Italian occupation of Valona.

On the other hand, the Imperial and Royal Government, impressed on its side by the necessity of maintaining the reciprocal rights and obligations resulting from the agreements in force and of persevering in the attitude always maintained towards the Albanian question, could not cease to be interested in Albania, a region so close

to the sphere of Austria-Hungary's own "most perceptible" interests, to the creation of which she had contributed together with Italy not only politically but also by means of very notable sacrifices of a military (the partial mobilisation of 1913), economical and financial order. For the rest, in accordance with the Conference of London, the Albanian question had become a European question, so that no single Power could dispose of it either alone or in agreement with others, since the existence and neutrality of Albania had been guaranteed by Europe.

Therefore it is only with the consent of the Powers—an unrealisable eventuality during the war—that the political situation of Albania could be modified.

Notwithstanding this, the Imperial and Royal Government, faithful to the spirit of the Austro-Hungarian-Italian agreement regarding Albania, perceiving in the Albanian question one of the problems of general policy regarding which the collaboration of Austria-Hungary and Italy might eventually continue in the future, declares itself still disposed to discuss with the Royal Italian Government reciprocal interests in Albania on the basis of the present situation, or to submit to revision the mutual agreements whenever future political changes should make this appear necessary to one or the other of the parties.

Passing on to examine the engagements to be undertaken by Italy, Baron Burian intimated to me that the Imperial and Royal Government desired to draw attention to the fact that Turkey having united herself to Austria-Hungary by the fact of her participation in the war, the neutrality which Italy would engage herself to maintain until the end of the war must similarly include the Ottoman Empire.

With regard to Article XI., Baron Burian informed me that the Imperial and Royal Government would accept the proposals formulated in it, provided that in the said article after the words "present war" were inserted the phrase: "and with regard also to territorial or other advantages that might accrue to Austria-Hungary from the treaty of peace that will terminate the present war."

And he added that the waiving on the part of the Imperial and Royal Government of compensation for the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesian Islands would also be subordinate to the same condition.

With regard, finally, to Article IX., Baron Burian informed me that without yet being in a position precisely to state the quota of the Public Debt concerning the territories to be ceded to Italy, or the lump sum to be claimed by Austria-Hungary as compensation for

State investments in the territory in question, the Imperial and Royal Government must nevertheless at once declare that the figure proposed by the Royal Italian Government would be entirely insufficient and would not represent even approximately an equitable compensation. And he added that, to cite only one point, he should state that the value of the military buildings alone, situated in the territory to be ceded to Italy, notably surpasses the total sum proposed by the Royal Italian Government. Not desiring, however, to trammel the conclusion of the agreement by contentions of a financial nature, the Imperial and Royal Government declared itself ready to submit the question of pecuniary indemnity, in the event of a disagreement with Italy, to the Arbitration Court of the Hague.

In handing me then a memorandum of the matters communicated to me, Baron Burian concluded by expressing the hope that your Excellency would appreciate the sentiment which had induced the Imperial and Royal Government to make this further sacrifice in favour of Italy.

I answered Baron Burian that I would hasten to telegraph to your Excellency all that he had said to me in reply to the proposals you had formulated.

AVARNA.

No. 72.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 21st April,* 1915.

I have examined the replies given to your Excellency by Baron Burian regarding the cessions which Austria-Hungary would be disposed to make, and I regret to have to declare that they do not appear to me to form an adequate basis for an agreement which is to create between the two States that enduring and normal situation which is mutually desired.

On one point only, that which regards the Trentino, has the Imperial and Royal Government shown itself disposed to cede a little more than in its first proposals; but even in this there is no provision that will overcome the main disadvantages of the present situation, whether considered from the linguistic, the ethnological or the military point of view.

On all the other demands Baron Burian answers us with a complete negative which takes no heed of all the reasons urged by us.

With regard to Albania and Valona, the argument put forward by Baron Burian to sustain his refusal is that various compacts already exist between Italy and Austria-Hungary and that there is, moreover, a European agreement on the subject. What we demanded was exactly that those previous agreements with Austria-Hungary should be modified by mutual consent, the Imperial and Royal Government ceasing entirely to interest itself in whatever we might agree regarding this with the rest of Europe, just as we cease to interest ourselves (see Article XI. proposed) in what Austria-Hungary might settle with respect to the Balkans at the end of the war.

With regard to Article XI. it was already my own notion that the renouncement to invoke the provisions of Article VII. should refer not only to the war, but also to advantages which from the treaty of peace might result to one side or the other in the Balkans and the Dodecanesus respectively.

As to Article IX., I admit that it is possible still to discuss the matter of the amount of the quota to be assumed of the Public Debt of the Empire, but we cannot take into account the value of the investments that may have been made by the State in the ceded territories, and this for the reasons already expounded in my telegram of the 8th April. *

Where disagreement appears to be insurmountable is on the subject of Article V. regarding the date of the eventual fulfilment of the agreement that might be reached. On this subject, too, I can do no more than refer to the reasons already stated why no Italian Government could make itself responsible for the integral fulfilment of an undertaking, which fulfilment had been postponed until the end of the war.

SONNINO.

No. 73.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 21*st April,* 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd.* 22*nd.*

I have conveyed to Baron Burian the substance of your Excellency's telegram, intimating to him that his replies in our interview

* See Document No. 64.

of last Friday regarding the cessions that Austria-Hungary was disposed to make, did not appear to your Excellency to afford a suitable basis for an agreement such as is mutually desired; and I then communicated to him the various observations which your Excellency has to offer upon those replies.

Baron Burian said that he took note of the communication, and as he desired attentively to examine your Excellency's observations, he would postpone making known his answers, but that he would let me have these as soon as possible.

AVARNA.

No. 74.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Vienna, 25th April,* 1915.

Although I have always endeavoured in my interviews with Baron Burian to convince him of the necessity of not delaying to satisfy our national aspirations and of agreeing to your Excellency's proposals, pointing out to him the grave consequences by which a refusal on his part might be attended, he has continued to persist in idle discussions until now, as your Excellency will have been able to perceive, and he does not appear exactly to grasp the real state of things with us. But what cannot fail in particular to occasion surprise is the illusion under which Baron Burian still labours that the Royal Italian Government must end by being convinced of the great sacrifice made by the Imperial and Royal Government if it consents to the cessions of territory in Southern Tyrol, and of the impossibility of its extending those concessions.

Moreover, Baron Burian, as he has several times given me to understand, cannot yet realise the necessity in which the Royal Italian Government might find itself, in the event of its demands not being integrally accepted, of going to war with Austria-Hungary and Germany.

It is perhaps to be expected that as a result of the renewed and more insistent pressure the exertion of which on the part of the German Government is to be foreseen, Baron Burian may be induced to extend in part the cessions of territories in Southern Tyrol and to make some concession on the side of our eastern frontier.

But even admitting that Baron Burian should be induced to make

concessions and to extend them as far as the actual limits traced by the Royal Italian Government, there would still remain to be determined the other important questions, namely of the establishment of Trieste as an autonomous State, of the cession of the Curzolare Islands, and of the Monarchy's desire to interest itself in Albania, regarding which, if the inclinations manifested to me by Baron Burian are to be taken into account, it is doubtful that the Imperial and Royal Government will give way.

If then, through unforeseen circumstances, the Imperial and Royal Government should end by submitting at the last moment even on these matters, as it has already done on the question of principle, there would still remain to settle the grave question of the immediate fulfilment of the agreement.

Regarding this question, which is by us considered a *sine qua non* of the said agreement, it is to be deemed beyond all measure difficult, as your Excellency asserts, that the dissensions existing between the Royal Italian Government and the Imperial and Royal Government on the subject should be settled after the decisive opposition offered by Baron Burian on this same question.

Therefore an agreement with Austria-Hungary on the basis of the proposals formulated by your Excellency seems almost unrealisable in the present state of things.

AVARNA

No. 75.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 29th April, 1915.
(Telegram.) *recd.* 30*th.*

I proceeded to-day to the Ballplatz at the request of Baron Burian, and he told me that he had begged me to visit him so that he might inform me of his opinion regarding the observations made by your Excellency upon the replies given by him to the proposals formulated by the Royal Italian Government which I had communicated to him in our interview on the 21st inst.

In recalling that those replies had not seemed to your Excellency to constitute in the aggregate a basis likely to ensure that good understanding and enduring harmony which was the aim of both Govern-

ments, Baron Burian informed me that he had to record that the sincere desire which he had several times expressed to me to reach a definite agreement with Italy had met with a serious obstacle, in the fact that some of the said proposals affected Austria-Hungary's vital interests. Now the relinquishing of those interests would create for the Monarchy such a situation, not only towards Italy, but also towards the other Powers, that its share in the political collaboration which was your Excellency's object would naturally be diminished.

He observed therefore, to begin with, on the score of Trieste, that by virtue of the Austro-Hungarian constitution, this city enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy. It formed a territory apart, and its Communal Council was invested with the functions of the provincial diets. The Italian element was largely represented in the autonomous administration of the city. Its numbers, the level of its education, and its economic position, assured for it, apart from its constitutional guarantees, an existence satisfactory in all respects. By detaching Trieste and its surroundings from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and creating it into a separate State, a mortal blow would be struck at the economic prosperity of that city, which, deprived of its *hinterland*, would lose all its importance, a prospect not in any way to be modified even by annexation to Italy, for which it would merely represent a superfluous port.

Trieste had always been an object of particular solicitude to the Imperial and Royal Government, which, in the interests, it is understood, of the State, would continue also in the future to favour its material and intellectual progress in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, whose prosperity depended entirely upon the bond uniting it to Austria-Hungary, which, whilst exacting the loyalty of its citizens, had never done anything to the detriment of their national character.

I could not refrain from pointing out to Baron Burian, as my own personal opinion, that we could not possibly admit in any way what he asserted, namely that the Imperial and Royal Government had done nothing to the detriment of the national character of the population of Trieste. And I reminded him on this subject of the interminable question of the Italian University in Trieste, which had given rise to frequent lengthy discussions and confidential measures between the two Governments and had provoked on several occasions strong agitations in Italy, besides the favoured treatment shown to the Slav schools at the expense of the national Italian culture in that city.

But Baron Burian, proceeding, dealt with the proposal regarding the cession to Italy of the Curzolare Islands and he observed that this question also brought us up against insurmountable obstacles. Abstracted from the purely Slav nationality of their inhabitants, those islands, in the hands of Italy, would constitute a strategic position that would dominate on the one hand the upper part of the Adriatic, where there could no longer be a question of equilibrium for Austria-Hungary, and would threaten on the other the very possession of the adjacent coast.

With regard to the cession of territories proposed in Austrian Friuli, Baron Burian pointed out that this would deprive Austria of a frontier that was indispensable to her for the defence not only of a part of her littoral, but also of several of her central provinces, and that it would moreover bring the Italian frontier nearer to her principal port. Besides this, the Italian element was only feebly represented, at least in a great part of the territory in question, which was peopled by Slavs.

Finally, referring to Tyrol, Baron Burian informed me that if, in accordance with its future delimitation, such as it was outlined in the last Austro-Hungarian proposal, part of the valley of the Noce, besides the valleys of Fassa and Ampezzo, were excluded from the cession of territories, the reasons which had prevailed in that respect were certainly not those of wishing to retain some region in which Italian was spoken.

This was not the case, particularly regarding the valleys of Fassa and Ampezzo, the population of which was Ladinian (Grisons), and desired with all the strength of its soul to remain united to Austria-Hungary, gravitating as it did towards the north from the point of view of all its exclusive interests.

Imperative strategic reasons created the necessity for Austria-Hungary to retain the eastern side of the valley of the Noce, which would remain insecure without possession of the heights protecting the region of Bolzano. And, he added, that supposing that we on our side should oppose his point of view regarding one or the other of these localities with arguments more or less analogous, it was necessary not to lose sight of the fact that the question for Austria-Hungary was one of a friendly cession of a part of her time-honoured possessions, and that the arguments of him who in the present instance relinquishes secure boundaries should, in the nature of things, take precedence of the arguments of him who acquires them.

Coming then to speak of the demand concerning immediate execu-

tion of the territorial cessions, Baron Burian told me that he did not abandon the hope that your Excellency upon submitting the matter to a searching examination would recognise the material impossibility of such a provision.

The absolute secrecy of the negotiations forbade until the conclusion of the agreement all the military, administrative, and other preparations which must precede the transference of the territory ceded.

All these preparatory measures demanded a certain amount of time, and could not be improvised at the last moment.

And this leaving out of all account the situation that would be created for Austria-Hungary if possession were taken by Italy of the territory in question at a moment in which the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was engaged in a vast war, and in which, consequently, the greater part of her territory was deprived of means of defence, her army being concentrated in the various theatres of operations.

Wishing, however, to render as easy as possible the position, at a given moment, of the Italian Government before Parliament and public opinion, provisions might be considered that would demonstrate in the eyes of all, the real and serious desire which existed faithfully to discharge the engagements assumed. To that end, as soon as the agreement were concluded, it would be possible to proceed to appoint a joint commission which would be entrusted with the settlement of the many questions of detail resulting from the cession of territories. The appointment and operation of this commission could not leave a shadow of doubt regarding the integrality and conclusiveness of the cession itself. Baron Burian added that if your Excellency on your own side desired to propose any other provisions towards the same end, he would not fail to examine them with the best intentions and to accept them as far as might be possible.

I told Baron Burian that notwithstanding these good intentions I must remind him with regard to this question of all that I had already laid before him in previous interviews, namely, that the immediate execution of the agreement was a condition *sine qua non* of the agreement itself, so that I could only refer him to the reasons already given him why no Italian Government could become guarantor of the integral execution of all the engagements assumed, the fulfilment of which was to be postponed until the end of the war.

Passing on to speak of the proposals of your Excellency in Article IX., Baron Burian said that although it would be easy to prove that the sum offered by the Italian Government as a quota of the Public Debt and as compensation was by a great deal inferior to the value

of the public effects would that be ceded to Italy, he shared the opinion expressed by your Excellency that such a question should not trammel the understanding provided that this were established upon all other points of the projected agreement. It was precisely because he was inspired by ideas of this order, and to afford yet another proof of his desire to surround the cession of territories by external and reassuring guarantees that he proposed to submit if necessary the financial controversy to an international tribunal, namely, to the Court of The Hague.

On the subject of the Albanian question Baron Burian repeated the expressions of his sincere desire to discuss with your Excellency reciprocal interests in Albania, taking into account the circumstances which had undergone a change during the present war, and to reach a fresh understanding on the subject with the Royal Italian Government which might, in placing things again upon European grounds, lead to Austria-Hungary's disinteresting herself, provided that Italy would similarly disinterest herself, in Albania with the exception of Valona and the sphere of interests that had their centre there, and provided that sufficient guarantees might be established against undertakings by any other Powers in Albania, an eventuality as menacing to the political and maritime interests of Austria-Hungary as to those of Italy.

I told Baron Burian that I would lose no time in acquainting your Excellency with the replies he had made to me regarding your communications, but that for my own part I thought it well to point out to him that with the exception of certain formal suggestions made by him on the subject of some of the proposals he persisted in pronouncing himself in the negative, particularly with regard to those formulated in Articles I., II., III., IV. and V.

AVARNA.

No. 76.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *Rome, 3rd May,* 1915.

I beg your Excellency to convey the following communication to the Minister for Foreign Affairs there, of which you will leave him a written copy:

The alliance between Italy and Austria-Hungary proclaimed itself, from the first, to be an element and a guarantee of peace, aiming first of all as the principal object at common defence. In view of subsequent events and of the new situation arising out of them, the two countries found it necessary to propose a new object no less essential, and in course of the successive renewals of the Treaty, they devoted themselves to safeguarding the continuity of their alliance, stipulating the principle of preliminary agreements regarding the Balkans, with a view to reconciling the divergent interests and propensities of the two Powers.

It is very evident that these stipulations, loyally observed, would have sufficed as a solid basis for a common and fruitful action. But Austria-Hungary, in the summer of 1914, without coming to any agreement with Italy, without even giving her the least intimation, and without taking any notice of the counsels of moderation addressed to her by the Royal Italian Government, notified to Serbia the ultimatum of the 23rd July, which was the cause and the point of departure of the present European conflagration.

Austria-Hungary by disregarding the obligations imposed by the Treaty profoundly disturbed the Balkan *status quo*, and created a situation from which she alone should profit to the detriment of interests of the greatest importance which her ally had so often affirmed and proclaimed.

So flagrant a violation of the letter and the spirit of the Treaty not only justified Italy's refusal to place herself on the side of her allies in a war provoked without previous notice to her, but at the same time deprived the alliance of its essential character and of its *raison d'être.*

Even the compact of friendly neutrality for which the Treaty provides was compromised by this violation. Reason and sentiment alike agree in preventing friendly neutrality from being maintained when one of the allies has recourse to arms for the purpose of realising a programme diametrically opposed to the vital interests of the other ally, interests the safeguarding of which constituted the principal reason of the alliance itself.

Notwithstanding this, Italy exerted herself for several months to create a situation that should be favourable to the reëstablishment between the two States of these friendly relations which constitute the essential foundation of all coöperation in the domain of general policy.

With this aim and in this hope the Royal Italian Government announced its willingness to come to an arrangement having for its basis

the satisfaction in an equitable degree of the legitimate national aspirations of Italy and serving at the same time to reduce the disparity existing in the reciprocal position of the two States in the Adriatic.

These negotiations did not lead, however, to any appreciable result.

All the efforts of the Royal Italian Government met with the resistance of the Imperial and Royal Government, which even now, after several months, has consented only to admit the special interests of Italy in Valona, and to promise an insufficient concession of territory in the Trentino, a concession which in no way admits of the normal settlement of the situation, whether from the ethnological, the political or the military point of view.

This concession, moreover, was to be carried into effect only in an indeterminate epoch, namely not until the end of the war.

In this state of things the Italian Government must renounce the hope of coming to an agreement, and sees itself compelled to withdraw all its proposals for a settlement.

It is equally useless to maintain for the alliance a formal appearance which could only serve to dissemble the reality of continual mistrust and daily opposition.

For these reasons Italy, confident of her just rights, affirms and proclaims that she resumes from this moment her complete liberty of action, and declares as cancelled and as henceforth without effect her treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary.

SONNINO.

No. 77.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Vienna, 4th May,* 1915.

I have made to-day to Baron Burian the communication prescribed by your Excellency.

AVARNA.

Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.[1]

(Telegram.) *Vienna, May* 21, 1915.

I gave, this afternoon, to the Italian Ambassador my reply to his communication of the 4th instant concerning the cancellation of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, and I handed him a written copy of it.

The reply read as follows:

The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister has had the honour to receive the communication concerning the cancellation of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, which the Italian Ambassador made on the 4th of May by order of his Government.

With painful surprise, the Austro-Hungarian Government takes cognisance of the decision of the Italian Government to put an end in such a summary manner to a treaty which was based on a community of our most important political interests, which has guaranteed security and peace to our respective States for so many years, and which has been of obvious benefit to Italy.

This surprise is all the more justified since the facts invoked in the first instance by the Italian Government in justification of its decision date back more than nine months and since the Royal Government in the meantime has repeatedly asserted its desire to maintain and even to strengthen the bonds of the alliance between our two countries, a desire which has always found a favourable reception and a cordial echo in Austria-Hungary.

The reasons which compelled the Austro-Hungarian Government in July of last year to send an ultimatum to Serbia, are too well known to require repetition here. The aim of Austria-Hungary was purely and simply to safeguard the Monarchy against the subversive machinations of Serbia and to prevent the continuance of an agitation which aimed at the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, and which had led to numerous outrages, culminating in the tragedy of Serajevo. This aim could in no way affect the interests of Italy, for the Austro-Hungarian Government never has supposed and considers it out of the question, that Italy's interests could in any way

[1] The translation here printed of the above note is taken from the *Austro-Hungarian Red Book* (*No.* 1), with the approval of the Italian Embassy in Washington. It does not appear in the *Green Book* issued by the Italian Government.

be identified with criminal intrigues against the security and territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary, unfortunately tolerated and encouraged by the Belgrade Government.

The Italian Government, moreover, was informed and knew that Austria-Hungary had no purposes of conquest in Serbia. It was expressly declared in Rome that if the war remained localised, Austria-Hungary had no intention to encroach upon the territorial integrity of Serbia.

When, in consequence of Russia's intervention, the purely local conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, contrary to our desires, assumed a European character, and Austria-Hungary and Germany found themselves attacked by several Great Powers, the Italian Government proclaimed Italy's neutrality, without, however, making the slightest suggestion that this war, which had been provoked and planned far in advance by Russia, could deprive the treaty of the Triple Alliance of its *raison d'être.*

It suffices to recall the declarations made at that time by the late Marchese di San Giuliano and the telegram which His Majesty, the King of Italy, on August 2, 1914, addressed to His Majesty, the Emperor-King, to establish the fact that the Italian Government saw nothing at that time in Austria-Hungary's proceeding which was in conflict with the stipulations of our Treaty of Alliance.

Attacked by the Powers of the Triple Entente, Austria-Hungary and Germany were obliged to defend their territories; but this defensive war was in no wise directed toward "the realisation of a programme opposed to Italy's vital interests." These vital interests, or what we could know of them, were in no way menaced. If, moreover, the Italian Government entertained apprehensions in this direction it could have given expression to them and would certainly have found both in Vienna and Berlin the best will to protect these interests.

The Royal Government at that time held the view that neither of its allies, considering the situation, could invoke the *casus foederis* as affecting Italy, but it made no communication which could justify the belief that it regarded the proceeding of Austria-Hungary as a " flagrant violation of both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty of Alliance."

The Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, even though deploring Italy's resolution to remain neutral,—a resolution which in our view was hardly compatible with the spirit of the Treaty,—nevertheless loyally accepted the view of the Italian Government, and the exchange

of views which then took place established the maintenance of the Triple Alliance.

Precisely with reference to this Treaty, and especially to Article VII., the Royal Government presented its claims, which aimed at securing certain compensation in the event of Austria-Hungary obtaining territorial or other advantages in the Balkan Peninsula from the war.

The Austro-Hungarian Government accepted this standpoint, and declared itself ready to consider the question, at the same time pointing out that, as long as the eventual advantages accruing to Austria-Hungary remained unknown, it was difficult to specify such compensation.

The Italian Government acceded to this view, as is shown by the declaration of August 25, 1914, by the late Marchese di San Giuliano, who said: "It would be premature now to talk of compensation," and by the remarks of the Duke of Avarna after our withdrawal from Serbia: "At present there is no object of compensation."

Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian Government has always been ready to enter into negotiations on this subject.

When the Italian Government, while still repeating its wish to maintain and strengthen the Alliance, presented certain demands which, on the plea of compensation, referred to the cession of territories constituting integral parts of the Dual Monarchy, the Austro-Hungarian Government always showed that it was guided by a sincere desire to reach an understanding with Italy, and although for ethnical, political, and military reasons, which have been amply explained in Rome, it was impossible to accede to all the demands of the Italian Government, the sacrifices which the Austro-Hungarian Government was prepared to make were so important that they were only justified by its desire to continue an alliance which had existed for so many years to the mutual advantage of both countries.

The Italian Government contends that the concessions offered by Austria-Hungary were to be realised only at an indefinite time, namely, at the end of the war, and seems to conclude that these concessions would therefore lose their entire value.

The Austro-Hungarian Government, while emphasising the material impossibility of an immediate surrender of the ceded territory, showed itself none the less ready to offer all necessary guarantees for the purpose of preparing for and insuring this transfer at no distant date.

The obvious good-will and conciliatory spirit of which the Austro-Hungarian Government has given proof in the course of the negotiations seem in no way to justify the opinion of the Italian Government that every hope must be abandoned of reaching an agreement.

Such an agreement, however, can be reached only when both sides are animated by the same sincere desire to reach an understanding.

The Austro-Hungarian Government cannot take cognisance of the declaration of the Italian Government that it desires to recover complete freedom of action, and to consider the Treaty of Alliance with Austria-Hungary henceforth null and void, as such a declaration by the Italian Government is in absolute contradiction with the solemnly undertaken obligations which Italy assumed in the Treaty of December 5, 1912, and which fixed the duration of our alliance to July 8, 1920, with a right to cancel it only on one year's notice, and with no provision for cancellation or abrogation of the Treaty before that time.

The Royal Italian Government having in an arbitrary manner freed itself from all its obligations, the Austro-Hungarian Government declines the responsibility for all consequences that may arise from this procedure.

Baron Sonnino, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Italian Representatives Abroad and to Foreign Governments.[1]

Rome, May 23, 1915.

The Triple Alliance was essentially defensive and designed solely to preserve the *status quo* or in other words the equilibrium in Europe. That these were its only objects and purposes is established by the letter and spirit of the Treaty as well as by the intentions clearly described and set forth in official acts of the Ministers who created the Alliance and confirmed and renewed it in the interest of peace which always has inspired Italian policy.

The Treaty, as long as its intents and purposes had been loyally interpreted and regarded and as long as it had not been used as a

[1] Translation furnished by the Italian Embassy at Washington. The note does not appear in the *Green Book* issued by the Italian Government.

pretext for aggression against others, greatly contributed to the elimination and settlement of causes of conflict, and for many years assured to Europe the inestimable benefits of peace.

But Austria-Hungary severed the Treaty by her own hands. She rejected the response of Serbia, which gave to her all the satisfaction she could legitimately claim. She refused to listen to the conciliatory proposals presented by Italy in conjunction with other powers, in the effort to spare Europe from a vast conflict certain to drench the continent with blood and to reduce it to ruin beyond the conception of human imagination, and finally she provoked that conflict.

Article 1 of the Treaty embodied the usual and necessary obligation of such pacts—the pledge to exchange views upon any political and economic questions of a general nature that might arise—pursuant to its terms none of the contracting parties had the right to undertake, without a previous agreement, any step the consequence of which might impose a duty upon the other signatories arising out of the Alliance, or which would in any way whatsoever encroach upon their vital interests. This Article was violated by Austria-Hungary when she sent to Servia her note dated July 23, 1914, an action taken without the previous assent of Italy.

Thus Austria-Hungary violated beyond doubt one of the fundamental provisions of the Treaty. The obligation of Austria-Hungary to come to a previous understanding with Italy was the greater because her obstinate policy against Serbia gave rise to a situation which directly tended to the provocation of an European war.

As far back as the beginning of July, 1914, the Italian Government, preoccupied by the prevailing feeling in Vienna, caused to be laid before the Austro-Hungarian Government a number of suggestions advising moderation and warning it of the impending danger of an European outbreak. The course adopted by Austria-Hungary against Serbia constituted moreover a direct encroachment upon the general interests of Italy, both political and economical, in the Balkan peninsula. Austria-Hungary could not for a moment imagine that Italy could remain indifferent while Serbian independence was being trodden upon. On a number of occasions theretofore Italy gave Austria to understand, in friendly but clear terms, that the independence of Serbia was considered by Italy as essential to Balkan equilibrium. Austria-Hungary was further advised that Italy could never permit that equilibrium to be disturbed to her prejudice. This warning had been conveyed not only by her diplomats in private conversations with responsible Austro-Hungarian officials, but was

proclaimed publicly by Italian statesmen on the floors of Parliament. Therefore when Austria-Hungary ignored the usual practices and menaced Serbia by sending her an ultimatum without in any way notifying the Italian Government of what she proposed to do, indeed leaving that Government to learn of her action through the press rather than through the usual channels of diplomacy, when Austria-Hungary took this unprecedented course she not only severed her alliance with Italy, but committed an act inimical to Italian interests. The Italian Government had obtained trustworthy information that the complete programme laid down by Austria-Hungary with reference to the Balkans was prompted by a desire to decrease Italy's economical and political influence in that section, and tended directly and indirectly to the subservience of Serbia to Austria-Hungary, the political and territorial isolation of Montenegro, and the isolation and political decadence of Roumania.

This attempted diminution of the influence of Italy in the Balkans would have been brought about by the Austro-Hungarian programme even though Austria-Hungary had no intention of making further territorial acquisitions. Furthermore, attention should be called to the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Government had assumed the solemn obligation of prior consultation of Italy as required by the special provisions of Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, which in addition to the obligation of previous agreement recognised the right of compensation to the other contracting parties in case one should occupy temporarily or permanently any section of the Balkans.

To this end, the Italian Government approached the Austro-Hungarian Government immediately upon the inauguration of Austro-Hungarian hostilities against Serbia, and succeeded in attaining reluctant acquiescence in the Italian representations. Conversations were initiated immediately after July 23 for the purpose of giving a new lease of life to the Treaty which had been violated and thereby annulled by the act of Austria-Hungary. This object could be attained only by the conclusion of new agreements. The conversations were renewed, with additional propositions as the basis, in December, 1914. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna at that time was given instructions to inform Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the Italian Government considered it necessary to proceed without delay to an exchange of views and consequently to concrete negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the complex situation arising out of the conflict which that Government had provoked. Count Berch-

told at first refused. He declared that the time had not arrived for negotiations. Subsequently, upon our rejoinder, in which the German Government united, Count Berchtold agreed to exchange views as suggested. We promptly declared, as one of our fundamental objects, that the compensation on which the agreement should be based should relate to territories at the time under the dominion of Austria-Hungary.

The discussion continued for months, from the first days of December to March, and it was not until the end of March that Baron Burian offered a zone of territory comprised within a line extending from the existing boundary of Italy to a point just north of the City of Trent. In exchange for this proposed cession, the Austro-Hungarian Government demanded a number of pledges, including among them an assurance of entire liberty of action in the Balkans. Note should be made of the fact that the cession of the territory around Trent was not intended to be immediately effective as we demanded but was to be made only upon the termination of the European War. We replied that the offer was not acceptable and then presented the minimum concessions which could meet in part cession in the Trentino, the Austro-Hungarian Government persisted our national aspirations and strengthen in an equitable manner our strategic position in the Adriatic. These demands comprised: the extension of the boundary in Trentino; a new boundary on the Isonzo; special provision for Trieste; the cession of certain islands of the Curzolari Archipelago; the abandonment of Austrian claims in Albania and the recognition of our possession of Avalona and the islands of the Ægean Sea which we occupied during our war with Turkey.

At first our demands were categorically rejected. It was not until another month of conversation that Austria-Hungary was induced to increase the zone of territory she was prepared to cede in the Trentino and then only as far as Mezzolombardo, thereby excluding the territory inhabited by people of the Italian race such as the Valle del Noce, Val di Fasso and Val di Ampezzo. Such a proposal would have given to Italy a boundary of no strategical value. In addition the Austro-Hungarian Government maintained its determination not to make the cession effective before the end of the war. The repeated refusals of Austria-Hungary were expressly confirmed in a conversation between Baron Burian and the Italian Ambassador at Vienna on April 29th, while admitting the possibility of recognising some of our interests in Avalona and granting the above-mentioned territorial

in its opposition to all our other demands, especially those regarding the boundary of the Isonzo, Trieste and the islands.

The attitude assumed by Austria-Hungary from the beginning of December until the end of April made it evident that she was attempting to temporise without coming to a conclusion. Under such circumstances Italy was confronted by the danger of losing forever the opportunity of realising her aspirations based upon tradition, nationality, and her desire for a safe position in the Adriatic, while other contingencies in the European conflict menaced her principal interests in other seas. Hence Italy faced the necessity and duty of recovering that liberty of action to which she was entitled and of seeking protection for her interests apart from the negotiations which had been dragging uselessly along for five months and without reference to the Treaty of Alliance which had virtually failed as a result of its annulment by the action of Austria-Hungary in July, 1914.

It would not be out of place to observe that the Alliance having terminated and there existing no longer any reason for the Italian people to be bound by it, though they had loyally stood by it for so many years because of their desire for peace, there naturally revived in the public mind the grievances against Austria-Hungary which for so many years had been voluntarily repressed. While the Treaty of Alliance contained no formal agreement for the use of the Italian language or the maintenance of Italian tradition and Italian civilisation in the Italian provinces of Austria, nevertheless if the Alliance was to be effective in preserving peace and harmony it was indisputably clear that Austria-Hungary, as our Ally, should have taken into account the moral obligation of respecting what constituted some of the most vital interests of Italy. Instead, the constant policy of the Austro-Hungarian Government was to destroy Italian nationality and Italian civilisation all along the coast of the Adriatic. A brief statement of the facts and of the tendencies well known to all will suffice: substitution of officials of the Italian race by officials of other nationalities; artificial immigration of hundreds of families of a different nationality; replacement of Italian by other labour; exclusion from Trieste by the decrees of Prince Hohenlohe of employees who were subjects of Italy; denationalisation of the judicial administration; refusal of Austria to permit an Italian University in Trieste which formed the subject of diplomatic negotiations; denationalisation of navigation companies; encouragement of other nationalities to the detriment of the Italian, and finally the methodical and unjustifiable expulsion of Italians in ever-increasing numbers. This

deliberate and persistent policy of the Austro-Hungarian Government with reference to the Italian population was not only due to internal conditions brought about by the competition of the different nationalities within its territory, but was inspired in great part by a deep sentiment of hostility and aversion toward Italy, which prevailed particularly in the quarters closest to the Austro-Hungarian Government and influenced decisively its course of action. Of the many instances which could be cited it is enough to say that in 1911, while Italy was engaged in war with Turkey, the Austro-Hungarian General Staff prepared a campaign against us and the military party prosecuted energetically a political intrigue designed to drag in other responsible elements of Austria. The mobilisation of an army upon our frontier left us in no doubt of our neighbour's sentiment and intentions. The crisis was settled pacifically through the influence, so far as known, of outside factors; but since that time we have been constantly under apprehension of a sudden attack whenever the party opposed to us should get the upper hand in Vienna.

All of this was known in Italy, and it was only the sincere desire for peace prevailing among the Italian people which prevented a rupture. After the European war broke out Italy sought to come to an understanding with Austria-Hungary with a view to a settlement satisfactory to both parties which might avert existing and future trouble. Her efforts were in vain, notwithstanding the efforts of Germany, which for months endeavoured to induce Austria-Hungary to comply with Italy's suggestions, thereby recognising the propriety and legitimacy of the Italian attitude. Therefore Italy found herself compelled by the force of events to seek other solutions. Inasmuch as the Treaty of Alliance with Austria-Hungary had ceased virtually to exist and served only to prolong a state of continual friction and mutual suspicion the Italian Ambassador at Vienna was instructed to declare to the Austro-Hungarian Government that the Italian Government considered itself free from the ties arising out of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance in so far as Austria-Hungary was concerned This communication was delivered in Vienna on May 4th.

Subsequently to this declaration and after we had been obliged to take steps for the protection of our interests, the Austro-Hungarian Government submitted new concessions, which, however, were deemed insufficient and by no means met our minimum demands. These offers could not be considered under the circumstances.

The Italian Government taking into consideration what has been stated above and supported by the vote of Parliament and the solemn

manifestation of the country, came to the decision that any further delay would be inadvisable. Therefore on this day (May 23rd) it was declared in the name of the King to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome that beginning to-morrow, May 24, it will consider itself in a state of war with Austria-Hungary. Orders to this effect also were telegraphed yesterday to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

SONNINO.

THE

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK

(No. 1)

THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK (NO. 1)[1]

No. 1.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Belgrade, July* 10 (23), 1914.

The Austrian Minister, at 6 o'clock this evening, presented an ultimatum from his Government to the Minister of Finance, Patchou, in the absence of Pashitch, requiring the acceptance of the demands contained therein within forty-eight hours. Giesl added verbally that, in the event of failure to accept the note integrally within forty-eight hours, he was under instructions to leave Belgrade with the staff of the legation. Pashitch and the other Ministers, who are away electioneering, have been recalled and are expected at Belgrade to-morrow, Friday, at 10 A.M. Patchou, who communicated to me the contents of the note, solicits the help of Russia and declares that no Servian Government could accept the demands of Austria.

STRANDTMAN.

No. 2.

The Charge d'Affaires in Servia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Belgrade,* 10 (23) *July,* 1914.

Text of the note which was transmitted to-day by the Minister of Austria-Hungary to the Servian Government:

On March 31st, 1909, the Minister of Servia in Vienna made, by order of his Government, to the Imperial and Royal Government, the following declaration:

[1] *Imperial Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Documents respecting the negotiations preceding the War.* 10/23 *July* - 24 *July*/6 *August,* 1914. Published by the Russian Government. Title of publication in the original French text: *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Recueil de Documents Diplomatiques. Négociations ayant précédé la guerre.* 10/23 *Juillet* - 24 *Juillet*/6 *Août,* 1914. Petrograd: Imprimerie de l'État. 1914.

"Servia recognises that she has not been injured in her rights by the accomplished fact created in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that she will conform in consequence to such decision as the Powers will take in regard to Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. Yielding to the advice of the Great Powers, Servia undertakes from now on to abandon the attitude of protest and opposition which she has observed in regard to the annexation since last Autumn, and she undertakes, in addition, to change the course of her actual policy toward Austria-Hungary in order to live henceforward with this latter on the footing of good neighbourhood."

Now the history of the late years, and notably the sad events of June 28, have demonstrated the existence in Servia of a subversive movement the object of which is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy certain parts of its territories. This movement, which originated under the eyes of the Servian Government, has reached the point of showing itself beyond the territory of the kingdom by acts of terrorism, by a series of criminal attempts and by murders.

The Royal Government of Servia, far from keeping the formal engagements contained in the declaration of March 31, 1909, has done nothing to suppress this movement; it has tolerated the criminal activity of the different societies and affiliations directed against the monarchy, the unrestrained language of the press, the glorification of the authors of the outrage, the participation of officers and functionaries in the subversive actions, an unwholesome propaganda in the public instruction—tolerated, in a word, all the manifestations which could lead the Servian population to hatred of the monarchy and contempt for its institutions.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Government of Servia had not ceased at the moment when the events of June 28 last showed to the entire world its dreadful consequences:—

It results from the depositions and avowals of the criminal authors of the outrage of June 28 that the murder of Serajevo was plotted in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were furnished had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the "Narodna Odbrana," and finally that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and of their arms was organised and effected by chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

The results of the investigation mentioned do not permit the Imperial and Royal Government any longer to pursue the attitude

of expectant longanimity which it had observed during years in the face of actions concentrated at Belgrade and propagated from there over the territories of the monarchy; these results impose upon it on the contrary the duty of bringing an end to plots which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the monarchy.

It is to attain this object that the Imperial and Royal Government sees itself obliged to demand from the Servian Government the official declaration that it condemns the propaganda directed against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, that is to say, the whole of the tendencies which seek in their last result to detach from the monarchy territories which form part of it, and that it undertakes to suppress by all means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a solemn character to this engagement the Royal Government of Servia will have published on the first page of the "Official Journal" on the date of 26 (13) July the following declaration:—

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, the whole of the tendencies which have the ultimate object of detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part of it, and it deplores sincerely the disastrous consequences of these criminal actions.

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries should have participated in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thereby compromised the relations of good neighbourship to which the Royal Government had solemnly engaged itself by its declaration of March 31, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of or attempt at interference in the destinies of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary whatever, considers it its duty formally to notify the officers, the functionaries, and all the population of the kingdom that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigour against those persons who should render themselves guilty of such acts, acts which it will use all its efforts to prevent and to repress."

This declaration shall be simultaneously brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army by an order of the day from his Majesty the King, and shall be published in the official bulletin of the army.

The Royal Servian Government engages itself in addition:

(1) To suppress any publication which excites to hatred and disdain of the monarchy and of which the general tendency is directed against its territorial integrity.

(2) To dissolve immediately the society called "Narodna Odbrana," to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and affiliations in Servia which give themselves to the propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; the Royal Government will take the measures necessary to prevent the dissolved societies from continuing their activity under another name and under another form.

(3) To eliminate without delay from the public instruction in Servia both in regard to the teaching corps and in the methods of education anything which serves or could serve to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

(4) To remove from the military service and from the administration in general all officers and functionaries guilty of the propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and whose names and acts the Imperial and Royal Government reserves to itself the right to communicate to the Royal Government.

(5) To accept the collaboration in Servia of the agents of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.

(6) To open a judicial enquiry against the partisans of the plot of June 28 who are upon Servian territory:—

Agents delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government will take part in the investigations bearing thereupon:—

(7) To proceed immediately to the arrest of Commander Voija Tankosic and of the individual named Milan Ciganovic, employé of the Servian Government, compromised by the results of the investigation of Serajevo.

(8) To prevent by efficacious measures the assistance of the Servian authorities in the illegal traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and severely punish the functionaries of the frontier service of Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having aided the authors of the crime of Serajevo by facilitating their passage across the frontier.

(9) To give the Imperial and Royal Government explanations regarding the unjustifiable statements of high Servian functionaries, both in Servia and abroad, who, despite their official positions, did not hesitate after the outrage of June 28 to express themselves in

interviews in a manner hostile toward the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; finally,

(10) To notify without delay the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised in the preceding points.

The Imperial and Royal Government awaits the reply of the Royal Government at the latest up to Saturday, the 25th of this month, at 6 o'clock in the evening.

A memorandum concerning the results of the investigation of Serajevo in regard to the functionaries mentioned in points 7 and 8 is annexed to this note.

STRANDTMAN.

No. 3.

Note verbale personally presented by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 10 A.M. *on July* 11 (24), 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on Thursday, the 10th (23rd) instant, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

[Here follows the text of the note. See No. 2.]

No. 4.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 11 (24), 1914.

Please convey the following message to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

"The Communication made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade affords to the Powers a period which is quite insufficient to

enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

"In order to prevent the consequences, incalculable and equally fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared herself to be disposed to inform the Powers of the facts elicited by the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study those facts.

"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well-founded, they would be in a position to offer corresponding advice to the Servian Government.

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the step taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government in regard to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations."

Communicated to London, Rome, Paris, Belgrade.

SAZONOFF.

No. 5.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives at London, Berlin, Rome and Paris.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 11 (24), 1914.

With reference to my telegram of to-day to Kudacheff * we trust that the Government to which you are accredited will share the Russian point of view and will at once instruct their Representative at Vienna to hold similar language.

Communicated to Belgrade.

STRANDTMAN.

* Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Vienna.

No. 6.

Telegram from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Servia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

Belgrade, July 11 (24), 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Government yesterday evening presented to the Servian Government a note respecting the outrage at Serajevo. Servia, aware of her international obligations, has declared, ever since the horrible crime was committed, that she condemned it, and that she was ready to open an enquiry in Servia if the complicity of certain of her subjects were proved at the trial instituted by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note are, however, unnecessarily humiliating for Servia, and incompatible with her dignity as an independent State. For instance, we are peremptorily called upon to insert a declaration by the Government in the "Official Journal," and for an order from the Sovereign to the army, in which we are to check the spirit of hostility towards Austria and to blame ourselves for criminal weakness as regards our treacherous intrigues. We are further required to admit Austro-Hungarian officials into Servia to take part with our officials at the trial and to superintend the carrying out of the other conditions laid down in the note. We are required to accept these demands in their entirety within forty-eight hours, failing which the Austro-Hungarian Legation will leave Belgrade. We are prepared to accept those of the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are compatible with the position of an independent State, as well as those to which your Majesty may advise us to agree, and all those persons whose complicity in the crime may be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of the demands could not be carried out without changes in our legislation, which would need time. We have been allowed too short a time-limit. We may be attacked at the expiration of the time-limit by the Austro-Hungarian army which is concentrating upon our frontier. We are unable to defend ourselves and we beg your Majesty to come to our aid as soon as possible. The much appreciated good-will which your Majesty has so often shown towards us inspires us with the firm belief that once again our appeal to your noble Slav heart will not pass unheeded.

At this critical moment I echo the feelings of the Servian people

in praying your Majesty to be pleased to interest yourself in the fate of the Kingdom of Servia.

ALEXANDRE.

No. 7.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 11 (24), 1914.

All the morning papers, even those few which recognise the impossibility of Servia's accepting the prescribed conditions, warmly welcome the strong line adopted by Austria. The semi-official "Lokal-Anzeiger" is particularly violent; it describes as fruitless any possible appeals that Servia may make to St. Petersburgh, Paris, Athens, or Bucharest, and concludes by saying that the German people will breathe freely when they learn that the situation in the Balkan peninsula is to be cleared up at last.

BRONEWSKY.

No. 8.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 11 (24), 1914.

A copy of the note officially presented at Belgrade has been communicated to the French Government by the Austrian Ambassador. The German Ambassador later visited the Minister and read to him a communication containing the Austrian arguments, and indicating that in the event of a refusal on the part of Servia, Austria would be obliged to resort to pressure, and, in case of need, to military measures. The communication ended with the observation that, in the opinion of Germany, this question ought to be settled between Austria and Servia direct, and that it was to the interest of the Powers to localise the affair by leaving it to the interested parties. The Acting Head of the Political Department, who was present at the interview, asked the Ambassador whether the

Austrian action should be considered as an ultimatum—in other words, whether, in the event of Servia not submitting entirely to the Austrian demands, hostilities were inevitable. The Ambassador avoided a direct reply, alleging that he had no instructions.

SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 9.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Belgrade, July* 11 (24), 1914.

Pashitch has returned to Belgrade. He intends to give an answer to Austria within the prescribed time-limit—that is to say, to-morrow, Saturday, at 6 P. M.—showing the points which are acceptable or unacceptable. To-day an appeal will be addressed to the Powers to defend the independence of Servia. Then, added Pashitch, if war is inevitable, we will make war.

STRANDTMAN.

No. 10.

Announcement by the Russian Government.

St. Petersburgh, July 12 (25), 1914.

Recent events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Servia by Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government the greatest anxiety. The Government is closely following the course of the dispute between the two countries, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent.

No. 11.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Vienna, July* 12 (25), 1914.

Count Berchtold is at Ischl. In view of the impossibility of arriving there in time, I have telegraphed to him our proposal to extend the time-limit of the ultimatum, and I have repeated this proposal verbally to Baron Macchio. The latter promised to communicate it in time to the Minister for Foreign Affairs but added that he had no hesitation in predicting a categorical refusal.

KOUDACHEFF.

No. 12.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Vienna, July* 12 (25), 1914.

In continuation of my telegram of to-day I have just heard from Macchio that the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse our proposal to extend the time-limit of the note.

KOUDACHEFF.

No. 13.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[Delayed in transmission, received July 14 (27), 1914.]

(Telegram.) *Belgrade, July* 12 (25), 1914.

Following is the reply which the President of the Servian Cabinet to-day handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade before the expiration of the time-limit of the ultimatum.

"The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

"Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connexion the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which as a general rule escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

"For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are

prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the 'Journal Officiel,' on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:—

"'The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour.'

"This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

"The Royal Government further undertake:—

"1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution.

"2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the

Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the 'Noradna Odbrana' and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government and will dissolve the 'Narodna Odbrana' Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

"3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

"4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

"5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

"6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th of June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

"7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voija Tankositch. As regards Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed

(on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo, for the purposes of the latter enquiry.

"8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznica line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

"9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime, and which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

"10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

"If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909."

STRANDTMAN.

No. 14.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 12 (25), 1914.

I have received your telegram of the 11th (24th) July and have communicated its contents to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He tells me that the British Government have likewise urged him to advise Vienna to extend the time-limit of the ultimatum. He has informed Vienna telegraphically of this step, and he will do the same as regards Russia's action, but he fears that in the absence of Berchtold, who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of time, his telegrams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the wisdom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined to think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance of Servia. I replied that a great Power such as Austria could give way without impairing her prestige, and I adduced every other similar argument, but failed, nevertheless, to obtain any more definite promise. Even when I gave him to understand that action must be taken at Vienna if the possibility of terrible consequences was to be avoided, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered each time in the negative.

BRONEWSKY.

No. 15.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 12 (25), 1914.

I have received your telegram of the 11th (24th) July respecting the extension of the time-limit of the Austrian ultimatum, and I have made the communication in accordance with your instructions. The French Representative at Vienna has been furnished with similar instructions.

SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 16.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 12 (25), 1914.

I have received your telegram of the 11th July. Grey has instructed the British Ambassador at Vienna, to support our action for the extension of the time-limit of the ultimatum. At the same time he explained to me that the Austrian Ambassador had come to see him, and had explained that the Austrian note should not be regarded as an ultimatum. It should be regarded as a step, which, in the event of no reply, or in the event of an unsatisfactory reply within the time fixed, would be followed by a rupture of diplomatic relations and the immediate departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister from Belgrade; without, however, entailing the immediate opening of hostilities. Grey added that as a result of this explanation he had told the British Ambassador at Vienna that, should it be too late to raise the question of extending the time-limit of the ultimatum, the question of preventing hostilities might perhaps serve as a basis for discussion.

BENCKENDORFF.

No. 17.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 12 (25), 1914.

In the event of any change for the worse in the situation which might lead to joint action by the Great Powers, we count upon it that England will at once side definitely with Russia and France, in order to maintain the European balance of power, for which she has constantly intervened in the past, and which would certainly be compromised in the event of the triumph of Austria.

SAZONOW.

No. 18.

Note verbale handed to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, July 12 (25), 1914.

We learn from an authoritative source that the news spread by certain newspapers, to the effect that the action of the Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade was instigated by Germany, is absolutely false. The German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was presented, and exercised no influence upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly attributed to Germany.

Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims made by the Vienna Cabinet against Servia, which she considers justified.

Above all Germany wishes, as she has already declared from the very beginning of the Austro-Servian dispute, that this conflict should be localised.

No. 19.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 12 (25), 1914.

Please refer to my telegram of the 11th (24th) July.

A morning paper has to-day published, in a not altogether correct form, the declarations made yesterday by the German Ambassador, and has added comments in which it characterises these utterances as being in the nature of threats. The German Ambassador, who is much upset by these disclosures, to-day visited the Acting Head of the Political Department, and explained to him that his words in nowise bore the threatening character attributed to them. He stated that Austria had presented her note to Servia without any definite understanding with Berlin, but that Germany nevertheless approved of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly "the arrow once shot" (these were his own words), Germany could only be guided by her duties as an ally.

SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 20.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 12 (25), 1914.

Grey has told me that the German Ambassador has declared to him that the German Government were not informed of the text of the Austrian note, but that they entirely supported Austria's action. The Ambassador at the same time asked if Great Britain could see her way to bring conciliatory pressure to bear at St. Petersburgh. Grey replied that this was quite impossible. He added that, as long as complications existed between Austria and Servia alone, British interests were only indirectly affected; but he had to look ahead to the fact that Austrian mobilisation would lead to Russian mobilisation, and that from that moment a situation would exist in which the interests of all the Powers would be involved. In that event Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action.

BENCKENDORFF.

No. 21.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Belgrade, July* 12 (25), 1914.

In spite of the extremely conciliatory nature of the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Austrian Minister has just informed the Servian Government, in a note handed in at 6.30 P.M. this evening, that, not having received a satisfactory answer within the time-limit fixed, he was leaving Belgrade with the entire staff of the legation. The Skuptchina is convoked for the 14th (27th) July at Nish. The Servian Government and the Diplomatic Body are leaving this evening for that town.

STRANDTMAN.

No. 22.

Russian Ambassador at London to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 12 (25), 1914.

Grey has told the German Ambassador that in his opinion Austrian mobilisation must lead to Russian mobilisation, that grave danger of a general war will thereupon arise, and that he sees only one means of reaching a peaceful settlement, namely, that, in view of the Austrian and Russian mobilisations, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain should abstain from immediate mobilisation, and should at once offer their good offices. Grey told me that the first essential of this plan was the consent of Germany and her promise not to mobilise. He has therefore, as a first step, made an enquiry on this point at Berlin.

BENCKENDORFF.

No. 23.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Rome.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 13 (26), 1914.

Italy might play a part of the first importance in favour of preserving peace, by bringing the necessary influence to bear upon Austria, and by adopting a definitely unfavourable attitude towards the dispute on the ground that it could not be localised. You should express your conviction that Russia cannot possibly avoid coming to the help of Servia.

SAZONOW.

No. 24.

Acting Russian Consul at Prague to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Prague, July* 13 (26), 1914.

Mobilisation has been ordered.

KAZANSKY.

No. 25.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 13 (26), 1914.

I had a long and friendly conversation to-day with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. After discussing the ten demands addressed to Servia, I drew his attention to the fact that, quite apart from the scarcely clever form in which they were presented, some of them were quite impracticable, even if the Servian Government agreed to accept them. Thus, for example, points 1 and 2 could not be carried out without recasting the Servian press law and associations law, and to that it might be difficult to obtain the consent of the Skuptchina. As for enforcing points 4 and 5, this might lead to most dangerous consequences, and even to the risk of acts of terrorism directed against the Royal Family and against Pashitch, which clearly could not be the intention of Austria. With regard to the other points it seemed to me that, with certain changes of detail, it would not be difficult to find a basis of mutual agreement, if the accusations contained in them were confirmed by sufficient proof.

In the interest of the maintenance of peace, which, according to the statements of Szapary, is as much desired by Austria as by all the Powers, it was necessary to end the tension of the present moment as soon as possible. With this object in view it seemed to me most desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador should be authorised to enter into a private exchange of views in order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of the 10th (23rd) July in consultation with me. This method of procedure would perhaps enable us to find a formula which would prove acceptable to Servia, while giving satisfaction to Austria in respect of the chief of her demands. Please convey the substance of this telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a judicious and friendly manner.

Communicated to Russian Ambassadors in Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy.

SAZONOFF.

No. 26.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 13 (26), 1914.

Please communicate the contents of my telegram to Vienna of to-day to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, and express to him the hope that he, on his part, will be able to advise Vienna to meet Russia's proposal in a friendly spirit.

SAZONOFF.

No. 27.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 13 (26), 1914.

The Director of the Political Department informs me that, upon his informing the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador of the contents of the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Ambassador did not conceal his surprise that it had failed to satisfy Giesl. In the opinion of the Director of the Political Department, Servia's conciliatory attitude should produce the best impression in Europe.

SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 28.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 13 (26), 1914.

The German Ambassador again visited the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, and made to him the following declarations:—

"Austria has declared to Russia that she does not desire territorial acquisitions, and that she harbours no designs against the integrity of

Servia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and quiet, and consequently it rests with Russia to prevent war. Germany is at one with France in her ardent desire to preserve peace, and she sincerely hopes that France will exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburgh."

The Minister pointed out that Germany on her part might well act on similar lines at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit displayed by Servia. The Ambassador replied that such a course was not possible, owing to the decision not to intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute. The Minister then asked whether the four Powers—Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France —could not make representations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna, for that the matter amounted, in effect, to a dispute between Austria and Russia. The Ambassador alleged that he had no instructions. Finally, the Minister refused to agree to the German proposal.

SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 29.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 13 (26), 1914.

The Director of the Political Department has expressed the personal opinion that the series of representations made by Germany at Paris aim at intimidating France and at securing her intervention at St. Petersburgh.

SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 30.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 13 (26), 1914.

On the news reaching Berlin that the Austrian army had mobilised against Servia, a large crowd, in which the papers re-

port the presence of an Austrian element, gave vent to a series of noisy demonstrations in favour of Austria. Late in the evening the crowd several times collected before the Imperial Russian Embassy and some anti-Russian shouting occurred. Hardly any police were present and no precautions were taken.

BRONEWSKY.

No. 31.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 14 (27), 1914.

I have received your telegram of the 13th (26th) July. Please inform me by telegraph whether you consider that your direct discussions with the Vienna Cabinet harmonise with Grey's scheme for mediation by the four Governments. Having heard from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh that you would be prepared to accept such a combination, Grey decided to turn it into an official proposal, which he communicated yesterday to Berlin, Paris, and Rome.

BENCKENDORFF.

No. 32.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris and London.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 27, 1914.

The British Ambassador called to enquire whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in summoning a conference in London of the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of finding a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hoped, might be favourable. I had not, however, received as yet any reply to my proposal for the revision of the note by the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet proved impossible, I was ready to fall in with the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind likely to lead to a favourable settlement of the dispute.

SAZONOFF.

No. 33.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 14 (27), 1914.

I have taken note of the reply returned by the Servian Government to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our expectations in its moderation and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfaction to Austria. We do not see what further demands could be made by Austria, unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war with Servia.

SAZONOFF.

No. 34.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 14 (27), 1914.

The German Ambassador discussed the situation again to-day at great length with the Director of the Political Department. The Ambassador laid great stress on the utter impossibility of any mediation or conference.

SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 35.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 14 (27), 1914.

I discussed the situation with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the presence of Berthelot, directly after my return to Paris. They both confirmed the information respecting the action taken by the German Ambassador, which Sevastopoulo has already telegraphed to you. This morning Baron von Schoen confirmed his declaration of yesterday in writing, *i.e.:*

1. That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no territorial acquisitions and that she harbours no designs against the integrity of Servia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and quiet.

2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war.

3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their ardent desire to preserve peace, should exercise their moderating influence upon Russia.

Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expression of solidarity of Germany and France. The Minister of Justice is convinced that these steps on the part of Germany are taken with the evident object of alienating Russia and France, of inducing the French Government to make representations at St. Petersburgh, and of thus compromising our ally in our eyes; and finally, in the event of war, of throwing the responsibility not on Germany, who is ostensibly making every effort to maintain peace, but on Russia and France.

ISVOLSKY.

No. 36.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 14 (27), 1914.

It is clear from your telegrams of the 13th (26) July that you were not then aware of the reply of the Servian Government. The

telegram from Belgrade informing me of it also took twenty hours to reach us. The telegram from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent the day before yesterday at 11 o'clock in the morning, at the special urgent rate, which contained instructions to support our representations, only reached its destination at 6 o'clock. There is no doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed by the Austrian telegraph office.

ISVOLSKY.

No. 37.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 14 (27), 1914.

On the instructions of his Government, the Austrian Ambassador has informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that Servia's answer has not been considered satisfactory in Vienna, and that to-morrow, Tuesday, Austria will proceed to take "energetic action" with the object of forcing Servia to give the necessary guarantees. The Minister having asked what form such action would take, the Ambassador replied that he had no exact information on the subject, but it might mean either the crossing of the Servian frontier, or an ultimatum, or even a declaration of war.

ISVOLSKY.

No. 38.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 14 (27), 1914.

I begged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support your proposal in Vienna that Szapary should be authorised to draw up, by means of a private exchange of views with you, a wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands which would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow answered that he was aware of this proposal and that he agreed with Pourtalès that, as Szapary had begun this conver-

sation, he might as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow answered that he could not advise Austria to give way.

BRONEWSKY.

No. 39.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 14 (27), 1914.

Before my visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day his Excellency had received the French Ambassador, who endeavoured to induce him to accept the British proposal for action, in favour of peace, such action to be taken simultaneously at St. Petersburgh and at Vienna by Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France. Cambon suggested that these Powers should give their advice to Vienna in the following terms: "To abstain from all action which might aggravate the existing situation." By adopting this vague formula, all mention of the necessity of refraining from invading Servia might be avoided. Jagow refused point-blank to accept this suggestion in spite of the entreaties of the Ambassador, who emphasised, as a good feature of the suggestion, the mixed grouping of the Powers, thanks to which the opposition between the Alliance and the Entente—a matter of which Jagow himself had often complained—was avoided.

BRONEWSKY.

No. 40.

Telegram from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness Prince Alexandria of Servia, July 14 (27), 1914.

When your Royal Highness applied to me at a time of especial stress, you were not mistaken in the sentiments which I entertain for you, or in my cordial sympathy with the Servian people.

The existing situation is engaging my most serious attention, and my Government are using their utmost endeavour to smooth away the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your Highness and the Royal Servian Government wish to render that task easy by neglecting no step which might lead to a settlement, and thus both prevent the horrors of a new war and safeguard the dignity of Servia.

So long as the slightest hope exists of avoiding bloodshed, all our efforts must be directed to that end; but if in spite of our earnest wish we are not successful, your Highness may rest assured that Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the fate of Servia.

NICHOLAS.

No. 41.

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Vienna, July* 14 (27), 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs is away. During a long conversation which I had with Macchio to-day I drew his attention in a perfectly friendly way, to the unfavourable impression produced in Russia by the presentation of demands by Austria to Servia, which it was quite impossible for any independent State, however small, to accept. I added that this method of procedure might lead to the most undesirable complications, and that it had aroused profound surprise and general condemnation in Russia. We can only suppose that Austria, influenced by the assurances given by the German Representative at Vienna, who has egged her on throughout this crisis, has counted on the probable localisation of the dispute with Servia, and on the possibility of inflicting with impunity a serious blow upon that country. The declaration by the Russian Government that Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the face of such conduct has caused a great sensation here.

SCHÉBÉKO.

No. 42.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 14 (27), 1914.

Grey has just informed the German Ambassador, who came to question him as to the possibility of taking action at St. Petersburgh, that such action ought rather to be taken at Vienna, and that the Berlin Cabinet were the best qualified to do so. Grey also pointed out that the Servian reply to the Austrian note had exceeded anything that could have been expected in moderation and in its spirit of conciliation. Grey added that he had therefore come to the conclusion that Russia must have advised Belgrade to return a moderate reply, and that he thought the Servian reply could form the basis of a peaceful and acceptable solution of the question.

In these circumstances, continued Grey, if Austria were to begin hostilities in spite of that reply, she would prove her intention of crushing Servia. Looked at in this light, the question might give rise to a situation which might lead to a war in which all the Powers would be involved.

Grey finally declared that the British Government were sincerely anxious to act with the German Government as long as the preservation of peace was in question; but, in the contrary event, Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action.

BENCKENDORFF.

No. 43.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 15 (28), 1914.

My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient.

This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.

It seems to me that Great Britain is in a better position than any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

SAZONOFF.

No. 44.

Russian Consul General at Fiume to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Fiume, July* 15 (28), 1914.

State of siege has been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and at Fiume, and the reservists of all classes have also been called up.

SALVIATI.

No. 45.

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Vienna, July* 15 (28), 1914.

I spoke to Count Berchtold to-day in the sense of your Excellency's instructions. I pointed out to him in the most friendly manner, how desirable it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Servia.

I drew Count Berchtold's attention to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia would involve.

Count Berchtold replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with

the St. Petersburgh Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the energetic measures which they had taken against Servia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had been incited to such a pitch of excitement, that the Government, even if they wished it, could no longer consent to such a course. This was all the more impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Servian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity of Servia's promises for the future.

SCHÉBÉKO.

No. 46.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 15 (28), 1914.

The Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Servian reply, although it was communicated to them. Up to the present this note has not appeared *in extenso* in any of the local papers, which, to all appearances, do not wish to publish it in their columns, being well aware of the calming effect which it would have on German readers.

BRONEWSKY.

No. 47.

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Vienna, July* 15 (28), 1914.

The order for general mobilisation has been signed.

SCHÉBÉKO.

No. 48.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 15 (28), 1914.

In face of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia, it is necessary that Great Britain should take instant mediatory action, and that the military measures undertaken by Austria against Servia should be immediately suspended. Otherwise mediation will only serve as an excuse to make the question drag on, and will meanwhile make it possible for Austria to crush Servia completely and to acquire a dominant position in the Balkans.

Sent to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

SAZONOFF.

No. 49.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 16 (29), 1914.

The German Ambassador informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there had been no news that the Austrian army had crossed the Servian frontier. I begged the Ambassador to express my thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenour of this communication. I have informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I told him, were directed against Germany; I added that neither should they be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation being the mobilisation of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The Ambassador said that he was in favour of direct explanations between the Austrian Government and Russia, and I replied that I, too, was quite willing, provided that the advice of the German Government, to which he had referred, found an echo at Vienna.

I pointed out at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account methods suitable for finding a peaceful solution would be to arrange for parallel discussions to be carried on as to a conference of the four Powers—Germany, France, England, and Italy—and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year's crisis.

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Servia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some good-will and that all the Powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

Communicated to Russian Ambassadors in England, France, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.

SAZONOFF.

No. 50.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at London and Paris.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 16 (29), 1914.

At the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, recorded in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schébéko's telegram of the 15th (28th) July.

The contents of this telegram amount to a refusal on the part of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Russian Government.

Hence nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in any steps which they may consider advisable.

Communicated to Vienna, Rome, and Berlin.

SAZONOFF.

No. 51.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 16 (29), 1914.

On my enquiry whether he had received from Vienna a reply respecting your proposal for private discussions at St. Petersburgh, the Secretary of State answered in the negative.

He declares that it is very difficult for him to produce any effect at Vienna, especially openly. He even added, in speaking to Cambon, that were pressure brought to bear too obviously, Austria would hasten to face Germany with a *fait accompli.*

The Secretary of State tells me that he received a telegram to-day from Pourtalès, stating that you seemed more inclined than you previously were to find a compromise acceptable to all parties. I replied that presumably you had been in favour of a compromise from the outset, provided always that it were acceptable, not only to Austria, but equally to Russia. He then said that it appeared that Russia had begun to mobilise on the Austrian frontier, and that he feared that this would make it more difficult for Austria to come to an understanding with us, all the more so as Austria was mobilising against Servia alone, and was making no preparations upon our frontier. I replied that, according to the information in my possession, Austria was mobilising upon the Russian frontier also, and that consequently we had to take similar steps. I added that whatever measures we might, perhaps, have taken on our side were in no wise directed against Germany.

BRONEWSKY.

No. 52.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Nish, July* 16 (29), 1914.

The Bulgarian Minister to-day declared to Pashitch, in the name of his Government, that Bulgaria would remain neutral.

STRANDTMAN.

No. 53.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 16 (29), 1914.

For the information of the President of the French Republic on his return, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had prepared a short summary of the present political situation, approximately in the following terms: Austria, fearing internal disintegration, seized upon the assassination of the Archduke as an excuse for an attempt to obtain guarantees, which may assume the form of an occupation of Servian military lines or even Servian territory. Germany is supporting Austria. The preservation of peace depends upon Russia alone, for the question at issue must be "localised" between Austria and Servia; that question is the punishment of Servia for her previous policy and the obtaining of guarantees for the future. Germany concludes from this that a moderating influence should be exerted at St. Petersburgh. This sophism has been refuted both in Paris and in London. In Paris, Baron von Schoen vainly endeavoured to induce France to adopt joint action with Germany towards Russia for the preservation of peace. The same attempts were made in London. In both capitals the answer was given that any action taken should be at Vienna, as it was Austria's inordinate demands, her refusal to discuss Servia's few reservations, and her declaration of war, that threatened to provoke a general war. France and England are unable to bring any moderating pressure to bear upon Russia, as, so far, that Power has shown the greatest moderation, more particularly in her advice to Servia to accept as much as was possible of the Austrian note. Apparently Germany has now given up the idea of pressure upon Russia only and inclines towards mediatory action both at St. Petersburgh and at Vienna, but at the same time both Germany and Austria are endeavouring to cause the question to drag on. Germany is opposing the conference without suggesting any other practical course of action. Austria is continuing discussions at St. Petersburgh, which are manifestly of a procrastinating nature. At the same time she is taking active steps, and if these steps are tolerated, her claims will increase proportionately. It is highly desirable that Russia should lend all her support to the proposal for mediation which will be made by Sir E. Grey. In the contrary event, Aus-

tria, on the plea of "guarantees," will be able, in effect, to alter the territorial status of eastern Europe.

ISWOLSKY.

No. 54.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 16 (29), 1914.

I have communicated the contents of your telegrams of the 15th (28th) July to Grey. He informed the German Ambassador to-day that the direct discussions between Russia and Austria had been fruitless, and that press correspondents were reporting from St. Petersburgh that Russia was mobilising against Austria in consequence of the latter's mobilisation. Grey said that in principle, the German Government had declared themselves in favour of mediation, but that he was experiencing difficulties with regard to the form it should take. Grey has urged that the German Government should indicate the form which, in their opinion, would enable the four Powers to have recourse to mediation to prevent war; France, Italy and Great Britain having consented, mediation could only come into play if Germany consented to range herself on the side of peace.

BENCKENDORFF.

No. 55.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 16 (29), 1914.

Viviani has just confirmed to me the French Government's firm determination to act in concert with Russia. This determination is upheld by all classes of society and by the political parties, including the Radical Socialists who have just addressed a resolution to the Government expressing the absolute confidence and the patriotic sentiments of their party. Since his return to Paris, Viviani has

telegraphed an urgent message to London that, direct discussions between St. Petersburgh and Vienna having ended, the London Cabinet should again put forward their proposal for mediation by the Powers as soon as possible under one form or another. Before seeing me to-day Viviani saw the German Ambassador, and the latter again assured him of the peaceful intentions of Germany. Viviani having pointed out that if Germany wished for peace she should hasten to give her support to the British proposal for mediation, Baron von Schoen replied that the words "conference" or "arbitration" alarmed Austria. Viviani retorted that it was not a question of words, and that it would be easy to find some other form for mediation. In the opinion of Baron von Schoen, it was necessary for the success of the negotiations between the Powers to know what Austria intended to demand from Servia. Viviani answered that the Berlin Cabinet could quite easily make this enquiry of Austria, but that, meanwhile, the Servian reply might well form the basis of discussion; he added that France sincerely desired peace, but that she was determined at the same time to act in complete harmony with her allies and friends, and that he, Baron von Schoen, might have convinced himself that this determination met with the warmest approval of the country.

ISWOLSKY.

No. 56.

Telegram from His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Servia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

Deeply touched by the telegram which your Majesty was pleased to address to me yesterday, I hasten to thank you with all my heart. Your Majesty may rest assured that the cordial sympathy which your Majesty feels towards my country is especially valued by us, and fills our hearts with the belief that the future of Servia is secure now that it is the object of your Majesty's gracious solicitude. These painful moments cannot but strengthen the bonds of deep attachment which bind Servia to Holy Slav Russia, and the sentiments of everlasting gratitude which we feel for the help and protection afforded to us by your Majesty will ever be cherished in the hearts of all the Serbs.

ALEXANDER.

No. 57.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Nish, July* 16 (29), 1914.

I have communicated to Pashitch the text of the telegraphic reply returned by His Majesty the Emperor to Prince Alexander. On reading it, Pashitch crossed himself and exclaimed: "Oh, Lord! The Czar is great and merciful!" he then embraced me and was overcome with emotion. The heir apparent is expected at Nish late to-night.

STRANDTMAN.

No. 58.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 16 (29), 1914.

The German Ambassador to-day informed me of the decision of his Government to mobilise, if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Now, in point of fact, we only began these preparations in consequence of the mobilisation already undertaken by Austria, and owing to her evident unwillingness to accept any means of arriving at a peaceful settlement of her dispute with Servia.

As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten on our own military preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the French Government of this, and add that we are sincerely grateful to them for the declaration which the French Ambassador made to me on their behalf, to the effect that we could count fully upon the assistance of our ally, France. In the existing circumstances, that declaration is especially valuable to us.

Communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Germany.

SAZONOFF.

No. 59.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Nish, July* 17 (30), 1914.

The Prince Regent yesterday published a manifesto, signed by all the Servian Ministers, on the declaration of war by Austria against Servia. The manifesto ends with the following words: "Defend your homes and Servia with all your might." At the solemn opening of the Skuptchina the Regent read the speech from the Throne, in his own name. At the beginning of his speech he pointed out that the place of their convocation showed the importance of present events. He followed this with a summary of recent events—the Austrian ultimatum, the Servian reply, the efforts of the Servian Government to do their utmost to avoid war that was compatible with the dignity of the State, and, finally, the armed aggression of their most powerful neighbour against Servia, at whose side stood Montenegro. Passing in review the attitude of the Powers towards the dispute, the Prince emphasised in the first place the sentiments which animated Russia, and the gracious communication from His Majesty the Emperor that Russia would in no case abandon Servia. At each mention of His Majesty the Czar and of Russia the hall resounded with loud bursts of wild cheering. The sympathy shown by France and England was also touched upon in turn, and called forth approving plaudits from the members. The speech from the Throne ended by declaring the Skuptchina open, and by expressing the hope that everything possible would be done to lighten the task before the Government.

STRANDTMAN.

No. 60.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 17 (30), 1914.

The German Ambassador, who has just left me, has asked whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might

give—that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia—and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate action:

"If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Servian question has become a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum such points as violate the sovereign rights of Servia, Russia undertakes to stop her military preparations."

Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question, for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military preparations.

SAZONOFF.

No. 61.

Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 17 (30), 1914.

I learn that the order for the mobilisation of the German army and navy has just been issued.

SWERBÉEW.

No. 62.

Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 17 (30), 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned that the news of the mobilisation of the German army and fleet, which has just been announced, is false; that the news sheets had been printed

in advance so as to be ready for all eventualities, and that they were put on sale in the afternoon, but that they have now been confiscated.

SWERBÉEW.

No. 63.

Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 17 (30), 1914.

I have received your telegram of 16th (29th) July, and have communicated the text of your proposal to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have just seen. He told me that he had received an identical telegram from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, and he then declared that he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our proposal.

SWERBÉEW.

No. 64.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 17 (30), 1914.

I have communicated the substance of your telegrams of the 16th (29th) and 17th (30th) July to Grey, who looks upon the situation as most serious, but wishes to continue the discussions. I pointed out to Grey that—since you agreed with him to accept whatever proposal he might make in order to preserve peace, provided that Austria did not profit by any ensuing delays to crush Servia—the situation in which you were placed had apparently been modified. At that time our relations with Germany had not been compromised. After the declaration made by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh regarding German mobilisation, those relations had changed, and you had returned the only reply to his request that was possible from a Great Power. When the German Ambas-

sador again visited you, and enquired what your conditions were, you had formulated them in altogether special circumstances. I also again emphasised to Grey the necessity of taking into consideration the new situation brought about by the fault of Germany in consequence of the German Ambassador's action. Grey replied that he fully understood this, and that he would remember these arguments.

BENCKENDORFF.

No. 65.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 17 (30), 1914.

The German Ambassador has asked Grey why Great Britain was taking military measures both on land and sea. Grey replied that these measures had no aggressive character, but that the situation was such that each Power must be ready.

BENCKENDORFF.

No. 66.

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Vienna, July* 18 (31), 1914.

In spite of the general mobilisation, my exchange of views with Count Berchtold and his colleagues continues. They all dwell upon the absence on Austria's part of any hostile intentions whatsoever against Russia, and of any designs of conquest at the expense of Servia, but they are all equally insistent that Austria is bound to carry through the action which she has begun and to give Servia a serious lesson, which would constitute a sure guarantee for the future.

SCHÉBÉKO.

No. 67.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 18 (31), 1914.

Please refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July. The British Ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me of the wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications in the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Ambassador. I replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I accordingly send you the text of the modified formula, which is as follows:

"If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Servia has become a question of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and decide what satisfaction Servia could afford to the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."

SAZONOFF.

No. 68.

Russian Ambassador at Berlin to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 18 (31), 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just told me that our discussions, which were already difficult enough on account of the mobilisation against Austria, were becoming even more so in view of the serious military measures that we were taking against Germany. He said that information on this subject was reaching Berlin from all sides, and this must inevitably provoke similar measures on the part of Germany. To this I replied that, according to sure information in my possession, which was confirmed by all our compatriots arriving from Berlin, Germany also was very actively en-

gaged in taking military measures against Russia. In spite of this, the Minister for Foreign Affairs asserts that the only step taken in Germany has been the recall of officers from leave and of the troops from manœuvres.

SWERBÉEW.

No. 69.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 18 (31), 1914.

I have requested the British Ambassador to express to Grey my deep gratitude for the firm and friendly tone which he has adopted in the discussions with Germany and Austria, thanks to which the hope of finding a peaceful issue to the present situation need not yet be abandoned.

I also requested him to inform the British Minister that in my opinion it was only in London that the discussions might still have some faint chance of success and of rendering the necessary compromise easier for Austria.

Communicated to Russian Ambassador in France.

SAZONOFF.

No. 70.

Secret Telegram to Russian Representatives Abroad.

(Telegram.) *July* 19 (*August* 1), 1914.

At midnight the German Ambassador announced to me, on the instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by midnight on Saturday, we had not begun to demobilise, not only against Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government would be compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my enquiry whether this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that we were very near it.

SAZONOFF.

No. 71.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 19 (*August* 1), 1914.

Grey tells me that he has telegraphed to Berlin that in his opinion the last formula accepted by the Russian Government offers the best prospect as a basis of negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. At the same time he expressed the hope that no Great Power would open hostilities before this formula had been considered.

BENCKENDORFF.

No. 72.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 19 (*August* 1), 1914.

The British Government have enquired of the French and German Governments whether they will respect the neutrality of Belgium.

France answered in the affirmative, but the German Government stated that they could not give any definite answer to the question.

BENCKENDORFF.

No. 73.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 19 (*August* 1), 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador yesterday visited Viviani and declared to him that Austria, far from harbouring any designs against the integrity of Servia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of

her grievances against Servia with the other Powers. The French Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the French frontier, for they are convinced that, under the guise of *Kriegszustand*, mobilisation is in reality being carried out.

ISWOLSKY.

No. 74.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 19 (*August* 1), 1914.

On the receipt in Paris of the telegram from the French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, reporting the communication made to you by the German Ambassador respecting Germany's decision to order general mobilisation to-day, the President of the French Republic signed the order for mobilisation. Lists of the reservists recalled to the colours are being posted up in the streets. The German Ambassador has just visited Viviani, but told him nothing fresh, alleging the impossibility of deciphering the telegrams he has received. Viviani informed him of the signature of the order for mobilisation issued in reply to that of Germany, and expressed to him his amazement that Germany should have taken such a step at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was still in progress between Russia, Austria and the Powers. He added that mobilisation did not necessarily entail war, and that the German Ambassador might stay in Paris as the Russian Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburgh.

ISWOLSKY.

No. 75.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 19 (*August* 1), 1914.

I hear from the President that during the last few days the Austrian Ambassador emphatically assured both the President of

the Council of Ministers and him that Austria had declared to Russia that she was ready to respect both the territorial integrity of Servia, and also her sovereign rights, but that Russia had intentionally received this declaration in silence. I contradicted this flatly.

ISWOLSKY.

No. 76.

Note presented by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh on July 19 (*August* 1), *at* 7.10 P.M.

(Translation.)

The Imperial German Government have used every effort since the beginning of the crisis to bring about a peaceful settlement. In compliance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburgh; but Russia, without waiting for any result, proceeded to a general mobilisation of her forces both on land and sea. In consequence of this threatening step, which was not justified by any military proceedings on the part of Germany, the German Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The German Government were, therefore, obliged to make representations to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and to insist upon a cessation of the aforesaid military acts. Russia having refused to comply with (not having considered it necessary to answer *) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this attitude *) that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, on the instructions of my Government, to inform your Excellency as follows:—

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at war with Russia.

POURTALÈS.

* The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both inserted in the note.

No. 77.

Announcement by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting Recent Events.

July 20 (*August* 2), 1914.

A garbled version of the events of the last few days having appeared in the foreign press, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs considers it his duty to publish the following brief account of the diplomatic discussions during the period under review:

On the 10th (23rd) July, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade presented a note to the Prime Minister of Servia, in which the Servian Government were accused of having fostered the pan-Serb movement, which had led to the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. Austria-Hungary, therefore, demanded of the Servian Government, not only the condemnation in the most formal manner of the above-mentioned propaganda, but also the adoption, under Austrian supervision, of a series of measures for the discovery of the plot, for the punishment of any Servian subjects who had taken part in it, and for the prevention of any future attempts at assassination upon Austrian soil. A time-limit of forty-eight hours was given to the Servian Government within which to reply to this note.

The Russian Government, to whom the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had communicated the text of the note seventeen hours after its presentation at Belgrade, having taken note of the demands contained therein, could not but perceive that some of these demands were impossible of execution as regards their substance, whilst others were presented in a form which was incompatible with the dignity of an independent State. Russia considered that the humiliation of Servia, involved in these demands, and equally the evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony in the Balkans, which underlay her conditions, were inadmissible. The Russian Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the most friendly manner that it would be desirable to reëxamine the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to agree to a discussion of the note. The moderating influence of the four Powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful.

Despite the fact that Servia had reprobated the crime, and had shown herself ready to give Austria satisfaction to an extent beyond

the expectations, not only of Russia, but also of the other Powers —despite these facts, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade considered the Servian reply insufficient and left the town.

Recognising the exaggerated nature of the demands made by Austria, Russia had previously declared that she could not remain indifferent, while not desisting from doing her utmost to find a peaceful issue which might prove acceptable to Austria, and spare the latter's self-respect as a Great Power. At the same time Russia let it be clearly understood that she could accept a peaceful settlement of the question only so far as it involved no humiliation of Servia as an independent State. Unhappily all the efforts of the Russian Government to this end were fruitless. The Austro-Hungarian Government, which had shunned any attempt at conciliatory intervention by the Powers in the Austrian dispute with Servia, proceeded to mobilise and declared war officially against Servia, and the following day Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accompanied the declaration of war openly accuses Servia of having prepared and carried out the crime of Serajevo. Such an accusation of a crime at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State, aroused, by its evident inanity, widespread sympathy for Servia throughout all classes of European society.

In consequence of this behaviour of the Austro-Hungarian Government, in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not remain indifferent to the fate of Servia, the Russian Government considered it necessary to order mobilisation in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan. This decision was rendered necessary by the fact that since the date when the Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to the Servian Government, and since the first steps taken by Russia, five days had elapsed, and yet the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia halfway in her efforts towards peace. Indeed, quite the contrary; for the mobilisation of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had been ordered.

The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken by Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that they were not in any way aimed at Germany. Simultaneously, the Russian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue discussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, either in the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or, as suggested by Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the four Great

Powers not directly interested, that is to say, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally unsuccessful. Austria-Hungary declined a further exchange of views with Russia, and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join the proposed conference of the Powers.

Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. When questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that these conditions were Austria's recognition that the Austro-Servian question had assumed a European character, and a declaration by her that she agreed not to insist upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the sovereign rights of Servia.

Germany considered this Russian proposal unacceptable to Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation of general mobilisation by Austria-Hungary reached St. Petersburgh.

All this time hostilities were continuing on Servian territory, and Belgrade was bombarded anew.

The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the scope of our precautionary military measures.

The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that Russia was compelled to begin preparations so as to be ready for every emergency.

But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of the situation, and she announced that she was ready to accept any proposed settlement of the problem that might be put forward, provided it complied with the conditions laid down by her.

In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German Government on the 18th (31st) July demanded of the Russian Government that they should suspend their military measures by midday on the 19th July (1st August), and threatened, should they fail to comply, to proceed to general mobilisation.

On the following day, the 19th July (1st August), the German Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded a declaration of war to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 78.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives Abroad.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 20 (*August* 2), 1914.

It is quite evident that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist upon us the responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to mobilise by the immense responsibility which would have fallen upon our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was undertaking general mobilisation.

The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that he would take no aggressive action as long as the discussions with Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many proofs of Russia's desire for peace, Germany neither could, nor had the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and independence of Servia. Any other solution, besides being entirely incompatible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset the European balance of power by securing the hegemony of Germany. The European—nay, the world-wide—character of this dispute is infinitely more important than the pretext from which it springs. By her decision to declare war upon us, at a moment when negotiations were in progress between the Powers, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility.

SAZONOFF.

No. 79.

Note presented by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 24 (*August* 6), 1914, *at* 6 P.M.

On the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform his Excellency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows:

[1] The *Russian Orange Book* (*No.* 1) closes with this number. In the English translation, printed by the Russian Government, there is appended a speech of M. Sazonoff, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. As this does not form a part of the original Russian book it is not reproduced in the Endowment's publication.

"In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia; and of the fact that, according to a communication from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has seen fit, as a result of that conflict, to open hostilities against Germany; and whereas Germany is consequently at war with Russia; Austria-Hungary therefore considers herself also at war with Russia from the present moment."

SZAPARY.

THE

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK

(No. 2)

THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK (NO. 2)[1]

No. 1.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July* 19 (*August* 1), 1914.

The Grand Vizier told me confidentially that the Austrian Ambassador was endeavouring to induce Turkey to take concerted action with Austria, but he alleged that an actual proposal of that kind had not been made. The Grand Vizier added that he was convinced of the necessity for Turkey to keep out of the conflict. I learn through reliable sources that certain members of the Committee desire to induce the Government to join the Triple Alliance, but it is thought that the Government made it understood that its desire was to resign authority rather than to enter upon the path of political adventure. For all that, I am convinced that Turkey will not fail to take the first favourable opportunity which might with impunity further her own interests.

GIERS.

No. 2.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July* 20 (*August* 2), 1914.

The Grand Vizier, upon his own personal initiative, declared to the French Ambassador, who had come to inform him of the

[1] *Imperial Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diplomatic Documents. Negotiations Covering the Period from July* 19/*August* 1 *to October* 19/*November* 1, 1914, *preceding the War with Turkey. Translation of the Russian and French texts.* Published by the Russian Government. Title of publication in the original French text: *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. Recueil de Documents Diplomatiques. Négociations ayant précédé la guerre avec la Turquie.* 19 *Juillet*/1 *Août* - 19 *Octobre*/1 *Novembre*, 1914. *Pétrograd. Imprimerie de l'État.* 1915.

French mobilisation, that it was his intention to proclaim the neutrality of Turkey. The question will be discussed by the Council of Ministers.

GIERS.

No. 3.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July* 20 (*August* 2), 1914.

Pursuant to information which reached me of the decision to effect a complete mobilisation, I visited the Grand Vizier to-day, and interrogated him relative to the object of the same. He confidentially declared to me that a mobilisation would indeed be ordered, but he did not know what class of men would be called out; that upon my visit to the Porte on the morrow he would give me more precise information concerning the calls; and that the Porte was resolved to assemble an army of 200,000 men in Thrace and on the Bosporus, apprehending a Bulgarian movement. He added that there was no intention to concentrate an army on the Caucasian frontier.

Communicated to Sofia and Bucharest.

GIERS.

No. 4.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July* 20 (*August* 2), 1914.

Judging from my discussion with the Grand Vizier, I conclude that the Porte, while observing neutrality for the present, is firmly resolved to be prepared for, either a modification of the Treaty of Bucharest in the interest of Bulgaria, or any other cir-

cumstance which may accrue to the profit of Turkey. There is no doubt that, fearing us, and suspecting, by reason of the calumnies of our enemies, that we will attack her, in her heart she desires the success of Germany. This feeling is strongly sustained by the efforts of the officials of the German military commission remaining in Turkey. This element is a highly undesirable one, as they are constantly inciting the Turks against us, but I suppose the Porte will not decide to send them away until the result of our struggle with Germany is made known.

GIERS.

No. 5.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July* 21 (*August* 3), 1914.

To-day the Grand Vizier assured me that the Porte, in ordering a general mobilisation, will call to the ranks only so many men as may be necessary to organise an army of 200,000 men in Thrace. The men called to the colours from Anatolia will be transported to Thrace, and will under no circumstances remain on our frontier. The same assurances were given the French Ambassador by Enver Pasha.

GIERS.

No. 6.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July* 21 (*August* 3), 1914.

From the explanations made to me by the Grand Vizier, and to the French Ambassador by Enver Pasha, it appears as though the latter advised the officers of the German commission of his readiness to release them if desired, but Limann von Sanders replied that Berlin had ordered them to remain in Turkey. There is no

doubt that this order from Berlin was issued with a view to using Turkey for one or the other of its purposes, and to sow discord between her and us. I am convinced, however, that Enver Pasha, in spite of his assurances, fearing us, values the presence of the German officers.

GIERS.

No. 7.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July* 22 (*August* 4), 1914.

The Council of Ministers yesterday decided to preserve the strictest neutrality, and with this end in view, among other things, decreed that mines should be laid in the Bosporus and Dardanelles, reserving passageway for commercial vessels under pilotage. This morning at 10 o'clock the mines were laid.

GIERS.

No. 8.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July* 23 (*August* 5), 1914.

The Military Agent, in conversation with Enver Pasha, at my instance expressed his surprise that German officers still remain in the army. Enver Pasha replied that he was not holding the Germans, but had no real reason to ask them to leave, pending a clearing up of the political situation. It also would not be to the best interest of the army to forcibly remove them during such a trying occasion as a mobilisation. Personally, he does not doubt that the German Government, in leaving them in Turkey, is following its own ends, with a view to bringing Turkey into its sphere of influence, but that that purpose will not be accomplished, for the reason that Turkey will follow a course dictated solely by her own interests.

GIERS.

No. 9.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 24 (*August* 6), 1914.

The Turkish Ambassador yesterday gave Mr. Nicholson the most reassuring representations relative to the designs of Turkey. The latter will remain neutral, and will only take certain measures of precaution. I am inclined to believe that the Turkish Ambassador is really exerting all his influence at Constantinople to induce Turkey to preserve neutrality.

BENCKENDORFF.

No. 10.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July* 25 (*August* 7), 1914.

The sequestration of Turkish dreadnoughts has aroused strong indignation here against England.

GIERS.

No. 11.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, July* 26 (*August* 8), 1914.

It is reported that the cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau," having rounded Matapan, are apparently headed for the Dardanelles.

You will please, in concert with the French and British Ambassadors, make the most earnest representations to the Porte relative to the responsibility it would assume in permitting the passage of these vessels through the Dardanelles, and insist upon their

leaving the Straits, or that they shall be disarmed, without carrying the matter to an open rupture.

SAZONOFF.

No. 12.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July* 26 (*August* 8), 1914.

To-day the Grand Vizier assured me that he would under no circumstances permit the passage of the "Breslau" and "Goeben" through the Dardanelles, and that he would continue to observe the strictest neutrality. He requested me to telegraph this statement to your Excellency. Nevertheless, I consider the situation very grave, in view of the exceedingly impressionable nature of the Turks, and the strong influence of the war party, urged on by the Germans.

GIERS.

No. 13.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July* 27 (*August* 9), 1914.

The Grand Vizier, whom I saw to-day, continues to assert that he is observing complete neutrality. He denies that the presence of German officers violates that neutrality.

GIERS.

No. 14.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, July* 27 (*August* 9), 1914.

If the "Goeben" proceeds through the Dardanelles under the German flag, it will be left to Admiral Eberhardt to use all means within his power to bar its exit into the Black Sea, and to destroy the "Goeben." Still, the Admiral will be instructed to avoid, except in case of extreme necessity, taking any action directly against Turkey.

SAZONOFF.

No. 15.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 26 (*August* 8), 1914.

The British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople has been instructed to insist upon the departure or immediate disarmament of the war vessels of belligerent powers which might pass the Straits, and likewise to renew energetic representations of the necessity for the observance of neutrality.

BENCKENDORFF.

No. 16.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, July* 28 (*August* 10), 1914.

Bear in mind that we do not fear Turkey's activities aimed directly against us.

While preserving an entirely friendly attitude in making your

statements to the Turks, try to impress upon them the fact that in taking action which has not our sanction they are jeopardising their existence, and that they are not in a position to do us serious injury.

Communicated to Paris and London.

SAZONOFF.

No. 17.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July* 29 (*August* 11), 1914.

The "Goeben" and the "Breslau" are entering the Dardanelles. It is reported that they have been purchased by the Turkish Government.

GIERS.

No. 18.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, July* 29 (*August* 11), 1914.

Your telegram of even date received.

If the Porte declares that it has purchased the "Goeben" and "Breslau," you will please, after consulting with the French and British Ambassadors, energetically protest against that act, as a violation of the neutrality of Turkey.

The 56th Article of the London Maritime Declaration of 1909, which, although not ratified, was nevertheless adopted by all the Powers at the time of the last war, and which acquired the standing of a customary maritime law, considers the transfer, to a neutral flag, of an enemy's merchant ship after declaration of hostilities, as null and void. This applies with still greater force to war vessels.

The purchase by Turkey of German war vessels which were in undoubted peril in the Mediterranean basin has as its object a manifest aid to Germany, and the alleged calculations of advantage to Turkey have no juridical standing.

Communicated to Paris and London.

SAZONOFF.

No. 19.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 29 (*August* 11), 1914.

The British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople has been instructed to insist, to the Porte, upon a strict observance by the Turkish Government of the provisions of international law, and upon the disarmament or departure of the "Goeben" and "Breslau."

BENCKENDORFF.

No. 20.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July* 30 (*August* 12), 1914.

The "Goeben" and the "Breslau" are still at Nogara. The cruisers, which were greeted by the Turks with enthusiasm, are taking coal here from the Turkish authorities. Turkish torpedo boats are passing out to sea from the Dardanelles, and are reporting to the German vessels the result of their reconnaissance. The German sailors made a strict search of the French, British, and Greek merchant vessels lying in the Dardanelles, and took a wireless telegraph outfit by force from the French steamer "Saghalien," under threat of blowing up the ship.

GIERS.

No. 21.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July* 30 (*August* 12), 1914.

The arrival of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" changes the situation here, not to our advantage. From a military point of view it strengthens Turkey's preparedness for war, and viewed from a political standpoint it will undoubtedly have the most serious consequences, strongly raising the Turkish spirit, and it may incite them to the rashest excesses.

GIERS.

No. 22.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July* 31 (*August* 13), 1914.

Having received information from the Dardanelles of the entry therein of German vessels, I entered a protest, in support of the French and British representatives, against violation of neutrality by Turkey. To my repeated representations to-day, the Grand Vizier gave me the answer that the purchase of the vessels had taken place at the last moment at Germany's proposal, after detention of Turkish dreadnoughts by Great Britain. The Grand Vizier asserts that all the German crews are now already being removed, and replaced by Turks. The British Chargé d'Affaires has instructed Admiral Limpus to verify the actuality of the substitution. Limpus insists that not one German shall remain on the vessels.

GIERS.

No. 23.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 1 (14), 1914.

It appears that the "Breslau" will come out to Constantinople this evening. I am informed that the "Goeben" is coaling at the Bay of Ismid. The British and French warships are stationed before the mouth of the Dardanelles. At 7 P.M. both the "Goeben" and the "Breslau" were still under the German flag.

GIERS.

No. 24.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 1 (14), 1914.

The Porte gave notice through a circular note of the issuance of its orders that wireless telegraph apparatus would be removed from foreign merchant vessels upon their entry into the Straits and restored to them after leaving the Straits. I protested, but in view of the existing situation here it is difficult to expect that the protest will achieve results.

GIERS.

No. 25.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, August* 1 (14), 1914.

This morning the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires read to me the following telegram from the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs,

setting forth that Turkey reaffirms her declaration of her intention to observe the strictest neutrality.

"That there may remain no doubt as to the pacific attitude which the Imperial Government has decided to maintain during the present hostilities, I again inform you that it has resolved to observe strict neutrality." (Signed) Saïd Halim, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

SAZONOFF.

No. 26.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 4 (17), 1914.

The "Goeben" and "Breslau" yesterday left Ismid to repair damages received: two shot holes on the starboard side of the "Goeben" and on the prow of the "Breslau." Repairs will require about ten days. Thirty-eight wounded men were put ashore from the "Goeben." Yesterday, 200 men of the German crews were removed from both vessels. The remainder, according to assurances given by the Minister of the Marine, will be removed upon the arrival from England of the Turkish crew returning on the Turkish cruiser "Reshid."

GIERS.

No. 27.

Russian Minister at Athens to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Athens, August* 6 (19), 1914.

I learn from a confidential source that when the Greek Minister at Berlin represented to Herr von Jagow that the purchase by Turkey of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" was an act unfriendly to Greece, the German Minister replied that as a matter of fact said purchase had never been made.

DEMIDOFF.

* Translated from the French text.

No. 28.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 6 (19), 1914.

Of the crews of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" two hundred men have already been put ashore and replaced by Turks. According to the Grand Vizier, the remainder will be removed upon the arrival from England of a Turkish crew belonging to the latter's vessels detained there.

GIERS.

No. 29.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 7 (20), 1914.

I must say that the situation here is of the greatest gravity for the reason that all affairs are in the hands of the military, who allow themselves license in everything and are openly exerting themselves, under German pressure, to draw Turkey into a war with us. Djavid Bey, the Grand Vizier, and, to some extent, Djemal Pasha, oppose this, but I am by no means convinced that the last word rests with them.

GIERS.

No. 30.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 6 (19), 1914.

The Minister of Finance visited me to-day and expressed to me his conviction that it was possible to effect an agreement with the Powers of the Triple Entente. According to Djavid Bey, the

Germans, especially within the last few days, have been lavish with promises, so tempting that they are hard to resist. The Minister thinks the Powers of the Entente ought to offer the Turks some benefits, even though less than those promised by the Germans, nevertheless sufficiently substantial, in order to restrain the Government from making an imprudent decision and to give the conservative members of the Cabinet an effective weapon with which to combat their war-like colleagues who are under German influence. Among such benefits might be counted the grant to Turkey of complete economic independence, and the suppression of the régime of capitulations. In response to my question as to whether under such conditions, the German commission could be removed from Turkey, the Minister replied that the privileges which might be offered to Turkey could be conditioned upon the removal of the German commission.

Communicated to Paris and London.

GIERS.

No. 31.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 7 (20), 1914.

Djavid Bey to-day visited the French and British Ambassadors and repeated to them the proposal which was made to me yesterday. Djemal Bey yesterday adopted the same view in conference with Sir L. Mallet. The difference between the proposals lies in the fact that the Turks evidently did not conceal from my colleagues the fact that, in the first place, they fear us, and for that reason they would like to arrive at a written agreement; not a general one with the Powers of the Entente, but with each one separately.

With regard to the question of capitulations, my colleagues and myself find that their complete suppression will be difficult. Nevertheless I admit the possibility of curbing their operation to a considerable extent. I would deem it quite possible to limit them by requiring guaranty of the inviolability of persons and dwellings

of foreign subjects, and the assistance of consuls in court proceedings.

Communicated to Paris and London.

GIERS.

No. 32.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris and London.

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, August* 8 (21), 1914.

I requested the French and British Ambassadors to advise their respective Governments not wholly to reject the plans proposed by Djavid Bey. Although it is doubtful that an agreement can be reached with Turkey, still we hold that we should not rebuff the more moderate element.

Communicated to Constantinople.

SAZONOFF.

No. 33.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, August* 9 (22), 1914.

Your telegram of August 8 (21), received.

M. Doumergue is in entire accord with your point of view. In considering the question of capitulations, according to the opinion of the French Ambassador at Constantinople as expressed by him to Djavid Bey, it is necessary to foreshadow certain transitional measures. M. Doumergue is in accord therewith, and is prepared to discuss a formula which may be submitted to the Turks.

Communicated to Constantinople.

ISVOLSKY.

No. 34.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, August* 10 (23), 1914.

In a memorandum handed me by the British Ambassador, it is stated that his Government, while deeming the Turkish demands excessive, considers it preferable not to reject them, viewing them as material for negotiation.

England is ready to join with us and France in giving written guaranty that the inviolability and independence of Turkey will be respected by the three Powers, and that the Treaty of Peace shall contain no conditions conflicting with those principles.

Further, so soon as a plan shall have been perfected for guaranteeing the administration of justice in a manner to meet modern conditions, England agrees to waive territorial jurisdiction operating by virtue of capitulations.

In exchange therefor, the Turkish Government binds itself to give a written pledge to fulfil, during the present war, all obligations arising from neutrality, and in every way to facilitate the uninterrupted and unhindered passage of merchant vessels through the Straits.

In like manner Turkey will proceed at once to return all German officers and the crews of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" to their native land.

Having accepted the said proposals of England, I beg of you, all three acting in concert, to be guided by them in further negotiations with the Porte.

If these negotiations should take a favourable turn, we calculate that the only certain guaranty of Turkey's future action lies in the removal of all German military as well as naval officers from her territory.

Communicated to Paris and London.

SAZONOFF.

No. 35.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, August* 11 (24), 1914.

Your telegram of August 10 (23), received.

An identical note from the British Ambassador here was also received by M. Doumergue, who, accepting the proposals of England therein laid down, is giving comformable instructions to the French Ambassador at Constantinople. He is thoroughly in accord with your view that if the negotiations with Turkey should take a favourable turn, they should be followed up by an insistence upon a general removal from Turkey of all German officers and men.

Communicated to London and Constantinople.

ISVOLSKY.

No. 36.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 14 (27), 1914.

According to persistent rumours, the exit of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" into the Black Sea will take place before long. From another source I learn that eighty German seamen and twenty mechanical engineers, dressed as common laborers, have arrived at Constantinople. In view of these facts, I had an interview to-day with the Grand Vizier, who categorically declared to me that he knew nothing of the arrival of the sailors. He gave his word that the "Goeben" would not leave for any point, and promised to again insist upon the prompt removal of all German crews from vessels. I believe the Grand Vizier is sincere, but his influence is greatly waning, and his final fall may come at any time. For that reason I freely admit the possibility of the departure of the "Goeben" into the Black Sea under German pressure, with crew part German, and flying the Turkish flag.

Communicated to Paris and London.

GIERS.

No. 37.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 14 (27), 1914.

A German Admiral is expected to arrive at an early date, for service as technical adviser in naval affairs. Twenty-seven German officers have already arrived for service in the Dardanelles forts.

GIERS.

No. 38.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, August* 15 (28), 1914.

Sir Edward Grey expressed to me his anxiety concerning the situation at Constantinople. He told me that if Turkey decides upon war, she will have to suffer the most serious consequences thereof. He believes that the efforts now being made by Germany will soon call forth a step by Turkey which will prove that Turkey and Germany are openly answerable for the war.

BENCKENDORFF.

No. 39.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 16 (29), 1914.

During the past half of August, the efforts of Germany to draw Turkey into war and to excite Turkish public opinion against the Powers of the Entente have become more and more plainly apparent. The Wolff Agency is industriously circulating in Turkey a manifesto of the Sultan and a warlike order from the army of Enver Pasha, calling upon the army to wash away the shame of the Balkan

war. Men of the navy and land forces from Germany are being brought into Turkey. On August 14, 150 German enlisted men arrived at Constantinople under the guise of artisans, and on the 15th, as many as 800 German soldiers with officers passed through Adrianople on a special train. Information from Erzeroum is that fifteen German officers arrived there to superintend the erection of new forts. German reservists and volunteers who did not succeed in returning to Germany received orders to enter the ranks of the Turkish army.

GIERS.

No. 40.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 19 (*September* 1), 1914.

The Minister of the Marine, who visited me yesterday, assured me upon his word of honour that not one German sailor should remain in the fleet, asking me only to allow him some time—about two weeks—for their gradual removal. To-day he will send away the first German detachment by land. This gradual separation is alleged to be necessary for him to allow the Turkish sailors time to master the technical details of running the purchased vessels. Djemal Pasha expressed, at the same time, his deep conviction of the necessity for Turkey to remain strictly neutral, and not to make war with any one, in the Balkans or any other theatre of action. He alleges that he stubbornly carries this point in the Council of Ministers. Some caution on his part is necessary, however, for, although as Minister of Marine he is independent, he is still in a subordinate position, as commander of the second army corps. He said he had no information concerning the arrival of new detachments of Germans.

Communicated to Paris and London.

GIERS.

No. 41.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 26 (*September* 8), 1914.

I have reason to believe that the Porte proposes, at the earliest moment, to declare the accomplished suppression of capitulations. I consider it necessary beforehand to define, by mutual agreement with our allies, our relation to such declaration. I also have information that, simultaneously with the order for suppression of capitulations, will be issued an irade by the Sultan for the abolishment of the International Sanitary Council.

Communicated to Bordeaux and London.

GIERS.

No. 42.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 27 (*September* 9), 1914.

The Italian Ambassador transmitted to me, by instruction of the Austrian Ambassador, a statement to the effect that the latter in no wise approves the intention of the Porte to suppress the capitulations, and that, in his capacity as dean of the corps, he is ready to join in a general protest by all the Ambassadors. This view is, according to the Margrave Pallavicini, shared also by the German Ambassador. I told the Marquis Garroni I saw no objection to joining in an identical note by all the Ambassadors to the Porte pointing out that capitulations are a result of international agreement, and cannot be abolished by a single-handed act.

Communicated to Bordeaux and London.

GIERS.

No. 43.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Despatch.) *Constantinople, August* 28 (*September* 10), 1914.

On the 27th of this August, the Grand Vizier addressed a note to all foreign representatives, a copy of which is enclosed herewith, giving notice of the abolishment of capitulations, beginning October 1 (new style) of this year.

As your Excellency will observe by the above-mentioned note, the Sublime Porte claims capitulations as its own individual voluntary act, which may in a like manner be abrogated at its personal discretion.

This line of action by the Ottoman Government, in contravention of treaties concluded with Turkey by all the European Governments, and directly injuring the interests of the latter, called forth a protest from them, expressed in an identical note transmitted to the Grand Vizier on this 28th of August, a copy of which I also have the honour to present herewith.

I deem it my duty to add that, as I had the honour to inform you by telegraph, a similar identical note was also transmitted to the Grand Vizier by the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors.

GIERS.

Text of Note of Sublime Porte to Imperial Russian Embassy at Constantinople, of August 27 (*September* 9), 1914.*

The Imperial Ottoman Government, animated by a spirit of hospitality and sympathy toward the subjects of friendly Powers, formerly determined in a special manner the rules to which foreigners should be subject on coming to the Orient to engage in business here, and communicated these rules to the Powers. In course of time these rules, which the Sublime Porte had promulgated upon its own exclusive initiative, came to be interpreted as privileges, strengthened and extended by certain practices, and maintained to the present under the name of old treaties or capitu-

* Translated from the French text.

lations. Meanwhile, these privileges, which on the one hand were at complete variance with the juridical rules of the times, and with the principles of national sovereignty, constituted, on the other hand, a hindrance to the progress and development of the Ottoman Empire, giving rise as well to certain misconceptions in the relations with foreign Powers; thus they form an obstacle to the attainment, by these relations, of the desired degree of cordiality and sincerity.

Overcoming all opposition, the Ottoman Empire continues to march in the path of regeneration and reform in which it was engaged in 1255 by Hatti-Hûmayoun of Gul-Hâné, and in order to secure for itself the position to which it is entitled in the family of civilised European people, adopted the most modern juridical principles, and did not depart from the plan of resting the edifice of state upon these foundations. The establishment of the constitutional régime shows how happily the efforts of the Ottoman Empire were crowned with success on its way of progress.

However, resulting from capitulations, interference by foreigners with the exercise of the judiciary power which constitutes the main basis of state sovereignty; limitation of legislative power upon the pretext that many of the laws could not be applied to foreigners; the fact that a criminal having made an attack upon the public safety escapes the application of the law for the sole reason that he is of foreign nationality; or again the fact that public procedure is compromised by the necessity of observing all sorts of restrictions and conditions in respect to the delinquent foreigner; and finally, the fact that litigation arising under the same contract permits a different mode of filing and procedure according to the nationality of the party;—all these facts, and other similar restrictive privileges, constitute an insurmountable barrier to any organisation of tribunals instituted for the purpose of assuring a perfect administration of justice in the country.

Likewise, the effect of capitulations which renders foreigners free and exempt from taxes in the Ottoman Empire leaves the Sublime Porte powerless not only to secure the means necessary to provide for the accomplishment of reforms, but even to meet the current needs of the administration without having recourse to loans. Similarly, the obstacles interposed against the increase of indirect taxation result in raising the quota of direct taxation, and oppressing the tax-paying Ottomans. The fact that foreigners engaged in business in the Ottoman Empire and enjoying here all

sorts of immunities and privileges are taxed less than the Ottomans, constitutes at once an evident injustice and an attack upon the independence and dignity of the State. The Imperial Government, in spite of all these obstacles, was pursuing its reformatory efforts with zeal, when the outbreak of a general war rendered the financial difficulties of the country extremely acute, endangering the accomplishment of every work begun or planned. Now, the Sublime Porte is convinced that the only means of salvation for Turkey is to accomplish that work of reform and development as soon as possible, as it is also convinced that all steps it will take in that direction will receive the encouragement of all friendly Powers.

It was upon the basis of this conviction that a decision was reached to abrogate, beginning October 1, 1914, the capitulations which have to the present time constituted a bar to all progress in the Empire, as well as all privileges and tolerances accessory to the capitulations or arising therefrom, and to adopt, as a basis of relations with all Governments, the general principles of international law.

While having the honour to announce the present decision, which, ushering in an era of happiness for the Ottoman Empire, will, therefore, I doubt not, be received with satisfaction by the Imperial Russian Government, I deem it my duty to add that the Sublime Porte, inspired in its decision only by the best interests of the Ottoman fatherland, does not cherish, in abrogating the capitulations, any unfriendly feeling toward any Power, and that it stands ready to enter into negotiations with the view of concluding commercial treaties with the Russian Government, based upon the general principles of public international law.

SAÏD HALIM.

Text of the Responsory Identical Note of August 28 (*September* 10), 1914.*

I have the honour to acknowledge to your Highness the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, wherein you were pleased to inform me of the decision by the Imperial Government to suppress capitulations in Turkey, beginning the 1st of next October.

I shall not fail to bring to the knowledge of my Government

* Translated from the French text.

this decision and the considerations upon which it is based, but deem it my duty just now to call the attention of your Highness, in contradiction of the opening sentences of your note, to the fact that the capitulary régime as it operates in Turkey is not an autonomous institution of the Empire, but a resultant of international treaties, diplomatic agreements and contractual acts of divers kinds. The régime cannot thereafter be modified in any of its parts, much less in its entirety be suppressed, without an entente with the contracting Powers.

In the absence, therefore, of a suitable agreement reached before the 1st of next October between the Ottoman Government and my own Government, I will find it impossible to recognise, from that date, the executive force of the one-sided decision of the Sublime Porte.

No. 44.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 28 (*September* 10), 1914.

To-day I pointed out to the Grand Vizier and to Djavid Bey that we could by no means tolerate the self-willed decision of the Porte; that by such an arrangement it had only succeeded in bringing the warring Powers together in an identical note of protest against it. As a way out of the situation, I advised them, without loss of time and before measures were taken for suppression to enter into negotiations concerning capitulary regulations which might be modified, and those without which foreigners cannot live in Turkey. Both seemed strongly impressed with the identical character of our notes of protest. They explained that in order to avoid war they had been forced to satisfy public opinion to some extent, and alleged that through suppression of capitulations they had secured peace for a month at least. According to their statement, they had thereby aroused the indignation of the German Ambassador.

There is no doubt that the Turks are continuing to play a double rôle, and are endeavouring to derive as much benefit as possible for themselves from the European war.

Communicated to Bordeaux and London.

GIERS.

No. 45.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 28 (*September* 10), 1914.

According to a communication from the Dardanelles, active strengthening of the forts there is going on under the direction of Weber Pasha and a newly arrived German high officer. Of the German soldiers brought to Constantinople, thirty artillerymen have been disembarked in the Dardanelles. The rest, according to the statement of a German soldier disguised in Turkish uniform, have been distributed among the forts along the Bosphorus. War supplies and artillery continue to arrive from Germany, and a new shipment of seventy-five car-loads is expected to arrive in a few days.

GIERS.

No. 46.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 28 (*September* 10), 1914.

A person who is in close touch with the Ottoman Ministers expresses the opinion that Turkey is bound to Germany by an agreement, which is supposed to have been effected mainly at the instance of Enver Pasha. This agreement does not, however, bind Turkey to an immediate declaration of war against us, which explains the position they are now taking, notwithstanding all the efforts made by the Germans to hasten matters to a conclusion.

Communicated to Bordeaux and London.

GIERS.

No. 47.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 28 (*September* 10), 1914.

I learn through reliable sources that on August 23 (September 5), Enver Pasha received a letter from the German Ambassador pointing out that the German Government considered that the time had arrived for Turkey to fulfil her obligations as an ally of Germany. This might be postponed only till the Dardanelles were fortified. Without conclusively determining the line of action to be pursued by the Turkish war forces, Germany suggests that it might be directed to an attack on Egypt and a descent upon Odessa.

GIERS.

No. 48.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Bordeaux and London.

Draft of an Identical Note of the Powers of the Triple Entente.*

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, August* 28 (*September* 10), 1914.

The régime of capitulations having been based upon reciprocal pacts, it does not belong to the Sublime Porte to declare its abrogation by a simple act of its own will.

The Russian, French and British Governments are nevertheless willing to examine at once, and in the most friendly spirit, the propositions which the Sublime Porte would deem necessary to address to them for the substitution, for the present régime, of a régime more in conformity with the general principle of international law. The said Governments could, in any event, proceed to this examination only after having received from the Sublime Porte the assurance that it would observe strict neutrality in the present war, and that it would likewise abstain from all offensive acts against any state that is a neighbour of Turkey.

Communicated to Constantinople.

SAZONOFF.

* Translated from the French text.

No. 49.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, August* 28 (*September* 10), 1914.

Please warn the Grand Vizier that the appearance in the Black Sea of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" may give rise to complications. Trusting that the reasonable element in Turkey cannot desire this, we deem it necessary to give friendly warning of it to Prince Saïd Halim.

SAZONOFF.

No. 50.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 31 (*September* 13), 1914.

Your telegram of August 28 received.

I warned the Grand Vizier that the appearance in the Black Sea of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" might lead to complications, the more so because the German officers on board those vessels would try to bring about such complications in order to draw Turkey into a war with us. The Grand Vizier answered me to the effect that he had no information concerning the departure of the vessels, and he did not see any reason for sending them into the Black Sea. I believe the Grand Vizier will oppose the departure of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" into the Black Sea, but, unfortunately, his voice has no longer any decisive significance.

GIERS.

No. 51.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 31 (*September* 13), 1914.

I learn from trustworthy sources that the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors, after having united in an identical note

of their Governments protesting against the abrogation of capitulations, now have already withdrawn from making any further objection to said abrogation.

GIERS.

No. 52.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August* 31 (*September* 13), 1914.

To-day the British Ambassador informed the Grand Vizier that England had recalled Admiral Limpus and all British officers in view of the impossible situation created for the British naval commission in Turkey.

Communicated to London.

GIERS.

No. 53.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Despatch.) *Constantinople, September* 1 (14), 1914.

Endeavouring by all possible means to gain the ascendency in Turkey, Germany and Austria-Hungary turned their special attention to organs of the press at Constantinople.

The Embassy at Constantinople has information showing that the principal newspapers receive from the two Governments the following very considerable subsidies:

The Ikdam receives 2,500 Turkish pounds; the Sabah, the Tanin and the Tasfiri-Efkiar 2,000 pounds each, and the Terjuman 500 pounds, from Germany; while from Austria-Hungary the three first-named papers receive 1,000 pounds each, and the two last-named 500 pounds each.

GIERS.

No. 54.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 2 (15), 1914.

I gather from my interviews to-day with Talaat Bey and Halil Bey that the Turks are beginning to realise that they were hasty in suppressing capitulations, and fear the consequences to arise after the close of the war. Both Ministers assured me of their desire to enter into an agreement with us.

They told me, privately, that they were ready to separate the economic from the juridical side of the question, delaying the suppression of the latter part of the régime for some time. They regarded economic freedom as of prime importance at present, in view of the impossibility, without it, satisfying the demands of the budget. They would like to see immediate action taken toward suspension of the economic regulations of capitulations, to which the Governments have not objected in principle. I feel, personally, that we should now meet them on this ground, as our refusal might play into the hands of the Germans.

GIERS.

No. 55.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 4 (17), 1914.

Citing the alleged successful contest with the war party in the Cabinet, Djavid Bey yesterday expressed his assurance that the Powers of the Triple Entente could bring about a demobilisation of Turkey if they would make it conditional upon their consent to the suppression of economic, as well as juridical, capitulations.

In view of the endeavour of the Turks after the retaking of Adrianople to place before Europe an accomplished fact from which they afterward refused to recede; and in view of the fact that, without declaring war against them, the Powers at the present time

have no means of exerting pressure upon them, I ask instructions, with the least possible delay, concerning the attitude the Imperial Government would maintain toward the proposal of Djavid Bey, if it were renewed in the name of the entire Cabinet, and with a secret clause providing that the régime without capitulations might be applied to foreigners only after the formulation of new rules effectually guaranteeing the inviolability of persons and dwellings of foreigners.

GIERS.

No. 56.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, September* 6 (19), 1914.

Your telegram of September 4 received.

We would be ready to agree to the suppression of capitulations, with a clause providing that the new régime could be applied only upon the formulation of new rules giving sufficient guarantees, if the Ottoman Government will make a proposal covering the unconditional neutrality of Turkey; such guarantee might be furnished by demobilisation and the removal of all German military officers.

Communicated to Bordeaux and London.

SAZONOFF.

No. 57.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 8 (21), 1914.

To-day I pointed out to the Grand Vizier that the voyage to-day of the "Goeben," even for a short time, into the Black Sea, did not coincide with his declaration that the Turkish fleet would not go there. I reminded him of my previous statement, that such a move might lead to incidents and results, the responsibility for

which would fall upon Turkey. I did not fail to call his attention anew to the fact that the international position of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" under the Turkish flag could not be deemed correct. The Grand Vizier strove to justify himself on the score that the departure of one large vessel for target practice, alleged to be dangerous in the Sea of Marmora, was not the departure of the fleet, and that he could only repeat the assurance that a general exit of the whole Turkish fleet would not take place.

His assertions, even if approved by the Council of Ministers, do not, however, constitute a serious guaranty, as the fleet, now in the hands of the Germans and under the immediate command of the Vice-Generalissimo Enver Pasha, can sail out even without the consent of the other Ministers.

GIERS.

No. 58.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 9 (22), 1914.

In the face of the decision of the Council of Ministers not to despatch the fleet to the Black Sea, the German Ambassador nevertheless sent the "Breslau" there, and thereupon informed the Grand Vizier that the German vessels were only to a certain extent under Turkish control, and that they were destined to serve, not only Turkish, but principally German interests. The Ambassador, at the same time, promised that the German officers would not challenge the Russian fleet.

GIERS.

No. 59.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 9 (22), 1914.

From information which has reached me, I conclude that the German and Austrian Ambassadors are strenuously endeavouring

to arouse the Turks to action against us, but the Turks apparently fear an open rupture with us. At the same time, they fear that the fleet under the command of Germans may provoke a battle with the Russian fleet.

GIERS.

No. 60.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 9 (22), 1914.

The text of a transitory law, affirmed by an irade of the Sultan, has been published, providing for the increase, beginning at midnight on September 30, new style, of customs duties to 15 per cent. ad valorem on goods which have heretofore borne 11 per cent., and to 12 per cent. ad valorem on goods that have borne 8 per cent. Articles of gold, silver and jewelry continue to be subject to the special reduced tariff now in force. Goods shipped prior to the publication of the present law will be subject to the tariff rates in force at the time they were shipped.

GIERS.

No. 61.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, September* 11 (24), 1914.

You may confer with your colleagues as to the date subsequent to which the Porte may consider that the financial side of capitulations has lost its validity, it being desirable to obtain a postponement of that date as far as possible.

SAZONOFF.

No. 62.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 12 (25), 1914.

The text of a transitory law has been published, extending the law of temettu to foreigners engaged in mercantile business and in the crafts, and likewise to those engaged in any profession.

GIERS.

No. 63.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Identical Telegram of Three Ambassadors.)*

Constantinople, September 12 (25), 1914.

In another interview which we have just had—my colleagues of France and England and myself—with the Ottoman negotiator, the latter adopted a more conciliatory tone. Apparently, the Imperial Ottoman Government is better aware of the value of the consent of the Triple Entente Governments to certain modifications which it desires should be made in the capitulary régime Accordingly it appears disposed to give us concessions in the judiciary and penal domain of capitulations which it has abrogated with the rest, in exchange for the placing of our nationals and Ottomans upon an equal footing in fiscal matters, and for an engagement to enter into negotiations for commercial treaties with said Government, founded upon the principles of public international law, and designed to replace all commercial and customs regulations of the old treaties. As jurisdiction is that which most concerns our nationals, it guaranteeing the protection of their persons and property against arbitrary procedure, we intend to continue the negotiations so long as we can hope to secure the maintenance, as it operates to-day, of the judiciary and penal régime in force

* Translated from the French text.

relating to foreigners, until such time as it shall have been modified with the consent of the Powers.

GIERS.

No. 64.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 13 (26), 1914.

In view of the proposed stoppage of the international postal service in conjunction with the suppression of capitulations, I deem it desirable for the Ambassadors of the Entente to confine action to a joint note on October 1, new style, if by that time we shall have arrived at no agreement with the Porte in respect to the question of capitulations.

GIERS.

No. 65.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, September* 13 (26), 1914.

Please inform the Ottoman Government:

The Russian Government confirms the protest which the Russian Ambassador submitted to the Sublime Porte on August 28 (September 10) last.* The capitulary régime having been founded upon reciprocal acts of agreement, it is not within the power of the Porte to abrogate it by unilateral action. The Imperial Government, therefore, protests against measures which the Ottoman authorities have taken, or are going to take, in violation of capitulary stipulations, and declares its resolution from the present moment to demand, at the proper time, legal reparation for all damages sustained by its subjects through such action.

The Russian Government holds that it would not be true to

* Translated from the French text.

the trustful friendship which very happily unites Russia and Turkey, did it not call the most serious attention of the Sublime Porte to the consequences of the line of political action in which it seems desirous to engage. The sympathy of Russia is at once a guaranty of tranquillity for Turkey and a most valuable promise of assistance, which it is not to the interest of Turkey to ignore.

Communicated to Bordeaux, London and Rome.

SAZONOFF.

No. 66.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 14 (27), 1914.

According to entirely reliable information, the Austro-Hungarian Government charged its Ambassador to use every means at his disposal to call forth an action of the Turkish fleet against Russia.

GIERS.

No. 67.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 14 (27), 1914.

A Turkish torpedo boat which had gone out into the Ægean Sea yesterday evening was stopped by a British warship which served notice that the British squadron had received orders not to permit the exit of any Turkish vessel from the Dardanelles, and to open fire in case of such an exit. The Turkish torpedo boat then returned to the Straits. The commandant of the Dardanelles, taking the British statement for a declaration of war, at once closed the Straits.

GIERS.

No. 68.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 14 (27), 1914.

Having learned of the closing of the Dardanelles, the French and British Ambassadors and myself went at once to the Grand Vizier to protest alternately against such action. To our enquiry as to whether it had been done by order of the Government or upon the personal initiative of the commandant, the Grand Vizier replied that some time ago the commandant had been given general instructions to close the Straits in case of danger, and that, in this case, looking upon the British statement as a danger, he had deemed it his right to take such a step without apprising the Porte. I counselled the Grand Vizier not to uphold this decision of the commandant, and to take immediate steps to have the Straits opened. The Council of Ministers is considering the question at the present moment. In conversation with me, the Grand Vizier complained that the British measures had first been made known in the Dardanelles, and affirmed to him only in a subsequent note of the British Ambassador, and in his opinion it was contrary to the previous declaration of England in which only the "Goeben" and "Breslau" were forbidden to enter the Ægean Sea. I told Saïd Halim that the Porte must shoulder the blame, as German officers had also been admitted to other vessels.

GIERS.

No. 69.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 15 (28), 1914.

Yesterday the Grand Vizier requested the British Ambassador to withdraw the British squadron to some distance from its alleged position at the very entrance of the Dardanelles, promising, in the event of compliance, that he would at once open the Straits. Sir

Louis Mallet transmitted this request to London. It is of the highest importance to us that if a withdrawal of the British squadron to some distance is deemed admissible, the latter shall take place only upon the absolute condition of the admission of all decisive measures necessary to preclude the possibility of the entrance of any ship of an enemy into the Dardanelles.

GIERS.

No. 70.

Russian Ambassador at Bordeaux to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Bordeaux, September* 17 (30), 1914.

The French Ambassador at Constantinople telegraphs that as a result of the subordination of the Turkish fleet to German command, the British Government has decided not to permit the exit of Turkish vessels into the Ægean Sea. After the British sentry-ship stopped a Turkish torpedo-boat destroyer which was issuing from the Dardanelles, and gave notice of the decision, the commandant of the Dardanelles closed the Straits to navigation. In response to the protest of the three Ambassadors, the Ottoman Council of Ministers stated that the Dardanelles would be opened if the British squadron were removed to Lemnos.

ISVOLSKY.

No. 71.

Russian Ambassador at Bordeaux to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Bordeaux, September* 18 (*October* 1), 1914.

The French Ambassador at London telegraphs that the British Government does not consider it possible to withdraw its ships to Lemnos, which would render it impossible to keep watch over sailings out of the Dardanelles.

ISVOLSKY.

No. 72.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, Sepember* 17 (30), 1914.

Beginning to-morrow, our post-offices and those of Great Britain, in Turkey, will discontinue the receipt and delivery of mails, as has been done with the Italian, Austro-Hungarian and German offices. The British Ambassador and I will make protest against the single-handed decree of the Porte, independent of the general protest which will be made in its turn.

GIERS.

No. 73.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 18 (*October* 1), 1914.

Agreeably with my instructions, given in good time, our post-offices did not open to-day, and all moneys and mail matter remaining in the office sub-stations were delivered yesterday evening to our nearest Consular offices for safe keeping. The French and British Ambassadors, and myself, in an identical note, protested against the one-sided decision of the Porte relative to closing the foreign mails.

GIERS.

No. 74.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 18 (*October* 1), 1914.

Yesterday and to-day the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Halil Bey, came to me to negotiate relative to suppression of

capitulations. As his own hypothesis, he suggested that, upon our agreement to allow Turkey economic freedom, the Council of Ministers might instruct the administrative and judiciary authorities to withhold temporarily the execution of the irade for the suppression of juridical capitulations, and at such a time, he, Halil Bey, would organise a commission to formulate such a régime as might satisfy us. The French and British Ambassadors assenting, I answered him that our agreement to accord economic freedom to Turkey depended directly upon the preservation of juridical capitulations henceforth until the institution of an order of things that might be recognised by us as sufficiently guaranteeing the protection of the interests of our subjects. To-day Halil Bey informed me that he had succeeded in inducing the Porte to accept his proposal, and alleged that, upon his insistence, secret instructions had been sent to each vali and judiciary institution not to put in effect the law suppressing juridical capitulations. Halil Bey proposes to invite Europeans now in the Turkish service to join the commission. There is but little hope, however, that the work of a commission, if one should be assembled, will lead to any favourable result.

GIERS.

No. 75.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 19 (*October* 2), 1914.

From absolutely reliable sources I learn that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared to the Grand Vizier that Turkey ought now to proceed against Russia. The Grand Vizier replied that Turkey was ready to proceed, but did not know in what direction action should begin; whereupon, the Ambassador pointed out that the fleet should be used, its first task being to exert pressure upon Bulgaria and Roumania. This end might be attained by destroying the Russian fleet, or, if it should shun fight, by establishing Turkish domination of the Black Sea. The Grand Vizier objected that Constantinople would be in peril in case the Turkish fleet suffered in a battle with the Russians.

GIERS.

No. 76.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 20 (*October* 3), 1914.

The general situation in Constantinople for the past few weeks has developed itself in one direction—increased preparation of Turkey for war. The appearance of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" completely turned the heads of the Turks, a fact of which the Germans and Austrians were not slow to take advantage, finally to win Turkey over to their side. As you already know through my telegram of August 27, even a treaty was concluded between them. Since that time, the Minister of War, appointed generalissimo of the army and navy, completely turned them over, the one as well as the other, to German hands. Turkey overflowed with German officers, men, weapons and ammunition. The Germans began with increased activity to prepare her for war with all the Powers of the Entente, fortifying the Straits and creating difficulties for all of us on the frontiers. The turning of all Turkey into an armed camp also had its effect upon the relations between the civil authorities and foreigners, and the duties devolving upon the Ambassadors and Consuls to protect the interests of foreign subjects became very onerous. The increasingly bad situation of the Germans in the theatre of war to some extent sobered the more moderate Ministers, and they are apparently beginning to oppose the efforts of the Germans immediately to drag Turkey into hostilities. A struggle is on in the Council of Ministers between the conservative party and Enver, sometimes supported by Talaat Bey—a struggle wavering continually according to the tenor of the news received from the seat of war. In the country, which is without doubt being plundered for war purposes, great dissatisfaction is arising, and in the army discontent is growing against the German hegemony. But there is no one with energy enough to head the movement. This alarming uncertainty of the situation may continue until we shall have achieved complete success in the war, when the present Ministers will have the hardihood to liberate themselves from Enver and from the Germans. But the most probable outcome is that the Germans themselves will create an incident to precipitate Turkey into war.

GIERS.

No. 77.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 20 (*October* 3), 1914.

According to reliable information I have received, the Porte has decided to abolish the Lebanon privileges at a very early date.

GIERS.

No. 78.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, September* 21 (*October* 4), 1914.

Your telegram of September 20 received.

Please support the insistence of the French Ambassador upon the preservation of the Lebanon statute.

SAZONOFF.

No. 79.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Despatch.) *Constantinople, September* 22 (*October* 5), 1914.

A month ago the British Ambassador, Sir Louis Mallet, returned to Constantinople.

Shortly after his arrival, Sir Louis solicited an audience with His Majesty the Sultan. His Majesty gave the Ambassador an extraordinarily amiable reception and told him Turkey desired to observe strict neutrality and did not cherish the slightest unfriendly design against any of the Foreign Powers, and that the German crews brought with the war vessels obtained from Germany might be sent away within a few days.

In response to this conciliatory declaration, Sir Louis Mallet,

in his turn, informed His Majesty that he was authorised to state that at the close of the war the Government of Great Britain would return to Turkey the two dreadnoughts which it has under detention.

GIERS.

No. 80.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Despatch.) *Constantinople, September* 22 (*October* 5), 1914.

General mobilisation in Turkey, and the placing of the whole country upon a war footing, had the direct result of a transfer of authority from the civil officials to the hands of the military. This situation heavily taxed the energies of our Consular officers in the Ottoman Empire. Governmental requisitions called forth by mobilisation and carried out, without regard to orderly procedure, and in violation of the rights of foreign subjects in Turkey, necessarily compelled the special attention of Consuls, and aroused them to action in defence of the victims. Protests which they made to the local civil authorities were of no avail, for the latter pointed out that all such measures were taken by order of the military authorities. These paid no attention whatever to the protests of the Consuls.

The suppression of capitulations by the single-handed decision of the Porte dealt a still heavier blow to the activities of Consuls in defence of their compatriots, making it impossible for them to give the latter direct protection and defend them from the uncurbed acts of the Turkish authorities.

Under such conditions the activities of our Consuls in the matter of protecting the rights and interests of our subjects hardly amount to more than fruitless protests; to the registration of cases of violation of rights and interests of their compatriots and reporting the same to the Imperial Embassy, so that, at the close of the war, when we will have to enter into negotiations with Turkey, there will be sufficient material in our hands to make a suitable showing for our demands upon the Porte.

Unfortunately it is only upon rare occasions that the Embassy itself succeeds in securing the restoration of rights of our subjects,

for, admitting the readiness of the Grand Vizier upon some occasions to satisfy our demands, it must be noted that his orders have seldom, and not very scrupulously at that, been obeyed by the local authorities.

GIERS.

No. 81.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 22 (*October* 5), 1914.

Your telegram of September 21 received.

The Ambassadors of the Entente Powers yesterday presented an identical note to the Porte relative to the necessity of preserving the Lebanon statute.

GIERS.

No. 82.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 26 (*October* 9), 1914.

An official German institution is in public operation here under the name of "station administration" (Etappen-Kommando), for making requisitions on foreign goods. On some receipts issued there is a mark indicating that the goods are requisitioned "for the German Government." At the head of the administration is a German naval officer, former commander of the German station ship. There were two cases of seizure of cargoes belonging to Russian subjects. I made the proper protest to the Porte.

GIERS.

No. 83.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 23 (*October* 6), 1914.

I learn through reliable sources that yesterday the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador advised the Grand Vizier that the allied German and Austrian Governments deem that the time has arrived for hostile action against us, and that the Turkish fleet should now be attacking the Black Sea coast. The Grand Vizier is alleged to have answered in an evasive manner, expressing the opinion that action by the fleet cannot have decisive results in the present state of affairs.

GIERS.

No. 84.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 28 (*October* 11), 1914.

The Porte has decided to promulgate at an early date a law for the subjection of all foreign schools, whether secular or clerical, to governmental control. I will protest conjointly with the French and British Ambassadors.

GIERS.

No. 85.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September* 30 (*October* 13), 1914.

Through reliable sources I am informed that the Germans ordered and have already received ten Russian and ten Roumanian war flags for the "Goeben."

GIERS.

No. 86.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, October* 2 (15), 1914.

It has been transmitted to me from entirely reliable sources that the Grand Vizier, in answer to the insistent demand of the German and Austrian Ambassadors for prompt war moves against us, stated that the only obstacle to such a step was the difficult financial situation.

GIERS.

No. 87.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, October* 3 (16), 1914.

I learned from an authentic source that on September 28 (October 11), a meeting took place at the German Ambassador's, in which Enver Pasha and Talaat Bey took part. A special document even was signed, by virtue of which Turkey obligated herself to open hostilities against us upon receipt of a financial subsidy from Germany. The first installment of the latter has been received.

GIERS.

No. 88.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, October* 5 (18), 1914.

According to reliable information which has reached me, another remittance of the money promised to Turkey for the attack she has obligated herself to make upon Russia will arrive in Constantinople from Germany October 8. Thereupon, Enver Pasha and Talaat Bey

will demand to know of the Grand Vizier whether he approves of immediate action, and, if not, they will demand his removal.

GIERS.

No. 89.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, October* 7 (20), 1914.

In a few days entirely possible attack of Turkey upon us in connexion with receipt by her of gold from Germany.

GIERS.

No. 90.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, October* 16 (29), 1914.

In view of the receipt of private reports by telegraph alleging that Turkish torpedo boats sank several vessels at Odessa, my French and British colleagues and myself offer to our Governments the suggestion that they declare to the Porte that it can take the choice between an immediate breaking off of relations with us, or the immediate removal from Turkey of all German officers, as well as of the mission of Limann von Sanders, and of the navy.

GIERS.

No. 91.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, October* 16 (29), 1914.

The Turks opened hostilities against the unfortified port of Theodosia and the gunboat stationed at the port of Odessa.

Consequently, you will please take steps for the departure of our Consular officers, placing the protection of our interests in the hands of the Italian Ambassador.

In this connexion you will inform the Porte that as a result of the said hostilities, you have been ordered to leave Constantinople with all of your subordinate officers.

Communicated to Bordeaux, London, Nish, Sofia, Bucharest, Rome, Athens and Cettinje.

SAZONOFF.

No. 92.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, October* 17 (30), 1914.

Your telegram received at 3 o'clock in the night; will carry out your instructions in the morning.

GIERS.

No. 93.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, October* 17 (30), 1914.

Urgent.—Reporting himself ill, the Grand Vizier could not receive me. I have carried out your instructions by letter.

GIERS.

No. 94.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Constantinople, October 17 (30), 1914.

Urgent.—Just now I saw the Grand Vizier, who expressed to me his poignant regret for the attack of the Turkish fleet, affirm-

ing that it was entirely contrary to the orders of the Porte. He assured me that he would be able to set the Germans straight. To my answer that I had been instructed to leave and would have to obey orders, he responded that, understanding this, he would nevertheless address Petrograd directly in the hope of settling the affair. It is not his good-will, but his authority, that I doubt, and I believe his fall, and that of Djavid Bey, are not far distant.

GIERS.

No. 95.

Russian Ambassador at Bordeaux to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Bordeaux, October* 17 (30), 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs told me that as late as yesterday, upon receipt of news from the French Consul at Odessa telling of the attack upon us by the Turks, he had reaffirmed his instructions to M. Bompard to act in coöperation with his Russian and British colleagues.

ISVOLSKY.

No. 96.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, October* 18 (31), 1914.

Mr. Nicolson told me that, according to the latest telegrams from Sir L. Mallet, M. Giers had demanded his passports, as did also the French and Italian Ambassadors, and they are leaving Constantinople.

BENCKENDORFF.

No. 97.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Bordeaux and London.

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, October* 19 (*November* 1), 1914.

The Ottoman Chargé d'Affaires read to me the following telegram from the Grand Vizier:

"Convey to the Minister of Foreign Affairs our infinite regret that an act of hostility, provoked by the Russian fleet, has compromised friendly relations between the two countries.

"You may assure the Imperial Russian Government that the Sublime Porte will not fail to give an appropriate solution to this question, and that it will adopt all means necessary to prevent the possible recurrence of similar events.

"You may at once declare to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that we have decided not to allow the Imperial fleet further passage into the Black Sea, and that we hope that the Russian fleet, on its part, will not further come to cruise in our waters.

"I have the firm hope that the Imperial Russian Government will show in this affair the same conciliatory spirit that we do, in the common interest of both countries."*

I replied to the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires that I categorically denied that the hostile initiative was taken by our fleet. Further, that I feared that it is now too late, anyhow, to make any sort of negotiations. If Turkey had announced the immediate expulsion of all German soldiers and sailors, it might then still have been possible to enter into negotiations looking to reparation for the treacherous attack upon our coast and the damages caused thereby. I added that the communication presented by him in no wise affected the situation that had arisen.

Fahreddin Bey will receive his passports for departure to-morrow.

SAZONOFF.

* Translated from the French text.

No. 98.[1]

Russian Ambassador to Turkey to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Despatch.) *Petrograd, October* 31 (*November* 13), 1914.

Persistently pursuing their purpose of dragging Turkey into war with Russia, in the hope that, calculating upon the expected rising of our Mussulmans, they could strike us a severe blow in the Caucasus and draw off a part of our army from our western front, the Germans and Austrians exerted every effort to compel the Ottoman Government to adopt a line of action finally leading to war with us, and, consequently, with all the Powers of the Triple Entente.

The solemn and repeated declarations of the Porte of its decision to observe strict neutrality during the European war, and simultaneously an increased general mobilisation; the permission of the German war vessels "Goeben" and "Breslau" to pass through the Straits, and notwithstanding all promises and assurances to the contrary, the leaving on them of German officers and crews; the admission of German soldiers into the ranks of the Turkish army; the movement of Turkish troops to our own and the British frontiers, and the demonstrative appearance of the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea—in all these it is impossible not to perceive measures plainly directed at the Powers of the Entente, in the hope of calling forth from them hostile action against Turkey. Notwithstanding this, the diplomatic representatives at Constantinople of the Triple Entente directed every exertion toward restraining Turkey from taking any rash step, and raised energetic protests at the time, against any unlawful measures taken by the Porte.

On the other hand, even in the midst of the Ottoman Government circles disputes arose between parties; those falling under the influence of Germany and having profound faith in her ultimate victory, and the more moderate members who deemed it necessary to maintain a waiting attitude pending developments in the theatre of war.

Notwithstanding all of the persuasions, promises and even threats

[1] The *Russian Orange Book* (*No.* 2) closes with this number. In the English translation, printed by the Russian Government, there is appended a speech of M. Sazonoff, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. As this does not form a part of the original Russian book it is not reproduced in the Endowment's publication.

of Germany, the same indeterminate situation might have been maintained for some time, had it not been for the culminating stroke, delivered, as might have been expected, by the Germans themselves.

On the 16th (29th) of October, rumours were circulated in Constantinople of an alleged encounter between the Russian and Turkish fleet in the Black Sea. The source of these rumours was apparently a telegram from the "Vestnik" (Official Messenger), which, however, was not transmitted to me by the Turkish authorities.

I received the first authentic information of it through the dragoman of the Grand Vizier, sent to me in haste by the latter in order to verify the news, which he did not wish to believe. I was not in a position to communicate anything to him in the matter, although it was hard to doubt the possibility of a collision coming as a natural result of the political situation that had arisen. Shortly afterward my British colleague informed me of a telegram he had received relative to the bombardment of Odessa by Turkish torpedo boats.

Anticipating an inevitable rupture of our relations with Turkey, I at once communicated the incident to Marquis Garroni, the Italian Ambassador, and requested him to prepare to take measures, at the proper time, for the protection of our Consuls in Turkey. I did not doubt that the Embassy would get out safely, but was much concerned about the fate of our Consular representatives.

At 3 o'clock in the night I received a telegram from your Excellency instructing me, on account of an attack made upon our Black Sea coast by the Turkish fleet, to leave Turkey with all Embassy and Consular officials, and the same night I communicated the matter to my French and British colleagues. At the same time, circulars of instructions were prepared and sent to Consuls, which, however, evidently were not forwarded to them, for on the next day the Embassy received the usual telegrams from them relating to current business which proved that they had not received my instructions.

On the morning of October 17 (30), I telephoned to the Grand Vizier asking him to appoint a time when he could receive me. Prince Saïd Halim responded that he regretted to say that because of illness he could not receive me. Thereupon I sent him an official note in which I gave a brief synopsis of the telegram I had received. In a private letter enclosed with the note, I expressed my regret at leaving Constantinople without bidding him adieu, and requesting the Grand Vizier to give me my passports and to take measures

to facilitate the unhindered departure of our Embassy and Consuls from Turkish territory.

The Ambassadors of France and Great Britain wrote to the Grand Vizier in the same spirit.

The Grand Vizier requested me to come and see him at Yenikeui at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

I found the British Ambassador with him and he was present during the greater part of our interview. Leading me to an adjoining room, the Grand Vizier began to assure me that neither he nor the Government desired war; that his position was becoming stronger every day, and he begged me to help him realise his sincere desire not to allow matters to arrive at a rupture between us. I reminded him that for three months past I had admonished him and Talaat Bey of the danger threatening Turkey from the Germans, and had also warned them that the patience of Russia might, and must, reach a limit. That limit had now been reached, and I was now obliged, by reason of instructions received, to leave Turkey. I added that the Grand Vizier could at any time bring his requests to the attention of the Imperial Government through one or the other channel of communication.

Prince Saïd Halim expressed his intention of telegraphing at once to Fahreddin to convey to the Imperial Government his deepest regret at what had occurred. In taking leave, I again requested Saïd Halim to give his especial attention to the safety of our Consuls, whose fate would determine our attitude toward the Ottoman representatives in Russia. The Grand Vizier promised that the departure of the Embassy, as well as of the Consuls, should take place under the most favourable conditions.

On leaving the Grand Vizier, I met the Ministers in the reception-room, gathering for a council, after which, in the evening, there was to be a joint conference between the Cabinet and a committee of the "Party of Union and Progress." Djavid Bey, with whom I conferred for a few minutes, assured me that he was quite aware of the consequences which would follow a war with Russia; that he would use all means to prevent it, but that in case his efforts proved to be in vain, he would prefer to retire.

After me, Sir L. Mallet again went in to the Grand Vizier, and he was followed by M. Bompard.

I then went to the Italian Ambassador and requested him to secure a special train for us for Saturday evening. Marquis Garroni also availed himself of the opportunity, during his interview

with Talaat Bey, to call his attention to the fact that Ottoman Consuls in Russia would be accorded the same treatment as Russian Consuls in Turkey. Talaat Bey again mentioned the arrests of the dragoman and imaum of the Ottoman Consulate at Batoum, and added that had it not been for this occurrence he might have shared our point of view; but he was now compelled first to enquire into the fate of Turkish Consuls in Russia.

Marquis Garroni then renewed his proposal to him that the Ottoman interests of Russia he confided to the care of Italy. In the event of such an arrangement, the Italian Embassies at Petrograd and Constantinople might be able conjointly to perfect plans for the return of Consuls to their native countries, to the satisfaction of both sides.

On October 18 (31), at 7.15 o'clock in the evening, occurred, under quite favourable conditions, the departure of the Imperial Embassy, the Consulate General and a majority of the members of the Russian colony, altogether about one hundred people.

GIERS.

THE

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK

THE SERBIAN BLUE BOOK[1]

No. 1.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June* 16/29, 1914.

The Vienna Press asserts that the magisterial enquiry has already shown that the Serajevo outrage was prepared at Belgrade; further, that the whole conspiracy in its wider issues was organised at Belgrade among youths inspired with the Great Serbian idea, and that the Belgrade Press is exciting public opinion by publishing articles about the intolerable conditions prevailing in Bosnia. Press articles of this kind, according to the Vienna Press, are exercising a strong influence, as Serbian newspapers are being smuggled in large quantities into Bosnia.

No. 2.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June* 17/30, 1914.

The tendency at Vienna to represent, in the eyes of Europe, the outrage committed upon the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince as

[1] *Miscellaneous. No.* 10 (1915). *Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of His Majesty, May,* 1915. London: Printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office, by Harrison and Sons, 45-47 St. Martin's Lane, W. C., 1915. [Cd. 7860.] The Serbian Blue Book was translated and printed by the British Government in this Command Paper as Section VI. No English translation was published by the Serbian Government. Title of publication in the French text: *Le Livre Bleu Serbe, Négociations ayant précédé la guerre,* (16/29 *juin*-3/16 *Août,* 1914). This text was furnished to the Endowment by Dr. Milenko R. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister at Paris (*Legation Royale de Serbie en France et en Belgique*). Published by the *Librairie Militaire Berger-Levrault, Paris, Rue des Beaux-Arts,* 5-7.

the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia is becoming more and more apparent. The idea is to use this as a political weapon against us. The greatest attention ought, therefore, to be paid to the tone adopted by our press in its articles on the Serajevo outrage.

No. 3.

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, June* 17/30, 1914.

The Berlin Press, in publishing articles based on information from Vienna and Budapest, in which the Serajevo outrage is connected with Serbia, is misleading German public opinion.

No. 4.

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, June* 17/30, 1914.

The hostility of public opinion in Germany towards us is growing, and is being fostered by false reports coming from Vienna and Budapest. Such reports are being diligently spread in spite of the contradictions issued by some newspapers and news agencies.

No. 5.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, June* 17/30, 1914.

As Count Berchtold was not able to receive me when I called, I spoke to the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign

Affairs concerning the Serajevo outrage. In the course of our conversation I adopted the following line of argument:—

"The Royal Serbian Government condemn most energetically the Serajevo outrage and on their part will certainly most loyally do everything to prove that they will not tolerate within their territory the fostering of any agitation or illegal proceedings calculated to disturb our already delicate relations with Austria-Hungary. I am of opinion that the Government are prepared also to submit to trial any persons implicated in the plot, in the event of its being proved that there are any in Serbia. The Royal Serbian Government, notwithstanding all the obstacles hitherto placed in their way by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy (creation of an independent Albania, opposition to Serbian access to the Adriatic, demand for revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, the September ultimatum, &c.) remained loyal in their desire to establish a sound basis for our good neighbourly relations. You know that in this direction something has been done and achieved. Serbia intends to continue to work for this object, convinced that it is practicable and ought to be continued. The Serajevo outrage ought not to and cannot stultify this work."

Baron Macchio has taken note of the above and promised to communicate to Count Berchtold all that I said to him.

On the same day I communicated to the French and Russian Ambassadors the substance of this conversation.

I have, &c.

No. 6.

M. M. Georgevitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Constantinople, June* 17/30, 1914.

I had to-day a long conversation with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador here concerning the Serajevo outrage. I expressed the hope that this regrettable event—whatever is said about it in certain diplomatic circles—would not unfavourably influence the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary which lately had shown considerable improvement.

He replied that such an eventuality was impossible, and ought not to be contemplated. He was also of opinion that Serbo-Austro-

Hungarian relations had much improved lately. He added that the work in that direction ought to be persevered in. He informed me that from his latest conversations with Count Berchtold he understood that the latter was satisfied with the attitude adopted by the Serbian Government, and that he, on his part, sincerely desired friendly relations with Serbia.

I have, &c.

No. 7.

M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister in London, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) *London, June* 18/*July* 1, 1914.

Basing their information upon reports coming from Austrian sources, nearly all the English newspapers attribute the Serajevo outrage to the work of Serbian revolutionaries.

No. 8.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Royal Serbian Legations abroad.

Belgrade, June 18/*July* 1, 1914.

The Austrian and Hungarian press are blaming Serbia more and more for the Serajevo outrage. Their aim is transparent, *viz.*, to destroy that high moral reputation which Serbia now enjoys in Europe, and to take the fullest advantage politically against Serbia of the act of a young and ill-balanced fanatic. But, in Serbia itself, the Serajevo outrage has been most severely condemned in all circles of society, inasmuch as all, official as well as unofficial, immediately recognised that this outrage would be most prejudicial not only to our good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary but also to our co-nationalists in that country, as recent occurrences have proved. At a moment when Serbia is doing everything in her power to improve her relations with the neighbouring Monarchy, it is absurd to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired acts

of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage. Unfortunately this did not lie within Serbia's power, as both assassins are Austrian subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been careful to suppress anarchic elements, and after recent events she will redouble her vigilance, and in the event of such elements existing within her borders will take the severest measures against them. Moreover, Serbia will do everything in her power and use all the means at her disposal in order to restrain the feelings of ill-balanced people within her frontiers. But Serbia can on no account permit the Vienna and Hungarian press to mislead European public opinion, and lay the heavy responsibility for a crime committed by an Austrian subject at the door of the whole Serbian nation and on Serbia, who can only suffer harm from such acts and can derive no benefit whatever.

Please act in the sense of the above views, and use all available channels in order to put an end as soon as possible to the anti-Serbian campaign in the European press.

No. 9.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June* 18/*July* 1, 1914.

There were demonstrations last night in front of the Legation. I may say that the police showed considerable energy. Order and peace were maintained. As soon as I obtain positive information that the Serbian flag has been burned, I will lodge a complaint in the proper quarters. I will report to you the result. Hatred against Serbians and Serbia is being spread among the people, especially by the lower Catholic circles, the Vienna press, and military circles. Please do what is possible to prevent demonstrations taking place in Serbia, and to induce the Belgrade press to be as moderate as possible in tone. The tendency towards us here is still the same. It is expected that the decision as to the attitude to be adopted towards Serbia and the Serbians will be taken after the funeral.

No. 10.

Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, June* 19/*July* 2, 1914.

The French Government advise us to maintain an attitude of the greatest possible calm and composure in official circles as well as in public opinion.

No. 11.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, June* 20/*July* 3, 1914.

Yesterday being the day on which the remains of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were brought from Serajevo to Vienna, I gave instructions that the national flag at my residence should be hoisted at half-mast as a sign of mourning.

Yesterday evening, on this account, protests were made by the concierge, the other tenants, the landlord's agent, and the landlord himself, who demanded the removal of the flag. Explanations proved of no avail, and the assistance of the police authorities was requested. The latter privately asked that the flag should be removed in order to avoid further disorders. The flag was not removed, and accordingly noisy demonstrations took place last night in front of the Legation. The conduct of the police was energetic, and nothing happened to the flag or to the building which might constitute an insult. At 2 A.M. the crowd dispersed. To-day's papers, more particularly the popular clerical papers, publish articles under the heading "Provocation by the Serbian Minister," in which the whole incident is falsely described.

The flag on the Legation building remained flying the whole time up to the conclusion of the service at the Court Chapel. As soon as this ceremony was concluded, the flag was removed. People from all over the quarter in which I live went to the Prefecture, the Municipality, and the State Council to demand the removal of our flag.

The crowd was harangued by Dr. Funder, director in chief of the Catholic *Reichspost*, Hermengild Wagner, and Leopold Mandl, all of whom are known as the chief instigators of the attacks in the Austrian and German press against Serbia and the Serbians.

I have, &c.

No. 12.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, June* 20/*July* 3, 1914.

In the course of a conversation which I had with the Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office on the subject of the Serajevo outrage, Baron Macchio severely criticised the Belgrade press and the tone of its articles. He argued that the Belgrade press was under no control and created *die Hetzereien gegen die Monarchie.* I told him that the press in Serbia was absolutely free, and that as a result private people as well as the Government very often suffered; there were, however, no means of proceeding against the press except by going to law. I told him that in the present instance the fault lay with the Austrian and Hungarian press which was controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Was it not true that during the past two years the Austrian and Hungarian press had been attacking Serbia, in such a manner as to offend her most sensitive feelings? The anniversary of the unfortunate war with Bulgaria had taken place a few days ago. I had myself witnessed the great lack of respect with which the Vienna press had written about Serbia and the Serbian army during and after the war, as well as in many other matters. The press in Belgrade was much more moderate. For instance, in the present case, a terrible crime had been committed and telegrams were being sent from Vienna to the whole world accusing the entire Serbian nation and Serbia of being accomplices of the detestable Serajevo outrage. All the Austrian newspapers were writing in that strain. Was it possible to remain indifferent? Even if the criminal was a Serbian, the whole Serbian nation and the Kingdom of Serbia could not be held guilty, nor could they be accused in such a manner.

Baron Macchio replied, "Nobody accuses the Kingdom of Serbia nor its Government, nor the whole Serbian nation. We accuse those

who encourage the Great Serbian scheme and work for the realisation of its object."

I told him that it appeared to me that from the first the nationality of the criminal had been deliberately put forward in order to involve Belgrade and to create the impression that the outrage had been organised by Serbia. This had struck me immediately, as I knew that up till now the Serbians of Bosnia had been spoken of as *die Bosniaken, bosnische Sprache, die Orthodoxen aus Bosnien,* while now it was being said that the assassin was *ein Serbe,* but not that he was a Bosnian nor that he was an Austrian subject. . . .

"I repeat," said Baron Macchio, "that we do not accuse the Serbian Government and the Serbian nation but the various agitators. . . ."

I begged him to use his influence in order to induce the Vienna press not to make matters more difficult by its accusations in this critical moment, when Serbo-Austrian relations were being put to a severe test.

I have, &c.

No. 13.

Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Paris, June* 21/*July* 4, 1914.

I had a long conversation on Wednesday last on the subject of the Serajevo outrage with M. Viviani, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was somewhat concerned at what had occurred. I made use of this opportunity to describe to him briefly the causes which had led to the outrage, and which were to be found, in the first place, in the irksome system of Government in force in the annexed provinces, and especially in the attitude of the officials, as well as in the whole policy of the Monarchy towards anything orthodox. He understood the situation, but at the same time expressed the hope that we should preserve an attitude of calm and dignity in order to avoid giving cause for fresh accusations in Vienna.

After the first moment of excitement public opinion here has quieted down to such an extent that the Minister-President himself considered it advisable in the Palais de Bourbon to soften the expressions used in the statement which he had made earlier on the subject in the Senate.

I have, &c.

No. 14.

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, June* 21/*July* 4, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that the outrages committed upon Serbs in Bosnia will increase the sympathy of Europe for us. He is of opinion that the accusations made against us in Vienna will not obtain credence. The chief thing is for public opinion in Serbia to remain calm.

No. 15.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June* 23/*July* 6, 1914.

The excitement in military and Government circles against Serbia is steadily growing owing to the tone of our press, which is diligently exploited by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade.

No. 16.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, June* 23/*July* 6, 1914.

The principal lines and tendencies to be found in the articles of the Vienna press on the subject of the Serajevo outrage are as follows:—

As long ago as Sunday afternoon, June 15/28 last, when the Vienna newspapers issued extra editions regarding the outrage upon the Crown Prince, the headlines announced that both the perpetrators were Serbians; moreover, this was done in such a manner as

to leave the impression that they were Serbs from Serbia proper. In the later reports, which described the outrage, there was a marked tendency to connect it with Serbia. Two circumstances were especially emphasised and were intended to indicate Belgrade as the place of origin of the outrage, *viz.:* (1) the visit to Belgrade of both of the perpetrators; and (2) the origin of the bombs. As the third and last link in this chain of evidence, the Vienna papers began to publish the evidence given by the assassins at the trial. It was characteristic to find that the Hungarian Korrespondenzbureau, and the Hungarian newspapers, especially the *Az Eszt* were alone in a position to know all about this "evidence." This evidence mainly tends to show: (1) that it has been established that the perpetrators, while in Belgrade, associated with the *comitadji* Mihaylo Ciganovitch; and (2) that the organiser and instigator of the outrage was Major Pribitchevitch.

Another tendency became apparent at the same time, *viz.:* to hold the "Narodna Odbrana" responsible for this outrage. Further, on Friday last, the latest announcement which the Hungarian Korrespondenzbureau made to the newspapers stated:—

"The enquiries made up to the present prove conclusively that this outrage is the work of a conspiracy. Besides the two perpetrators, a large number of persons have been arrested, mostly young men, who are also, like the perpetrators, proved to have been employed by the Belgrade 'Narodna Odbrana' in order to commit the outrage, and who were supplied in Belgrade with bombs and revolvers."

On the same day, late at night, the Hungarian Korrespondenzbureau sent the following request to the newspapers:—

"We beg the Editor not to publish the report relating to the Serajevo outrage, which appeared in our evening's bulletin."

At the same time the Vienna Korrespondenzbureau published the following official statement:—

"We learn from authoritative quarters that the enquiries relating to the outrage are being kept absolutely secret. All the details, therefore, which have appeared in the public press should be accepted with reserve."

Nevertheless, the Budapest newspapers continued to publish alleged reports on the enquiry. In the last "report" of the Budapest newspaper *A Nap,* which was reprinted in yesterday's Vienna papers, the tendency to lay the responsibility for the outrage on the "Narodna Odbrana" is still further emphasised. According to this report the

accused Gabrinovitch had stated that General Yankovitch is the chief instigator of the outrage.

I have, &c.

No. 17.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, June 24/July 7, 1914.*

In influential circles the excitement continues undiminished. Though the Emperor has addressed a letter to the Prime Ministers of Austria and Hungary respectively, and to the Minister of Finance, Herr Bilinski, in which an appeal is made for calmness, it is impossible to determine what attitude the Government will adopt towards us. For them one thing is obvious; whether it is proved or not that the outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they must sooner or later solve the question of the so-called Great Serbian agitation within the Hapsburg Monarchy. In what manner they will do this and what means they will employ to that end has not as yet been decided; this is being discussed especially in high Catholic and military circles. The ultimate decision will be taken only after it has been definitely ascertained what the inquiry at Serajevo has brought to light. The decision will be in accordance with the findings of the enquiry.

In this respect, Austria-Hungary has to choose one of the following courses: either to regard the Serajevo outrage as a national misfortune and a crime which ought to be dealt with in accordance with the evidence obtained, in which case Serbia's coöperation in the work will be requested in order to prevent the perpetrators escaping the extreme penalty; or, to treat the Serajevo outrage as a Pan-Serbian, South Slav and Pan-Slav conspiracy with every manifestation of the hatred, hitherto repressed, against Slavdom. There are many indications that influential circles are being urged to adopt the latter course: it is therefore advisable to be ready for defence. Should the former and wiser course be adopted, we should do all we can to meet Austrian wishes in this respect.

I have, &c.

No. 18.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, June 26/July 9, 1914.*

The Crown Prince Alexander is receiving threatening letters from Austria-Hungary nearly every day. Make use of this in course of conversation with your colleagues and journalists.

No. 19.

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 1/14, 1914.*

The Secretary of State has told me that he could not understand the provocative attitude of the Serbian press and the attacks made by it against Austria-Hungary, who, as a Great Power, could not tolerate such proceedings.

No. 20.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July 1/14, 1914.*

(1) The Austrian Korrespondenzbureau is showing a marked tendency to excite public opinion in Europe. This Bureau interprets neither correctly nor sincerely the tone adopted by the Belgrade press. It selects the strongest expressions from such articles as contain replies to insults, threats and false news designed to mislead public opinion, and submits them to the Austro-Hungarian public.

(2) The Korrespondenzbureau quotes especially extracts from articles from those Serbian newspapers which are not the organs of any party or corporation.

(3) As far back as the annexation crisis, Austria-Hungary prohibited the entry into the country of all Serbian political and other newspapers, and thus our Press would not be in a position to excite public opinion in Austria-Hungary and Europe if the Korrespondenzbureau did not lay stress on and spread broadcast the items of news which it gathers from various Serbian papers, in every instance exaggerating them. Six days ago the entry into Austria-Hungary of the *Odyek*, the organ of the Independent Radical Party, was prohibited; thus all our papers are now prevented from entering Austria-Hungary.

(4) With us the press is absolutely free. Newspapers can be confiscated only for *lèse-majesté* or for revolutionary propaganda; in all other cases confiscation is illegal. There is no censorship of newspapers.

In these circumstances, you should point out for their information, where necessary, that we have no other constitutional or legal means at our disposal for the control of our press. Nevertheless, when the articles in our papers are compared with those of Austria-Hungary, it is evident that the Austro-Hungarian papers originate the controversy, while ours merely reply.

Please also emphasise the fact that public opinion in Serbia is relatively calm, and that there is no desire on our part to provoke and insult Austria-Hungary. No one in Europe would know what our newspapers were writing if the Korrespondenzbureau did not publish these items of news with the intention of doing as much harm as possible to Serbia.

No. 21.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July* 1/14, 1914.

During the past few days the Austro-Hungarian newspapers have been spreading reports to the effect that there have been demonstrations at Belgrade against the Austro-Hungarian Legation, that some Hungarian journalists were killed; that Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgrade were maltreated and are now panic-stricken; that at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig Serbian students made

a demonstration against the Austro-Hungarian Minister, &c. All these reports are absolutely untrue and imaginary. Complete calm prevails in Belgrade and there were no demonstrations of any kind this year, nor has there been any question of disorder. Not only do the Austro-Hungarian Minister and his staff walk about the town without being molested in any way, but no Austro-Hungarian subject has been in any way insulted, either by word or deed, as is reported by the Viennese papers; still less was any attack made upon the house of any Austro-Hungarian subject or were any of their windows broken. Not a single Austro-Hungarian subject has had the slightest cause for any complaint. All these false reports are being purposely spread in order to arouse and excite Austro-Hungarian public opinion against Serbia.

The whole of Belgrade and the entire diplomatic body were present to-day at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig; there was not the slightest sign of resentment shown by anybody. During the whole ceremony exemplary order was maintained; so much so that foreigners were impressed with the good behaviour of the crowd, which was such as does not always prevail on similar occasions even in their own countries.

Be good enough to communicate the above to the Government to which you are accredited and to the press.

No. 22.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, July* 1/14, 1914.

Once more public opinion has been excited against us by the Literary Bureau of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. With the exception of the *Zeit* and the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, all the Austro-Hungarian newspapers have obtained from that Bureau the material and tone of their articles on the subject of the Serajevo outrage. You have yourself seen what kind of material and tone this is.

I am reliably informed that official German circles here are especially ill-disposed towards us. These circles have had some in-

fluence upon the writings of the Vienna press, especially upon those of the *Neue Freie Presse.*

This latter paper is still anti-Serbian *à l'outrance.* The *Neue Freie Presse,* which is widely read and has many friends in high financial circles, and which—if so desired—writes in accordance with instructions from the Vienna Press Bureau, briefly summarises the matter as follows: "We have to settle matters with Serbia by war; it is evident that peaceable means are of no avail. And if it must come to war sooner or later, then it is better to see the matter through now."

The Bourse is very depressed. There has not been such a fall in prices in Vienna for a long time. Some securities have fallen 45 kronen.

I have, &c.

No. 23.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, July* 2/15, 1914.

The most important question for us is, What, if any, are the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government as regards the Serajevo outrage? Until now I have been unable to find this out, and my other colleagues are in a similar position. The word has now been passed round here not to tell anybody anything.

The evening before last the Ministers of the Dual Monarchy held a meeting. It has not been possible to learn anything about the object and the result of this meeting. The communiqué issued on the subject was brief and obscure. It appears that the consequences of the Serajevo outrage were discussed at length, but that nothing was decided. It is not clear whether the Chief of Staff and the Naval Commander-in-Chief were present, as was rumoured. After this meeting Count Berchtold travelled to Ischl to report to the Emperor, who, after the funeral of Franz Ferdinand, had returned there to recover his health. In the Hungarian Parliament Count Tisza has replied to the interpellations of the opposition concerning the Serajevo incident; you are acquainted with his statements. His speech was not clear, and I believe it was intentionally obscure. Some peo-

ple saw in it signs of an intention quietly to await the development of events and of calmness in the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government, while others saw in it hidden intentions for (I should say) an action as yet undecided. It was noted that there was no occasion for haste until the results of the magisterial enquiry were announced. Some time has now elapsed; the matter has been spoken of, discussed, written about and distorted; then came the death of Hartwig and the alarm of Baron Giesl. In connexion with this again came the interpellations addressed to Count Tisza in the Hungarian Parliament; you have read his reply. Many hold the opinion here that this second speech is much more restrained than the first, and that this is to be attributed to an order from the Emperor. (The Bourse has now recovered; both the War Minister and the Chief of Staff have gone on leave.) I am loath to express an opinion. In the above-mentioned speech it is to be noted that the possibility of war is not excluded, in the event of the demands of Austria-Hungary in regard to the Serajevo outrage not being complied with.

One thing is certain: Austria-Hungary will take diplomatic steps at Belgrade as soon as the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo is completed and the matter submitted to the Court.

I have, &c.

No. 24.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, July* 2/15, 1914.

It is thought here that the magisterial enquiries and investigations have not produced sufficient evidence to justify bringing an official accusation against Serbia, but it is believed that the latter will be accused of tolerating within her borders certain revolutionary elements. Diplomatic circles here criticise and condemn the mode of procedure of the Austro-Hungarian Government, especially the attitude throughout of the Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna press. There are many who consider our attitude to be correct and in accordance with the dignity of a nation. They find fault only with the views expressed in some of our newspapers, though they all admit that it is provoked by the Vienna press.

In spite of the fact that it appears that the German Foreign Office does not approve of the anti-Serbian policy of Vienna, the German Embassy here is at this very moment encouraging such a policy.

I have, &c.

No. 25.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, July* 2/15, 1914.

What steps will be taken? In what form? What demands will Austria-Hungary make of Serbia? I do not believe that to-day even the Ballplatz itself could answer these questions clearly and precisely. I am of opinion that its plans are now being laid, and that again Count Forgach is the moving spirit.

In an earlier report I mentioned that Austria-Hungary has to choose between two courses: either to make the Serajevo outrage a domestic question, inviting us to assist her to discover and punish the culprits; or to make it a case against the Serbians and Serbia, and even against the Jugo-Slavs. After taking into consideration all that is being prepared and done, it appears to me that Austria-Hungary will choose the latter course. Austria-Hungary will do this in the belief that she will have the approval of Europe. Why should she not profit by humiliating us, and, to a certain extent, justify the Friedjung and Agram trials? Besides, Austria-Hungary desires in this manner to justify in the eyes of her own people and of Europe the sharp and reactionary measures which she contemplates undertaking internally in order to suppress the Great Serbian propaganda and the Jugo-Slav idea. Finally, for the sake of her prestige, Austria-Hungary must take some action in the belief that she will thus raise her prestige internally as well as externally. . . .

Austria-Hungary will, I think, draw up in the form of a memorandum an accusation against Serbia. In that accusation will be set forth all the evidence that has been collected against us since April, 1909, until to-day; and I believe that this accusation will be fairly lengthy. Austria-Hungary will communicate this accusation to the Cabinets of the European Powers with the remark that the facts contained therein give her the right to take diplomatic steps at Belgrade, and

to demand that Serbia should in the future fulfil all the obligations of a loyal neighbour. At the same time Austria-Hungary will also hand us a note containing her demands, which we shall be requested to accept unconditionally.

I have, &c.

No. 26.

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July* 3/16, 1914.

The Secretary of State has informed me that the reports of the German Minister at Belgrade point to the existence of a Great Serbian propaganda, which should be energetically suppressed by the Government in the interest of good relations with Austria-Hungary.

No. 27.

M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister at London, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) *London, July* 4/17, 1914.

The Austrian Embassy is making very great efforts to win over the English press against us, and to induce it to favour the idea that Austria must give a good lesson to Serbia. The Embassy is submitting to the news editors cuttings from our newspapers as a proof of the views expressed in our press. The situation may become more acute during the next few weeks. No reliance should be placed in the ostensibly peaceable statements of Austro-Hungarian official circles, as the way is being prepared for diplomatic pressure upon Serbia, which may develop into an armed attack. It is probable that as soon as Austria-Hungary has taken action at Belgrade she will change her attitude and will seek to humiliate Serbia.

No. 28.

M. Ljub Michailovitch, Minister at Rome, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July* 4/17, 1914.

I have obtained reliable information to the effect that the Marquis di San Giuliano has stated to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador that any step undertaken by Austria against Serbia which failed to take into account international considerations would meet with the disapproval of public opinion in Italy, and that the Italian Government desire to see the complete independence of Serbia maintained.

No. 29.

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, July* 5/18, 1914.

I have spoken to the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the provocative attitude of the Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna press.

M. Sazonof told me a few days ago that he wondered why the Austrian Government were doing nothing to put a stop to the futile agitation on the part of the press in Vienna which, after all, frightened nobody, and was only doing harm to Austria herself.

No. 30.

M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Serbian Missions abroad.

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July* 6/19, 1914.

Immediately after the Serajevo outrage the Austro-Hungarian press began to accuse Serbia of that detestable crime, which, in the opinion of that press, was the direct result of the Great Serbian

idea. The Austrian press further contended that that idea was spread and propagated by various associations, such as the "Narodna Odbrana," "Kolo Srpskich Sestara," &c., which were tolerated by the Serbian Government.

On learning of the murder, the Serbian Royal Family, as well as the Serbian Government, sent messages of condolence, and at the same time expressed severe condemnation of and horror at the crime that had been committed. All festivities which had been fixed to take place on that day in Belgrade were immediately cancelled.

Nevertheless, the press of the neighbouring Monarchy continued to hold Serbia responsible for the Serajevo outrage. Moreover, the Austro-Hungarian press began to spread in connexion with it various false reports, designed to mislead public opinion, which provoked the Belgrade press to reply in self-defence, and sometimes to active hostility in a spirit of embitterment aroused by the misrepresentation of what had occurred. Seeing that the Austro-Hungarian press was intentionally luring the Belgrade press into an awkward and delicate controversy, the Serbian Government hastened to warn the press in Belgrade, and to recommend it to remain calm and to confine itself to simple denials and to the suppression of false and misleading reports. The action of the Serbian Government was ineffectual in the case of some of the less important papers, more especially in view of the fact that newly invented stories were daily spread abroad with the object of serving political ends not only against Serbia but also against the Serbs in Austria-Hungary. The Serbian Government were unable to avert these polemics between the Serbian and the Austrian press, seeing that Serbian law, and the provisions of the constitution itself, guarantee the complete independence of the press and prohibit all measures of control and the seizure of newspapers. These polemics were further aggravated by the fact that the Vienna and Budapest journals selected passages from such of the Serbian newspapers as have practically no influence upon public opinion, strengthened still further their tone, and, having thus manipulated them, passed them on to the foreign press with the obvious intention of exciting public opinion in other European countries and of representing Serbia as being guilty.

Those who have followed the course of these polemics will know that the Belgrade newspapers merely acted in self-defence, confining their activities to denials and to the refutation of falsehoods designed to mislead public opinion, at the same time attempting to convince foreign Governments (which, being occupied with other and more

serious affairs, had no time to go into the matter themselves) of the intention of the Austro-Hungarian press to excite public opinion in its own country and abroad.

The Serbian Government at once expressed their readiness to hand over to justice any of their subjects who might be proved to have played a part in the Serajevo outrage. The Serbian Government further stated that they had prepared a more drastic law against the misuse of explosives. The draft of a new law in that sense had already been laid before the State Council, but could not be submitted to the Skuptchina, as the latter was not sitting at the time. Finally, the Serbian Government stated that they were ready, as heretofore, to observe all those good neighbourly obligations to which Serbia was bound by her position as a European State.

During the whole of this period, from the date of the perpetration of the outrage until to-day, not once did the Austro-Hungarian Government apply to the Serbian Government for their assistance in the matter. They did not demand that any of the accomplices should be subjected to an enquiry, or that they should be handed over to trial. In one instance only did the Austrian Government ask for information as to the whereabouts of certain students who had been expelled from the Pakratz Teachers' Seminary, and had crossed over to Serbia to continue their studies. All available information on this point was supplied.

The campaign against Serbia, however, was unremittingly pursued in the Austrian press, and public opinion was excited against her in Austria as well as in the rest of Europe. Matters went so far that the more prominent leaders of political parties in Austria-Hungary began to ask questions in Parliament on the subject of the outrage, to which the Hungarian Prime Minister replied. It is evident from the discussions in this connexion that Austria is contemplating some action, but it is not clear in what sense. It is not stated whether the measures which are to be taken—more especially military measures—will depend upon the reply and the conciliatory attitude of the Serbian Government. But an armed conflict is being hinted at in the event of the Serbian Government being unable to give a categorically satisfactory reply.

On the sudden death of the Russian Minister, M. de Hartwig, at the residence of the Austrian Minister, the polemics in the newspapers became still more acute; nevertheless this sad event did not lead to any disorders even during the funeral of M. Hartwig. On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Legation was so perturbed

by certain false reports that Austrian subjects began to conceal themselves, some of them taking refuge in the Semlin and Belgrade hotels, and others in the Legation itself. At 5 P.M. on the day of the King's birthday, which passed in the most orderly manner, I was informed by the Austrian Minister, through the Vice-Consul, M. Pomgraz, that preparations were being made for an attack that night on the Austrian Legation and on Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgrade. He begged me to take the necessary steps for the protection of Austro-Hungarian subjects and of the Legation, stating at the same time that he held Serbia responsible for all that might occur. I replied that the responsible Serbian Government were not aware of any preparations of this kind being made, but that I would in any case at once inform the Minister of the Interior, and beg him at the same time to take such measures as might be necessary. The next day showed that the Austrian Legation had been misled by false rumours, for neither any attack nor any preparations for attack were made. Notwithstanding this, the Austro-Hungarian press took advantage of this incident to prove how excited public opinion was in Serbia and to what lengths she was ready to go. It went even further and tried to allege that something really had been intended to happen, since M. Pashitch himself had stated that he had heard of such rumours. All this indicates clearly the intention to excite public opinion against Serbia whenever occasion arises.

When all that has been said in the Hungarian Parliament is taken into consideration, there is reason for apprehension that some step is being prepared against us which may produce a disagreeable effect upon the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. There is still further ground for such apprehension, as it is abundantly evident that the enquiry which is being made is not to be limited to the perpetrators and their possible accomplices in the crime, but is most probably to be extended to Serbia and the Great Serbian idea.

By their attitude and the measures they have taken, the Serbian Government have irrefutably proved that they are working to restrain excitable elements, and in the interests of peace and the maintenance of good relations with all their neighbours. The Government have given their particular attention to the improvement and strengthening of their relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which had lately become strained as a result of the Balkan wars and of the questions which arose therefrom. With that object in view, the Serbian Government proceeded to settle the question of the Oriental Railway, the new railway connexions, and the transit through Serbia

of Austro-Hungarian goods for Constantinople, Sofia, Salonica, and Athens.

The Serbian Government consider that their vital interests require that peace and tranquillity in the Balkans should be firmly and lastingly established. And for this very reason they fear lest the excited state of public opinion in Austria-Hungary may induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to make a *démarche* which may humiliate the dignity of Serbia as a State, and to put forward demands which could not be accepted.

I have the honour therefore to request you to impress upon the Government to which you are accredited our desire to maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, and to suppress every attempt directed against the peace and public safety of the neighbouring Monarchy. We will likewise meet the wishes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the event of our being requested to subject to trial in our independent Courts any accomplices in the outrage who are in Serbia—should such, of course, exist.

But we can never comply with demands which may be directed against the dignity of Serbia, and which would be inacceptable to any country which respects and maintains its independence.

Actuated by the desire that good neighbourly relations may be firmly established and maintained, we beg the friendly Governments to take note of these declarations and to act in a conciliatory sense should occasion or necessity arise.

No. 31.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Vienna, July* 7/20, 1914.

It is very difficult, indeed almost impossible, to ascertain here anything positive as to the real intentions of Austria-Hungary. The word has been passed round to maintain absolute secrecy about everything that is being done. Judging by the articles in our newspapers, Belgrade is taking an optimistic view of the questions pending with Austria-Hungary. There is, however, no room for optimism. There is no doubt that Austria-Hungary is making preparations of a serious character. What is chiefly to be feared, and is highly probable, is

that Austria is preparing for war against Serbia. The general conviction that prevails here is that it would be nothing short of suicide for Austria-Hungary once more to fail to take advantage of the opportunity to act against Serbia. It is believed that the two opportunities previously missed—the annexation of Bosnia and the Balkan war—have been extremely injurious to Austria-Hungary. In addition, the conviction is steadily growing that Serbia, after her two wars, is completely exhausted, and that a war against Serbia would in fact merely mean a military expedition to be concluded by a speedy occupation. It is also believed that such a war could be brought to an end before Europe could intervene.

The seriousness of Austrian intentions is further emphasised by the military preparations which are being made, especially in the vicinity of the Serbian frontier.

I have, &c.

No. 32[1]

Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, to Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Belgrade, July* 10/23, 1914.

I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency herewith the enclosed Note which I have received from my Government, addressed to the Royal Serbian Government.

I have, &c.

Handed personally at 6 P.M.

On the 31st March, 1909, the Serbian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Serbian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:—

[1] Although this document appeared in the original *Serbian Blue Book*, it was not printed in the English version of the *Serbian Blue Book* issued by the British Government in *Miscellaneous, No.* 10. The document in question [together with some comment not contained in the original Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia] is, however, printed in the same publication as document No. 4, in Section II, entitled *British Correspondence.* The Endowment has therefore used this English translation of the original Austro-Hungarian note, and has inserted it in its proper place in the *Serbian Blue Book.*

"Serbia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter."

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Serbian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Serbian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Serbian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction. In short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Serbian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Serbian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Serbian officers and functionaries belonging to the "Narodna Odbrana," and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer

the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government sees itself compelled to demand from the Royal Serbian Government a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it undertakes to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Serbian Government shall publish on the front page of its "Official Journal" of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:—

"The Royal Government regrets that Serbian officers and func- directed against Austria-Hungary—*i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

"The Royal Government regrets that Serbian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress."

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the "Official Bulletin" of the army.

The Royal Serbian Government further undertakes:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

2. To dissolve immediately the society styled "Narodna Odbrana," to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Serbia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserves to itself the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo;

8. To prevent by effective measures the coöperation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay

of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note.

ANNEX.

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last, has up to the present led to the following conclusions:—

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, one Milan Čiganović, and Trifko Grabež, with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosić.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež by the man Milan Čiganović and Commander Voija Tankosić at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depôt of the Servian army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Čiganović taught Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabež in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider.

5. To enable Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Čiganović.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabać (Rade Popović) and Ložnica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbić, of Ložnica, with the assistance of various individuals.

No. 33.

Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July* 10/23, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Minister handed me this afternoon at 6 P.M. a note in regard to the Serajevo outrage embodying the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and insisting on a reply from the Serbian Government within two days, *i.e.*, by Saturday, at 6 P.M. He informed me orally that he and his staff would leave Belgrade unless a favourable answer were forthcoming within the stipulated time.

Some of the Ministers being absent from Belgrade the Serbian Government have not as yet come to any decision, but I am in a position to state now that the demands are such that no Serbian Government could accept them in their entirety.

No. 34.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd.

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July* 11/24, 1914.

I informed the Russian Chargé d'Affaires that I would hand in the reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum on Saturday at 6 P.M. I told him that the Serbian Government would appeal to the Governments of the friendly Powers to protect the independence of Serbia. If war was inevitable, I added, Serbia would carry it on.

No. 35.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. M. Boschkovitch, Minister in London.

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July* 11/24, 1914.

I informed the British Chargé d'Affaires to-day that the Austro-Hungarian demands were such that no Government of an independent

country could accept them in their entirety. I expressed the hope that the British Government might possibly see their way to induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to moderate them. I did not conceal my anxiety as to future developments.

No. 36.

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, July* 11/24, 1914.

As I was leaving M. Sazonof, to whom I communicated the contents of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, I met the German Ambassador. He seemed to be in very good spirits. During the conversation which followed in regard to the Austro-Hungarian *démarche* I asked Count Pourtalès to indicate to me some way out of the situation created by the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. The Ambassador replied that this depended on Serbia alone, since the matter in question must be settled between Austria and Serbia only, and did not concern any one else. In reply I told Count Pourtalès that he was under a misapprehension, and that he would see before long that this was not a question merely between Serbia and Austria, but a European question.

No. 37.

His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia.[1]

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July* 11/24, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Government yesterday evening presented to the Serbian Government a note respecting the outrage at Serajevo. Serbia, aware of her international obligations, has declared, ever since the horrible crime was committed, that she condemned it, and that she was ready to open an enquiry in Serbia if the complicity of certain of her subjects were proved at the trial instituted

[1] This note was not printed in *Miscellaneous, No.* 10 (1915), which merely refers to No. 6 of *Russian Orange Book,* where it is printed. The translation as here reproduced is taken from that source.

by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note are, however, unnecessarily humiliating for Serbia, and incompatible with her dignity as an independent State. For instance, we are peremptorily called upon to insert a declaration by the Government in the "Official Journal," and for an order from the Sovereign to the army, in which we are to check the spirit of hostility towards Austria and to blame ourselves for criminal weakness as regards our treacherous intrigues. We are further required to admit Austro-Hungarian officials into Serbia to take part with our officials at the trial and to superintend the carrying out of the other conditions laid down in the note. We are required to accept these demands in their entirety within forty-eight hours, failing which the Austro-Hungarian Legation will leave Belgrade. We are prepared to accept those of the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are compatible with the position of an independent State, as well as those to which your Majesty may advise us to agree, and all those persons whose complicity in the crime may be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of the demands could not be carried out without changes in our legislation, which would need time. We have been allowed too short a time-limit. We may be attacked at the expiration of the time-limit by the Austro-Hungarian army which is concentrating upon our frontier. We are unable to defend ourselves and we beg your Majesty to come to our aid as soon as possible. The much appreciated good-will which your Majesty has so often shown towards us inspires us with the firm belief that once again our appeal to your noble Slav heart will not pass unheeded.

At this critical moment I echo the feelings of the Serbian people in praying your Majesty to be pleased to interest yourself in the fate of the Kingdom of Serbia.

No. 38.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July* 12/25, 1914.

A brief summary of the reply of the Royal Government was communicated to the representatives of the allied Governments at

the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-day. They were informed that the reply would be quite conciliatory on all points, and that the Serbian Government would accept the Austro-Hungarian demands as far as possible. The Serbian Government trust that the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless they are determined to make war at all costs, will see their way to accept the full satisfaction offered in the Serbian reply.

No. 39.

Reply of Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian Note.—Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.[1]

"The Royal Serbian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia.

"Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina * and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Serbian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connexion the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government

[1] This note was not printed in *Miscellaneous, No.* 10 (1915), which merely refers to No. 39 of *British Correspondence*, where it is printed. The translation here reproduced is taken from that source.

* The Serbian Parliament.

cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which as a general rule escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

"For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Serbian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the 'Journal Officiel,' on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:—

"The Royal Government of Serbia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Serbian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Serbian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 18th (31st) March, 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such

acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake:—

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Serbian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Serbia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the

collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th (28th) June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankositch. As regards Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th (28th) June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo, for the purposes of the latter enquiry.

8. The Serbian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznica line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Serbia or abroad, in interviews after the crime, and which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

"If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Serbian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909."

No. 40.

Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Belgrade, July* 12/25, 1914, 6 *p.m.*

As the time-limit stipulated in the note, which, by order of my Government, I handed to His Excellency M. Patchou, on Thursday, the day before yesterday, at 6 P.M., has now expired, and as I have received no satisfactory reply, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I am leaving Belgrade to-night together with the staff of the Imperial and Royal Legation.

The protection of the Imperial and Royal Legation, together with all its appurtenances, annexes, and archives, as well as the care of the subjects and interests of Austria-Hungary in Serbia, is entrusted to the Imperial German Legation.

Finally, I desire to state formally that from the moment this letter reaches Your Excellency the rupture in the diplomatic relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary will have the character of a *fait accompli*.

I have, &c.

No. 41.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.

I communicated the reply to the Austro-Hungarian note to-day at 5.45 P.M. You will receive the full text of the reply to-night. From it you will see that we have gone as far as was possible. When I handed the note to the Austro-Hungarian Minister he stated that he would have to compare it with his instructions, and that he would then give an immediate answer. As soon as I returned to the Ministry, I was informed in a note from the Austro-Hungarian Minister that he was not satisfied with our reply, and that he was leaving Belgrade the same evening, with the entire staff of the Legation. The protection of the Legation and its archives, and the care of Austrian and Hungarian interests had been entrusted by him to the German Legation. He stated finally that on receipt of the note diplomatic relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary must be considered as definitely broken off.

The Royal Serbian Government have summoned the Skuptchina to meet on July 14/27 at Nish, whither all the Ministries with their staffs are proceeding this evening. The Crown Prince has issued in the name of the King, an order for the mobilisation of the army, while to-morrow or the day after a proclamation will be made in which it will be announced that civilians who are not liable to military service should remain peaceably at home, while soldiers should proceed to their appointed posts and defend the country to the best of their ability, in the event of Serbia being attacked.

No. 42.

Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna.

SIR, *Vienna, July* 12/25, 1914.

As no satisfactory reply has been given to the note which the Imperial and Royal Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

handed to the Royal Government on the 10/23 instant, I have been compelled to instruct Baron Giesl to leave the Serbian capital and to entrust the protection of the subjects of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty to the German Legation.

I regret that the relations which I have had the honour to maintain with you, M. le Ministre, are thus terminated, and I avail myself of this opportunity to place at your disposal the enclosed passports for your return to Serbia, as well as for the return of the staff of the Royal Legation.

I have, &c.

No. 43.

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Serbia.[1]

(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, July* 14/27, 1914.

When your Royal Highness applied to me at a time of especial stress, you were not mistaken in the sentiments which I entertain for you, or in my cordial sympathy with the Serbian people.

The existing situation is engaging my most serious attention, and my Government are using their utmost endeavour to smooth away the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your Highness and the Royal Serbian Government wish to render that task easy by neglecting no step which might lead to a settlement, and thus both prevent the horrors of a new war and safeguard the dignity of Serbia.

So long as the slightest hope exists of avoiding bloodshed, all our efforts must be directed to that end; but if in spite of our earnest wish we are not successful, your Highness may rest assured that Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the fate of Serbia.

[1] This note was not printed in *Miscellaneous, No.* 10 (1915), which merely refers to No. 40 of *Russian Orange Book*, where it is printed. The translation here reproduced is taken from that source.

No. 44.

His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia.[1]

(Telegraphic.) *Nish, July* 17/30, 1914.

Deeply touched by the telegram which your Majesty was pleased to address to me yesterday, I hasten to thank you will all my heart. Your Majesty may rest assured that the cordial sympathy which your Majesty feels towards my country is especially valued by us, and fills our hearts with the belief that the future of Serbia is secure now that it is the object of your Majesty's gracious solicitude. These painful moments cannot but strengthen the bonds of deep attachment which bind Serbia to Holy Slav Russia, and the sentiments of everlasting gratitude which we feel for the help and protection afforded to us by your Majesty will ever be cherished in the hearts of all the Serbs.

No. 45.

Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. N. Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July* 15/28, 1914.

The Royal Serbian Government not having answered in a satisfactory manner the note of July 10/23, 1914, presented by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in state of war with Serbia.

[1] This note was not printed in *Miscellaneous, No.* 10 (1915), which merely refers to No. 56 of the *Russian Orange Book*, where it is printed. The translation here reproduced is taken from that source.

No. 46.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) *Nish, July* 15/28, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on Serbia at noon to-day by an open telegram to the Serbian Government.

No. 47.

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Your Excellency, *Petrograd, July* 15/28, 1914.

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have received from M. Pashitch the following urgent telegram despatched from Nish at 2.10 P.M.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on Serbia to-day at noon by an open telegram to the Serbian Government."

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of this regrettable act, which a Great Power had the courage to commit against a small Slav country which only recently emerged from a long series of heroic but exhausting battles, and I beg leave on this occasion of deep gravity for my country, to express the hope that this act, which disturbs the peace of Europe and revolts her conscience, will be condemned by the whole civilised world and severely punished by Russia, the protector of Serbia.

I beg Your Excellency to be so kind as to lay this petition from the whole Serbian nation before the throne of His Majesty.

I take this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my loyalty and respect.

I have, &c.

No. 48.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd.

SIR, *Petrograd, July* 17/30, 1914.

I had the honour to receive your note of July 15/28, No. 527, in which you communicated to me the contents of the telegram received by you from His Excellency, M. Pashitch, in regard to the declaration of war on Serbia by Austria-Hungary. I sincerely regret this sad event, and will not fail to lay before His Majesty the petition by the Serbian nation, whose interpreter you are.

I have, &c.

No. 49.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Nish, July* 22/*August* 4, 1914.

Please inform the Imperial Government that you have received instructions to leave Germany, together with the staffs of the Legation and Consulate. You should leave immediately.

No. 50.

The Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the German Legation at Nish.

Nish, July 24/*August* 6, 1914.

The Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform the Imperial Legation that, in view of the state of war which now exists between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, and of that between Russia and Germany, the ally of Austria-Hungary, the Royal Serbian Government, in view of the solidarity of her interests with Russia and her allies, considers the mission of Baron Gieslingen, the Imperial German Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraor-

dinary, to be at an end. The Royal Serbian Government requests His Excellency to leave Serbian territory with the staff of the Legation. The necessary passports are enclosed herewith.

No. 51.

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 24/August 6, 1914.

On the occasion of my visit to the Under-Secretary of State, M. Zimmermann, for the purpose of breaking off diplomatic relations, he stated, in the course of conversation, that Germany had always cherished friendly feelings towards Serbia, and that he regretted that owing to the political *groupement* our relations had to be broken off. He blames Russia only, as the instigator of Serbia, for the developments which have occurred, and which will have grave consequences for all nations. If Russia, at the last moment—just when it appeared possible that an armed conflict might be avoided—had not ordered the mobilisation of her whole forces, there would have been no war, for Germany had used her whole influence in Austria-Hungary in order to bring about an understanding with Russia. Austria-Hungary would have probably been satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade, when negotiations would have begun with a view to regularising the relations between Serbia and Austria.

No. 52.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SIR, *Nish, August 3/16, 1914.*

From June 17/30 the Serbian Legation at Vienna was practically surrounded by police and gendarmes, while the staff were under constant police supervision. Our movements and our communications with the outer world were, as you can imagine, rendered

extremely difficult; the attitude of the population towards the Legation and its staff was inclined to be menacing.

After the beginning of July (o.s.) even telegraphic communication with you became difficult, while matters developed with such rapidity that I was unable to report to you some of the events which preceded our armed conflict with Austria-Hungary. I accordingly do so now.

Up to the end of June (o.s.) the whole question of the Serajevo outrage appeared to be developing normally. At the commencement of July, however, a change took place as regards the question of the consequences of the Serajevo affair. There were no tangible proofs that a radical change had taken place, but it was to some extent indicated by certain vague signs and symptoms which betrayed the existence of some hidden intentions. First of all, the Vienna and Budapest press, in conformity with instructions issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ceased to publish reports of the magisterial inquiry relating to the Serajevo outrage. The press began also to represent the whole matter as a question which must be settled between Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone—eventually by war.

Moreover, statements to this effect were communicated to the leading Vienna newspapers by the German Embassy. Exceptions were: the semi-official *Fremdenblatt,* which was, in general, more moderate in the tone of its articles; *Die Zeit;* and the *Arbeiter Zeitung.*

Simultaneously with this new attitude on the part of the press, a very unsettled condition of affairs developed on the Bourse, such as it had not witnessed during the whole course of recent events in the Balkans. In private conversations also and in high financial circles the "settlement with Serbia" was declared to be the only way out of the general financial and economic crisis prevailing in Austria-Hungary ever since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under secret instructions it was ordered that gold should be gradually withdrawn from circulation, and a corresponding rise in exchange took place.

A further indication was the clumsy explanation given of the reasons which had induced the Minister for War, Krobatin, and the Chief of the General Staff, Hetzendorf, to interrupt their leave of absence and return to Vienna. The Chief of Staff constantly travelled to the south, east, and north of Austria, and at that time had had an interview with the Chief of the German General Staff, Count Moltke, in Bohemia, I believe, at Carlsbad.

All the reserves which had been called out for the June manœuvres

in Bosnia and Herzegovina were kept with the colours beyond the stipulated period.

The number of soldiers belonging to the permanent establishment in Austria-Hungary allowed to go home on short leave of absence in order to gather in the harvest, and to attend to other private affairs, was much larger than is usually the case; at the same time those whose duties were of a military-administrative nature were called upon in ever increasing numbers.

Another indication was the non-committal nature of the answers given to several interpellations in the Hungarian Diet by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, a statesman who is very clear as a rule in his political statements.

The attitude of the Ballplatz was especially characteristic. None of the usual weekly receptions by Count Berchtold was held. They suddenly ceased at the Ballplatz to discuss the Serajevo outrage with the representatives of foreign countries; or, if discussion did arise, it seemed as if instructions had been issued on the subject; that is to say, it was mentioned to every one in such a manner as to dispel all apprehensions and suspicion that Austria-Hungary was preparing some serious step against Serbia. They acknowledged that some step would be undertaken at Belgrade as soon as the results of the magisterial enquiry should have sufficiently established the connexion between Belgrade and the Serajevo outrage. But, at the same time, it was said that this step would not be such as to give rise to any uneasiness. The Russian Ambassador, who spoke several times on the subject with Count Forgach, in the absence of Count Berchtold, was unable to discover the true nature of Austria's intentions. M. Schebeko told me that Count Szapary, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Petrograd, who, for family reasons, was at that time stopping in Vienna, had said to him that the step to be taken at Belgrade would be of conciliatory character. According to M. Schebeko, Count Szapary had also assured M. Sazonof that the intended Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia would not be such as to cause Russia any dissatisfaction. The French Ambassador, M. Dumaine, who, under instructions from his Government, had drawn the attention of the Ballplatz to the complications which might arise should the eventual demands which it was intended to make of Serbia not be of a moderate nature, was told by the principal Under-Secretary, Baron Macchio, that the Austro-Hungarian Government, appreciating the friendly and conciliatory action of the French Government, would only put forward such demands, embodied in a note to

the Serbian Government, as Serbia would be able to accept without difficulty. I drew the attention of the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente to the fact that such an assurance might well conceal the true nature of the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and that the Powers of the Triple Entente might then be confronted by certain *faits accomplis* which Europe would be compelled to accept in order to avoid a general European war.

The line followed by the Ballplatz was, moreover, comparatively successful, as all those of my colleagues whom I saw during that period were more or less dissuaded from believing that Austria-Hungary contemplated any serious step which could provoke European complications. Many of the members of the diplomatic body were so firmly convinced of this that they were preparing at that time to quit Vienna on long leave of absence at various watering places.

Nevertheless, it was known that a note was being drawn up at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which would contain the accusations against Serbia, and also the demands of Austria-Hungary. This task was entrusted to Count Forgach, formerly Austro-Hungarian Minister in Serbia. At the same time it was universally believed that of the foreign representatives, the German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, was the only one who was kept informed of the note even in its minutest details, while I had reason to believe that he was also coöperating in drafting it. In view of the above, the representatives of the friendly Powers agreed with me in thinking that the note would impose very difficult terms on Serbia, but that there would be no inacceptable demands. When the contents of the note were published all of them were surprised, not to say dumbfounded.

In the same way as the contents of the note were kept secret, a similar amount of secrecy was observed in regard to the date of its presentation. On the very day that the note was presented at Belgrade, the French Ambassador had a prolonged conversation with the Principal Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs—Count Berchtold was again absent at Ischl—on the subject of the note. Yet Baron Macchio did not tell M. Dumaine that the note would be presented at Belgrade that afternoon, and published in the newspapers on the following day.

On the publication in the Vienna papers on the morning of July 11 (24) of the contents of the note, which Baron Giesl had presented to the Serbian Government, a feeling of dejection came over the friends both of Serbia and of the peace of Europe. It was only

then realised that serious European complications might ensue, though it was not believed that it was the intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to provoke them. This feeling of depression was increased by the tone of the articles in the Viennese newspapers, with the exception of *Die Zeit* and *Arbeiter Zeitung* and by demonstrations in the streets, which clearly showed that war would be a most welcome solution—a war with Serbia, of course.

On that day, after having two or three conversations, I realised that an armed conflict between Serbia and the Dual Monarchy was inevitable, even should Serbia accept all the demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian Note, from the first to the last. The attitude of the people in the streets towards our Legation was such that I expected even personal attacks upon the members of the staff.

The French Ambassador, the British Ambassador, and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires held the view that the step taken by Austria-Hungary should be considered not as a note but as an ultimatum. They disapproved of the form, the contents, and the time-limit of the note; they also declared it to be inacceptable.

In the course of conversation with them on the subject of the note I pointed out that those passages in it which dealt with the order by the King to the army, with the dismissal of officers and Government officials, and especially that which referred to the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian officials in the "Suppression of the subversive movement in Serbia against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy," would be inacceptable as not being compatible with the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia. Only a victorious war, I said, could enforce the acceptance of conditions which were so humiliating to an independent State. In reply to their enquiry whether it would not perhaps be better to accept the conditions and avoid war for the present, I said that the Austro-Hungarian Note, which amounted in fact to a declaration of war upon Serbia, was worded in such a way that, even if Serbia should accept all the conditions without reserve, Austria-Hungary would still find an excuse for her army to march into Serbia at any time. It was in the belief that the conflict would be limited to Serbia and Austria-Hungary that Austria-Hungary had drafted such a note.

To M. Dumaine, Sir M. de Bunsen, and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, the unexpected character of the note was the cause not only of surprise but also of alarm, in view of the complications which they feared might ensue. The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, previously to the presentation of the note, had stated on several occa-

sions to his colleagues that Russia could not remain indifferent to any step taken by Austria-Hungary which might have as an object the humiliation of Serbia. He also expressed the same view at the Ballplatz. Hence the apprehension felt by the three Ambassadors, who at once foresaw the possibility of war between Russia and Austria-Hungary.

The day after the note was presented, Prince Koudacheff went to see Count Berchtold to discuss the matter. In reply to his statement, that the note as it stood was inacceptable, and that Russia could not watch with indifference the humiliation of Serbia, Count Berchtold said that Austria-Hungary had been obliged to take this step as her very existence was threatened; that she could not withdraw nor alter the demands made in the note, and that he considered that the matter in dispute concerned Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone and that no other Power had any grounds for interference.

Count Berchtold's reply did not allow of any further doubts as to the intention of Austria-Hungary to chastise Serbia by force of arms without the consent of the European concert. From conversations which I had at that time with the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente—who during the whole of that difficult period showed every kindness and attention to me and to the staff of the Legation—it seemed quite clear that Austria-Hungary had been assured, and felt convinced, that the Serbo-Austro-Hungarian conflict would be localised, as she would otherwise not have decided upon a note which undoubtedly meant war. It was also clear that Austria-Hungary was confirmed in this impression especially—and perhaps solely—by Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador in Vienna. Herr von Tschirschky was the only one who thought, and even stated publicly, that Russia would remain quiet while Austria-Hungary carried out her punitive expedition against Serbia. He declared that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would easily control the Pan-Slavists, in the same way as he had done last year, and that Russia was not disposed at the moment to begin a discussion of the many vexed questions in Europe and Asia which were her main concern. It was necessary, according to Herr von Tschirschky, to give Serbia a lesson. Russia had no right to interfere. As far as Germany, he said, was concerned, she was in the fullest sense of the word conscious of what she was doing in giving Austria-Hungary her support in the matter.

These statements of Herr von Tschirschky have induced many to hold the opinion that Germany desired to provoke a European war,

on the ground that it was better to have war with Russia before the latter had completed her military reorganisation, *i.e.*, before the spring of 1917. This point of view had formerly been freely discussed and even written about in Vienna. "The longer the matter is postponed, the smaller will become the chances of success of the Triple Alliance." On the other hand, rumours from the most authoritative diplomatic sources in Berlin reached me in Vienna, to the effect that the Wilhelmstrasse did not approve of Austria's policy on this question, and that Herr von Tschirschky has exceeded the instructions given to him.

The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, on his return from Petrograd, did his utmost at the Ballplatz to obtain an extension of the brief time-limit given to the Serbian Government for a reply to the Austro-Hungarian Note, and to discover some way which might lead to an exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd in regard to the whole question, but until July 13 (26), when we met, his efforts had proved unavailing. From the conversations I then had with him, I gathered that the Austro-Hungarian Note, in its contents and in its form, was regarded as a challenge to Russia and not to Serbia, and that Russia would not permit the humiliation of Serbia, even if war were to be the price.

On the day of my departure from Vienna, M. Schebeko told me that, in spite of the many great difficulties to be overcome, there was a prospect of arriving at a solution by which an armed conflict might be avoided by means of discussion between the Russian Government and Count Szapary. A feeling of depression, however, prevailed in Vienna as soon as reports began to be spread that the Austro-Serbian conflict would bring about a war between Russia and the Dual Monarchy.

APPENDIX

Speech of Signor Giolitti before the Italian Chamber of Deputies on the 5th December, 1914.[1]

[Extract]

Therefore, inasmuch as I hold it necessary that Italy's loyal observance of international treaties shall be considered as being above any possibility of dispute—(*Hear, hear*)—I feel it my duty to recall a precedent, which proves that the interpretation placed by the Government on the Treaty of the Triple Alliance is the correct interpretation, and was admitted as correct in identical circumstances by the Allied Powers.

During the Balkan War, on the 9th August, 1913, about a year before the present war broke out, during my absence from Rome, I received from my hon. colleague, Signor di San Giuliano, the following telegram:—

"Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the *casus foederis* of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to be inapplicable. (*Sensation.*)

"I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that, therefore, we do not consider that the *casus foederis* arises.

"Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve."

I replied:—

"If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a *casus foederis* cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch as no

[1] It would appear that, in like manner, Austria approached Roumania in May, 1913. Mr. Take Jonesco has formally stated that he had traced this fact in a telegram sent by Count Berchtold to Prince Fürstenberg and that the telegram had been communicated by the latter to the Roumanian Government. Semi-official denials on the part of Austria as a result of this revelation do not permit us to include the telegram, as an official text, in this collection.

NOTE.—As this footnote, which appears in the original *Serbian Blue Book*, is not contained in the translation issued by the British Government, a translation, for which the editor is responsible, has been made and inserted.

one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure." (*Hear, hear.*)

This course was taken, and our interpretation was upheld and recognised as proper, since our action in no way disturbed our relations with the two Allied Powers. The declaration of neutrality made by the present Government conforms therefore in all respects to the precedents of Italian policy, and conforms also to an interpretation of the Treaty of Alliance which has been already accepted by the Allies.

I wish to recall this, because I think it right that in the eyes of all Europe it should appear that Italy has remained completely loyal to the observance of her pledges.

INDEX

INDEX

[Numbers in italics are document numbers, the other numbers page numbers. The letters appearing before document numbers indicate the government issuing the document, as follows: *A*—Austria-Hungary; *B*—Belgium; *E*—England (Great Britain); *F*—France; *G*—Germany; *I*—Italy; *R*—Russia; and *S*—Serbia. In cases where a second series of documents has been issued by any government, the figure 2 in small type precedes the letter indicating the government issuing it. In some instances, where the system of numbering or sub-numbering the documents does not follow the usual rule, the document number is omitted and the page reference only given. *Intro.* means Introduction and *Mem.* Memorandum.]

ADRIATIC SEA. Mines in the. *²A60*, 181.

AFGHANISTAN. Reported seditious activities of Turkey in. *²E59*, 1085; *²E100*, 1113; *²E129*, 1139.

AFRICAN COLONIES. Neutralisation of. *B57*, 399; *B58*, 400; *B59*, 401; *B61*, 402; *B62*, 402; *B63*, 404; *B74*, 410; *B75*, 410; *B76*, 411; *²B2*, 420; *²B39*, 458; *²B54*, 480; *²B58*, 483; *²B66*, 490; *²B67*, 491.

ALBANIA.

- Attitude of Greece toward. *²A55*, 178; *²A56*, 179; *²A66*, 184; *²A67*, 185; *²A69*, 186.
- Attitude of Italy toward. *²A29*, 160; *²A54*, 178; *²A59*, 180; *²A62*, 182; *²A64*, 183; *²A66*, 184; *²A67*, 185; *²A69*, 186; *²A72*, 188; *²A90*, 203.
- Austrian suggestion of, as compensation to Italy. *²A90*, 203; *²A134*, 255; *²A147*, 273; *²A150*, 276; *²A153*, 279; *²A155*, 281; *²A158*, 282; *²A166*, 291; *²A171*, 297; *²A172*, 300; *I10*, 1221; *I11*, 1224; *I12*, 1226; *I71*, 1305; *I75*, 1312.
- Intervention is urged upon Italy by Great Britain. *²A68*, 185.
- Italian military occupation of. *²A50*, 175; *²A51*, 176; *²A52*, 177; *²A53*, 177; *²A54*, 178; *²A55*, 178; *²A56*, 179; *²A57*, 179; *²A59*, 180; *²A61*, 181; *²A62*, 182; *²A64*, 183; *²A69*, 186; *²A70*, 187; *²A71*, 187; *²A72*, 188; *²A73*, 188; *²A80*, 197; *²A81*, 198; *²A82*, 198; *²A83*, 199; *²A84*, 200; *²A85*, 200; *²A86*, 200; *²A87*, 201; *²A88*, 201; *²A89*, 202; *²A95*, 208.
- Italy assumes administrative control of. *²A93*, 206; *²A100*, 215; *²A101*, 216; *²A126*, 247.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

- Assassination of the Archduke. *A. Intro.*, 3; *A1*, 8; *A19*, 29; *F7*, 556; *F75*, 624; *G. Mem.*, 771.
- ———. Approval in Serbia. *A3*, 9; *A5*, 11; *A6*, 12; *A19*, 29.
- ———. Non-action of Serbia. *A2*, 9; *A9*, 21; *F19*, 565.
- ———. Resentment toward Serbia in Austria. *A4*, 10; *²B3*, 422; *F8*, 557; *F11*, 558; *S2*, 1441; *S9*, 1445; *S11*, 1446; *S14*, 1449; *S17*, 1451.
- ———. Results of Serajevo investigations. *A7*, 14; *A19*, 29; *E4*, 866; *G. Mem.*, 771.
- Delays alleged in transmitting French and Russian diplomatic despatches. *R36*, 1355.
- Economic and political situation, July 1914. *F13*, 560; *F14*, 561.
- Mediation proposals, attitude toward. *See* MEDIATION PROPOSALS.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.—*Continued.*

Military preparations and mobilisation. ²*B17*, 440; ²*B19*, 442; ²*B20*, 443; *E127*, 986; *F11*, 558; *F18*, 564; *F90*, 649; *F115*, 672; *R24*, 1349; *R30*, 1352; *R44*, 1360; *R47*, 1361. *See, also,* MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND MOBILISATIONS, Austria-Russia and Germany-Russia.

Moderation of, suggestions and attempts.

France. *F17*, 563; *F22*, 568; *F23*, 569; *F28*, 579; *F33*, 586; *F34*, 586; *F70*, 619; *F95*, 653; *R28*, 1351.

Germany. *E34*, 902; *E71*, 936; *E108*, 972; *E121*, 982; *E138*, 993; *F19*, 565; *F37*, 589; *F56*, 607; *F70*, 619; *F72*, 621; *F77*, 639; *F78*, 640; *F92*, 650; *F94*, 653; *F102*, 659; *F109*, 666; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G21*, 808; *G22*, 808; *R28*, 1351; *R43*, 1359.

Great Britain. *E1*, 863; *E5*, 879; *E46*, 916; *E58*, 930; *E72*, 937; *E77*, 941; *E81*, 945; *E111*, 974; *F19*, 565; *F80*, 641; *G14*, 805; *R42*, 1359.

Italy. ²*A3*, 131; *E19*, 807; *E63*, 932; *F27*, 579; *F72*, 621; *F96*, 654.

Russia. ²*B17*, 440; *E54*, 926; *F55*, 606; *G22*, 809; *G22*, 811; *R23*, 1349; *R43*, 1359.

Political situation. *I74*, 1311; *S23*, 1455; *S24*, 1456; *S25*, 1457; *S52*, 1482.

Salonica Railway, reported designs on. *E19*, 893; *E82*, 945.

Summary of events. *A. Intro.*, 3.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY–SERBIA.

Alleged intention of Austria to war on Serbia in 1913. *S.*, 1489.

Anti-Austrian and Pan-Serbian propaganda. *A. Intro.*, 3; *A6*, 12; *A8*, 18; *A19*, 29; *E4*, 866; *E9*, 883; *E95*, 959; *F28*, 579; *F75*, 624; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G*, 794; *G1*, 798; *S16*, 1449; *S26*, 1458; *S30*, 1459.

———. Approval of demands in press and public in Austria and Germany. ²*B5*, 425; ²*B6*, 426; *E20*, 893; *F12*, 559; *F27*, 579; *F29*, 582; *F30*, 582; *F47*, 596; *R7*, 1338; *R46*, 1361; *S24*, 1456; *S25*, 1457; *S26*, 1458.

———. Foreknowledge of Germany of demands. ²*B4*, 424; ²*B8*, 428; *E6*, 880; *E18*, 891; *E25*, 896; *E95*, 959; *F15*, 369; *F21*, 373; *F30*, 379; *F35*, 381; *F36*, 382; *F41*, 387; *F57*, 399; *F62*, 402; *R18*, 1347; *R19*, 1347; *R20*, 1348.

———. Foreknowledge of Italy of demands. *E38*, 903; *F26*, 578; *F35*, 587; *F51*, 604; *F56*, 607; *F72*, 621.

Austrian assurances concerning Serbian territory and sovereignty. *A. Intro.*, 3; *A18*, 28; *A26*, 81; *A27*, 83; *A31*, 86; *A32*, 87; *A47*, 108; *E18*, 891; *E33*, 901; *E44*, 915; *E48*, 918; *E55*, 927; *E56*, 928; *E57*, 929; *E59*, 930; *E62*, 931; *E75*, 939; *E79*, 943; *E84*, 946; *E91*, 953; *E97*, 960; *E99*, 962; *E120*, 981; *E137*, 992; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G3*, 801; *G5*, 802; *R75*, 1376.

———. German support of Austrian assurances. *E33*, 901; *E75*, 939; *E84*, 946; *E97*, 960; *E100*, 963; *F56*, 607; *F57*, 609; *F94*, 653; *F103*, 660; *G10*, 804; *G11*, 804; *G16*, 806; *G22*, 809; *R28*, 1351; *R35*, 1355.

———. Russia's attitude toward Austrian assurances. *A55*, 114; *E72*, 937; *E79*, 943; *E141*, 996; *F10*, 558; *F85*, 646; *R75*, 1376.

Austrian demands on Serbia. *A7*, 14; ²*A5*, 133; ²*A8*, 141; *E4*, 866; *F24*, 570; *G. Mem.*, 781; *R1*, 1331; *R2*, 1331; *S32*, 1464; *S33*, 1469.

———. Explanation and justification of demands. *A. Intro.*, 3; *A6*, 12; *A8*, 18; *A9*, 21; *A11*, 23; *A14*, 24; *A18*, 28; *A19*, 29; ²*A1*, 127; ²*A5*, 133; ²*A8*, 141; *B1*, 349; *E3*, 864; *E5*, 879; *E44*, 915; *F25*, 576; *F75*, 624; *R3*, 1335; *R18*, 1347.

———. Note not an ultimatum and Austria's course upon non-acceptance. *A17*, 27; *E7*, 882; *E14*, 889; *E19*, 893; *E20*, 893; *E25*, 896; *F36*, 588; *R16*, 1346.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY–SERBIA.—*Continued.*

Declaration of Serbia in 1909 concerning relations with Austria. *A. Intro.*, 3; *A7*, 14; *A16*, 26; *E17*, 890.

Localisation of dispute.

Austrian efforts. *A9*, 21; *A10*, 22; *A11*, 23; *A14*, 24; *A21*, 75; *A26*, 81; *A32*, 87; *A44*, 106; *A47*, 108; *A48*, 110; *E5*, 879; *E48*, 918; *E118*, 979.

British attitude. *A41*, 103; *E5*, 879; *E24*, 895; *E25*, 896; *E48*, 918; *E87*, 948; *E91*, 953; *E116*, 977; *F19*, 565; *F36*, 588; *F66*, 617; *R20*, 1348.

German efforts. *A12*, 24; *A13*, 24; *A16*, 26; *A45*, 107; *2B10*, 432; *E2*, 864; *E9*, 883; *E46*, 916; *E81*, 945; *F28*, 579; *F30*, 582; *F37*, 589; *F56*, 607; *F57*, 609; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G1*, 798; *G15*, 806; *G30*, 815; *R8*, 1338; *R18*, 1347.

Russia declines to localise dispute. *A15*, 26; *A16*, 26; *2B7*, 428; *E6*, 880; *E7*, 882; *E56*, 928; *E94*, 958; *E95*, 959; *F18*, 564; *F52*, 605; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G4*, 802; *R10*, 1339.

Mediation between. *See* MEDIATION PROPOSALS.

Opening of hostilities. *A40*, 101; *A41*, 103; *2B17*, 440; *2B19*, 442; *E56*, 928; *E65*, 934; *F113*, 670.

Press, attitude of, in two countries. *S1*, 1441; *S8*, 1444; *S12*, 1447; *S15*, 1449; *S16*, 1449; *S20*, 1452; *S21*, 1453; *S22*, 1454; *S29*, 1459; *S30*, 1459.

Satisfaction of Austrian demands without impairing territory or sovereignty of Serbia. *A4*, 10; *A10*, 22; *A11*, 23; *A13*, 24; *E17*, 890; *E30*, 899; *E55*, 927; *E95*, 959; *E97*, 960; *E99*, 962; *E111*, 974; *E120*, 981; *F15*, 562; *F18*, 564; *F19*, 565; *F28*, 579; *F96*, 654; *F103*, 660; *F112*, 669; *R60*, 1369; *R67*, 1373.

Serbia condemns assassination, denies complicity, will suppress anarchistic activities, and hopes for continuance of good relations. *S5*, 1442; *S6*, 1443; *S8*, 1444; *S12*, 1447; *S30*, 1459.

Serbian reply to Austria. *A25*, 77; *A34*, 88; *B4*, 358; *E21*, 893; *E39*, 904; *F46*, 595; *F49*, 597; *G. Mem.*, 771; *R13*, 1340; *S38*, 1471; *S39*, 1472.

———. Austrian comments. *A34*, 88; *F75*, 624.

———. Powers consider reply moderate. *B6*, 363; *E22*, 894; *E46*, 916; *E48*, 918; *R27*, 1351; *R33*, 1354; *R42*, 1359.

———. Reply urged as basis for discussion. *A38*, 99; *A41*, 103; *A43*, 105; *A44*, 106; *E27*, 898; *E34*, 902; *E46*, 916; *E58*, 930; *E63*, 932; *E76*, 940; *E86*, 948; *F92*, 650; *R55*, 1367.

———. ———. Austrian attitude toward suggestion. *A29*, 85; *A39*, 101; *A44*, 106; *E61*, 931; *E62*, 931; *E75*, 939; *F83*, 644; *G. Mem.*, 771.

———. ———. German attitude toward suggestion. *E34*, 902; *F83*, 644; *F92*, 650; *G. Mem.*, 771.

———. Reply unsatisfactory to Austria. *A34*, 88; *A37*, 99; *B5*, 362; *2B9*, 431; *E31*, 900; *E48*, 918; *R21*, 1348; *R37*, 1356; *S41*, 1477; *S42*, 1477.

Severance of diplomatic relations. *A30*, 85; *B53*, 393; *E23*, 895; *E31*, 900; *F18*, 564; *F48*, 597; *F77*, 639; *R21*, 1348; *S40*, 1476; *S41*, 1477; *S42*, 1477.

Severe measures against Serbia threatened. *A6*, 12; *A8*, 18; *A9*, 21; *A30*, 85; *2A4*, 133; *2A10*, 142; *E61*, 931; *E62*, 931; *E79*, 943; *F18*, 564; *F75*, 624; *F77*, 639; *S23*, 1455; *S24*, 1456; *S25*, 1457; *S31*, 1463.

Time-limit upon Serbian reply. Russian request for extension of. *A20*, 75; *A21*, 75; *E13*, 887; *E40*, 912; *F38*, 590; *F42*, 593; *F43*, 593; *F45*, 595; *R4*, 1335; *R5*, 1336; *R11*, 1340.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY–SERBIA.—*Continued.*

———. Austrian attitude. *A. Intro.*, 3; *A9*, 21; *A20*, 75; *A21*, 75; *E7*, 882; *R12*, 1340.

———. British attitude. *A10*, 22; *E3*, 864; *E5*, 879; *E6*, 880; *E7*, 882; *E11*, 885; *E26*, 897; *F40*, 591; *F41*, 592; *R16*, 1346.

———. French attitude. *F25*, 576; *F31*, 584; *F48*, 597; *F75*, 624; *F139*, 689; *R15*, 1345.

———. German attitude. *E11*, 885; *E18*, 891; *F41*, 592; *R14*, 1345.

———. Italian attitude. *F44*, 594.

War declared by Austria. *A24*, 77; *A37*, 99; *B7*, 363; *E50*, 920; *E66*, 934; *E73*, 938; *F83*, 644; *S45*, 1479; *S46*, 1480.

BALKAN interests and policies of Austria and Italy. 2*A2*, 128; 2*A16*, 149; 2*A17*, 151; 2*A30*, 160; 2*A99*, 214; *I12*, 1226.

Correspondence in 1909 and 1911 regarding. 2*A*, 336-345.

———. Interests and policies of Austria and Russia. *A. Intro.*, 3; *A26*, 81; *A31*, 86; *A47*, 108; *A49*, 110; *A50*, 111; *A55*, 114; *E17*, 890; *E44*, 915; *E90*, 951; *E91*, 953; *E97*, 960; *E139*, 994; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G3*, 801.

BALUCHISTAN. Alleged seditious activities of Turkey in. 2*E100*, 1113.

BELGIUM.

Alleged ill-treatment of Austrians in Belgium. 2*B32*, 454; 2*B33*, 455; 2*B35*, 456; 2*B40*, 458; 2*B42*, 461; 2*B50*, 470; 2*B55*, 481.

Appeal to guarantors to defend neutrality. *B40*, 386; 2*B27*, 450; 2*B28*, 451; *F145*, 692; *F152*, 696.

Appeal to guarantors withheld until hostile act committed. *B24*, 375; *B38*, 384; *E151*, 1001; *F142*, 691.

Apprehensive over German attitude. *B19*, 893; *F87*, 648.

Declaration to Powers that it has observed neutrality and will defend it. *B2*, 864; *B3*, 864; *B16*, 889; *B17*, 890; 2*B22*, 445; 2*B23*, 446.

Defensive measures. *B2*, 356; *B3*, 357; *B8*, 364; *B10*, 365; *B11*, 365; *B16*, 369; *B17*, 370; *B42*, 387; *B43*, 388; *B44*, 389; 2*B1*, 419; 2*B22*, 445; 2*B23*, 446; *F87*, 648.

Germany's conditions and offers to Great Britain respecting neutrality of. *B36*, 382; *E85*, 947; *E101*, 964; *E109*, 973; *E123*, 984; *E157*, 1004; *E*,1026-1027; *F144*, 692; *G*,822.

———. Effect of German attitude toward, upon British course. *B26*, 376; *B36*, 382; 2*B29*, 451; *E101*, 964; *E109*, 973; *E119*, 980; *E123*, 984; *E148*, 999; *E160*, 1006; *E*,1027; *F110*, 667; *F126*, 681; *F137*, 687; *F144*, 692; *F145*, 692; *G*,824.

Protest to all nations against violation of neutrality. *B44*, 389.

Removal of Government to France. 2*B56*, 481; 2*B57*, 483.

Résumé of events concerning violation of neutrality. *B38*, 384.

See headings following concerning violation of neutrality.

BELGIUM–AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. Declaration of war and reasons therefor. *A67*, 122; *B77*, 411; *B78*, 412; 2*B50*, 470.

Cannon sent by Austria into Belgium before declaration of war, alleged. 2*B104*, 511; 2*B105*, 512.

Military agreement with Entente Powers alleged by Austria. 2*B105*, 512; 2*B106*, 514.

Rupture of diplomatic relations. 2*B50*, 470.

BELGIUM-FRANCE.

African colonies, neutrality of. *B57*, 399; *B58*, 400; *B59*, 401; *B61*, 402; *B62*, 402; *B63*, 404; *B74*, 404; *B75*, 410; *B76*, 411; ²*B2*, 420; ²*B39*, 458; ²*B54*, 480; ²*B58*, 483; ²*B66*, 490; ²*B67*, 491.

British request to France to respect Belgian neutrality. *E114*, 976; *E115*, 977; *B11*, 365; *B13*, 368; *F123*, 678; *R72*, 1375.

Congratulations on Belgian defence. ²*B30*, 453; ²*B31*, 454.

Congratulations on French defence. ²*B44*, 467; ²*B47*, 469.

France agrees to respect Belgian neutrality. *B9*, 364; *B13*, 368; *B15*, 369; *E125*, 985; *F119*, 674; *F122*, 678; *R72*, 1375.

France offers aid to Belgium. *B24*, 375; *B52*, 393; *E151*, 1001; *F142*, 691.

France protests to Germany against the violation of Belgian neutrality. *F149*, 695.

French army arrives in Belgium. ²*B30*, 453.

German allegation of contemplated invasion of Belgium by France. *B20*, 371; *B22*, 373; *B35*, 381; *B36*, 382; ²*B119*, 527; *E126*, 986; *E153*, 1002; *E157*, 1004; *F149*, 695; *G*,837.

German allegation that French troops entered Belgium and committed hostile acts before the war. *B21*, 373; ²*B116*, 517; ²*B117*, 519; ²*B118*, 520; *E160*, 1006; *F147*, 693; *F155*, 697.

Removal of Belgian Government to France. ²*B56*, 481; ²*B57*, 483.

BELGIUM-GERMANY.

African colonies, neutralisation of. ²*B2*, 420; ²*B39*, 458; ²*B54*, 480; ²*B58*, 483; ²*B66*, 490; ²*B67*, 491.

Belgium apprehensive over German attitude. *B19*, 371; *F87*, 648.

Belgium urges Germany to respect neutrality. *B19*, 371.

British request for German respect for Belgian neutrality. *B11*, 365; *B13*, 368; *B14*, 368; *E114*, 976; *E115*, 977; *F123*, 678; *R72*, 1375.

———. German attitude toward British request. *B14*, 368; *E122*, 983; *F123*, 678; *R72*, 1375.

Conversation between King and Emperor regarding war with France, reported. *F6*, 554.

Embargo on grain as an act of hostility. *B79*, 413; *E122*, 983.

German allegation of contemplated French invasion of Belgium. *B20*, 371; *B22*, 373; *B35*, 381; *B36*, 382; ²*B119*, 527; *E126*, 986; *E153*, 1002; *E157*, 1007; *F149*, 695; *G*,837.

German allegation that French troops entered Belgium and committed hostile acts before the war. *B21*, 373; ²*B116*, 517; ²*B117*, 519; ²*B118*, 520; *E*,1054; *F147*, 693; *F155*, 697.

German declaration of 1913 respecting Belgian neutrality. *B12*, 366.

German troops enter Belgian territory. *B30*, 379; *B35*, 381; *B40*, 386; *E158*, 1005; *F140*, 689; *F151*, 696.

German ultimatum to Belgium. *B27*, 377; ²*B51*, 472; *E154*, 1003; *F154*, 697.

Germany asks passage for troops through Belgium. *B20*, 371; *B23*, 375; *B36*, 382; ²*B25*, 448; *E157*, 1004; *F141*, 690; *G27*, 813.

———. Belgium refuses passage. *B22*, 373; *B23*, 375.

Military agreement alleged by Germany between Belgium and Great Britain. ²*B98*, 492; ²*B99*, 495; ²*B100*, 498; ²*B101*, 500; ²*B102*, 503; ²*B103*, 507; *E*,1033; *G*,837; *G*,840; *G*,856.

Peace proposal by Germany after fall of Liége. *B60*, 401; *B64*, 404; *B70*, 408.

BELGIUM-GERMANY.—*Continued.*

———. Declined by Belgium. *B65*, 405; *B68*, 407; *B69*, 408; *B71*, 408; *B72*, 409; *B73*, 409.

Severance of diplomatic relations and declaration of war. *B31*, 379; *B32*, 380; *B33*, 380; *B34*, 381; *B45*, 390; *B46*, 390; *B47*, 390; *B51*, 393; *B67*, 407; *2B52*, 475.

Speech of German Chancellor regarding violation of neutrality. *B35*, 381.

BELGIUM-GREAT BRITAIN.

African colonies, neutrality of. *B75*, 410; *2B2*, 420; *2B39*, 458; *2B54*, 480; *2B58*, 483; *2B66*, 490; *2B67*, 491.

Belgium appeals to Great Britain for diplomatic intervention with Germany. *B25*, 376; *E153*, 1002.

———. Great Britain protests to Germany. *E153*, 1002.

Belgium urged to defend neutrality. *B11*, 365; *E115*, 977; *E128*, 987.

Congratulations on Belgian defence. *2B37*, 456; *2B38*, 457.

Congratulations on British defence. *2B45*, 468; *2B48*, 469.

Defensive alliance proposed by Great Britain. *B37*, 383.

France and Germany asked by Great Britain to respect Belgian neutrality. *B11*, 365; *B13*, 368; *B14*, 368; *E114*, 976; *E115*, 977; *F123*, 678; *R72*, 1375.

———. France agrees to respect Belgian neutrality. *B9*, 364; *B13*, 368; *B15*, 369; *E125*, 985; *F119*, 674; *F122*, 678; *R72*, 1375.

———. German attitude toward request. *B14*, 368; *E122*, 983; *F123*, 678; *R72*, 1375.

Great Britain offers aid to Belgium. *B28*, 377; *B37*, 383; *2B30*, 453; *2B34*, 455; *E155*, 1003.

Great Britain's obligations as guarantor of Belgian neutrality. *B43*, 388; *B48*, 392; *B49*, 392; *F137*, 687.

Great Britain's ultimatum to Germany. *A58*, 116; *B36*, 382; *B39*, 386; *E159*, 1009; *F153*, 697.

Military agreement alleged between. *2B98*, 492; *2B99*, 495; *2B100*, 498; *2B101*, 500; *2B102*, 503; *2B103*, 507; *2B105*, 512; *2B106*, 514; *E126*, 986; *G*,837; *G*,840; *G*,856.

War declared by Great Britain on Germany. *B41*, 387.

———. Account of rupture of diplomatic relations. *E160*, 1006.

BELGIUM-RUSSIA. Russia offers aid to defend neutrality. *B52*, 393; *2B36*, 456; Congratulations on Russian military success. *2B46*, 468; *2B49*, 469.

BULGARIA. Attitude of. *R52*, 1364.

Capitulations, abolishment of. *2E24*, 1068; *2E28*, 1071; *2E69*, 1093; *2E70*, 1093; *2E71*, 1094; *2E73*, 1095; *2E76*, 1096; *2E77*, 1097; *2E144*, 1157; *2R30*, 1397; *2R31* 1398; *2R33*, 1399; *2R34*, 1400; *2R35*, 1401; *2R41*, 1404; *2R42*, 1404; *2R43*, 1405; *2R44*, 1408; *2R48*, 1410; *2R51*, 1411; *2R54*, 1413; *2R55*, 1413; *2R56*, 1414; *2R60*, 1416; *2R61*, 1416; *2R62*, 1417; *2R63*, 1417; *2R65*, 1418; *2R74*, 1422; *2R77*, 1425; *2R78*, 1425; *2R80*, 1426; *2R81*, 1427; *2R84*, 1428.

CONGO. Neutralisation of. *B57*, 399; *B58*, 400; *B59*, 401; *B61*, 402; *B62*, 402; *B63*, 404; *B74*, 410; *B75*, 410; *B76*, 411; *2B2*, 420; *2B39*, 458; *2B54*, 480; *2B58*, 483; *2B66*, 490; *2B67*, 491.

DARDANELLES. Detention of merchant vessels in. *2E12*, 1061; *2E23*, 1067; *2E26*, 1070; *2E28*, 1071; *2E29*, 1071; *2E32*, 1073; *2E33*, 1074; *2E38*, 1075; *2E62*, 1086; *2E63*, 1087; *2E78*, 1098; *2R34*, 1400; *2R35*, 1401.

DARDANELLES.—*Continued.*

Closing of the. 2*E97*, 1111; 2*E98*, 1112; 2*E99*, 1112; 2*E102*, 1114; 2*E105*, 1116; 2*E107*, 1117; 2*E108*, 1117; 2*R67*, 1419; 2*R68*, 1420; 2*R69*, 1420; 2*R70*, 1421; 2*R71*, 1421.

Fortifications of. 2*E12*, 1061; 2*E19*, 1065; 2*E25*, 1069; 2*E27*, 1070; 2*E38*, 1075; 2*E39*, 1076; 2*E46*, 1081; 2*E76*, 1096; 2*E82*, 1101; 2*E105*, 1116; 2*R7*, 1388; 2*R37*, 1402; 2*R45*, 1409.

EGYPT.

British defensive measures in. 2*E52*, 1083.

Hostile preparations of Turkey against. 2*E35*, 1074; 2*E36*, 1075; 2*E44*, 1079; 2*E51*, 1083; 2*E66*, 1091; 2*E74*, 1095; 2*E85*, 1104; 2*E89*, 1106; 2*E90*, 1107; 2*E91*, 1108; 2*E92*, 1108; 2*E95*, 1110; 2*E96*, 1111; 2*E100*, 1113; 2*E104*, 1115; 2*E109*, 1118; 2*E115*, 1125; 2*E118*, 1127; 2*E125*, 1130; 2*E127*, 1139; 2*E129*, 1139; 2*E130*, 1140; 2*E132*, 1141; 2*E133*, 1141; 2*E136*, 1143; 2*E143*, 1149; 2*E149*, 1171; 2*E151*, 1172; 2*E152*, 1172; 2*E156*, 1174; 2*E163*, 1176; 2*E164*, 1177; 2*E166*, 1178; 2*E169*, 1180; 2*E172*, 1181; 2*E181*, 1185.

Plot against Suez Canal. 2*E125*, 1130; 2*E143*, 1149; 2*E181*, 1185.

Status of note to be altered if Turkey remains neutral. 2*E5*, 1058; 2*E118*, 1127; 2*E143*, 1149.

Turkish forces cross frontier. 2*B60*, 484; 2*E173*, 1181; 2*E176*, 1182.

ENGLAND. *See* GREAT BRITAIN.

FRANCE.

Condition for war. *E32*, 900.

Conversation between German Emperor and King of Belgium regarding war with, reported. *F6*, 554.

German conditions and offers to Great Britain respecting neutrality of. *E85*, 947; *E101*, 964; *E109*, 973; *E123*, 984.

———. Misunderstanding regarding. *E*,1026-1027; *G*,823.

Mediation proposals, attitude toward. *See* MEDIATION PROPOSALS.

Message from President to Parliament on war. *F158*, 709.

Military preparations and mobilisation. 2*B17*, 440; 2*B21*, 444; 2*B26*, 449; *E76*, 940; *E99*, 962; *E*, 1023; *F125*, 679; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G. Mem.*, 779; *G9*, 803; *G19*, 807; *G*, 820; *R74*, 1376. *See, also,* MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND MOBILISATION, France-Germany.

———. Zone maintained between troops and frontier. *E134*, 990; *E136*, 991; *E140*, 995; *F136*, 687; *F155*, 697.

Protest against violation of international law and conventions by Germany. *F157*, 707.

Speech of President of the Council on the war. *F159*, 711.

Summaries of events. *F20*, 566; *F50*, 602; *F55*, 606; *F61*, 612; *R53*, 1365.

FRANCE–AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

French attitude toward Austro-Serbian dispute. *See* AUSTRIA-SERBIA.

French attitude toward extension of time-limit in Austrian demands. *F25*, 576; *F31*, 584; *F48*, 597; *F75*, 624; *F139*, 689; *R15*, 1345.

French suggestions and attempts to moderate Austria. *F17*, 563; *F22*, 568; *F23*, 569; *F28*, 579; *F33*, 586; *F34*, 586; *F70*, 619; *F95*, 653; *R28*, 1351.

French view of Austrian demands on Serbia. *A4*, 10; *A11*, 23; *F28*, 579.

Participation of Austrian troops in Franco-German War. *A61*, 118; *A62*, 118; *A64*, 119.

Severance of diplomatic relations and declaration of war. *A63*, 118; *A65*, 120; 2*B31*, 454.

FRANCE-GERMANY.

Attitude of the French press. *F57*, 609; *F62*, 614; *F78*, 640.

Days of grace for vessels in port. *F147*, 693.

France protests against violation of Belgium and Luxemburg neutrality. *F149*, 695.

France protests against violation of international law and conventions. *F157*, 707.

France protests threatening attitude of Germany. *E126*, 986; *F83*, 644; *F114*, 671; *F120*, 675; *F121*, 677; *R19*, 1347; *R29*, 1352.

French allegation of German attempt to alienate France and Russia and disintegrate Triple Entente. *F56*, 607; *F57*, 609; *F62*, 614; *F78*, 640; *F114*, 671; *R29*, 1352; *R35*, 1355.

German allegation of hostile acts committed by France through Belgium. *B21*, 373; *F147*, 693; *F155*, 697.

German allegation of intention of France to invade Belgium. *B20*, 371; *B22*, 373; *B35*, 381; *B36*, 382; *2B119*, 527; *E157*, 1004; *F149*, 695.

German attempts to moderate Russia through France. *G11*, 804; *F56*, 607; *R28*, 1351.

German conditions and offers to Great Britain respecting French neutrality. *E85*, 947; *E101*, 964; *E109*, 973; *E123*, 984.

———. Misunderstanding regarding. *E*, 1026-1027; *G*, 823.

German policy towards France. *F2*, 540.

Germany's request for French attitude in Russo-German war. *F101*, 658; *F116*, 672; *F117*, 673; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G24*, 811; *G26*, 813.

Military preparations and mobilisation. *A45*, 107; *A48*, 110; *E98*, 961; *E134*, 990; *E136*, 991; *F101*, 658; *F106*, 663; *F127*, 681; *F133*, 686; *G*, 820; *R73*, 1375.

Reciprocal charges of violations of territory. *B21*, 373; *E134*, 990; *F139*, 689; *F146*, 693; *F147*, 693; *F148*, 694; *F149*, 695; *F155*, 697; *G. Mem.*, 780.

Rupture of diplomatic relations. *F149*, 695; *F150*, 695; *F155*, 697.

———. Discourtesies to French ambassador at Berlin. *F155*, 697.

War declared. *F157*, 707.

FRANCE-GREAT BRITAIN.

African colonies, neutrality of. *B57*, 399; *B58*, 400; *B59*, 401; *B61*, 402; *B62*, 402; *B63*, 404; *B74*, 410; *B75*, 410; *B76*, 411; *2B2*, 420; *2B39*, 458; *2B54*, 480; *2B58*, 483; *2B66*, 490; *2B67*, 491.

British request that France respect neutrality of Belgium. *B11*, 365; *B13*, 368; *E114*, 976; *E115*, 977; *F123*, 678; *R72*, 1375.

———. France agrees to respect Belgian neutrality. *B9*, 364; *B13*, 368; *B15*, 369; *E125*, 985; *F119*, 674; *F122*, 678; *R72*, 1375.

British support sought for France and Russia. *2B26*, 449; *E6*, 880; *E44*, 915; *E59*, 930; *E80*, 944; *E87*, 948; *E89*, 950; *E116*, 977; *E119*, 980; *E124*, 985; *F31*, 584; *F63*, 616; *F96*, 654; *F110*, 667; *F127*, 681; *R17*, 1346.

Coöperation of fleets. *E148*, 999; *F126*, 681; *F137*, 687; *F138*, 688; *F143*, 691; *F145*, 692; *G*, 826.

Exchange of notes in 1912 concerning coöperation in case of attack. *E105*, 966; *F159*, 711; *G*, 827.

German conditions and offers to Great Britain respecting French neutrality. *E85*, 947; *E101*, 964; *E109*, 973; *E123*, 984.

———. Misunderstanding regarding. *E*, 1026-1027; *G*, 822.

Letters exchanged between heads of Governments. *E*, 1029; *F110*, 667.

Moroccan dispute differentiated from Serbian dispute. *E87*, 948; *E116*, 977.

FRANCE-GREAT BRITAIN-RUSSIA. Declaration not to make separate peace. *F160*, 721.

Politico-military relations. *G*, 826.

GERMANY.

Announcement to confederated governments. *G2*, 799.

Army, reports on strengthening of. *F1*, 531; *F2*, 540.

Attitude of press and public over Austro-Serbian dispute. ²*B6*, 426; ²*B12*, 434; ²*B14*, 436; *F27*, 579; *F29*, 582; *F47*, 596; *R7*, 1338; *R46*, 1361; *S3*, 1442; *S4*, 1442; *S19*, 1452.

Emperor's conversation with King of Belgium regarding war with France. *F6*, 554.

Emperor's return to Berlin. *E33*, 901.

Mediation proposals, attitude toward. *See* MEDIATION PROPOSALS.

Military preparations and mobilisation. ²*B14*, 436; ²*B19*, 442; ²*B20*, 443; ²*B21*, 444; ²*B24*, 446; *E105*, 966; *E124*, 985; *E142*, 997; *F15*, 562; *F58*, 611; *F59*, 611; *F60*, 612; *F88*, 648; *F89*, 649; *F104*, 661; *F105*, 662; *F111*, 668; *F130*, 684; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G*, 822; *R61*, 1370; *R62*, 1370. *See, also*, MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND MOBILISATION, France-Germany and Germany-Russia.

Speech of Chancellor regarding neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg. *B35*, 381.

Summary of events. *G. Mem.*, 771.

GERMANY–AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Approval of Austrian demands in press and public in Germany. ²*B5*, 425; ²*B6*, 426; *E20*, 893; *F12*, 559; *F27*, 579; *F29*, 582; *F30*, 582; *F47*, 596; *G. Mem.*, 771; *R7*, 1338; *R46*, 1361; *S24*, 1456; *S25*, 1457; *S26*, 1458.

Foreknowledge of Germany of Austrian demands. ²*B4*, 424; ²*B8*, 428; *E6*, 880; *E18*, 891; *E25*, 896; *E95*, 959; *F15*, 562; *F21*, 567; *F30*, 582; *F35*, 587; *F36*, 588; *F41*, 592; *F57*, 609; *F62*, 614; *R18*, 1347; *R19*, 1347; *R20*, 1348.

Germany's good offices between Austria and Italy. ²*A15*, 147; ²*A42*, 171; ²*A43*, 171; ²*A77*, 193; ²*A103*, 216; ²*A143*, 267; ²*A174*, 302; ²*A176*, 304; *I2*, 1210; *I5*, 1214; *I8*, 1218; *I9*, 1220; *I11*, 1224; *I13*, 1230; *I15*, 1231; *I16*, 1233; *I17*, 1236; *I25*, 1251; *I26*, 1252; *I29*, 1258; *I31*, 1259; *I38*, 1268; *I39*, 1269; *I40*, 1270; *I46*, 1279.

Germany offers to guarantee fulfilment of Austria's agreement with Italy. ²*A125*, 247; ²*A128*, 249; *I48*, 1282; *I49*, 1283; *I53*, 1287.

Germany's support of Austria in negotiations with Italy. ²*A97*, 210; ²*A142*, 266; *I45*, 1276; *I46*, 1279; *I48*, 1282.

Joint action to secure Russian demobilisation. *A42*, 104; *A48*, 110; *A54*, 114; *A57*, 116; *G13*, 805. *See, also*, MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND MOBILISATIONS, Germany-Russia.

Moderation of Austria by Germany. *E34*, 902; *E71*, 936; *E108*, 972; *E121* 982; *E138*, 993; *F19*, 565; *F37*, 589; *F56*, 607; *F70*, 619; *F72*, 621; *F77*, 639; *F78*, 640; *F92*, 650; *F94*, 653; *F102*, 659; *F109*, 666; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G21*, 808; *G22*, 808; *G30*, 815; *R28*, 1351; *R43*, 1359.

Support of Austria by Germany. *A13*, 24; *A26*, 81; ²*B6*, 426; ²*B10*, 432; *E9*, 883; *E32*, 900; *E54*, 926; *E85*, 947; *F9*, 557; *F16*, 563; *F28*, 579; *F29*, 582; *F30*, 582; *F83*, 644; *F92*, 650; *F95*, 653; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G1*, 798; *G13*, 805; *G22*, 809; *R18*, 1347; *R19*, 1347. *See, also*, German efforts to localise dispute, German support of Austria's assurances concerning Serbian territory and sovereignty, attitude toward extension of time-limit, under AUSTRIA-SERBIA, and attitude toward mediation, under MEDIATION PROPOSALS.

GERMANY-RUSSIA.

Alleged efforts of Germany to cause attack by German ships on Russia in Black Sea. ²*B60*, 484; ²*E27*, 1070; ²*E41*, 1077; ²*E42*, 1078; ²*E76*, 1096; ²*E79*, 1099; ²*E82*, 1101; ²*E83*, 1102; ²*E84*, 1102; ²*E99*, 1112; ²*E119*, 1128; ²*E126*, 1138; ²*E167*, 1179; ²*E177*, 1183; ²*E178*, 1183; ²*E183*, 1191; ²*R58*, 1415; ²*R59*, 1415; ²*R83*, 1428; ²*R85*, 1428; ²*R90*, 1430; ²*R91*, 1430.

Anti-Russian attitude of German representative at Vienna. *E78*, 941; *E94*, 958; *E95*, 959; *F18*, 564.

Exchange of telegrams between sovereigns. *E*, 1029; *F102*, 659; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G22*, 808; *G22*, 809; *G22*, 810; *G22*, 811.

German attempts to moderate Russia. *E1*, 863; *E10*, 884; *E11*, 885; *E46*, 916; *E111*, 974; *F37*, 589; *F80*, 641; *G10*, 804; *G11*, 804; *G30*, 815; *F56*, 607; *R20*, 1348; *R28*, 1351; *R42*, 1359.

German attitude toward Russia's request for extension of time-limit in Austrian demands. *E11*, 885; *E18*, 891; *F41*, 592; *R14*, 1345.

German belief that Russia was unprepared for war. ²*B12*, 434; *E32*, 900; *E80*, 944; *F96*, 654.

German efforts to localise Austro-Serbian dispute. *A12*, 24; *A13*, 24; *A16*, 26; *A45*, 107; ²*B10*, 432; *E2*, 864; *E9*, 883; *E46*, 916; *E81*, 945; *F28*, 579; *F30*, 582; *F37*, 589; *F56*, 607; *F57*, 609; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G1*, 798; *G15*, 806; *G30*, 815; *R8*, 1338; *R18*, 1347.

German support of Austrian assurances to Russia regarding Serbian territory and sovereignty. *E33*, 901; *E75*, 939; *E84*, 946; *E97*, 960; *E100*, 963; *F56*, 607; *F57*, 609; *F94*, 653; *F103*, 660; *G10*, 804; *G11*, 804; *G16*, 806; *G22*, 809; *R28*, 1351; *R35*, 1355.

German support of direct negotiations between Austria and Russia. *E43*, 914; *E71*, 936; *E93*, 954; *F81*, 643; *F92*, 650; *F94*, 653; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G16*, 806; *G17*, 806; *G21*, 808; *G22*, 808; *G22*, 809; *R51*, 1364.

Military preparations and mobilisation. *A28*, 84; *A42*, 104; *A46*, 108; *A48*, 110; *E97*, 960; *E98*, 961; *E99*, 962; *E113*, 976; *E121*, 982; *E134*, 990; *E138*, 993; *E141*, 996; *F92*, 650; *F101*, 658; *F102*, 659; *F103*, 660; *F109*, 666; *F116*, 672; *F117*, 673; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G10*, 804; *G11*, 804; *G12*, 804; *G13*, 805; *G20*, 807; *G22*, 808; *G22*, 811; *G*, 821; *R58*, 1368; *R60*, 1369; *R64*, 1371; *R67*, 1373; *R68*, 1373.

Opening of hostilities. *A57*, 116; ²*B24*, 446; *G. Mem.*, 771.

Responsibility for the war. ²*B20*, 443; *E141*, 996; *G*, 835; *S51*, 1482.

Rumours of peace between. *I61*, 1298; *I70*, 1305.

Russia declines to localise dispute. *A15*, 26; *A16*, 26; ²*B7*, 428; *E6*, 880; *E7*, 882; *E56*, 928; *E94*, 958; *E95*, 959; *F18*, 564; *F52*, 605; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G4*, 802; *R10*, 1339.

Russia proposes reference to The Hague. *E*, 1029; *G22*, 810.

Ultimatum from Germany to Russia. *A54*, 114; *A57*, 116; ²*B19*, 442; *E138*, 993; *F116*, 672; *F120*, 675; *F121*, 677; *G24*, 811; *R70*, 1374.

War declared by Germany on Russia. *A57*, 116; *E117*, 978; *E144*, 997; *F134*, 686; *F135*, 686; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G25*, 812; *R76*, 1377.

GREAT BRITAIN.

Attitude of press toward Serbia. *S7*, 1444; *S27*, 1458.

Mediations proposed by. *See* MEDIATION PROPOSALS.

Military and naval preparations. *E47*, 917; *E48*, 918; *F66*, 617; *F108*, 665; *F145*, 692; *R65*, 1372.

GREAT BRITAIN–AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Austrian participation in Franco-German War. *A61*, 118; *A62*, 118; *A64*, 119.

British attitude toward localisation of Austro-Serbian dispute. *A41*, 103; *E5*, 879; *E24*, 895; *E25*, 896; *E48*, 918; *E87*, 948; *E91*, 953; *E116*, 977; *F19*, 565; *F36*, 588; *F66*, 617; *R20*, 1348.

British suggestions and attempts to moderate Austria. *E1*, 863; *E5*, 879; *E46*, 916; *E58*, 930; *E72*, 937; *E77*, 941; *E81*, 945; *E111*, 974; *F19*, 565; *F80*, 641; *G*, 821; *R42*, 1359.

British support of direct negotiations between Austria and Russia. *E3*, 864; *E69*, 935.

British support of Russian request for extension of time-limit. *A10*, 22; *E3*, 864; *E5*, 879; *E6*, 880; *E7*, 882; *E11*, 885; *E26*, 897; *F40*, 591; *F41*, 592; *R16*, 1346.

Conflict between, no reason for, unless France involved. *A58*, 116.

———. Not to take place without formal declaration. *A60*, 117.

Résumé of negotiations at Vienna. *E161*, 1012.

Rupture of diplomatic relations. *E161*, 1012.

War, Declaration of. *A65*, 120.

GREAT BRITAIN-FRANCE-RUSSIA. Declaration not to make separate peace. *F160*, 721.

Politico-military relations. *G*, 826.

GREAT BRITAIN-GERMANY.

Belgian neutrality, effect of respect for, upon British course. *B26*, 376; *B36*, 382; *2B29*, 451; *E101*, 964; *E109*, 973; *E119*, 980; *E123*, 984; *E148*, 999; *E160*, 1006; *E*, 1026-1027; *F110*, 667; *F126*, 681; *F137*, 687; *F144*, 692; *F145*, 692; *G*, 824.

British neutrality, German overtures for. *B36*, 382; *2B29*, 451; *E85*, 959; *E101*, 964; *E109*, 973; *E123*, 984; *E157*, 1004; *F144*, 692.

———. Misunderstanding regarding. *E*, 1026-1027; *G*, 823.

British neutrality presumed, effect of, upon probability of war, and British warnings. *2B14*, 436; *2B24*, 446; *E17*, 890; *E44*, 915; *E47*, 917; *E59*, 930; *E87*, 948; *E102*, 965; *E119*, 980; *F63*, 616; *F92*, 650; *F127*, 681; *R20*, 1348.

British request to Germany to respect Belgian neutrality. *B11*, 365; *B13*, 368; *B14*, 368; *E114*, 976; *E115*, 977; *F123*, 678; *R72*, 1375.

———. Germany's attitude toward British request. *B14*, 368; *E122*, 983; *F123*, 678; *R72*, 1375.

Conditions of British intervention. *E87*, 948; *E89*, 950; *F37*, 589; *F63*, 616; *F66*, 617; *F110*, 667; *R20*, 1348.

Detention of British vessels and cargoes. *E130*, 988; *E143*, 997; *E145*, 998; *E149*, 1000; *E150*, 1001; *E156*, 1004.

Exchange of telegrams between heads of government. *G*, 821; *E*, 1023.

Great Britain protests against violation of Belgian neutrality. *E153*, 1002.

Ultimatum from Great Britain to Germany. *A58*, 116; *B36*, 382; *B39*, 386; *E159*, 1005; *F153*, 697.

War, declaration of. *B41*, 387; *2B26*, 449.

———. Account of rupture of diplomatic relations. *E160*, 1006.

See British attitude toward Austro-Serbian dispute under AUSTRIA-SERBIA.

GREECE. Attitude toward Albania. *2A55*, 178; *2A56*, 179; *2A66*, 184; *2A67*, 185; *2A69*, 186.

Protests against sale of German war-ships to Turkey. *2R27*, 1396.

GREECE.—*Continued.*

Report that Turkey would war against. ²*B43*, 464.

Return of islands from, suggested by Turkey. ²*E24*, 1068.

HOLLAND.

Declaration of neutrality by. *B53*, 393.

Mobilisation of. ²*B23*, 446.

Regulations to maintain neutrality. *B53*, 393.

HOLLAND-BELGIUM. Closing of the Scheldt. *B29*, 378; *B50*, 392; *B54*, 398; *B55*, 399; *B56*, 399.

HOLLAND-GERMANY. Germany gives assurance of respect for Dutch neutrality. *B36*, 382; *E85*, 947; *E101*, 964; *E109*, 973; *E157*, 1004.

HOLLAND-GREAT BRITAIN. Defensive alliance proposed. *B37*, 383.

HOLY WAR. Attempts to incite. ²*E48*, 1082; ²*E100*, 1113; ²*E154*, 1173; ²*E155*, 1173; ²*E158*, 1174; ²*E160*, 1175; ²*E164*, 1177; ²*E165*, 1178; ²*E166*, 1178.

INDIA. Alleged seditious activities of Turkey in. ²*E44*, 1079; ²*E59*, 1085; ²*E150*. 1171.

Rumour of revolution in. ²*E75*, 1096.

ITALY.

Attitude toward Austro-Serbian dispute. ²*A9*, 142; ²*A20*, 153; *S28*, 1459. *See* AUSTRIA-SERBIA.

Attitude in case of European War. ²*A17*, 151; ²*A20*, 153; ²*A22*, 154; ²*A26*, 157; ²*A28*, 159.

Austro-Serbian war not within terms of Triple Alliance. ²*A22*, 154; ²*A28*, 159; *E29*, 898; *E152*, 1002; *F51*, 604; *F124*, 679; *F125*, 679; *S*. 1489.

Death of Marchese di San Giuliano. ²*A65*, 183.

Foreknowledge of Austrian demands on Serbia. ²*A12*, 144; *E38*, 903; *F26*, 578; *F35*, 587; *F51*, 604; *F56*, 607; *F72*, 621.

Justification of attitude toward Austria. *S*. 1488.

Mediation proposals, attitude toward. *See* MEDIATION PROPOSALS.

Military preparations. ²*A31*, 162; ²*A38*, 167; ²*A39*, 168; ²*A40*, 169; ²*A46*, 173; ²*A47*, 174; ²*A92*, 205; ²*A95*, 208; ²*A133*, 254; *I11*, 1224.

Moderation, attempted, of Austria. *E19*, 893; *E63*, 932; *F27*, 579; *F72*, 621; *F96*, 654.

Moderation, attempted, of Germany. *E106*, 971; *F71*, 620.

Neutrality in European War. ²*A27*, 159; ²*A37*, 166; ²*A46*, 173; ²*A49*, 175.

Political and parliamentary situation in. ²*A88*, 201; ²*A105*, 224; ²*A108*, 227; ²*A114*, 236; ²*A116*, 237; ²*A129*, 250; ²*A133*, 254; ²*A135*, 257; ²*A136*, 258; ²*A137*, 258; ²*A140*, 261; ²*A167*, 292; ²*A173*, 302; ²*A184*, 311; ²*A187*, 317; ²*A189*, 321; ²*A191*, 322; ²*A193*, 324; ²*A194*, 324; ²*A196*, 325; ²*A198*, 326; ²*A201*, 332.

Public opinion in. *F52*, 605.

ITALY-AUSTRIA.

Albania suggested by Austria as compensation to Italy. ²*A90*, 203; ²*A134*, 255; ²*A147*, 273; ²*A150*, 276; ²*A153*, 279; ²*A155*, 281; ²*A158*, 282; ²*A166*, 291; ²*A171*, 297; ²*A172*, 300; *I10*, 1221; *I11*, 1224; *I12*, 1226; *I71*, 1305; *I75*, 1312.

Austria agrees to discuss cession of its territory. ²*A115*, 236; *I39*, 1269; *I40*, 1270; *I41*, 1270.

Austria agrees to transfer ceded territories provided they are not occupied by the military. ²*A192*, 323; ²*A195*, 325; ²*A202*, 333; ²*A203*, 333.

ITALY-AUSTRIA.—*Continued.*

Austria declines to agree to execution of agreement before conclusion of peace. 2*A117*, 237; 2*A118*, 240; 2*A122*, 244; 2*A123*, 245; 2*A124*, 245; 2*A127*, 248; 2*A128*, 249; 2*A148*, 275; 2*A158*, 282; 2*A169*, 294; 2*A171*, 297; 2*A172*, 300; 2*A174*, 302; 2*A192*, 323; 2*A195*, 325; 2*A202*, 333; 2*A203*, 333; *I43*, 1273; *I45*, 1276; *I46*, 1279.

Austria submits draft of treaty embodying further concessions. 2*A177*, 305; 2*A178*, 306; 2*A179*, 307; 2*A181*, 309; 2*A185*, 311; 2*A188*, 318; 2*A190*, 322; 2*A194*, 324; 2*A199*, 329.

Austrian offer of additional territory. Third offer. 2*A169*, 294; *I75*, 1312.

Austrian refusal of Italian demands and enlargement of first offer of territory. 2*A144*, 268; 2*A146*, 272; *I71*, 1305.

Austrian territory offered to Italy. First offer. 2*A131*, 252; 2*A134*, 255; *I56*, 1291; *I60*, 1296.

Austria's agreement to Italy's interpretation. 2*A20*, 153; 2*A24*, 155; 2*A26*, 157; 2*A44*, 172; 2*A45*, 173; 2*A48*, 174; *I7*, 1217.

Austria's contemplated war on Serbia in 1913. *S*. 1489.

Austria's efforts to obtain Italy's support. 2*A1*, 127; 2*A7*, 140; 2*A11*, 143; 2*A21*, 153; 2*A23*, 155; 2*A24*, 155; 2*A25*, 156; 2*A30*, 160.

Balkan interests and policies discussed. 2*A2*, 128; 2*A16*, 149; 2*A17*, 151; 2*A30*, 160; 2*A99*, 214; *I12*, 1226.

Correspondence in 1909 and 1911 regarding. 2*A*, 336-345.

Compensation to Italy discussed. 2*A15*, 147; 2*A16*, 149; 2*A18*, 151; 2*A19*, 152; 2*A20*, 153; 2*A78*, 194; 2*A79*, 197; *I1*, 1209; *I3*, 1211; *I4*, 1213; *I6*, 1214; *I8*, 1218; *I10*, 1221; *I12*, 1226; *I14*, 1230; *I16*, 1233; *I21*, 1241; *I22*, 1245.

Correspondence in 1909 concerning interpretation of Triple Alliance in connexion with annexation of Sandjak of Novibazar. 2*A*, 336.

Correspondence in 1911 concerning interpretation of Triple Alliance in connexion with Italy's war against Turkey. 2*A*, 337-345.

Counter-claim of Austria to compensation. 2*A104*, 217; 2*A106*, 224; 2*A118*, 240; 2*A125*, 247; *I20*, 1237; *I21*, 1241; *I23*, 1249; *I35*, 1266; *I43*, 1273; *I44*, 1275; *I45*, 1276.

Counter-proposals requested from Italy. 2*A138*, 260; 2*A139*, 261; *I62*, 1298.

Danger of war and responsibility therefor. 2*A175*, 304; 2*A180*, 308; 2*A181*, 309; 2*A182*, 309; 2*A183*, 310.

Discussions of specific Italian demands. 2*A147*, 273; 2*A149*, 275; 2*A150*, 276; 2*A151*, 278; 2*A171*, 297; 2*A172*, 300; 2*A174*, 302.

Germany's good offices between Austria and Italy. 2*A15*, 147; 2*A42*, 171; 2*A43*, 171; 2*A77*, 193; 2*A103*, 216; 2*A143*, 267; 2*A174*, 302; 2*A176*, 304; *I2*, 1210; *I5*, 1214; *I8*, 1218; *I9*, 1220; *I11*, 1224; *I13*, 1230; *I15*, 1231; *I16*, 1233; *I17*, 1236; *I25*, 1251; *I26*, 1252; *I29*, 1258; *I31*, 1259; *I38*, 1268; *I39*, 1269; *I40*, 1270; *I46*, 1279.

Germany offers to guarantee fulfilment of Austria's agreement with Italy. 2*A125*, 247; 2*A128*, 249; *I48*, 1282; *I49*, 1283; *I53*, 1287.

Germany's support of Austria in negotiations with Italy. 2*A97*, 210; 2*A142*, 266; *I45*, 1276; *I46*, 1279; *I48*, 1282.

Guarantees offered by Austria for carrying out agreement after the war. 2*A119*, 242; 2*A121*, 243; 2*A125*, 247; 2*A128*, 249; 2*A148*, 275; 2*A158*, 282; 2*A169*, 294; 2*A172*, 300; 2*A174*, 302; *I49*, 1283; *I53*, 1287; *I71*, 1305; *I74*, 1311.

Initiative in negotiations withdrawn by Italy and assumed by Austria. 2*A106*, 224; 2*A124*, 245; 2*A127*, 248; 2*A130*, 251; *I22*, 1245; *I48*, 1282; *I52*, 1287; *I53*, 1287.

ITALY-AUSTRIA.—*Continued.*

Interpretation of Article VII of the Triple Alliance discussed. 2*A2*, 128; 2*A9*, 142; 2*A13*, 144; 2*A16*, 149; 2*A35*, 163; 2*A36*, 165.

Islands in the Ægean suggested by Austria as Italy's compensation. 2*A76*, 192.

Italy breaks off negotiations. Abrogation of Triple Alliance. 2*A170*, 294; 2*A200*, 329; *I76*, 1316; *I77*, 1318.

Italy's conditions for negotiations for cession of Austrian territory, including immediate execution of agreement. 2*A117*, 237; 2*A118*, 240; 2*A121*, 243; 2*A124*, 245; 2*A127*, 248; 2*A128*, 249; 2*A153*, 279; 2*A158*, 282; 2*A169*, 294; 2*A171*, 297; 2*A172*, 300; 2*A174*, 302; 2*A192*, 323; 2*A195*, 325; 2*A202*, 333; 2*A203*, 333; *I35*, 1266; *I42*, 1271; *I44*, 1275; *I47*, 1281; *I48*, 1282; *I50*, 1284; *I51*, 1285; *I52*, 1287; *I53*, 1287; *I54*, 1289; *I71*, 1305; *I75*, 1312.

Italy's demand for cession of Austrian territory and Austrian attitude towards. 2*A33*, 163; 2*A41*, 170; 2*A76*, 192; 2*A90*, 203; 2*A91*, 204; 2*A92*, 205; 2*A94*, 206; 2*A95*, 208; 2*A99*, 214; 2*A111*, 232; *I10*, 1221; *I11*, 1224; *I12*, 1226; *I15*, 1231; *I16*, 1233; *I17*, 1236; *I18*, 1236; *I19*, 1237; *I20*, 1237; *I25*, 1251; *I28*, 1256; *I32*, 1260; *I33*, 1262; *I34*, 1263; *I35*, 1266.

Italy's demand for written agreement concerning compensation before Austria proceeds against any Balkan state. 2*A74*, 188; 2*A75*, 190; 2*A109*, 228; 2*A111*, 232; 2*A113*, 234; *I16*, 1233; *I23*, 1249; *I24*, 1250; *I26*, 1252; *I27*, 1253; *I28*, 1256; *I31*, 1259; *I32*, 1260; *I33*, 1262; *I34*, 1263; *I35*, 1266.

Italy rejects Austrian offer. 2*A132*, 253; *I58*, 1293; *I60*, 1296.

Italy's rejection of second Austrian offer and Austrian observations thereon. 2*A152*, 279; 2*A153*, 279; 2*A154*, 280; 2*A158*, 282; 2*A164*, 289; 2*A166*, 291; *I72*, 1309; *I73*, 1310.

Italy's territorial demands upon Austria. 2*A141*, 263; *I64*, 1299; *I65*, 1303; *I67*, 1304; *I69*, 1304.

Military preparations and mobilisation. 2*A31*, 162; 2*A39*, 168.

Montenegro. Austria's efforts to secure neutrality of, through Italy. 2*A1*, 127; 2*A32*, 162; 2*A34*, 163.

———. Italy regards Austrian action against as violation of Triple Alliance. *I36*, 1267; *I59*, 1295; *I63*, 1299.

Press, attitude of. 2*A107*, 227.

Secrecy of negotiations. 2*A110*, 231; 2*A112*, 234; *I39*, 1269; *I41*, 1270.

Special mission to Italy proposed by Austria. 2*A157*, 282; 2*A159*, 286; 2*A161*, 287; 2*A163*, 289; 2*A165*, 290.

Summary of negotiations. *I*, 1322.

Two foregoing Austrian proposals received unfavourably by Italy. 2*A197*, 326; 2*A203*, 333.

War declared by Italy. 2*A204*, 334; 2*A205*, 335; *I*, 1322.

ITALY-ENTENTE POWERS. (France and Great Britain) negotiations between. 2*A58*, 180; 2*A63*, 182; 2*A133*, 254; 2*A134*, 255; 2*A156*, 281; 2*A160*, 287; 2*A162*, 288; 2*A168*, 292; 2*A175*, 304; 2*A186*, 316; *I58*, 1293.

ITALY-GERMANY.

Germany's good offices between Austria and Italy. 2*A15*, 147; 2*A42*, 171; 2*A43*, 171; 2*A77*, 193; 2*A103*, 216; 2*A143*, 267; 2*A174*, 302; 2*A176*, 304; *I2*, 1210; *I5*, 1214; *I8*, 1218; *I9*, 1220; *I11*, 1224; *I13*, 1230; *I15*, 1231; *I16*, 1233; *I17*, 1236; *I25*, 1251; *I26*, 1252; *I29*, 1258; *I31*, 1259; *I38*, 1268; *I39*, 1269; *I40*, 1270; *I46*, 1279.

ITALY-GERMANY.—*Continued.*

Germany offers to guarantee fulfilment of Austria's agreement with Italy. ²*A125*, 247; ²*A128*, 249; *I48*, 1282; *I49*, 1283; *I53*, 1287.

Germany's support of Austria in negotiations with Italy. ²*A97*, 210; ²*A142*, 266; *I45*, 1276; *I46*, 1279; *I48*, 1282.

JAPAN–AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. Severance of diplomatic relations. *A69*, 123.

JAPAN-GERMANY.

Severance of diplomatic relations. *A36*, 99; *A66*, 120; *A68*, 122.

Ultimatum from Japan to Germany. *G29*, 814.

LOCALISATION OF AUSTRO-SERBIAN DISPUTE.

Austrian efforts. *A9*, 21; *A10*, 22; *A11*, 23; *A14*, 24; *A21*, 75; *A26*, 81; *A32*, 87; *A44*, 106; *A47*, 108; *A48*, 110; *E5*, 879; *E48*, 918; *E118*, 979.

British attitude. *A41*, 103; *E5*, 879; *E24*, 895; *E25*, 896; *E48*, 918; *E87*, 948; *E91*, 953; *E116*, 977; *F19*, 565; *F36*, 588; *F66*, 617; *R20*, 1348.

German efforts. *A12*, 24; *A13*, 24; *A16*, 26; *A45*, 107; ²*B10*, 432; *E2*, 864; *E9*, 883; *E46*, 916; *E81*, 945; *F28*, 579; *F30*, 582; *F37*, 589; *F56*, 607; *F57*, 609; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G1*, 798; *G15*, 806; *G30*, 815; *R8*, 1338; *R18*, 1347; *S36*, 1401.

Russia declines to localise dispute. *A15*, 26; *A16*, 26; ²*B7*, 428; *E6*, 880; *E7*, 882; *E56*, 928; *E94*, 958; *E95*, 959; *F18*, 564; *F52*, 605; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G4*, 802; *R10*, 1339.

LUXEMBURG-BELGIUM. Departure of Belgian Minister. *B66*, 405; ²*B41*, 459.

LUXEMBURG-FRANCE. France agrees to respect Luxemburg's neutrality. *F128*, 683; *F129*, 684.

———. Departure of French Minister. *F156*, 703.

———. France protests to Germany against violation of Luxemburg's neutrality. *F149*, 695.

LUXEMBURG-GERMANY.

British attitude toward violation of neutrality. *E148*, 999; *F137*, 687.

Departure of Belgian Minister. *B66*, 405; ²*B41*, 459.

Departure of French Minister. *F156*, 703.

France protests against violation of Luxemburg. *F149*, 695.

German troops enter Luxemburg. *B18*, 370; ²*B22*, 445; *E129*, 987; *E146*, 998; *E147*, 998; *F131*, 684; *F132*, 685; *F133*, 686.

Germany urged to respect neutrality. *F111*, 668.

Speech of German Chancellor concerning. *B35*, 381.

LUXEMBURG-GREAT BRITAIN. British attitude toward violation of neutrality. *E148*, 999; *F137*, 687.

MEDIATION PROPOSALS.

British proposal that Serbian reply be considered by Austria as basis for discussion. *A38*, 99; *A41*, 103; *A43*, 105; *A44*, 106; *E27*, 898; *E34*, 902; *E46*, 916; *E58*, 930; *E63*, 932; *E76*, 940; *E86*, 948; *F92*, 650; *R55*, 1366.

———. Austrian attitude. *A29*, 85; *A39*, 101; *A44*, 106; *E61*, 931; *E62*, 931; *E75*, 939; *F83*, 644; *G. Mem.*, 771.

———. German attitude. *E34*, 902; *F83*, 644; *F92*, 650; *G. Mem.*, 771.

British proposal for mediation by France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy. *B6*, 363; *E10*, 884; *E11*, 885; *E24*, 895; *E25*, 896; *E37*, 903; *E111*, 974; *F32*, 585; *F34*, 586; *F36*, 588; *F41*, 592; *F69*, 619; *F71*, 620; *G*, 821; *G30*, 815; *R22*, 1349.

MEDIATION PROPOSALS.—*Continued.*

———. Austrian attitude. *A. Intro.*, 3; *E61*, 931; *E62*, 931; *F83*, 644; *G18*, 807; *R73*, 1375.

———. French attitude. *E42*, 913; *E51*, 922; *E52*, 924; *F34*, 586; *F70*, 619; *F76*, 638; *F79*, 641; *F81*, 643; *R28*, 1351; *R39*, 1357; *R55*, 1366.

———. German attitude. *E18*, 891; *E25*, 896; *E46*, 916; *E84*, 946; *E94*, 958; *E121*, 982; *F67*, 618; *F77*, 639; *G14*, 805; *G15*, 806; *R34*, 1354; *R39*, 1357.

———. Italian attitude. *2B6*, 426; *E35*, 902; *F71*, 620; *F97*, 656.

———. Russian attitude. *2B17*, 440; *E78*, 941; *F85*, 646; *F86*, 647; *R48*, 1362.

British proposal for conference of four powers at London, and suspension of military operations. *E36*, 902; *E42*, 913; *E67*, 934; *F68*, 618.

———. Austrian attitude. *A38*, 99; *A41*, 103; *E62*, 931; *G. Mem.*, 771.

———. French attitude. *E40*, 912; *E42*, 913; *E51*, 922; *E52*, 924; *F61*, 612.

———. German attitude. *A35*, 98; *E43*, 914; *E67*, 934; *E71*, 936; *E84*, 946; *E121*, 982; *F73*, 622; *F74*, 622; *F78*, 640; *F81*, 643; *F92*, 650; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G17*, 806.

———. Italian attitude and suggestions. *E35*, 902; *E49*, 920; *E57*, 929; *E64*, 933; *E78*, 941; *E80*, 944; *E92*, 953; *E106*, 971; *F71*, 620; *F84*, 645.

———. Russian attitude. *2B17*, 440; *E40*, 912; *E53*, 925; *E55*, 927; *E78*, 941; *E93*, 954; *F68*, 618; *F91*, 650; *R69*, 1374.

British-Russian proposal for submission to mediating powers of Serbia's satisfaction to Austria after occupation of Belgrade. *E76*, 940; *E88*, 949; *E103*, 965; *E104*, 966; *E111*, 974; *E131*, 988; *E135*, 991; *E*, 1023; *G*, 821; *R71*, 1375.

———. Austrian attitude. *A. Intro.*, 3; *A51*, 112; *E131*, 988; *E135*, 991; *F93*, 652; *F107*, 664; *F112*, 669.

———. German attitude. *E98*, 961; *E100*, 963; *E112*, 975; *E121*, 982; *E*, 1023; *G*, 821.

———. Russian attitude and modifications. *E88*, 949; *E97*, 960; *E99*, 962; *E120*, 981; *E132*, 989; *E139*, 994; *F103*, 660; *F113*, 670; *R60*, 1369; *R64*, 1371; *R67*, 1373.

Germany asked for formula of mediation. *E60*, 931; *E68*, 935; *E80*, 944; *E84*, 946; *E88*, 949; *E92*, 953; *E100*, 963; *E107*, 972; *E111*, 974; *F74*, 622; *F81*, 643; *F98*, 656; *F108*, 665; *R54*, 1366.

Powers agree to accept any mediation proposals made by Austria and Germany which will preserve peace. *E78*, 941; *E84*, 946; *E111*, 974; *F86*, 647; *R64*, 1371.

Russian proposal for simultaneous direct negotiations and discussions by the four powers. *A56*, 115; *E133*, 989; *F103*, 660; *R49*, 1362; *R63*, 1371.

Russian proposal for reference to The Hague. *G22*, 810.

Suspension of mediation proposals pending direct negotiations between Austria and Russia. *E53*, 925; *E55*, 927; *E67*, 934; *E68*, 935; *F80*, 641; *F104*, 661; *R31*, 1353; *R32*, 1353.

———. Renewal of mediation proposals. *E78*, 941; *E93*, 954; *E106*, 971; *F91*, 650; *F97*, 656; *R50*, 1363.

MESOPOTAMIA. Military activities of Turkey in. *2E115*, 1125; *2E129*, 1139; *2E133*, 1141; *2E135*, 1142; *2E148*, 1171; *2E151*, 1172.

MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND MOBILISATIONS.

Austria. *2B17*, 440; *2B19*, 442; *2B20*, 443; *E127*, 986; *F11*, 558; *F18*, 564; *F90*, 649; *F115*, 672; *R24*, 1349; *R30*, 1352; *R44*, 1360; *R47*, 1361.

MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND MOBILISATIONS.—*Continued.*

Austria-Russia. *A28*, 84; *A48*, 110; *A49*, 110; *A50*, 111; *A53*, 114; ²*A21*, 153; *E24*, 895; *E25*, 896; *E44*, 915; *E57*, 929; *E59*, 930; *E93*, 954; *E96*, 960; *E113*, 976; *E118*, 979; *E126*, 986; *E134*, 990; *F91*, 650; *F95*, 653; *F96*, 654; *F100*, 658; *F101*, 658; *F103*, 660; *F104*, 661; *F109*, 666; *F118*, 674; *G6*, 802; *G20*, 807; *G22*, 808; *G22*, 811; *G*, 821; *R51*, 1364; *R60*, 1369; *R67*, 1373.

Belgium. *B2*, 356; *B3*, 357; *B8*, 364; *B10*, 365; *B11*, 365; *B16*, 369; *B17*, 370; *B42*, 387; *B43*, 388; *B44*, 389; *F87*, 648.

France. ²*B17*, 440; ²*B21*, 444; ²*B26*, 449; *E76*, 940; *E*, 976; *E99*, 962; *E111*, 974; *F125*, 679; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G9*, 803; *G19*, 807; *G*, 820; *R74*, 1376.

France-Germany. *A45*, 107; *A48*, 110; ²*B18*, 441; *E98*, 961; *E134*, 990; *E136*, 991; *E111*, 974; *F101*, 658; *F106*, 663; *F127*, 681; *F133*, 686; *G*, 820-821; *R73*, 1375.

Germany. ²*B14*, 436; ²*B19*, 442; ²*B20*, 443; ²*B21*, 444; ²*B24*, 446; *E105*, 966; *E124*, 985; *E142*, 997; *F15*, 562; *F58*, 611; *F59*, 611; *F60*, 612; *F88*, 648; *F89*, 649; *F104*, 661; *F105*, 662; *F111*, 668; *F130*, 684; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G*, 823; *R61*, 1370; *R62*, 1370.

Germany-Russia. *A28*, 84; *A42*, 104; *A46*, 108; *A48*, 110; *E97*, 960; *E98*, 961; *E99*, 962; *E113*, 976; *E121*, 982; *E134*, 990; *E138*, 993; *E141*, 996; *E111*, 974; *F92*, 650; *F101*, 658; *F102*, 659; *F103*, 660; *F109*, 666; *F116*, 672; *F117*, 673; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G10*, 804; *G11*, 804; *G12*, 804; *G13*, 805; *G20*, 807; *G22*, 808; *G22*, 811; *G*, 821; *R58*, 1368; *R60*, 1369; *R64*, 1371; *R67*, 1373; *R68*, 1373.

Great Britain. ²*B29*, 451; *E47*, 917; *E48*, 918; *F66*, 617; *F108*, 665; *F145*, 692; *R65*, 1372.

Holland. ²*B23*, 446.

Italy. ²*A31*, 162; ²*A38*, 167; ²*A39*, 168; ²*A40*, 169; ²*A46*, 173; ²*A47*, 174; ²*A92*, 205; ²*A95*, 208; ²*A133*, 254; *I11*, 1224.

Italy-Austria. ²*A31*, 162; ²*A39*, 168.

Russia. *A. Intro.*, 3; *A33*, 87; *A47*, 108; *A52*, 113; *A55*, 114; ²*B17*, 440; ²*B20*, 443; *E6*, 880; *E17*, 890; *E70*, 936; *E71*, 936; *E76*, 940; *E78*, 941; *E84*, 946; *E86*, 948; *E94*, 958; *E95*, 959; *E97*, 960; *E99*, 962; *E135*, 991; *E111*, 974; *F67*, 618; *F117*, 673; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G7*, 803; *G8*, 803; *G*, 820; *G21*, 808; *G30*, 815.

Serbia. *A22*, 76; *A23*, 76; *A29*, 85; *A39*, 101; *A40*, 101; *A44*, 106; *B5*, 362; *S41*, 1477.

MONTENEGRO. Austria's efforts to secure neutrality of, through Italy. ²*A1*, 127; ²*A32*, 162; ²*A34*, 163.

———. Italy regards Austrian action against as violation of Triple Alliance. *I36*, 1267; *I59*, 1295; *I63*, 1299.

MOROCCAN DISPUTE. Difference between Serbian dispute and. *E87*, 948; *E116*, 977.

NARODNA ODBRANA, Serbian Society. Objects and activities of. *A19*, 29; ²*A6*, 140; *S16*, 1449.

NETHERLANDS. *See* HOLLAND.

NORWAY. Will remain neutral. ²*B26*, 449.

NORWAY-GREAT BRITAIN. Defensive alliance proposed. *B37*, 383.

PERSIA. Alleged seditious activities of Turkey in. ²*E59*, 1085; ²*E121*, 1128.

RUSSIA.

Attitude of Russian press. ²*B17*, 440; *F64*, 616.

Mediation, attitude toward. *See* MEDIATION PROPOSALS.

RUSSIA.—*Continued.*

Military preparations and mobilisation. *A. Intro.*, 3; *A33*, 87; *A47*, 108; *A52*, 113; *A55*, 114; ²*B17*, 440; ²*B20*, 443; *E6*, 880; *E17*, 890; *E70*, 936; *E71*, 936; *E76*, 940; *E78*, 941; *E84*, 946; *E86*, 948; *E94*, 958; *E95*, 959; *E97*, 960; *E99*, 962; *E135*, 991; *E111*, 974; *F67*, 618; *F117*, 673; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G7*, 803; *G8*, 803; *G21*, 808; *G*, 820.

Political situation in. *G*, 835.

Summary of events. *R77*, 1378.

See attitude of Russia under other headings.

RUSSIA–AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Austrian assurances concerning Serbian territory and sovereignty. *A. Intro.*, 3; *A18*, 28; *A26*, 81; *A27*, 83; *A31*, 86; *A32*, 87; *A47*, 108; *E18*, 891; *E33*, 901; *E44*, 915; *E48*, 918; *E55*, 927; *E56*, 928; *E57*, 929; *E59*, 930; *E62*, 931; *E75*, 939; *E79*, 943; *E84*, 946; *E91*, 953; *E97*, 960; *E99*, 962; *E120*, 981; *E137*, 992; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G3*, 801; *G5*, 802; *R75*, 1376.

———. German support of Austrian assurances. *E33*, 901; *E75*, 939; *E84*, 946; *E97*, 960; *E100*, 963; *F56*, 607; *F57*, 609; *F94*, 653; *F103*, 660; *G10*, 804; *G11*, 804; *G16*, 806; *G22*, 809; *R28*, 1351; *R35*, 1355.

———. Russia's attitude toward Austrian assurances. *A55*, 114; *E72*, 937; *E79*, 943; *E141*, 996; *F10*, 558; *F85*, 646; *R75*, 1376.

Balkan interests and policies. *A. Intro.*, 3; *A26*, 81; *A31*, 86; *A47*, 108; *A49*, 110; *A50*, 111; *A55*, 114; *E17*, 890; *E44*, 915; *E90*, 951; *E91*, 953; *E97*, 960; *E139*, 994; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G3*, 801.

Direct negotiations between. *A31*, 86; *A47*, 108; *A53*, 114; ²*B16*, 439; *E44*, 915; *E56*, 928; *E70*, 936; *E120*, 981; *E139*, 994; *F55*, 606; *R41*, 1358; *R66*, 1372.

———. Conflict of, with mediation proposals. *E53*, 925; *E55*, 927; *E67*, 934; *E68*, 935; *F80*, 641; *F104*, 661; *R31*, 1353; *R32*, 1353.

———. Declined by Austria. *A40*, 101; *E74*, 939; *E84*, 946; *E93*, 954; *F82*, 644; *F83*, 644; *F91*, 650; *F93*, 652; *R45*, 1360; *R50*, 1363.

———. Proposed by Russia. *E45*, 916; *F54*, 606; *R25*, 1350; *R26*, 1351.

———. Resumed. *A49*, 110; *A50*, 111; *A55*, 114; *A56*, 115; ²*B15*, 438; *E96*, 960; *E110*, 974; *E133*, 989; *E137*, 992; *F104*, 661; *F120*, 675; *F121*, 677.

———. Support by Germany. *E43*, 914; *E71*, 936; *E93*, 954; *F81*, 643; *F92*, 650; *F94*, 653; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G16*, 806; *G17*, 806; *G21*, 808; *G22*, 808; *G22*, 809; *R51*, 1364.

———. Support by Great Britain. *E3*, 864; *E69*, 935.

Localisation of Austro-Serbian dispute.

Austrian efforts. *A9*, 21; *A10*, 22; *A11*, 23; *A14*, 24; *A21*, 75; *A26*, 81; *A32*, 87; *A44*, 106; *A47*, 108; *A48*, 110; *E5*, 879; *E48*, 918; *E118*, 979.

British attitude toward Austro-Serbian dispute. *A41*, 103; *E5*, 879; *E24*, 895; *E25*, 896; *E48*, 918; *E87*, 948; *E91*, 953; *E116*, 977; *F19*, 565; *F36*, 588; *F66*, 617; *R20*, 1348.

German efforts. *A12*, 24; *A13*, 24; *A16*, 26; *A45*, 107; ²*B10*, 432; *E2*, 864; *E9*, 883; *E46*, 916; *E81*, 945; *F28*, 579; *F30*, 582; *F37*, 589; *F56*, 607; *F57*, 609; *G. Mem.*, 771; *G1*, 798; *G15*, 806; *G30*, 815; *R8*, 1338; *R18*, 1347.

Russia declines to localise dispute. *A15*, 26; *A16*, 26; ²*B7*, 428; *E6*, 880; *E7*, 882; *E56*, 928; *E94*, 958; *E95*, 959; *F18*, 564; *F52*, 605; *G4*, 802; *G. Mem.*, 771; *R10*, 1339.

Mediation between. *See* MEDIATION PROPOSALS.

Military preparations and mobilisation. *A28*, 84; *A48*, 110; *A49*, 110; *A50*, 111; *A53*, 114; ²*A21*, 153; *E24*, 895; *E25*, 896; *E44*, 915; *E57*, 929;

RUSSIA–AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.—*Continued.*

E59, 930; *E93*, 954; *E96*, 960; *E113*, 976; *E118*, 979; *E126*, 986; *E134*, 990; *E111*, 974; *F91*, 650; *F95*, 653; *F96*, 654; *F100*, 658; *F101*, 658; *F103*, 660; *F104*, 661; *F109*, 666; *F118*, 674; *G6*, 802; *G20*, 807; *G22*, 808; *G22*, 811; *G*, 821; *R51*, 1364; *R60*, 1369; *R67*, 1373.

Moderation, attempts.

Austrian attempts to moderate Russia. *A44*, 106. *See* Austrian assurances regarding Serbian territory and sovereignty.

Russian attempts to moderate Austria. ²*B17*, 440; *E54*, 926; *F55*, 481; *G21*, 808; *G22*, 811; *R23*, 1349; *R43*, 1359.

Proposal by Russia for simultaneous discussion by Powers with. *A56*, 115; *E133*, 989; *F103*, 660; *R49*, 1362; *R63*, 1371.

Rumours of peace between. ²*A145*, 272; *I57*, 1293; *I66*, 1303; *I68*, 1304; *I70*, 1305.

Russia alleges Austria resolved to war on Serbia. *A14*, 24; *E40*, 912; *E44*, 915.

Russia not expected to go to war by Austria. *E22*, 900; *E71*, 936; *F96*, 654.

Russia protests against demands on Serbia. *A14*, 24; *E7*, 882.

Time-limit in Austrian demands. Russian request for extension of. *A20*, 75; *A21*, 75; *E13*, 887; *E40*, 912; *F38*, 590; *F42*, 593; *F43*, 593; *F45*, 595; *R4*, 1335; *R5*, 1336; *R11*, 1340.

———. Austrian attitude. *A. Intro.*, 3; *A9*, 21; *A20*, 75; *A21*, 75; *E7*, 882; *R12*, 1340.

———. British attitude. *A10*, 22; *E3*, 864; *E5*, 879; *E6*, 880; *E7*, 882; *E11*, 885; *E26*, 897; *F40*, 591; *F41*, 592; *R16*, 1346.

———. French attitude. *F25*, 576; *F31*, 584; *F48*, 597; *F75*, 624; *F139*, 689; *R15*, 1345.

———. German attitude. *E11*, 885; *E18*, 891; *F41*, 592; *R14*, 1345.

———. Italian attitude. *F44*, 594.

War declared by Austria. *A59*, 117; *R79*, 1381.

RUSSIA-FRANCE.

French support of Russia. *F31*, 584; *F56*, 607; *F57*, 609; *F101*, 658; *F114*, 671; *R55*, 1366.

French support of Russian request for extension of time-limit. *F25*, 576; *F31*, 584; *F48*, 597; *F75*, 624; *F139*, 689; *R15*, 1345.

German attempts to moderate Russia through France. *F56*, 607; *G11*, 804; *R28*, 1351.

See French attitude toward dispute under AUSTRIA-SERBIA.

RUSSIA-FRANCE-GREAT BRITAIN. Declaration not to make separate peace. *F160*, 721.

Politico-military relations. *G*, 826.

RUSSIA-GREAT BRITAIN.

British support sought for Russia and France. *E6*, 880; *E44*, 915; *E59*, 930; *E80*, 944; *E87*, 948; *E89*, 950; *E116*, 977; *E119*, 980; *E124*, 985; *F31*, 584; *F63*, 616; *F96*, 654; *F110*, 667; *F127*, 681; *G30*, 815; *R17*, 1346.

Exchange of telegrams between sovereigns. *E*, 1020.

Moderation of Russia by Great Britain. ²*B17*, 440; *E1*, 863; *E10*, 884; *E11*, 885; *E46*, 916; *E111*, 974; *E*, 974; *F37*, 589; *F80*, 641; *G10*, 804; *R20*, 1348; *R42*, 1359.

Naval agreement between. *G*, 826-835.

See British attitude toward dispute under AUSTRIA-SERBIA.

SALONICA RAILWAY. Reported designs of Austria on. *E19*, 893; *E82*, 945.

SCHELDT, Closing of the. Correspondence between Belgium and Holland. *B29*, 378; *B50*, 392; *B54*, 398; *B55*, 399; *B56*, 399.

SERAJEVO INVESTIGATIONS. Results of. *A7*, 14; *A19*, 29; *E4*, 866; *G. Mem.*, 771.

SERBIA.

Appeal to the Powers. *E17*, 890; *F68*, 618; *R19*, 1347; *S34*, 1469; *S38*, 1471.

Declaration of 1909 concerning relations with Austria. *A. Intro.*, 3; *A7*, 14; *A16*, 26; *E17*, 890.

Mediation proposals. *See* MEDIATION PROPOSALS.

Military preparations and mobilisation. *A22*, 76; *A23*, 76; *A29*, 85; *A39*, 101; *A40*, 101; *A44*, 106; *B5*, 362.

Note to all countries setting forth its case. *S30*, 1459.

Summary of events. *R59*, 1369.

Threats against Serbian Crown Prince from Austrians. *S18*, 1452.

View as to cause of assassination. *S13*, 1448.

See headings under other countries.

SERBIA-FRANCE.

French advice to Serbia. *A13*, 24; *E15*, 889; *E16*, 889; *F26*, 578; *F34*, 586; *S10*, 1446; *S13*, 1448.

French opinion of Austrian demands and Serbian compliance. *A4*, 10; *A11*, 23; *F28*, 579.

See French attitude toward dispute under AUSTRIA-SERBIA.

SERBIA-GERMANY.

Severance of diplomatic relations. *S49*, 1481; *S50*, 1481.

SERBIA-GREAT BRITAIN.

Appeal by Serbia to Great Britain for intervention. *E8*, 882; *E83*, 945; *F53*, 605; *F69*, 619; *S35*, 1469.

British advice to Serbia. *E12*, 886; *E22*, 894; *E30*, 899; *E65*, 934.

See British attitude toward dispute under AUSTRIA-SERBIA.

SERBIA-RUSSIA.

Appeal by Serbia to Russia for assistance. *F99*, 657; *R11*, 1340; *R40*, 1357; *R56*, 1367; *R57*, 1368; *S37*, 1471; *S47*, 1480; *S48*, 1481.

Russia not indifferent to Serbian dispute with Austria. *A16*, 26; *2B7*, 428; *E7*, 882; *E94*, 958; *E95*, 959; *R10*, 1339.

Russian advice to Serbia. *E22*, 894; *E46*, 916; *E56*, 928; *E94*, 958; *R40*, 1357; *R42*, 1359; *R56*, 1367; *R57*, 1368.

Russian support of Serbia. *A. Intro.*, 3; *A26*, 81; *E17*, 890; *E55*, 927; *E56*, 928; *E95*, 959; *F18*, 564; *F52*, 605; *R33*, 1354; *R40*, 1357; *R56*, 1367; *R57*, 1368; *S43*, 1478; *S44*, 1479.

See, also, Russian attitude toward dispute under RUSSIA-AUSTRIA.

SUMMARIES of events.

Austria. *A. Intro.*, 3.

Belgium. *B38*, 384.

France. *F20*, 566; *F50*, 602; *F55*, 606; *F61*, 612; *R53*, 1365.

Germany. *G. Mem.*, 771.

Russia. *R77*, 1378.

Serbia. *R59*, 1369.

Suez Canal. Defensive measures. *2E52*, 1083.

Plot against. *2E125*, 1130; *2E143*, 1149; *2E181*, 1185. *See* EGYPT.

Sweden. Will remain neutral. *2B26*, 449.

Thrace. Turkey suggests return of. *2E24*, 1068; *2E91*, 1108.

TIME-LIMIT IN AUSTRIAN DEMANDS, Russian request for extension of. *A20*, 75; *A21*, 75; *E13*, 887; *E40*, 912; *F38*, 590; *F42*, 593; *F43*, 593; *F45*, 595; *R4*, 1335; *R5*, 1336; *R11*, 1340.

———. Austrian attitude. *A. Intro.*, 3; *A9*, 21; *A20*, 75; *A21*, 75; *E7*, 882; *R12*, 1340.

———. British attitude. *A10*, 22; *E3*, 864; *E5*, 879; *E6*, 880; *E7*, 882; *E11*, 885; *E26*, 897; *F40*, 591; *F41*, 592; *R16*, 1346.

———. French attitude. *F25*, 576; *F31*, 584; *F48*, 597; *F75*, 624; *F139* 689; *R15*, 1345.

———. German attitude. *E11*, 885; *E18*, 891; *F41*, 592; *R14*, 1345.

———. Italian attitude. *F44*, 594.

TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

Abrogated by Italy. 2*A170*, 294.

Austria denies Italy's right to abrogate. 2*A200*, 329.

Austria regards Italy's demand for territory as violation of. 2*A95*, 208; 2*A99*, 214.

Interpretation of. 2*A2*, 128; 2*A9*, 142; 2*A13*, 144; 2*A16*, 149; 2*A20*, 153; 2*A24*, 155; 2*A26*, 157; 2*A35*, 163; 2*A36*, 165; 2*A44*, 172; 2*A45*, 173; 2*A48*, 174; *I2*, 1210.

Italy does not regard Austria's war as coming within terms of. 2*A22*, 154; 2*A28*, 159; *E29*, 898; *E152*, 1002; *F51*, 604; *F124*, 679; *F125*, 679.

Italy regards action by Austria against Balkan state without previous agreement as violation of. 2*A106*, 224; *I35*, 1266; *I36*, 1267; *I63*, 1299.

Negotiations in 1909 concerning interpretation of. 2*A*, 336.

Negotiations in 1911 concerning interpretation of. 2*A*, 337-345.

Text of articles of. 2*A*, 335; *I4*, 346; *I5*, 346; *I6*, 346.

TRIPLE ENTENTE.

Alleged attempts of Germany to disintegrate. *F56*, 607; *F57*, 609; *F62*, 614; *F78*, 640; *F114*, 671; *R29*, 1352; *R35*, 1355.

Declaration not to make separate peace. *F160*, 721.

Politico-military relations of. *G*, 826.

TURKEY.

Abolishment of capitulations. 2*E24*, 1068; 2*E28*, 1071; 2*E69*, 1093; 2*E70*, 1093; 2*E71*, 1094; 2*E73*, 1095; 2*E76*, 1096; 2*E77*, 1097; 2*E144*, 1157; 2*R30*, 1397; 2*R31*, 1398; 2*R33*, 1399; 2*R34*, 1400; 2*R35*, 1401; 2*R41*, 1404; 2*R42*, 1404; 2*R43*, 1405; 2*R44*, 1408; 2*R48*, 1410; 2*R51*, 1411; 2*R54*, 1413; 2*R55*, 1413; 2*R56*, 1414; 2*R60*, 1416; 2*R61*, 1416; 2*R62*, 1417; 2*R63*, 1417; 2*R65*, 1418; 2*R74*, 1422; 2*R77*, 1425; 2*R78*, 1425; 2*R80*, 1426; 2*R81*, 1427; 2*R84*, 1428.

Abolishment of post offices. 2*E86*, 1104; 2*E93*, 1109; 2*E140*, 1144; 2*R64*, 1418; 2*R72*, 1422; 2*R73*, 1422.

Dardanelles, Detention of merchant vessels in. 2*E12*, 1061; 2*E23*, 1067; 2*E26*, 1070; 2*E28*, 1071; 2*E29*, 1071; 2*E32*, 1073; 2*E33*, 1074; 2*E38*, 1075; 2*E62*, 1086; 2*E63*, 1087; 2*E78*, 1098; 2*R34*, 1400; 2*R35*, 1401.

———. Closing of the. 2*E97*, 1111; 2*E98*, 1112; 2*E99*, 1112; 2*E102*, 1114; 2*E105*, 1116; 2*E107*, 1117; 2*E108*, 1118; 2*R67*, 1419; 2*R68*, 1420; 2*R69*, 1420; 2*R70*, 1421; 2*R71*, 1421.

———. Fortification of. 2*E12*, 1061; 2*E19*, 1065; 2*E25*, 1069; 2*E27*, 1070; 2*E37*, 1075; 2*E39*, 1076; 2*E46*, 1081; 2*E76*, 1096; 2*E82*, 1101; 2*E105*, 1116; 2*R7*, 1388; 2*R37*, 1402; 2*R45*, 1409.

Holy war, alleged attempt to incite. 2*E48*, 1082; 2*E100*, 1113; 2*E154*, 1173; 2*E155*, 1173; 2*E158*, 1174; 2*E160*, 1175; 2*E164*, 1177; 2*E165*, 1178; 2*E166*, 1178.

TURKEY.—*Continued.*

Military preparations and mobilisation. 2*B43*, 464; 2*E3*, 1058; 2*E39*, 1076; 2*E44*, 1079; 2*E82*, 1101; 2*E97*, 1111; 2*E104*, 1115; 2*E109*, 1118; 2*E115*, 1125; 2*E118*, 1127; 2*E129*, 1139; 2*E133*, 1141; 2*E135*, 1142; 2*E139*, 1144; 2*E143*, 1149; 2*E148*, 1171; 2*E149*, 1171; 2*E151*, 1172; 2*E168*, 1179; 2*E175*, 1182; 2*R3*, 1386; 2*R5*, 1387; 2*R80*, 1426.

Neutrality regulations. 2*E144*, 1157; 2*E145*, 1159.

Political conditions in. 2*B60*, 484; 2*E12*, 1061; 2*E23*, 1067; 2*E27*, 1070; 2*E36*, 1075; 2*E42*, 1078; 2*E61*, 1086; 2*E68*, 1092; 2*E76*, 1096; 2*E82*, 1101; 2*E83*, 1102; 2*E84*, 1102; 2*E88*, 1105; 2*E94*, 1109; 2*E108*, 1117; 2*E120*, 1128; 2*E134*, 1142; 2*E153*, 1173; 2*E176*, 1182; 2*E185*, 1193; 2*E186*, 1205; 2*R21*, 1394; 2*R29*, 1397; 2*R38*, 1402; 2*R44*, 1408; 2*R76*, 1424; 2*R88*, 1429; 2*R94*, 1431; 2*R98*, 1434.

Press, attitude of. 2*E147*, 1167; 2*R53*, 1412.

Public opinion in. *F65*, 617.

Wireless telegraph regulations, protest against. 2*E171*, 1181; 2*R24*, 1395.

See, also, references to documents under EGYPT.

TURKEY-AUSTRIA.

Efforts of Austria to involve Turkey in European war, alleged. 2*E170*, 1180; 2*R1*, 1385; 2*R59*, 1415; 2*R66*, 1419; 2*R75*, 1423; 2*R83*, 1428; 2*R86*, 1429.

TURKEY-BELGIUM.

Rupture of diplomatic relations. 2*B62*, 487; 2*B63*, 488; 2*B64*, 488; 2*B65*, 489.

Status of relations between. 2*B60*, 484; 2*B61*, 487.

TURKEY-ENTENTE POWERS.

Alleged violations of neutrality by Germany. 2*E144*, 1157; 2*E145*, 1159.

Alleged violations of neutrality by Turkey. 2*E20*, 1065; 2*E43*, 1079; 2*E64*, 1089; 2*E88*, 1105; 2*E94*, 1109; 2*E101*, 1113; 2*E109*, 1118; 2*E143*, 1149; 2*R22*, 1394.

Alleged violations of Turkish neutrality by Great Britain. 2*E80*, 1100; 2*E81*, 1100; 2*E97*, 1111; 2*E101*, 1113; 2*E103*, 1114; 2*E106*, 1116; 2*E109*, 1118; 2*E110*, 1119; 2*E111*, 1120; 2*E113*, 1124; 2*E117*, 1126; 2*E120*, 1128; 2*E121*, 1128; 2*E122*, 1129; 2*E123*, 1129; 2*E137*, 1143; 2*E146*, 1166; 2*E159*, 1175; 2*R67*, 1419; 2*R68*, 1420; 2*R70*, 1421.

Conditions submitted by Turkey to Entente Powers. 2*E24*, 1068; 2*E28*, 1071; 2*E91*, 1108; 2*E116*, 1126; 2*R30*, 1397; 2*R31*, 1398; 2*R32*, 1399; 2*R34*, 1400; 2*R35*, 1401.

Independence and integrity of Turkey assured in return for neutrality. 2*E17*, 1064; 2*E20*, 1065; 2*E21*, 1066; 2*E27*, 1070; 2*E28*, 1071; 2*E54*, 1084; 2*E57*, 1085; 2*E64*, 1089; 2*R34*, 1400; 2*R35*, 1401.

Severance of diplomatic relations. 2*E179*, 1184; 2*E180*, 1184; 2*E182*, 1189; 2*E183*, 1191; 2*E184*, 1193; 2*R91*, 1430; 2*R92*, 1431; 2*R93*, 1431; 2*R94*, 1431; 2*R95*, 1432; 2*R96*, 1432; 2*R97*, 1433.

Summary of events at Constantinople. 2*E185*, 1193; 2*E186*, 1205; 2*R98*, 1434.

Turkish assurances of neutrality. 2*E3*, 1058; 2*E14*, 1062; 2*E18*, 1064; 2*E42*, 1078; 2*E49*, 1082; 2*E50*, 1083; 2*E112*, 1020; 2*E164*, 1177; 2*R2*, 1385; 2*R7*, 1388; 2*R9*, 1389; 2*R13*, 1390; 2*R25*, 1395; 2*R79*, 1425.

TURKEY-GERMANY.

Efforts of Germany to involve Turkey in European war. 2*B43*, 464; 2*B53*, 479; 2*B59*, 484; 2*B60*, 484; 2*E18*, 1064; 2*E22*, 1067; 2*E24*, 1068; 2*E27*, 1070; 2*E36*, 1075; 2*E39*, 1076; 2*E41*, 1077; 2*E42*, 1078; 2*E43*, 1079; 2*E45*, 1080; 2*E48*, 1082; 2*E75*, 1096; 2*E76*, 1096; 2*E79*, 1099; 2*E82*, 1101; 2*E83*, 1102; 2*E84*, 1102; 2*E90*, 1107; 2*E91*, 1108; 2*E99*, 1112;

TURKEY-GERMANY.—*Continued.*

2E108, 1117; *2E114*, 1125; *2E115*, 1125; *2E119*, 1128; *2E120*, 1128; *2E124*, 1130; *2E126*, 1138; *2E127*, 1139; *2E128*, 1139; *2E129*, 1139; *2E130*, 1140; *2E157*, 1174; *2E164*, 1177; *2E167*, 1179; *2E177*, 1183; *2E178*, 1183; *2E183*, 1191; *2R6*, 1387; *2R39*, 1402; *2R46*, 1409; *2R47*, 1410; *2R58*, 1415; *2R59*, 1415; *2R83*, 1428; *2R85*, 1428; *2R86*, 1429; *2R87*, 1429; *2R88*, 1429; *2R89*, 1429; *2R90*, 1430; *2R91*, 1430.

German military and naval officers and supplies in Turkey. *2B60*, 484; *2E3*, 1058; *2E25*, 1069; *2E31*, 1073; *2E39*, 1076; *2E40*, 1077; *2E41*, 1077; *2E43*, 1079; *2E46*, 1081; *2E47*, 1081; *2E64*, 1089; *2E72*, 1094; *2E74*, 1095; *2E82*, 1101; *2E84*, 1102; *2E104*, 1115; *2E115*, 1125; *2E131*, 1141; *2E138*, 1143; *2E161*, 1176; *2E162*, 1176; *2E182*, 1189; *2E183*, 1191; *2E184*, 1193; *2R4*, 1386; *2R6*, 1387; *2R8*, 1388; *2R30*, 1397; *2R35*, 1401; *2R36*, 1401; *2R37*, 1402; *2R39*, 1402; *2R45*, 1409; *2R82*, 1427; *2R90*, 1430.

German ships *Goeben* and *Breslau*.

Alleged efforts of Germany to cause attack by German ships on Russia in Black Sea. *2B60*, 484; *2E27*, 1070; *2E41*, 1077; *2E42*, 1078; *2E76*, 1096; *2E79*, 1099; *2E82*, 1101; *2E83*, 1102; *2E84*, 1102; *2E99*, 1112; *2E119*, 1128; *2E126*, 1138; *2E167*, 1179; *2E177*, 1183; *2E178*, 1183; *2E183*, 1191; *2R58*, 1415; *2R59*, 1415; *2R83*, 1428; *2R85*, 1428; *2R90*, 1430; *2R91*, 1430.

British and Russian demands that crews be returned to Germany. *2E11*, 1061; *2E16*, 1063; *2E18*, 1064; *2E20*, 1065; *2E21*, 1066; *2E28*, 1071; *2E29*, 1071; *2E30*, 1072; *2E32*, 1073; *2E38*, 1075; *2E42*, 1078; *2E48*, 1082; *2E49*, 1082; *2E50*, 1083; *2E54*, 1084; *2E56*, 1085; *2E102*, 1114; *2E107*, 1117; *2E112*, 1120; *2E141*, 1146; *2E174*, 1181; *2E184*, 1193; *2R22*, 1394; *2R26*, 1396; *2R28*, 1397; *2R34*, 1400; *2R35*, 1401; *2R36*, 1401; *2R40*, 1403; *2R79*, 1425.

British attitude toward German ships and Turkish vessels with German crews in case they enter the Mediterranean Sea. *2E53*, 1084; *2E55*, 1084; *2E56*, 1085; *2E58*, 1085; *2E60*, 1060; *2E64*, 1089; *2E65*, 1090; *2E97*, 1111; *2E174*, 1181; *2R67*, 1419; *2R68*, 1420; *2R70*, 1421.

Departure demanded. *2R15*, 1391; *2R19*, 1393.

Hostile acts committed by, against British and French ships at Constantinople. *2E10*, 1061; *2E13*, 1062; *2E20*, 1065; *2E62*, 1086; *2E63*, 1087; *2R20*, 1393.

Passage through Dardanelles protested by Great Britain and Russia. *2E7*, 1059; *2E8*, 1060; *2R11*, 1389; *2R12*, 1390.

Purchase of by Turkey. *2E9*, 1060; *2E15*, 1063; *2E18*, 1064; *2E65*, 1090; *2R17*, 1392; *2R18*, 1392; *2R22*, 1394; *2R23*, 1395; *2R27*, 1396.

———. Protested by Greece. *2R27*, 1396.

———. Protested by Russia. *2R18*, 1392; *2R22*, 1394.

Russian attitude toward German ships in case they enter the Black Sea. *2R14*, 1391; *2R36*, 1401; *2R49*, 1411; *2R50*, 1411; *2R57*, 1414; *2R58*, 1415.

Violations of Turkish neutrality by Germany, alleged. *2E144*, 1157; *2E145*, 1159.

TURKEY-GREAT BRITAIN.

British naval mission in Turkey. *2E11*, 1061; *2E16*, 1063; *2E18*, 1064; *2E67*, 1091; *2E68*, 1092; *2E112*, 1120; *2R52*, 1412.

Detention of British ships at Constantinople. *2E12*, 1061; *2E23*, 1067; *2E26*, 1070; *2E28*, 1071; *2E29*, 1071; *2E32*, 1073; *2E33*, 1074; *2E38*, 1075; *2E62*, 1086; *2E63*, 1087; *2E78*, 1098; *2R34*, 1400; *2R35*, 1401.

Egypt, status of, not to be altered if Turkey remains neutral. *2E5*, 1058; *2E118*, 1127; *2E143*, 1149.

TURKEY-GREAT BRITAIN.—*Continued.*

Plot against the Suez Canal. 2*E125*, 1130; 2*E143*, 1149; 2*E181*, 1185.

Requisition of Turkish ships by Great Britain. 2*E1*, 1057; 2*E2*, 1057; 2*E4*, 1058; 2*E6*, 1059; 2*E9*, 1060; 2*E20*, 1065; 2*E24*, 1068; 2*E34*, 1074; 2*E64*, 1089; 2*E87*, 1105; 2*E112*, 1120; 2*R10*, 1389; 2*R22*, 1394; 2*R79*, 1425.

Seditious activities of Turkey in Afghanistan. 2*E59*, 1085; 2*E100*, 1113; 2*E129*, 1139.

In Baluchistan. 2*E100*, 1113.

In India. 2*E44*, 1079; 2*E59*, 1085; 2*E150*, 1171.

In Persia. 2*E59*, 1085; 2*E121*, 1128.

Seditious activities and military preparations of Turkey against Egypt. 2*E35*, 1074; 2*E36*, 1075; 2*E44*, 1079; 2*E51*, 1083; 2*E66*, 1091; 2*E74*, 1095; 2*E85*, 1104; 2*E89*, 1106; 2*E90*, 1107; 2*E91*, 1108; 2*E92*, 1108; 2*E95*, 1110; 2*E96*, 1111; 2*E100*, 1113; 2*E104*, 1115; 2*E109*, 1118; 2*E115*, 1125; 2*E118*, 1127; 2*E125*, 1130; 2*E127*, 1139; 2*E129*, 1139; 2*E130*, 1140; 2*E132*, 1141; 2*E133*, 1141; 2*E136*, 1143; 2*E143*, 1149; 2*E149*, 1171; 2*E151*, 1172; 2*E152*, 1172; 2*E156*, 1174; 2*E163*, 1176; 2*E164*, 1177; 2*E166*, 1178; 2*E169*, 1180; 2*E172*, 1181; 2*E181*, 1185.

Severance of diplomatic relations. 2*E180*, 1184; 2*E182*, 1189; 2*E183*, 1191; 2*E184*, 1193.

Summary of events at Constantinople and report of rupture of diplomatic relations. 2*E185*, 1193; 2*E186*, 1205.

Turkish troops cross the Egyptian frontier. 2*B60*, 484; 2*E173*, 1181; 2*E176*, 1182.

Ultimatum from Great Britain to Turkey. 2*E179*, 1184.

Violations of Turkish neutrality by Great Britain, alleged. 2*E80*, 1100; 2*E81*, 1100; 2*E97*, 1111; 2*E101*, 1113; 2*E103*, 1114; 2*E106*, 1116; 2*E109* 1118; 2*E110*, 1119; 2*E111*, 1120; 2*E113*, 1124; 2*E117*, 1126; 2*E120*, 1128; 2*E121*, 1128; 2*E122*, 1129; 2*E123*, 1129; 2*E137*, 1143; 2*E146*, 1166; 2*E159*, 1175; 2*R67*, 1419; 2*R68*, 1420; 2*R70*, 1421.

For references to documents concerning the sale and subsequent activities of the German war-ships sold to Turkey, *see heading* TURKEY-GERMANY.

For references to documents concerning the German military and naval aid to Turkey, *see heading* TURKEY-GERMANY.

TURKEY-RUSSIA.

Hostilities between. 2*B60*, 484; 2*E114*, 1125; 2*E177*, 1183; 2*E178*, 1183; 2*E183*, 1191; 2*R90*, 1430; 2*R91*, 1430.

Severance of diplomatic relations. 2*R91*, 1430; 2*R92*, 1431; 2*R93*, 1431; 2*R94*, 1431; 2*R95*, 1432; 2*R96*, 1432; 2*R97*, 1433.

Summary of events at Constantinople. 2*R98*, 1434.

Turko-Italian war. Austrian attitude in, discussed. 2*A13*, 144; 2*A16*, 149; 2*A74*, 188; 2*A75*, 190; 2*A78*, 194; 2*A79*, 197.

———. Correspondence between Italy and Austria regarding interpretation of Triple Alliance during the. 2*A*, 337-345.

For references to documents concerning the German military and naval officers and supplies in Turkey and the sale of German war-ships to Turkey, *see heading* TURKEY-GERMANY.

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